Richard Jeffrey, Michael Hendrickson; XIV*—Probabilizing Pathology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 211–226, htt.

Richard Jeffrey, Michael Hendrickson; XIV*—Probabilizing Pathology, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 211–226, htt.

Reasons transmit. If one has a reason to attain an end, then one has a reason to effect means for that end: reasons are transmitted from end to means. I argue that the likelihood ratio (LR) is a compelling measure of reason transmission from ends to means. The LR measure is superior to other measures, can be used to construct a condition specifying precisely when reasons transmit, and satisfies intuitions regarding end-means reason transmission in a broad array of cases.

The probabilization of a logic system consists of enriching the language (the formulas) and the semantics (the models) with probabilistic features. Such an operation is said to be exogenous if the enrichment is done on top, without internal changes to the structure, and is called endogenous otherwise. These two different enrichments can be applied simultaneously to the language and semantics of a same logic. We address the problem of studying the transference of metaproperties, such as completeness and decidability, to the (...) exogenous probabilization of an abstract logic system. First, we setup the necessary framework to handle the probabilization of a satisfaction system by proving transference results within a more general context. In this setup, we define a combination mechanism of logics through morphisms and prove sufficient condition to guarantee completeness and decidability. Then, we demonstrate that probabilization is a special case of this exogenous combination method, and that it fulfills the general conditions to obtain transference of completeness and decidability. Finally, we motivate the applicability of our technique by analyzing the probabilization of the linear temporal logic over Markov chains, which constitutes an endogenous probabilization. The results are obtained first by studying the exogenous semantics, and then by establishing an equivalence with the original probabilization given by Markov chains. (shrink)

We establish a probabilized version of modus tollens, deriving from p(E|H)=a and p()=b the best possible bounds on p(). In particular, we show that p() 1 as a, b 1, and also as a, b 0. Introduction Probabilities of conditionals Conditional probabilities 3.1 Adams' thesis 3.2 Modus ponens for conditional probabilities 3.3 Modus tollens for conditional probabilities.

Medical diagnosis has been traditionally recognized as a privileged field of application for so called probabilistic induction. Consequently, the Bayesian theorem, which mathematically formalizes this form of inference, has been seen as the most adequate tool for quantifying the uncertainty surrounding the diagnosis by providing probabilities of different diagnostic hypotheses, given symptomatic or laboratory data. On the other side, it has also been remarked that differential diagnosis rather works by exclusion, e.g. by modus tollens, i.e. deductively. By drawing on a (...) case history, this paper aims at clarifying some points on the issue. Namely: 1) Medical diagnosis does not represent, strictly speaking, a form of induction, but a type, of what in Peircean terms should be called ‘abduction’ (identifying a case as the token of a specific type); 2) in performing the single diagnostic steps, however, different inferential methods are used for both inductive and deductive nature: modus tollens, hypothetical-deductive method, abduction; 3) Bayes’ theorem is a probabilized form of abduction which uses mathematics in order to justify the degree of confidence which can be entertained on a hypothesis given the available evidence; 4) although theoretically irreconcilable, in practice, both the hypothetical- deductive method and the Bayesian one, are used in the same diagnosis with no serious compromise for its correctness; 5) Medical diagnosis, especially differential diagnosis, also uses a kind of “probabilistic modus tollens”, in that, signs (symptoms or laboratory data) are taken as strong evidence for a given hypothesis not to be true: the focus is not on hypothesis confirmation, but instead on its refutation [Pr (¬ H/E1, E2, …, En)]. Especially at the beginning of a complicated case, odds are between the hypothesis that is potentially being excluded and a vague “other”. This procedure has the advantage of providing a clue of what evidence to look for and to eventually reduce the set of candidate hypotheses if conclusive negative evidence is found. 6) Bayes’ theorem in the hypothesis-confirmation form can more faithfully, although idealistically, represent the medical diagnosis when the diagnostic itinerary has come to a reduced set of plausible hypotheses after a process of progressive elimination of candidate hypotheses; 7) Bayes’ theorem is however indispensable in the case of litigation in order to assess doctor’s responsibility for medical error by taking into account the weight of the evidence at his disposal. (shrink)

Gentzen’s approach to deductive systems, and Carnap’s and Popper’s treatment of probability in logic were two fruitful ideas that appeared in logic of the mid-twentieth century. By combining these two concepts, the notion of sentence probability, and the deduction relation formalized in the sequent calculus, we introduce the notion of ’probabilized sequent’ \ with the intended meaning that “the probability of truthfulness of \ belongs to the interval [a, b]”. This method makes it possible to define a system of derivations (...) based on ’axioms’ of the form \, obtained as a result of empirical research, and then infer conclusions of the form \. We discuss the consistency, define the models, and prove the soundness and completeness for the defined probabilized sequent calculus. (shrink)

In this important new study Ian Hacking continues the enquiry into the origins and development of certain characteristic modes of contemporary thought undertaken in such previous works as his best selling Emergence of Probability. Professor Hacking shows how by the late nineteenth century it became possible to think of statistical patterns as explanatory in themselves, and to regard the world as not necessarily deterministic in character. Combining detailed scientific historical research with characteristic philosophic breath and verve, The Taming of Chance (...) brings out the relations among philosophy, the physical sciences, mathematics and the development of social institutions, and provides a unique and authoritative analysis of the "probabilization" of the Western world. (shrink)

Often our reason for doing something is an "instrumental reason": that doing that is a means to doing something else that we have reason to do. What principles govern this "instrumental transmission" of reasons from ends to means? Negatively, I argue against principles often invoked in the literature, which focus on necessary or sufficient means. Positively, I propose a principle, "General Transmission," which answers to two intuitive desiderata: that reason transmits to means that are "probabilizing" and "nonsuperfluous" with respect to (...) the relevant end. I then apply General Transmission to the debate over "detachment": whether "wide-scope" reason for a material conditional or disjunction implies "narrow-scope" reason for the consequent or disjuncts. (shrink)

Accounts of big data practices often assume that they target individuals. Personalization, with all the risks of discrimination and bias it entails, has been the critical focus in accounts of consumption, government, social media, and health. This paper argues that personalization through models using large-scale data is part of a more expansive change in probabilization that, in principle, is not reducible to individual or ‘personal’ attributes and actions. It describes the ‘personalization’ of an online grocery shopping recommender system to list (...) a small number of grocery items of personal relevance for each of the millions of online grocery shoppers at a major UK supermarket chain. Drawing on a theory of probability proposed by the philosopher of science Karl Popper and anthropological work on shopping, it suggests that the attempt to generate personalized predictions necessarily incorporates impersonal relations to others and things. Using a mixture of discourse analysis and code-based reconstruction of key elements of the recommender system, it suggests that personalization is one facet of an open-ended weave of propensities associated with people and things in contemporary big data configurations. The paper explores how, in the context of recommender systems, the constitutive incompleteness of shopping lists, their propensity to expand or change, might be more important than their capacity to be personalized. (shrink)

One cannot understand the literary form of a dialogue without understanding its philosophical project and vice versa. This dissertation seeks to establish how Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues work as dialogues. Each of these works, Contra Academicos, De beata vita and De ordine, pursues two streams of inquiry: one dialectical, one self-reflexive. The first uses aporetic debates to identify problems with individuals' current beliefs. The second reflects on the act of debate as an instance of rational activity and through this draws attention (...) to features of human rationality. The goal of all this is to change how the inquirer thinks about himself, to bring him to see some final theory as plausible ( probabile). We find all the elements of this method in earlier authors: aporia in Plato, self-reflection in Plotinus, plausible conclusions in Cicero. But in Augustine these are fused into a system, one which structures all seven of his dialogues. This study situates Augustine against this philosophical tradition and provides a fresh start for future work on his texts. Chapter 1 argues that standing scholarly debates have imposed an unhelpful set of concerns on the dialogues. Chapters 2 through 4 set out the basic literary and philosophical project of each dialogue. Chapter 5 argues that the three dialogues, taken as a set, are programmatic for a particular kind of philosophical undertaking, one which can be traced through Augustine's subsequent works. (shrink)

Nel febbraio 1912 Wittgenstein venne ammesso al Trinity College con Russell come supervisor, e iniziò a seguire le lezioni di Moore. E’ probabile che leggesse il libretto di Moore, Ethics, pubblicato al suo arrivo a Cambridge, o che ritrovasse nelle lezioni di Moore alcune delle suggestioni presenti nel libro. Ma dopo il Tractatus Wittgenstein dedicò poco spazio alle riflessioni sull’etica e quel poco in un periodo ristretto di tempo, agli inizi degli anni ‘30, dalla Conferenza sull’etica2 alle lezioni del (...) ’32-33. Alle lezioni del 32-33 assistettero sia Alice Ambrose che George E. Moore, che ci lascianpo diversi tipi di appunti:3 Ambrose riporta frasi di Wittgenstein, Moore presenta e rielabora le sue idee. Una lettura comparata di questi appunti dà un’idea abbastanza chiara di quanto Wittgenstein in quegli anni riuscisse a fondere le sue idee sui giudizi morali con le sue idee sulla grammatica filosofica che veniva elaborando nel Big Typescript. (shrink)

Introduzione Nel codice della sua Bibliotheca consacrato a recensire la produzione letteraria di Temistio, il patriarca Fozio testimonia di aver letto – oltre ad alcune opere filosofiche – un corpus di trentasei discorsi politici (λόγοι πολιτιϰοιλς), tra cui alcuni indirizzati a Costanzo, a Valente e Valentiniano II, a Teodosio, non tutti pervenuti. Ora, l'opera oratoria di Temistio, quale noi moderni leggiamo, comprende trentatrè orazioni, pubbliche e private, di cui due (o forse tre) incomplete. È molto probabile che gli altri (...) tre discorsi che Fozio ugualmente leggeva siano da identificare con orazioni perdute, di cui sopravvivono talune notizie: il discorso recitato nel 357 dinanzi al senato di Costantinopoli in occasione di un'ambasceria a Roma, il panegirico indirizzato nel 363 all'imperatore Giuliano per il suo quarto consolato e l'orazione sulla tolleranza religiosa indirizzata a Valente tra gli anni 375–376. Verrebbe, in questo modo, confermata la notizia della Bibliotheca circa l'esistenza di un corpus di complessivi trentasei discorsi ed in particolare rafforzata l'ipotesi, ventilata da taluni studiosi, secondo cui la silloge temistiana in nostro possesso corrisponderebbe in buona sostanza al ‘libro’ recensito da Fozio. (shrink)

Introduzione Nel codice della sua Bibliotheca consacrato a recensire la produzione letteraria di Temistio, il patriarca Fozio testimonia di aver letto – oltre ad alcune opere filosofiche – un corpus di trentasei discorsi politici (λόγοι πολιτιϰοιλς), tra cui alcuni indirizzati a Costanzo, a Valente e Valentiniano II, a Teodosio, non tutti pervenuti. Ora, l'opera oratoria di Temistio, quale noi moderni leggiamo, comprende trentatrè orazioni, pubbliche e private, di cui due (o forse tre) incomplete. È molto probabile che gli altri (...) tre discorsi che Fozio ugualmente leggeva siano da identificare con orazioni perdute, di cui sopravvivono talune notizie: il discorso recitato nel 357 dinanzi al senato di Costantinopoli in occasione di un'ambasceria a Roma, il panegirico indirizzato nel 363 all'imperatore Giuliano per il suo quarto consolato e l'orazione sulla tolleranza religiosa indirizzata a Valente tra gli anni 375–376. Verrebbe, in questo modo, confermata la notizia della Bibliotheca circa l'esistenza di un corpus di complessivi trentasei discorsi ed in particolare rafforzata l'ipotesi, ventilata da taluni studiosi, secondo cui la silloge temistiana in nostro possesso corrisponderebbe in buona sostanza al ‘libro’ recensito da Fozio. (shrink)

French theorists have recently proposed a theory which describes all literature in terms of the probable, the vraisemblable.6 This poetics of the probable commences with a purely relativistic claim. What is probable not only changes in accordance with the audience’s concept of reality but also changes in accordance with the needs of the story and with the narrative possibilities open to various genres. It includes all of the norms and models making a given text understandable to the reader, however outlandish (...) and eccentric it may be. Various levels of the vraisemblable are distinguished from each other, and the vraisemblable based upon models of the world or the world view prevalent in a given culture is scrupulously separated from types of the vraisemblable that are based upon literary, generic models. However, as Tzvetan Todorov gladly admits, “the two notions tend to melt into each other.”7 He and other theorists see the literary genre itself as one of the models “probabilizing” a given text, at times in direct contradiction with “natural” models of the world. Still others see the world, or the prevalent world view, as the universal text which probabilizes other texts.[…]Rather than how this new concept of the vraisemblable, of probability, fares in relation to farce in films, theater, and literature, I prefer to ask how farce fares in relation to it. I think that it doesn’t do well. Farce shows that it is a mistake to unify the possibilities for understanding a text and the possibilities for understanding its fictional world within a single integrated concept. It is a further mistake to term such a concept “probability.” When dealing with the fantastic or the marvelous, for instance, probabilizing the text and probabilizing the work’s fictional world may legitimately be unified under a single principle or concept. If we agree to change or suspend a fundamental belief about the world, we will be able to perceive as logical and probable not only the texts but also the fictional worlds of such works. Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief” excellently fits works that are written in these genres. Such works require that we temporarily forget a certain general belief about the world. After we’ve agreed, as a result of this suspension, to include certain elements in the world , we may then rebuild the fictional world while using the rest of our beliefs along with this new assumption. Farce’s incredibility creates a different situation. Before we have even begun to recover from an attack upon one probability principle, another is undermined. In farce the rules of probability are not neutralized in one specific realm of reality; their inversion operates constantly on all of reality’s realms. The image of a seemingly real world, reminding us of our own world and of our own set of probabilities, is all we need to be constantly astonished by farce’s persistently novel deviations from predictable probability. Here, in direct opposition to the marvelous, the new deviations must keep on coming from unexpected directions, because farce won’t allow its incredibilities to consolidate and become new rules of probability. The fictional world of overt farce lacks a specific factor, the one that would have probabilized all of the other factors of this world. Such an Archimedean center might seem to be located in the genre’s definition—this genre, however, does not probabilize the incredible. Farce’s definition does not make farce’s world more intelligible in any sense of that word. At the very most, farce allows us to forgo such intelligibility without transgressing the established boundaries of art.6. For an excellent presentation of their views, see Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature , pp. 131-60.7. Tzvetan Todorov, The Poetics of Prose, trans. Richard Howard , p. 83. See also his introduction to Communications 11 : 2. (shrink)

„Strategia noastră a fost de a gândi un text util pentru profesori, dar de a-l scrie mai ales pentru studenți. Etica este interesantă cu precădere atunci când pune în joc intuiții morale sau valori diferite și când ne confruntăm cu dileme în care decizia nu este evidentă, iar dezacordul este rezonabil. Prin urmare, am încercat să ne ferim pe cât a fost posibil de verdicte și de simpla enumerare a unor interdicții. Veți observa că, de cele mai multe ori, exercițiile (...) și temele de discuție nu au soluții impuse. Nu pentru că autorii manualului nu ar adera la anumite soluții (poate nu la aceleași!), ci pentru că ni s-a părut mult mai importantă conturarea problemelor. Dilemele și întrebările deschise generează dezbateri și prilejuiesc reflecție. Sentințele, pe de altă parte, tind să ucidă discuția și să prilejuiască mai curând reacții de îmbrățișare sau de respingere vehementă. Dacă vom ajunge, în comunitățile noastre profesionale și în societate, să vorbim mai mult unii cu alții și mai puțin unii la alții, vom fi făcut probabil un pas major în direcția corectă pentru dezvoltarea unei atitudini morale.” (Autorii). (shrink)

Si tratta della fase successiva di una ricerca condotta dall'A. sulle quaestiones sul libro III della Fisica contenuto in un gruppo di otto commenti di probabile origine inglese risalenti al periodo 1250-1270 e già pubblicata nella stessa rivista. Nel presente saggio l'A. prende in considerazione le questiones sul libro IV e si occupa principalmente del contesto dottrinale dei commenti e dei rapporti sussistenti tra essi. Nella seconda parte dello studio, che apparirà nel numero 9 del 1998 della stessa rivista, (...) saranno descritti i modi della trattazione degli argomenti affrontati da Aristotele nel libro IV quali il tempo, il vuoto e il luogo. In appendice viene pubblicata la lista delle quaestiones sul IV della Fisica che sono contenute nei commenti considerati e vengono raccolte in tre gruppi in base al tema affrontati tra quelli sopracitati. (shrink)

I distinguish two varieties of ancient skepticism on the basis of their competing attitudes towards reason. Pyrrhonian skeptics, according to Sextus Empiricus, not only doubt our ability to arrive at true beliefs, but also the value of doing so, whereas the Academics, as portrayed by Cicero, are committed to the view that true beliefs are as beneficial as they are difficult to acquire. Next, I examine Academic epistemology, focusing on one of Cicero's most important and problematic philosophical coinages---probabilitas . He (...) offers this term as the Academic's fallible criterion of judgment and as an alternative to the Stoic criterion which even more problematically guarantees certainty. The Academic, following Plato's Socrates, subjects his beliefs to close scrutiny in order to see whether they can survive refutation. By seeking out these 'dialectical survivors' the Academic seeks to eliminate the false beliefs from the set of beliefs that seem probabile. ;After discussing Academic epistemology, I examine some ethical implications of this view. The Stoics claim that no amount of non-moral goods can add to the eudaimonia of the sage, for he is in possession of the only genuine good, virtue. And virtue, for the Stoics is the healthy state of the psyche which results from deep, systematic knowledge. Here again, Cicero offers an Academic alternative. He maintains the Stoic's naturalistic ethical formula that a virtuous life is one lived in accordance with nature, but his interpretation reflects his epistemic modesty. To live in accordance with nature turns out to mean 'insofar as it is morally intelligible'. ;Finally, I argue for the plausibility of Cicero's claim to practice a method which originates with Socrates and after its revival in the third century BCE continuosly flourished to his own age . I conclude that Cicero's account of the Academy is both historically plausible and philosophically interesting; and thus Cicero should be taken seriously as a philosopher in his. own right and not merely as a doxographer. (shrink)

The history of statistics is filled with many controversies, in which the prime focus has been the difference in the “interpretation of probability” between Fre- quentist and Bayesian theories. Many philosophical arguments have been elabo- rated to examine the problems of both theories based on this dichotomized view of statistics, including the well-known stopping-rule problem and the catch-all hy- pothesis problem. However, there are also several “hybrid” approaches in theory, practice, and philosophical analysis. This poses many fundamental questions. This paper (...) reviews three cases and argues that the interpretation problem of probabil- ity is insufficient to begin a philosophical analysis of the current issues in the field of statistics. A novel viewpoint is proposed to examine the relationship between the stopping-rule problem and the catch-all hypothesis problem. (shrink)

The text and apparatus below are Diggle's. At the end of the article I give, for the sake of the curious, an expanded version, for 11ff., of Wecklein's ‘Appendix coniecturas minus probabiles continens’, with references where they are known to me.

RésuméLe but de cet article est ?on;étudier quelques aspects des rapports entre Huygens et Spinoza. Après un court examen de ľoptique des deux auteurs, nous montrons que cette science a servi de paradigme à la métaphysique du philosophe. Nous considérons aussi bien la méthode que le contenu . Mais il y a ?on;autres paradigmes: la mécanique pendulaire, par exemple, dont la contradiction avec ľoptique peut être atténuée, grâce à la géométrie de Huygens ; ou encore le début de la théorie (...) des probabilés, au moyen de laquelle nous présentons une nouvelle interpretation des fins de ľElhique.SummaryThe purpose of this article is to study some aspects of the relations between Huygens and Spinoza. After a short examination of the two authors' optics, we show that this science has been used as a “paradigm” for philosopher's metaphysics. We take account of the method as well as the matter . But there are other paradigms: pendulum mechanics, for example, those contradiction with optics may be reduced, thanks to Huygens' geometry ; or probability theory's beginning, with which we present a new explanation of the aims of Ethics.ZusammenfassungIn diesem Artikel werden einige Aspekte des Verhältnisses zwischen Huygens und Spinoza untersucht. Nach einer Untersuchung der Optik der beiden Autoren wird gezeigt, dass diese Wis‐senschaft als Paradigma für die Metaphysik des Philosophen gedient hat. Wir ziehen sowohl die Methode als auch den Inhalt in Betracht. Es gibt aber auch andere Paradigmen: die Mechanik des Pendels, z. B., deren Widerspruch mit der Optik dank der Geometrie Huygens' abgeschwächt werden kann; oder auch der Beginn der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, mit deren Hil‐fe wir eine neue Interpretation der Zwecke in der Ethik vorlegen. (shrink)

L’articolo si propone di chiarire uno dei punti oscuri della biografia di Giordano Bruno. Nel 1571 il Capitolo generale dei Domenicani di Roma lo assegnò come studente formale allo Studio di Andria. Secondo i suoi più importanti biografi, il Nolano non ci sarebbe mai andato. Attraverso l’accurata analisi dei documenti relativi al corso di studi, e il riscontro delle citazioni contenute in alcune opere, l’ipotesi che Bruno abbia soggiornato ad Andria per circa un anno appare, invece, estremamente probabile. The (...) article tries to clarify one of the obscure points of Giordano Bruno’s biography. In 1571 the General Chapter of the Dominicans in Rome assigned him, as a formal student, to the Study of Andria. According to his most important biographers, the Nolan never went there. However, through the careful analysis of the documents relating to his course of studies, and the comparison of the quotations contained in some of his works, the hypothesis that Bruno stayed in Andria for about a year appears extremely probable. (shrink)

Kant scholars have rarely addressed the centuries-old tradition of casuistry and the concept of conscience in Kant’s writings. This book offers a detailed exploration of the period from Pascal’s Provincial Letters to Kant’s critique of probabilism and discusses his proposal of a (new) casuistry as part of an moral education. *** -/- Die Debatte um Kasuistik und Probabilismus zählt zu den wichtigsten Themen der Moraltheologie und Moralphilosophie der frühen Neuzeit. In der enormen Verbreitung der Literatur über die Gewissensfälle (casus conscientiae) (...) und in der großen Resonanz der Lehre von den wahrscheinlichen Meinungen (opiniones probabiles) in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts findet sich ein wirkungsmächtiges Modell für die Analyse des moralischen Handelns, in welchem Universalität des Gebots und Kontingenz der Handlung, Notwendigkeit der Norm und individuelle Freiheit miteinander versöhnt werden. Dennoch erregt dieses Modell heftige Kritik, die in Pascals berühmtem Angriff in den Briefen in die Provinz (1656–1657) gipfelt. So beginnt für die Kasuistik und den Probabilismus eine lange Krise, welche die Entstehung der modernen Moralphilosophie und den Siegeszug des kantischen Paradigmas ankündigt. Die Krise von Kasuistik und Probabilismus fällt zusammen mit einer einsetzenden rigoristischen Reaktion der christlichen Moraltheologie sowohl katholischer als auch protestantischer Prägung,welche die moralischen und spekulativen Folgen eines Rückgriffs auf Gewissensfälle und wahrscheinliche Meinungen als inakzeptabel ablehnt. Die Ablehnung geht aber weiter und dringt bis in den Kern der philosophischen Reflexion vor: Die rigoristische Reaktion gegen Kasuistik und Probabilismus entzündet sich im moralphilosophischen Denken Kants als Folge seiner umfassenden kritischen Revision der Grundbegriffe der Moralphilosophie sowie insbesondere seiner Neubestimmung des Verhältnisses von Gewissen und praktischem Urteil. Dem Grundsatz des Probabilismus setzt Kant das Kriterium der moralischen Gewißheit („quod dubitas, ne feceris!“) entgegen, das er als „Postulat des Gewissens“ bezeichnet (RGV 6:185.23–186.9).Und die Kasuistik wird als eine „Critic der Handlungen nach Sophistic“ abgestempelt, als eine „Uebung, um nach der Sophistic das Gewissen zu hintergehen oder es zu chicaniren, insofern man es in Irrthum zu setzen denkt“ (V-MS/Vigil 27:620.2–5). Dennoch weist Kant den kasuistischen Fragen eine herausragende Stellung in der Tugendlehre zu und legt der Kasuistik im Rahmen der ethischen Methodenlehre, also im Hinblick auf pädagogische Anwendungen, letztlich eine positive Funktion bei. Vermutlich ist Kants Angriff auf Kasuistik und Probabilismus durch den Einfluss Pascals philosophisch vermittelt. Kants Verhältnis zu Pascal und, allgemeiner, zu dem historischen Hintergrund, welchem dieser angehört, sind gleichwohl noch erstaunlich wenig erforscht: Trotz der wiederholten (stillschweigenden oder sogar ausdrücklichen) Hinweise an wichtigen Stellen in Kants Schriften richtet die Kant-Forschung ihre Aufmerksamkeit nur selten auf die Jahrhunderte währende Tradition der Kasuistik und den Begriff des Gewissens, der in ihrem Rahmen ausgearbeitet wird. Aus dieser langen Geschichte wird in diesem Band insbesondere der Zeitraum „von Pascal bis Kant“ eingehend untersucht, d.h. der noch wenig erkundete Zeitabschnitt von der beißenden Polemik von Pascals Briefe in die Provinz bis zu Kants eigener Kritik des Probabilismus und seinem Entwurf einer (neuen) Kasuistik als Teil der ethischen Methodenlehre. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Carneades' pithanon should be understood as what is probably, though not certainly, true. In this, I oppose, e.g., Burnyeat and Frede, who argue that the pithanon should be understood as the persuasive, and not tied to notions of evidential support. There is a free pdf of this paper available on the OSAP website; see the link below.

A non-expert who struggles to make good decisions and who turns to decision theory for help, might be more than a little surprised by what they find. If they read a standard treatment of the subject, they will find that they are assumed to be logically omniscient: they know all the logical facts about the propositions whose truth they have considered. Their beliefs are also assumed to be logically closed: if they believe each of a set of propositions S, then (...) they believe everything that can be deduced from S. Finally, they are assumed to be maximally opinionated—they have assigned precise probabilities and cardinal utilities to each possible state of the world that can be formulated via S. The normative core of standard decision theory consists of some very weak axioms for these probabilities and car-dinal utilities, plus the advice to maximize their expected utility, which is a function of the probabil-ities and cardinal utilities for each possible state of the world given each possible choice that they can make. The non-expert might understandably react by saying that this theory is too idealized to be useful for human beings. It is this criticism that Richard Bradley addresses with patience, rigour, and ardour in this book. (shrink)