Linking arbitrary shapes to personal labels or reward values results in immediate processing benefits for those stimuli that happen to be associated with the self or high rewards in perceptual matching tasks. Here we further explored how social and reward associations interact with multisensory stimuli by pairing labels and objects with tones. We also investigated whether self and reward biases persist for multisensory stimuli with the label removed after an association had been made. Both high reward stimuli and (...) those associated with the self, resulted in faster responses and improved discriminability, which persisted for multisensory stimuli even when the labels were removed. However, these self- and reward-biases partly depended on the specific alignment between the physical tones and the conceptual order. Performance for reward associations improved when the endpoints of low or high rewards were paired with low or high tones; meanwhile, for personal associations, there was a benefit when the self was paired with either low or high tones, but there was no effect when the stranger was associated with either endpoint. These results indicate that, unlike reward, social personal associations are not represented along a continuum with two marked endpoints but rather with a single reference point. (shrink)

We report two experiments in which participants had to judge the time of occurrence of a stimulus relative to a clock. The experiments were based on the control condition used by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl [Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. . Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activities : The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106, 623–642] to correct for any bias in the (...) estimation of the time at which an endogenous event, the conscious intention to perform a movement, occurred. Participants’ responses were affected systematically by the sensory modality of the stimulus and by the speed of the clock. Such findings demonstrate the variability in judging the time at which an exogenous event occurs and, by extension, suggest that such variability may also apply to the judging the time of occurrence of endogenous events. The reliability of participants’ estimations of when they formed the conscious intention to perform a movement in Libet et al.’s study is therefore questionable. (shrink)

We report two experiments in which participants had to judge the time of occurrence of a stimulus relative to a clock. The experiments were based on the control condition used by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl [Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. . Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activities : The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106, 623–642] to correct for any bias in the (...) estimation of the time at which an endogenous event, the conscious intention to perform a movement, occurred. Participants’ responses were affected systematically by the sensory modality of the stimulus and by the speed of the clock. Such findings demonstrate the variability in judging the time at which an exogenous event occurs and, by extension, suggest that such variability may also apply to the judging the time of occurrence of endogenous events. The reliability of participants’ estimations of when they formed the conscious intention to perform a movement in Libet et al.’s study is therefore questionable. (shrink)

Given the extreme focus on perceived physical defects in body dysmorphic disorder (BDD), we expected that perceptual and cognitive biases related to physical appearance would be associated with BDD...

Perceptual grouping has traditionally been thought to be governed by innate, universal principles. However, recent work has found differences in Japanese and English speakers' non-linguistic perceptual grouping, implicating language in non-linguistic perceptual processes (Iversen, Patel, & Ohgushi, 2008). Two experiments test Japanese- and English-learning infants of 5-6 and 7-8 months of age to explore the development of grouping preferences. At 5-6 months, neither the Japanese nor the English infants revealed any systematic perceptual biases. However, by (...) 7-8 months, the same age as when linguistic phrasal grouping develops, infants developed non-linguistic grouping preferences consistent with their language's structure (and the grouping biases found in adulthood). These results reveal an early difference in non-linguistic perception between infants growing up in different language environments. The possibility that infants' linguistic phrasal grouping is bootstrapped by abstract perceptual principles is discussed. (shrink)

Recent research put forward the hypothesis that eye movements are integrated in memory representations and are reactivated when later recalled. However, “looking back to nothing” during recall might be a consequence of spatial memory retrieval. Here, we aimed at distinguishing between the effect of spatial and oculomotor information on perceptual memory. Participants’ task was to judge whether a morph looked rather like the first or second previously presented face. Crucially, faces and morphs were presented in a way that the (...) morph reactivated oculomotor and/or spatial information associated with one of the previously encoded faces. Perceptual face memory was largely influenced by these manipulations. We considered a simple computational model with an excellent match that expresses these biases as a linear combination of recency, saccade, and location. Surprisingly, saccades did not play a role. The results suggest that spatial and temporal rather than oculomotor information biases perceptual face memory. (shrink)

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish (...) to argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

For almost half a century dual-stream advocates have vigorously defended the view that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in the primary visual cortex: a ventral, perception-related ‘conscious’ stream and a dorsal, action-related ‘unconscious’ stream. They furthermore maintain that the perceptual and memory systems in the ventral stream are relatively shielded from the action system in the dorsal stream. In recent years, this view has come under scrutiny. Evidence points to two overlapping action pathways: (...) a dorso-dorsal pathway that calculates features of the object to be acted on, and a ventro-dorsal pathway that transmits stored information about skilled object use from the ventral stream to the dorso-dorsal pathway. This evidence suggests that stored information may exert significantly more influence on visually guided action than hitherto assumed. I argue that this, in turn, supports the notion of skilled automatic action that is nonetheless agential. My focus here will be on actions influenced by implicit biases (stereotypes/prejudices). Action that is biased in this way, I argue, is in an important sense intentional and agential. (shrink)

Siegel recently distinguishes between seven possible ways in which our perceptual access to social information can be biased by flawed practice of either individuals or social structures, two of which, namely attention and cognitive penetration, imply that it is the content of perception, as opposed to that of judgments, that is biased. Both attention and cognitive penetration, however, rely on cognitive states imposing top-down influences on perceptual states. As such, perceptual bias resulting from them is to a (...) large extent merely a derivation of cognitive bias. In this paper, I propose another way in which our perception can be biased, namely, as the result of faulty assumptions made by the visual system. Furthermore, I argue that in contrast to cognitive penetration and attentional direction, perceptual bias arising in this way is fundamentally perceptual and does not depend on inputs from one’s cognitive system. This sort of perceptual bias, if it exists, would have important implications for how we conceptualize social bias and pose special challenges to traditional interventions designed to counteract bias. (shrink)

Perception provides us with access to the external world, but that access is shaped by our own experiential histories. Through perceptual learning, we can enhance our capacities for perceptual discrimination, categorization, and attention to salient properties. We can also encode harmful biases and stereotypes. This article reviews interdisciplinary research on perceptual learning, with an emphasis on the implications for our rational and normative theorizing. Perceptual learning raises the possibility that our inquiries into topics such as (...) epistemic justification, aesthetic criticism, and moral knowledge should include not only an examination of cognition but also of perception. (shrink)

Over the course of her career, Jean Harvey argued that as agents engaged in a “life of moral endeavor,” we should understand ourselves and others to be moral works in progress, always possessing the potential to grow beyond and become more than the sum of our past wrongs. In this paper I follow Harvey and argue that in order to live a life of moral endeavor, it is not enough merely to know about injustice. Instead, we must engage in the (...) difficult and often painful task of overcoming deep-seated cognitive biases that cause us to fail to perceive the ubiquitous injustice that pervades our world. I conclude by arguing that education, empathy, and love can each help us to increase our perceptual awareness of injustice and so should be recognized to be crucial parts of a life of moral endeavor. (shrink)

In many critical investigations of machine vision, the focus lies almost exclusively on dataset bias and on fixing datasets by introducing more and more diverse sets of images. We propose that machine vision systems are inherently biased not only because they rely on biased datasets but also because theirperceptual topology, their specific way of representing the visual world, gives rise to a new class of bias that we callperceptual bias. Concretely, we define perceptual topology as the set of those (...) inductive biases in machine vision systems that determine its capability to represent the visual world. Perceptual bias, then, describes the difference between the assumed “ways of seeing” of a machine vision system, our reasonable expectations regarding its way of representing the visual world, and its actual perceptual topology. We show how perceptual bias affects the interpretability of machine vision systems in particular, by means of a close reading of a visualization technique called “feature visualization”. We conclude that dataset bias and perceptual bias both need to be considered in the critical analysis of machine vision systems and propose to understand critical machine vision as an important transdisciplinary challenge, situated at the interface of computer science and visual studies/Bildwissenschaft. (shrink)

This essay aims to show that implicit biases should not be conceived of as “inside the head” of individuals, but rather as embodied and social. My argument unfolds in three stages. First, I make the case for conceiving of implicit biases as perceptual habits. Second, I argue that we should think of perceptual habits and, by extension, implicit biases, as located in the body. Third, I claim that individual habits are shaped by the social world (...) in which we find ourselves and that the social world is itself shaped by our habitual ways of interacting with and perceiving others. This suggests that implicit biases are part of the fabric of the social world. Thus, I conclude that implicit biases should be understood as embodied and social. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the use of after-effects as a criterion for showing that we can perceive high-level properties. According to this criterion, if a high-level property is susceptible to after-effects, this suggests that the property can be perceived, rather than cognized. The defenders of the criterion claim that, since after-effects are also present for low-level, uncontroversially perceptual properties, we can safely infer that high-level after-effects are perceptual as well. The critics of the criterion, on the other (...) hand, assimilate it to superficially similar effects in cognition and argue that the after-effect criterion is a cognitive phenomenon rather than a perceptual one, and that as a result it is not a reliable guide for exploring the contents of perception. I argue against both of these views and show that high-level after-effects cannot be identified either with low-level after-effects or with cognitive biases. I suggest an intermediate position: high-level after-effects are not cognitive, but they are nonetheless not a good criterion for exploring the contents of perception. (shrink)

Because the visual system cannot process all of the objects, colors, and features present in a visual scene, visual attention allows some visual stimuli to be selected and processed over others. Most research on visual attention has focused on spatial or location-based attention, in which the locations occupied by stimuli are selected for further processing. Recent research, however, has demonstrated the importance of objects in organizing (or segregating) visual scenes and guiding attentional selection. Because of the long history of spatial (...) attention research, theories of spatial attention are more mature than theories of other visual processes, such as object segregation and object attention. In the present paper, I outline a biased competition account of object segregation and attention, following similar accounts that have been developed for spatial attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). In my biased competition account, I seek to understand how some objects can be segregated and selected over other objects in a complex visual scene. Under this account, there are two sources of visual information that allow an object to be processed over other objects: bottom-up information carried by the physical stimulus and top-down information based on an observer's goals. I use the biased competition account to combine many diverse findings from the object segregation and attention literatures into a common framework. (shrink)

I argue that racially biased perception can be incompetent in a way that undermines perceptual warrant. This can occur even when the subject is unaware of the influence of the bias upon their beliefs or when they possess no defeating evidence that makes it rational for them to doubt the accuracy of their perceptual experiences. When a subject’s racial bias causes their perceptual system to encode inaccurate information about their environment, or to process information in an epistemically (...) incompetent manner, this can reduce their perceptual competence, and thus their perceptual warrant. I discuss a series of cases that illustrate how my proposals treat various instances of racially biased perception. I then distinguish my view from a competing proposal from Jessie Munton (2019) which claims that racially biased priors are epistemically incompetent because they are gerrymandered. A gerrymandered prior is one whose accuracy depends on ongoing manipulations of the environment. I argue that the kinds of manipulations that Munton cites do not necessarily impact perceptual competence and that my account better explains how racist institutions and societal structures can impact the epistemic competence of perceivers. (shrink)

When an elastic material is horizontally stretched, the material is compressed vertically – so-called the Poisson effect. In the different case of the Poisson effect, when an elastic material is vertically squashed, the material is horizontally extended. In both cases, the visual system receives image deformations involving horizontal expansion and vertical compression. How does the brain disentangle the two cases and accurately distinguish stretching from squashing events? Manipulating the relative magnitude of the deformation of a square between horizontal and vertical (...) dimensions in the two-dimensional stimuli, we asked observers to judge the force direction in the stimuli. Specifically, the participants reported whether the square was stretched or squashed. In general, the participant’s judgment was dependent on the relative deformation magnitude. We also checked the anisotropic effect of deformation direction [i.e., horizontal vs. vertical stretching ] and found that the participant’s judgment was strongly biased toward horizontal stretching. We also observed that the asymmetric deformation pattern, which indicated the specific context of force direction, was also a strong cue to the force direction judgment. We suggest that the brain judges the force direction in the Poisson effect on the basis of assumptions about the relationship between image deformation and force direction, in addition to the relative image deformation magnitudes between horizontal and vertical dimensions. (shrink)

There is ongoing philosophical debate about the kinds of properties that are represented in visual perception. Both “rich” and “thin” accounts of perceptual content are concerned with how prior assumptions about the world influence the construction of perceptual representations. However, the idea that biased assumptions resulting from oppressive social structures contribute to the contents of perception has been largely neglected historically in this debate in the philosophy of perception. I draw on neurobiological evidence of the role of the (...) amygdala in visual processing to show that the influence of biased assumptions on visual perception gives us a unique path to rich evaluative content that does not require an appeal to controversial mechanisms like top-down modulation. (shrink)

Aging is accompanied by stereotyped changes in functional brain activations, for example a cortical shift in activity patterns from posterior to anterior regions is one hallmark revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of aging cognition. Whether these neuronal effects of aging could potentially contribute to an amelioration of or resistance to the cognitive symptoms associated with psychopathology remains to be explored. We used a visual illusion paradigm to address whether aging affects the cortical control of perceptual beliefs and (...) biases. Our aim was to understand the effective connectivity associated with volitional control of ambiguous visual stimuli and to test whether greater top-down control of early visual networks emerged with advancing age. Using a bias training paradigm for ambiguous images we found that older participants (n = 16) resisted experimenter-induced visual bias compared to a younger cohort (n = 14) and that this resistance was associated with greater activity in prefrontal and temporal cortices. By applying Dynamic Causal Models for fMRI we uncovered a selective recruitment of top-down connections from the middle temporal to Lingual gyrus (LIN) by the older cohort during the perceptual switch decision following bias training. In contrast, our younger cohort did not exhibit any consistent connectivity effects but instead showed a loss of driving inputs to orbitofrontal sources following training. These findings suggest that perceptual beliefs are more readily controlled by top-down strategies in older adults and introduce age-dependent neural mechanisms that may be important for understanding aberrant belief states associated with psychopathology. (shrink)

The visual system is known to extract summary representations of visually similar objects which bias the perception of individual objects toward the ensemble average. Although vision plays a large role in guiding action, less is known about whether ensemble representation is informative for action. Motor behavior is tuned to the veridical dimensions of objects and generally considered resistant to perceptual biases. However, when the relevant grasp dimension is not available or is unconstrained, ensemble perception may be informative to (...) behavior by providing gist information about surrounding objects. In the present study, we examined if summary representations of a surrounding ensemble display influenced grip aperture and orientation when participants reached-to-grasp a central circular target which had an explicit size but importantly no explicit orientation that the visuomotor system could selectively attend to. Maximum grip aperture and grip orientation were not biased by ensemble statistics during grasping, although participants were able to perceive and provide manual estimations of the average size and orientation of the ensemble display. Support vector machine classification of ensemble statistics achieved above-chance classification accuracy when trained on kinematic and electromyography data of the perceptual but not grasping conditions, supporting our univariate findings. These results suggest that even along unconstrained grasping dimensions, visually-guided behaviors toward real-world objects are not biased by ensemble processing. (shrink)

In this paper I explore how we ought to respond to the problematic inner lives of those that we love. I argue for an understanding of love that is radical and challenging—a powerful form of resistance within the confines of everyday relationships. I argue that love, far from the platitudinous and saccharine view, does not call for our acceptance of others’ failings. Instead, loving another means believing in their potential to grow and holding them to account when they fail. I (...) argue that loving others means meeting them where they are and working to understand the role that oppressive ideologies, coupled with cognitive biases, play in generating and entrenching their problematic mental states. I then argue that we ought not disengage with our loved ones or write them off as lost causes, nor should we accept that we will simply “agree to disagree.” Instead, we should stand in moral solidarity with our loved ones and press them to become better while simultaneously understanding that such moral growth is usually a slow and painful process—often, the project of a lifetime. (shrink)

Identifying the referent of novel words is a complex process that young children do with relative ease. When given multiple objects along with a novel word, children select the most novel item, sometimes retaining the word‐referent link. Prior work is inconsistent, however, on the role of object novelty. Two experiments examine 18‐month‐old children's performance on referent selection and retention with novel and known words. The results reveal a pervasive novelty bias on referent selection with both known and novel names and, (...) across individual children, a negative correlation between attention to novelty and retention of new word‐referent links. A computational model examines possible sources of the bias, suggesting novelty supports in‐the‐moment behavior but not retention. Together, results suggest that when lexical knowledge is weak, attention to novelty drives behavior, but alone does not sustain learning. Importantly, the results demonstrate that word learning may be driven, in part, by low‐level perceptual processes. (shrink)

While the recognition of ambiguous emotions is crucial for successful social interactions, previous work has shown that they are perceived differently depending on whether they are viewed on male or female faces. The present paper aims to shed light on this phenomenon by exploring two hypotheses: the confounded signal hypothesis, which posits the existence of perceptual overlaps between emotions and gendered morphotypes, and the social role hypothesis, according to which the observer's responses are biased by stereotypes. Participants were asked (...) to categorise blended faces (i.e. artificial faces made ambiguous by mixing two emotions) in a forced-choice task. Six emotions were used to create each blend (neutral, surprise, sadness, fear, happiness, anger), for a total of 15 expressions. We then applied signal detection theory – considering both the morphotype of the stimuli and the participants’ gender – to distinguish participants’ perceptual processes from their response biases. The results showed a perceptual advantage for anger on male faces and for sadness on female faces. However, different strategies were deployed when labelling emotions on gendered morphotypes. In particular, a response bias towards angry male faces establishes their special status, as they resulted in both excellent detection and a tendency to be over-reported, especially by women. (shrink)

Game Transfer Phenomena refers to a cluster of involuntary phenomena related to playing videogames, including sensory and cognitive intrusions, transient changes in perception and self-agency. The Game Transfer Phenomena Scale has been used to measure the frequency of GTP with respect to five factors. The present study aimed to validate an instrument for assessing the multiple dimensions of GTP that helps clarify the distinction between GTP experiences. GTP were contextualized onto the spectrum of intrusive cognitions, perceptual distortions, and dissociations. (...) The relationship between GTP, involuntary phenomena without game content in terms of, e.g., hallucinations and perceptual distortions, and game-biased perceptions, as well as the positive and negative impact of GTP and level of distress were also examined. The data were collected using a survey. Separate confirmatory factor analyses of the dimensions of “inner intrusions/misperceptions,” “outer intrusions/distortions,” and “dissociations/mix-ups” produced acceptable fit indices. The findings show that phenomena manifesting as internal experiences are more common, while those manifesting as externalized intrusions are less common. Correlations between the GTP dimensions, INVWG, and GBPA, such as the insertion of game elements in thoughts, perceptions, and dreams, supported convergent validity. The correlations between the GTP dimensions and hours played supported criterion validity. Distress was correlated with outer intrusions and dissociations/mix-ups, but not with inner intrusions. Taken together, these results support the validity and reliability of the proposed assessment of GTP constructs. (shrink)

Meta-accuracy of first impressions on the Internet has the potential to shape subsequent interactions. Aiming to enhance understanding of the underlying perceptual dimensions, the contribution of social competence, and the existence of positive/negative bias in first impressions’ meta-accuracy online, we conducted a study in a simulated asynchronous social-media-type setting. Target participants uploaded a selfie, wrote a short description of themselves, provided estimates of how warm and competent they believed others would find them based on their selfies and texts, and (...) completed two social competence questionnaires. Perceiver participants assessed the warmth and competence of the selfies and texts as well. Meta-accuracy was measured as the absolute difference between metaperception and others’ perception. Through correlational analyses, we confirmed that meta-accuracy of first impressions on the Internet aligned with the universal dimensions of social cognition, found sporadic evidence for the positive association between meta-accuracy and social competence, and showed that meta-accuracy for specific Internet expressive means varied with varying proficiency in these means. Through t-tests, we demonstrated positive meta-accuracy bias for selfies along the warmth dimension and negative bias for text along the competence dimension. Overall, our results suggest the primacy of warmth and uniqueness of the male targets-female perceivers combination for meta-accuracy on the Internet. Our findings expand knowledge about first impressions’ meta-accuracy on the Internet. (shrink)

The Cambridge Platonist Henry More was fiercely averse to the Lurianic Kabbalah, with which he became acquainted through the two tomes of the Kabbala denudata. More contributed to the first tome substantially and was highly influential in shaping the reception of this work, edited by Christian Knorr von Rosenroth. He denounced the incompatibility of the Christian religion with Luria's system and in his last contribution, the Fundamenta, he put forward an apagogical argument meant to show the inconsistency of Luria's teaching. (...) The article aims at exploring the nature of More's argument so as to highlight the philosophical essence of his criticism, the intention of which was to emphasize the incompatibility of the Kabbalah with any form of rational speculation. Luria's doctrine appeared to More to be a compromise between materialism and spiritualism, a sort of hybrid theory that was even worse than materialism, given its misleading theistic appearance as well as the lack of internal coherence. This compromise was also morally unacceptable, being symptomatic of weakness of the will. (shrink)

Recent mathematical results, obtained by the author, in collaboration with Alexander Stokolos, Olof Svensson, and Tomasz Weiss, in the study of harmonic functions, have prompted the following reflections, intertwined with views on some turning points in the history of mathematics and accompanied by an interpretive key that could perhaps shed some light on other aspects of (the development of) mathematics.