Abstract Finding the western just war criterion of reasonable chance of success to be a contribution to ethical decision making about armed conflict requires dealing with a number of critiques. Specifying ?probability? rather than the alternatives ?hope? or ?chance?, and raising standards of evidence involved, makes the term less vague. Expanding the concept of ?success? to include morally defensible aims that can be achieved without military victory enriches the understanding of the moral relationship between ends and means in armed conflict. (...) Asking decision makers to accept moral responsibility for the costs of possible failure is a unique contribution to the just war criteria. The enriched concept of reasonable probability of success thus offers morally significant insights to prewar jus ad bellum decisions, and can benefit ethical decision-making about whether to continue once fighting has begun. (shrink)

On ‘caritas’ and the promise of ‘right intent’ Back to the roots of justice in war In classical Just War texts, the criterion of ‘right intent’ is considered a key concept with regard to the justice of a war as such, since it refers to the basic iustus disposition from which the other criteria (ad bellum as well as in bello and post bellum) should be applied. However, in current JW debates, determined to a large extent by Traditionalists and Revisionists, (...) the importance of this key concept threatens to disappear from view. This article aims to show the relevance of further reflection on the role and meaning of the criterion of ‘right intent’ using classical JW insights and in particular Hannah Arendt’s analysis of Augustine’s concept of ‘caritas’, given the political relevance of this concept as pointed out by Arendt. The criterion of ‘right intent’ is closely connected to Arendt’s distinction between power and violence and her principle of the right to have rights. Right intent, as a virtue, based on and inspired by caritas, in more contemporary discourse, a humanitarian ethos, implies the promise of the iustus application of the JW criteria that were originally formulated precisely for that reason. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe jus ad bellum criterion of right intention is a central guiding principle of just war theory. It asserts that a country’s resort to war is just only if that country resorts to war for the right reasons. However, there is significant confusion, and little consensus, about how to specify the CRI. We seek to clear up this confusion by evaluating several distinct ways of understanding the criterion. On one understanding, a state’s resort to war is just only if it (...) plans to adhere to the principles of just war while achieving its just cause. We argue that the first understanding makes the CRI superfluous, because it can be subsumed under the probability of success criterion. On a second understanding, a resort to war is just only if a state’s motives, which explain its resort to war, are of the right kind. We argue that this second understanding of the CRI makes it a significant further obstacle to justifying war. However, this second understanding faces a possible infinite regress problem, wh... (shrink)

According to just war theory, a resort to war is justified only if it satisfies the right intention condition. This article offers a critical examination of this condition, defending the thesis that, despite its venerable history as part of the just war tradition, it ought to be jettisoned. When properly understood, it turns out to be an unnecessary element of jus ad bellum, adding nothing essential to our assessments of the justice of armed conflict.