The category of jus post bellum is a welcome addition to discussions of the justice of war. But, despite its handy Latin label, we will argue that it cannot be properly understood merely as a set of corollaries from jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Instead, an acceptable theory of justice in the postwar period will have to draw on a broader set of normative ideas than those that have been the focus of the just war (...) tradition. In this paper, we will argue that norms of political reconciliation provide some of the resources we need to address postwar justice. (shrink)

The article deals with the newly discussed set of principles that focus on various issues concerning the end of a war and the establishment of peaceful conditions for the society after a war ends. It also reveals some drawbacks of the jus post bellum principles and searches for its possible modifications into a more complex and applicable set of rules that should govern any post-war activities on both sides of the conflict. The aim is to reach its (...) plausibility in a dynamic global society and thus argue that global peace is an attainable goal only when it becomes the goal of the global community. (shrink)

Just war scholars are increasingly focusing on the importance of jus post bellum – justice after war – for the legitimacy of military campaigns. Should something akin to jus post bellum standards apply to terrorist campaigns? Assuming that at least some terrorist actors pursue legitimate goals or just causes, do such actors have greater difficulty satisfying the prospect-of-success criterion of Just War Theory than military actors? Further, may the use of the terrorist method as such – (...) state or non-state – jeopardize lasting peace in a way that other violent, for instance military, strategies do not? I will argue that there appears to be little reason to believe that terrorist campaigns are in principle less able to secure or at least contribute to a lasting peace than military campaigns; quite to the contrary. Or, put differently, if terrorism is an unlikely method for securing peace, then war is an even more unlikely one. (shrink)

Abstract None of the numerous modern proposals for jus post bellum models has gained wide acceptance. The proposals tend to resemble laundry lists, often enumerated without an obvious and coherent ethical rationale. Recognizing the importance of jus post bellum, this article seeks to move the jus post bellum discourse forward. First, the article constructs a foundation of seven principles for jus post bellum models by modifying and integrating the separate proposals advanced by (...) Bellamy and Evans. Then building on that revised set of foundational principles, this article incorporates selected criteria and research from prior proposals to erect a five-part jus post bellum framework: (1) respect for persons; (2) establish justice; (3) exercise ecological responsibility; (4) engage multinational commitment and support; and (5) maintain progress toward closure. The article concludes by arguing that the proposed jus post bellum model is comprehensive, parsimonious, pragmatic, and has a universally applicable framework analogous to Just War Theory's other two components. (shrink)

Jus post bellum is the ‘new’ part of just war theory that deals with questions of post war justice. While many argue for this extension of just war theory, there is no agreement on the content and scope of post war norms. The debate on jus post bellum is often presented as one between so-called ‘minimalists’ and ‘maximalists’. This article analyses these main positions and the supposed differences between them, and argues that this distinction (...) is no longer relevant. There is no clear opposition between the two positions, but there are gradual variations in terms of content and scope of jus post bellum. In order to pinpoint these variations, a broader perspective is taken. The article thus aims to demonstrate that the content and scope of post war norms depends on two factors: the particular situation to which just war theory applies, and the general view on just war theory and international relations that is adopted. These factors explain the general shift towards a maximalist understanding of jus post bellum. (shrink)

The burgeoning literature on jus post bellum has repeatedly reaffirmed three positions that strike me as deeply implausible: that in the aftermath of wars, compensation should be a priority; that we should likewise prioritize punishing political leaders and war criminals even in the absence of legitimate multilateral institutions; and that when states justifiably launch armed humanitarian interventions, they become responsible for reconstructing the states into which they have intervened – the so called “Pottery Barn” dictum, “You break it, (...) you own it.” Against these common positions, this chapter argues that compensation should be subordinate to reconstruction, with resources going where they are most needed and can do the most good, rather than to the most aggrieved. Just punishment, meanwhile, presupposes just multilateral institutions – the victor cannot be trusted to mete out punishment fairly. And just interveners, who have already taken on such a heavy burden, are entitled to expect the international community to contribute to reconstruction after they have made the first and vital steps. After presenting each of these objections in greater depth, the chapter proceeds to draw some tentative inferences from the threads running through each, and suggest that they illustrate a distinctive flaw in the way in which jus post bellum is addressed by many just war theorists, who not only see the war as the grounds of post bellum duties, but also take it to specify their content: Specifically, they take the rights violations with which wars are imbued to be the basis for post-war action, but take the content of post-war duties to be focused on rectifying those rights violations, rather than the more forward-looking goal of establishing a lasting peace. This backward-looking orientation unduly confines these theorists to making attributions of fault, to a limited palette of normative concepts, and to a focus on the belligerents rather than the international community as a whole. Undoubtedly warfare creates a distinctive normative relationship between belligerent states (though we must question how much of this devolves to the citizens of those states). War does generate grounds for post-war duties – but there are other grounds for those duties too, moreover the grounds should not determine the content. It of course matters that the citizens of two states harmed one another in violation of their rights. But when the war is done, peacebuilding should be the priority, not raking over the wrongs of both sides. Sections 2–4 present the objections, Section 5 offers the tentative analysis and proposes a shift in focus toward an ethics of peacebuilding, and Section 6 concludes. (shrink)

This paper serves three purposes. First, it examines the theme of jus post bellum (“postwar justice”) as it emerges within a just peacemaking (JP) framework. Second, it defines just political participation as civil society peacebuilding reflected in Catholic social thought (CST). Third, it envisions a place for just political participation within the jus post bellum praxis specifically endorsed by the World Bank report of 2007, titled Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors. The paper (...) then attends to the Church and faith-based organizations and their roles in civil society peacebuilding postbellum. In doing so, it clarifies the characteristics of jus post bellum within a JP scheme by (a) distinguishing them from the just war approach, (b) identifying JP-oriented jus post bellum thinkers such as Daniel Philpott and Larry May, and (c) incorporating civil society peacebuilding endorsed by both the World Bank report and CST. (shrink)

This collection of essays brings together jus post bellum and transitional justice theorists to explore the legal and moral questions that arise at the end of war and in the transition to less oppressive regimes. Transitional justice and jus post bellum share in common many concepts that will be explored in this volume. In both transitional justice and jus post bellum, retribution is crucial. In some contexts criminal trials will need to be held, and (...) in others truth commissions and other hybrid trials will be considered more appropriate means for securing some form of retribution. But there is a difference between how jus post bellum is conceptualized, where the key is securing peace, and transitional justice, where the key is often greater democratization. This collection of essays highlights both the overlap and the differences between these emerging bodies of scholarship and incipient law. (shrink)

Leading legal, political and moral theorists discuss the normative issues that arise when war concludes and when a society strives to regain peace.

Jus post Bellum is, like Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, a part of just war theory. Jus post Bellum is distinguished from the other parts of just war theory by being primarily concerned with the principles necessary for securing a just and lasting peace after the end of a war. Traditionally, jus post bellum has focused primarily on three goals: [1] compensating those who have been the victims of unjust aggression, while (...) respecting the rights of the aggressors, [2] punishing and rehabilitating those guilty of war crimes and other violations of the principles of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello and [3] developing measures that will prevent future war and violence (Orend 2000 and May 2012). In this chapter, I outline an account of political forgiveness and explain the role that political forgiveness can have in promoting the goals of jus post bellum. My conception of political forgiveness requires some unpacking. Let me begin with individual forgiveness, which I understand along familiar Butlerian lines as the renunciation of resentment (Butler, Sermon IX in McNaughton 2017: 75-83), though with a bit of a twist. More exactly, ● An individual, I, forgives J for doing F if and only if I renounces all her own warrant for resenting J for doing F. Resentment is a judgment-sensitive attitude, and, therefore, it tends to track judgments concerning its warrant (Scanlon 1998: 20 and Smith 2015). In cases of perfect forgiveness, I’s renunciation causes her to cease feeling resentment toward J for doing F, though, of course, less perfect cases are possible. I reject the idea that there is a sharp discontinuity between individual and political forgiveness, a position argued for by, e.g., Peter Digeser (1998 and 2001). By contrast, I understand political forgiveness as the renunciation of resentment by the relevant political body in question. With greater precision, ● A sovereign political body, P, forgives J for doing F if and only if P renounces all warrant that its citizens have for resenting, as part of their public lives, J for doing F. A little more explanation is in order. Sovereign political bodies, such as national governments, claim degrees of control over the lives of their citizens, in both their public and their private aspects, though the claims with respect to the former tend to be considerably more expansive than the claims with respect to the latter. I assume here that, at least in the case of legitimate governments, these claims of control are often valid. Such governments may reasonably renounce certain grounds for motivating action in the public sphere. For example, governments may renounce all warrant that its citizens have, as part of their public lives, for hating members of marginalized groups. In practice, this means that, while citizens might continue to act in their private lives out of hatred for members of these groups, their appeal to this hatred is seen by the state as irrelevant to matters of law and public policy as well as being wholly out-of-place in public discourse. Political forgiveness toward J for doing F, as I understand it, involves an analogous rejection of resentment, on the part of citizens in their public lives, toward J for doing F. I turn now to the matter of how political forgiveness supports securing a just and lasting peace between former belligerents. With respect to the first goal of jus post bellum, political forgiveness helps to balance compensation for victims and respect for the rights of defeated aggressors by countering the all-too-human tendency to overvalue harms done to oneself and to members of one’s group. As regards the second goal, political forgiveness plays a similar role but also provides a model for rehabilitation by exemplifying among the victorious the behavior to be emulated by the vanquished. Finally, political forgiveness promotes the third goal of jus post bellum by providing a space for nations to meet as moral equals rather than allowing one nation to have the moral high ground over the other. None of this, of course, means that political forgiveness should be unearned or that it should be confused with condonation (Kolnai 1973 and Pettigrove 2004). However, the question of what is required to put oneself in a position to be forgiven as part of jus post bellum is a matter that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. (shrink)

How should we think about justice at war’s end in the case of Afghanistan in 2022 and beyond? The basic principles of jus post bellum include order, justice, and conciliation; and there have been numerous policy attempts to realize these principles since the fall of the Taliban and flight of al Qaeda in December 2001. With the precipitous abandonment of Afghanistan by the Biden Administration and other allies in 2021, we have a sober opportunity to reflect on three (...) periods of jus post bellum efforts: an initial humanitarian and human security phase ; the surprising resilience of the Taliban and efforts at some sort of national grand bargain circa the 10-year mark ; and now a future based upon Western withdrawal and the re-emerging dominance of the Taliban. (shrink)

This paper explores Brian Orend's contribution to the just war tradition, specifically his proposed jus post bellum criteria and his idea of pre-commitment to jus in bello and jus post bellum as part of an expanded jus ad bellum criterion of right intention. The latter is based on his interpretation of Kant's work: that as part of the original decision to begin a war, a state should commit itself to certain rules of conduct and appropriate (...) war termination, and if it cannot so commit, it should not continue further down the path to using force. Orend's revised right intention brings jus post bellum ?into the fold? of the just war tradition, requiring that state obligations go beyond correct conduct in war. The article argues that whatever the nature of the just cause, there is a compelling argument for committing to jus in bello and jus post bellum as part of jus ad bellum right intention. The justness of the cause in the contemporary era requires strictness rather than leniency in the conduct and termination of war for a state to remain legitimate in the eyes of the world. In the context of Orend's proposals, this would require that states ?do their homework? and ?tie themselves to the mast?; this includes providing proof that the situation on the ground is understood, conducting a feasibility test on the proposed intervention and publicly identifying and committing to their obligations and responsibilities during and after war. Recognising the practical and political obstacles to adopting this idealistic revision of the just war tradition, the paper nevertheless concludes that Orend's contribution is significant and worthy of exploration: it offers a kernel of hope for counteracting pressures to lower the threshold of resort to force, delivering greater justice for the innocent victims of war and providing greater probability of durable peace post-war. (shrink)

This essay addresses two growing edges of the just war tradition. First, theorists have been accused of focusing narrowly on justifying war and governing its conduct, neglecting wider considerations that encompass justice during the years prior to and after war. Second, calling a war "just" allegedly makes it seem "good" so that it is easier to fight a war and to bend or set aside the rules. Based on "imperfect justice," we argue for a "justified" war theory, taking all criteria (...) and categories seriously, including jus ante bellum and jus post bellum. (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "La guerre peut-elle être juste? Peut-elle s'affubler d'un qualificatif juste sans injustice? Les récits cosmogoniques sont la merveilleuse monstration que les hommes se sont toujours fait la guerre. L'attitude belliqueuse de certains souverains et les atrocités des champs de bataille ont amené des analystes à définir des critères stricts pour limiter la souffrance humaine. Désormais, tout Etat qui n'observerait pas scrupuleusement les linéaments de cet édit risque d'être déclaré Hostis humani generis. Dans sa conception (...) traditionnelle in stricto sensu, la théorie de la guerre dite juste comporte, d'une part, le jus ad bellum (droit à la guerre) ou droit de faire la guerre et, d'autre part, le jus in bello qui règlemente la conduite de la guerre. Qu'en est-il de l'après-guerre et du jus post bellum? Cet ouvrage, importante contribution au débat sur la théorie de la guerre juste, répond justement à ce questionnement.". (shrink)

The inclusion of jus post bellum in just war theory may be justified. But, according to Evans, it becomes problematic when confronted with tenets of "just occupation," namely that sovereignty or self-determination should be restored to the occupied people as soon as is reasonably possible.

In this essay, Ben-Porath begins from the assumption that just war theory should be extended to include a jus post bellum component. Postwar conduct should be significantly informed by a care ethics perspective, particularly its political aspects as developed by Joan Tronto and others. Care ethics should be extended to the international postwar arena with one significant amendment, namely, weakening the aim of ending dependence.

In this essay, Ben-Porath begins from the assumption that just war theory should be extended to include a jus post bellum component. Postwar conduct should be significantly informed by a care ethics perspective, particularly its political aspects as developed by Joan Tronto and others. Care ethics should be extended to the international postwar arena with one significant amendment, namely, weakening the aim of ending dependence.

In this essay, Ben-Porath begins from the assumption that just war theory should be extended to include a jus post bellum component. Postwar conduct should be significantly informed by a care ethics perspective, particularly its political aspects as developed by Joan Tronto and others. Care ethics should be extended to the international postwar arena with one significant amendment, namely, weakening the aim of ending dependence.

While there is an acknowledged overlap of transitional justice and jus post bellum, there has been no real attention to delineating a clear relationship between the two or addressing the significan...

Several aspects of our post-9/11 reality challenge the relevance, practicality, and international viability of the two primary trajectories of the Christian tradition on war and peace : the rise of strong religion around the world, the privatization of first-world faith, and an American preference for autonomous reason. This article proposes “faith-based diplomacy” as a constructive middle or third way between what have become dichotomous Christian responses to war and violent conflict, and a response that attends to the challenges of (...) our post-9/11 “signs of the times.” After reviewing recent developments in each trajectory, I suggest that faith-based diplomacy cultivates a series of intentional dispositions and actions that foster peace and seek justice even in the absence of armed conflict. It offers a model of “justice before war” or jus ante bellum that complements the growing edges of both the just war theory and peacemaking by offering several as yet unexplored dispositions and commitments necessary for effective responses to violent conflict. (shrink)

Several aspects of our post-9/11 reality challenge the relevance, practicality, and international viability of the two primary trajectories of the Christian tradition on war and peace (just war theory and pacifism): the rise of strong religion around the world, the privatization of first-world faith, and an American preference for autonomous reason. This article proposes “faith-based diplomacy” as a constructive middle or third way between what have become dichotomous Christian responses to war and violent conflict, and a response that attends (...) to the challenges of our post-9/11 “signs of the times.” After reviewing recent developments in each trajectory, I suggest that faith-based diplomacy cultivates a series of intentional dispositions and actions that foster peace and seek justice even in the absence of armed conflict. It offers a model of “justice before war” or jus ante bellum that complements the growing edges of both the just war theory and peacemaking by offering several as yet unexplored dispositions and commitments necessary for effective responses to violent conflict. (shrink)

This presentation discusses why just war theory is in need of just military preparedness (jus ante bellum) as a new category of just war thinking and it articulates six principles of just military preparedness. The paper concludes that the United States fails to satisfy any of these principles and addresses how this bears on the application of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum norms to possible future American military interventions.

This collection of essays brings together some of the leading legal, political and moral theorists to discuss the normative issues that arise when war concludes and when a society strives to regain peace. In the transition from war, mass atrocity or a repressive regime, how should we regard the idea of democracy and human rights? Should regimes be toppled unless they are democratic or is it sufficient that these regimes are less repressive than before? Are there moral reasons for thinking (...) that soldiers should be relieved of responsibility so as to advance the goal of peace building? And how should we regard the often conflicting goals of telling the truth about what occurred in the past and allowing individuals to have their day in court? These questions and more are analyzed in detail. It also explores whether jus post bellum itself should be a distinct field of inquiry. (shrink)

James Turner Johnson has played a pivotal role in bringing just war thinking to the fore in international relations. This has brought with it increased interest in the relationship between the just war tradition and the laws of war. Whilst Johnson maintains that the legal rules relating to the conduct of war correspond with the requirements of jus in bello, he is more critical of the legal regime relating to recourse to force and has occasionally argued in favour of the (...) superiority of just war thinking to international law in this area. This article discusses Johnson's thinking on the relationship between ethics and law on recourse to force. It begins by outlining Johnson's approach before suggesting that it is overly critical of the post-1945 order. The paper concludes by calling for reconciliation between law and ethics. (shrink)

In this essay, I reflect on the divergent arguments about limited force made by Daniel R. Brunstetter and Samuel Moyn in their respective monographs. Arguing that their positions can be reconciled, I agree with Brunstetter that limited force has a role to play in establishing and maintaining a just world order. At the same time, however, I am mindful of Moyn's warning that limited force may lead to perpetual war. The way to ensure that limited force both works toward justice (...) and does not result in perpetual war, I argue, is to focus more on considerations of jus ante bellum (right before war) and jus post bellum (right after war), the so-called “growing edges of just war theory.” I hold that the responsible use of statecraft, which just war thinking seeks to inform, accepts that limited force constitutes a legitimate tool to facilitate order, justice, and peace. However, any justifiable use of force must be restrained and limited and aim for a just peace. The embrace of limited force should thus be complemented with an effort by state leaders to bolster the edges of just war in order to facilitate a security environment that requires the use of limited force less frequently. (shrink)

Even in just wars we infringe the rights of countless civilians whose ruination enables us to protect our own rights. These civilians are owed compensation, even in cases where the collateral harms they suffer satisfy the proportionality constraint. I argue that those who authorize or commit the infringements and who also benefit from those harms will bear that compensatory duty, even if the unjust aggressor cannot or will not discharge that duty. I argue further that if we suspect antecedently that (...) we will culpably refrain from compensating those victims post bellum, then this makes satisfying the war’s proportionality constraint substantially more difficult at the outset of the war. The lesson here is that failing to take duties of compensation in war seriously constrains our moral permission to protect ourselves. (shrink)

Saint Augustine, being seen as one of the first just war theorists, famously stated that the true object of war is peace.1And while just war theory is often said to be the leading position on the morality of war, today, it is struggling to keep up with the changing international reality. It is premised upon a certain conception of war - as armed conflict between two states - and on a clear demarcation line between the situation of war and the (...) situation of peace. This however, seems to no longer fit the political reality. More often than not, we find ourselves in a grey area. This ‘new’ political reality, the changed character of war, and the often blurry boundaries between war and peace, pose serious challenges to just war theory. This paper analyzes one solution: an extension of the bipartite conception of the theory. A branch called jus ante bellum, preventive peacemaking, is sometimes suggested to precede jus ad bellum. And jus post bellum, justice after the war, is the welcomed branch that could provide post war guidance. This paper explores what it means to adopt these branches. What does it bring us to extend the theory? It is presumed that it would benefit the goal of just war theory, that Augustine already pointed at: limiting war and realizing a ‘just and durable peace’. But is an extension really a good idea? There are several reasons why we should be careful to regard these arguably important issues within the parameters of just war theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post-War JusticeAnna Floerke ScheidAfter the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post-War Justice Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2010. 220 pp. $20.00Beginning with Ezekiel’s imagery of a field filled with dry bones in the aftermath of war, Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright approach the burgeoning question of how (...) best to establish a just peace following violent conflict. As theologians committed to the Christian tradition’s emphasis on restoring peace following warfare, their project develops jus post bellum categories that have thus far been considered more by philosophers, political scientists, and international law scholars than by theologians. The authors see themselves as extending the work of Glen Stassen and other just peacemaking theorists. Where just peacemaking provides theologically rooted criteria for jus ante bellum, Allman and Winright want to root theologically jus post bellum. “We believe that expanding the just war tradition to encompass jus post bellum will actually ‘close the loop’ or make for a more honest just war theory by bringing us back to the practices of just peacemaking” (55–56).The book is presented in two parts. The first part offers an overview of the history of the just war tradition and of the emerging discussion of jus post bellum. Despite its brevity, a key strength of this overview is its comprehensiveness. Allman and Winright illustrate the tradition’s roots in Hellenistic philosophy, its development by patristic and medieval theologians, and finally its adoption in the secular sphere. The authors then uncover nascent elements of jus post bellum throughout the just war tradition. Here they pay particular attention to Immanuel Kant before turning to contemporary philosophers, including perhaps the most well-known jus post bellum theorist, Brian Orend, with whom the authors dialogue extensively in the second part.The second part constitutes the book’s major constructive contribution to the theological ethics of warfare and conflict resolution. The authors posit four “categories” that they argue are “consistent with the Christian just war tradition” and necessary for a just peace following war (85). First, they contend that the just cause, which prompts the war, must be reconsidered jus post bellum. “The logic is simple and clear: the end of a just war must be accomplishing the objectives that served as the grounds for going to war in the first place” (100). Second, the authors explore the need for postconflict reconciliation, arguing [End Page 223] for restorative forms of justice alongside retributive forms. This chapter would benefit from more extensive dialogue with theologians such as John de Gruchy, Robert Schreiter, and Charles Villa-Vicencio, who have devoted themselves to the topics of reconciliation and restorative justice from the Christian perspective. Third, the authors discuss the value of punishment in establishing justice. Their discussion of the symbolic importance of reparations is especially insightful. The authors suggest that “reparations require a reversal of power. Those who once were dominant are now in a submissive/vulnerable position” in relation to those who were once powerless (130). Finally, the authors propose a “restoration phase” following warfare wherein basic security must be established and political reforms enacted to preclude any return to the status quo ante bellum. The victors must ensure the economic recovery of the vanquished; provide for the needs of the war’s most vulnerable victims, such as children; and clean up environmental hazards that resulted from fighting.The book is most impressive in that it conjoins multiple postconflict endeavors (e.g., reconciliation and war crimes tribunals) that are frequently separated or seen as oppositional in other literature. This strength indicates that the book may continue to yield serious contributions to the ethics of conflict resolution, especially as scholars accept the authors’ challenge to “develop and further refine” the categories they propose.Anna Floerke ScheidDuquesne UniversityCopyright © 2012 The Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Though scholars of political science and moral philosophy have long analyzed the justifications for and against waging war as well as the ethics of warfare itself, the problem of _ending_ wars has received less attention. In the first book to apply just war theory to this phase of conflict, Eric Patterson presents a three-part view of justice in end-of-war settings involving order, justice, and reconciliation. Patterson’s case studies range from successful applications of _jus post bellum,_ such as the (...) U.S. Civil War or Kosovo, to challenges such as present-day Iraq. (shrink)

The entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002 establishing the International Criminal Court has signified a shift in the goals pursued by international criminal law. Due to new types of warfare dynamics, international protection is in need of new orientations, particularly with regard to conflict deterrence aims. This urgency is widely documented by the normative action framework of the Responsibility to Protect and, more recently, by the UN Secretary-General 2012–2013 Reports for the RtoP’s implementation. The scope (...) of this study is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to explore theoretical overlapping between the jus post bellum and the RtoP with regard to deterrence effects of the ICC; on the other hand, it proposes to illustrate such dynamics by reference to Kenya’s post-electoral violence during the period 2007–2013. Kenya represents an instance of a post-conflict society whereby transitional justice actions have taken place under a de facto adoption of a RtoP framework. As a result, I defend a qualified correlation between ICC’s retribution and deterrence effects. I claim that the hypothesis of the ICC’s deterring effects accounts in Kenya is constructed upon a general condition of direct compliance by self-interested rational actors as well as on unintended effects of ethnic stabilization. I further consider that this possibility is reinforced by systemic interdependencies with other national and international initiatives such as the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation mediation initiative, the Grand Coalition Government, the Panel of African Eminent Personalities led by Kofi Annan, and the findings of the Commission of Enquiry of Post-Election Violence. (shrink)

Critical analysis of development of concept of jus ante bellum.

With his new book, A Theory of Truces, Nir Eisikovits has succeed in producing the most comprehensive and insightful book to exist on the nature and morality of truces during international military conflict. In it he plausibly argues that thought about such conflict should avoid binary terms such as long-lasting peace and all-out war, and instead must readily acknowledge conditions “in between” them, such as cease-fires and agreements to limit belligerence to certain times. In this critical notice of Eisikovits’ book, (...) I have two major aims, in light of the fact that in it he does not systematically engage with the contemporary literature on and positions in just war theory. One aim is to situate Eisikovits’ analysis of truces in that context, and to contend that he has implicitly founded a new field that merits the title jus interruptus bellum as distinct from jus in bello and jus ex bello. Another is to build on Eisikovits’ ethical appraisal of truces, by considering what principles of just war theory entail for them. (shrink)

The just-war framework neatly distinguishes between jus ad bellum, the criteria that address political leaders’ decisions for waging war, and jus in bello, the criteria that address soldiers’ condu...