In her book, Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett thinks through what ontological, political, and ecological questions would look like if humans could admit that matter and nonhuman things are living, creative agents; the contributors to this issue of Evental Aesthetics begin to think through what aesthetic questions would look like.

Abstract: The following is an outline of an emerging foundation for science that begins to explain living forms and their patterns of movement beyond the sphere of mechanistic interactions. Employing an event ontology based on a convergence of quantum physics and Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, coupled with the controversial yet promising theory of formative causation, this development will explore possible influences on the outcomes of events beyond any combination of external forces, laws of Nature, and chance. If (...) it turns out there are no such additional influences--beyond mechanistic causes--it is difficult to see how agency or free will could exist. Assuming agency exists, as Whitehead apparently does, while committing to an event ontology in which process is fundamental leads to interesting questions about the natures of any entities that might participate in events. Furthermore, what might the purposes and agendas of such entities be based upon, beyond memory traces or DNA code? This ontological model, recognizing processes as fundamental, leads to a revised cosmology where the trajectory of a series of events may be due to more than rearrangement of material bits according to external forces and where goal-directed, recurring processes and the emergence of mind are not so surprising. Just as special relativity reduces to classical treatment when speeds slow down, this scientific model for a living world reduces to mechanistic materialism whenever conditions are more limited. Though this development is based on a philosophy of process, there are some dissimilarities with respect to Whitehead’s particular version. (shrink)

In recent years philosophers have given much attention to the ‘ontological problem’ of events. Donald Davidson puts the matter thus: ‘the assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our common talk; or so, at any rate, I have been arguing. I do not know of any better, or further, way of showing what there is’. It might be thought bizarre to assign to philosophers the task of ‘showing what (...) there is’. They have not distinguished themselves by the discovery of new elements, new species or new continents, nor even of new categories, although there has often been more dreamt of in their philosophies than can be found in heaven or earth. It might appear even stranger to think that one can show what there actually is by arguing that the existence of something needs to be assumed in order for certain sentences to make sense. More than anything, the sober reader will doubtlessly be amazed that we need to assume, after lengthy argument, ‘that there are events’. (shrink)

We propose a new event ontology of the world, which is part of a general approach to philosophy based on combining ideas from science, ontology, and the philosophy of nature. While the position advocated here is grounded in science and philosophy, it attempts to move _beyond_ each of them by devising and exploring a series of technical (naturalized or naturalistic) ontological concepts such as Interconnectedness, the Whole, the Global, Chaos, the event assemblage, and Nonspace. A central (...) theme in our event ontology is the mapping out of a fundamental critique of the theory of the organism and organization, especially when the latter two are viewed as processes in spacetime. In particular, and following earlier leads, we criticize the spacetime doctrine by arguing that it is not ontologically fundamental, where we suggest its replacement by more primordial naturalized ontological concepts of space such as ontospace and Nonspace. The event ontology of nature can be considered a radical alternative attitude toward the relation between the human and nature, an attitude, in fact, that has been repeatedly explored, though under very different headings, by numerous scattered thinkers throughout the history of ideas. We examine some of the past thinkers who contributed to this general but still incoherent body of thought, including Leibniz, Heidegger, Simondon, Ruyer, Deleuze, Whitehead, and Guattari. The goal of this article is to provide a condensed high-level view on this very complex and still evolving subject intended for a large audience, not necessarily only philosophers, but also scientists, mathematicians, technologists, theologians, sociologists, artists, and psychologists. (shrink)

After Einstein presented his “special theory of relativity” with its marvelous principles, “principle of relativity” and “the constant speed of light”, it led to bizarre implications, such as, time dilation, length contraction, energy-mass conversion, and invariance of the space-time interval, we had trouble to understand these stunning consequences with our very classical ontology, which can be regarded as Aristotelian ontology. Thus, both physicists and philosophers have required a new kind of ontology, capable of explaining the new phenomena. (...) Hermann Minkovski proposed that Einstein’s theory implies a “four-dimensional space-time”, instead of a three-dimensional space with time passing over space. Accordingly, the universe consists of four-dimensional stuff such as events. Event ontology goes together with “block universe argument”. Accordingly, the universe looks like a block of ice or a loaf of bread and in which past, present and future take place together. Therefore, block universe argument makes impossible change, motion, and causal relations. Although they sound strange, “simultaneity of relativity”, an outcome of special theory of relativity, supports event ontology and block universe argument. Nevertheless, there are plenty of difficulties come along with the event ontology. In this paper, I will discuss those handicaps of the argument that events are basic components of the universe.Einstein, “özel görelilik kuramını” ve olağanüstü iki ilkesini, “görelilik ilkesini” ve “ışık hızının sabitliğini”, sunduktan sonra, bu kuramın Aristotelesci ontoloji olarak tabir edebileceğimiz klasik ontolojinin kavramlarıyla anlaşılması zor çıktıları oldu. Örneğin, zamanın genişlemesi, uzunluğun kısalması, enerji-kütle değişimi ve uzam-zaman aralığının değişmezliği gibi. Bu nedenle, hem fizikçiler hem de felsefeciler yeni keşfedilen olguları açıklayabilecek yeni bir ontolojinin gerekliliğini duydular. Hermann Minkovski proposed that Einstein’ın kuramının; zamanın, uzamın dışında olduğu üç-boyutlu uzam yerine “dört-boyutlu bir uzam-zaman” içerdiğini iddia etti. Buna göre evren, “olaylar” gibi dört-boyutlu şeylerden ibaret. Olay ontolojisi, “blok evren argümanı” ile uyuşur. Blok evren argümanına göre, evren bir buz kütlesine ya da bir somun ekmeğe benzer. Geçmiş, şimdi ve gelecek bu bloğun içinde aynı anda yer almaktadır. Bu nedenle blok evren argümanı; değişimi, hareketi ve nedensel ilişkileri imkansız kılar. Bu argüman tuhaf görünse de özel görelilik kuramının bir çıktısı olan “göreliliğin eş zamanlılığı”, olay ontolojisini ve blok evren argümanını destekler. Yanı sıra olay ontolojisi pek çok zorluğu da beraberinde getirir. Bu makalede, olayların evrenin temel yapı taşları olduğu iddiasınının zorluklarını tartışacağım. (shrink)

Through both an historical and philosophical analysis of the concept of possibility, we show how including both potentiality and actuality as part of the real is both compatible with experience and contributes to solving key problems of fundamental process and emergence. The book is organized into four main sections that incorporate our routes to potentiality: (1) potentiality in modern science [history and philosophy; quantum physics and complexity]; (2) Relational Realism [ontological interpretation of quantum physics; philosophy and logic]; (3) Process Physics (...) [ontological interpretation of relativity theory; physics and philosophy]; (4) on speculative philosophy and physics [limitations and approximations; process philosophy]. We conclude that certain fundamental problems in modern physics require complementary analyses of certain philosophical and metaphysical issues, and that such scholarship reveals intrinsic features and limits of determinism, potentiality and emergence that enable, among others, important progress on the quantum theory of measurement problem and new understandings of emergence. (shrink)

We develop a new understanding of the historical horizon of event ontology. Within the general area of the philosophy of nature, event ontology is a still emerging field of investigation in search for the ultimate materialist ontology of the world. While event ontology itself will not be explicated in full mathematical details here, our focus is on its conceptual interrelation with the dominant current of Idealism in Western thought approached by us as a (...) problem in the history of ideas. Our presentation is designed to be accessible to a wider audience. We especially highlight the deep connection between event ontology and postmodernism in general, and the post-war French philosophers Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari in particular, who are viewed as main sources for current and future programs of abstract materialism. (shrink)

In the paper, I distinguish between the semantic and the “direct” approach to event ontology. The first approach, employed by D. Davidson, starts with logical analysis of natural language. This analysis uncovers quantification over the domain of events. Thus, we have ontological commitment to events and, at the same time, also a suggestion of how to view their nature. The second approach, used by J. Kim and D. Lewis, deals with events “directly”, i.e. not by analyzing language first. (...) Events are postulated because they are useful in other theories and their nature is adjusted to the needs of these theories. In the paper, I analyze both approaches and outline their problems and advantages. I conclude that we should conditionally prefer the latter approach on methodological grounds. This preference is based on the assumption that submitting hypotheses to tests seems to be a crucial part of metaphysical methodology. Since the “direct” approach to event ontology allows for more testing, it should be preferred over the semantic approach. (shrink)

Although there have been efforts to integrate Semantic Web technologies and artificial agents related AI research approaches, they remain relatively isolated from each other. Herein, we introduce a new ontology framework designed to support the knowledge representation of artificial agents’ actions within the context of the actions of other autonomous agents and inspired by standard cognitive architectures. The framework consists of four parts: 1) an event ontology for information pertaining to actions and events; 2) an epistemic (...) class='Hi'>ontology containing facts about knowledge, beliefs, perceptions and communication; 3) an ontology concerning future intentions, desires, and aversions; and, finally, 4) a deontic ontology for modeling obligations and prohibitions which limit agents’ actions. The architecture of the ontology framework is inspired by deontic cognitive event calculus as well as epistemic and deontic logic. We also describe a case study in which the proposed DCEO ontology supports autonomous vehicle navigation. (shrink)

This article aims to explore representation of the content knowledge of historical Malay manuscripts by extracting the event features using an event ontology framework. The manuscript used during the testing is Sulalatus Salatin by Abdul Ahmad Samad and it was published at University of Malaya Digital Library database. In aligning to a domain-specific ontology, the Simple Event Model model is adopted and an event-based ontology for historical Malay manuscripts is designed. Information extraction approach (...) is done manually to extract events from the manuscript and mapped into Protégé editor. Competency questions were constructed and submitted to the Protégé editor using SPARQL to check the ontology capability of providing answers as well as to examine its correctness. Event-based ontology model assists in discovering and representing the content knowledge of historical Malay manuscripts and supports organisation of knowledge. All the main concepts are extracted from selected Malay manuscript and 17 concepts used to develop the event-based ontology model. The knowledge was verified by three domain experts in Malay manuscript. In the findings, the interrater reliability for Event and Actor instances is 84%, which means 16% of instances and its type are incorrect and need amendment. For Place, interrater reliability is 95% and 99% for Role. Meanwhile, the experts achieved 100% agreement for Time. In addition, the experts agreed that the concepts, properties and instances for Malay Manuscript Ontology and complied with the criteria of consistency, completeness, conciseness, expandability and ease of use. The development of the event-based model of an ontology-based system with a high level of semantic granularity reflects the various cultural riches and intellectual aspect stored in Malay manuscripts. This will enable systematic research of the knowledge embedded in the manuscripts and make it widely and easily accessible by everyone. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper I argue that an ontology of events is precise, flexible and general enough so as to cover the three main alternative formulations of quantum mechanics as well as theories advocating an antirealistic view of the wave function. Since these formulations advocate a primitive ontology of entities living in four-dimensional spacetime, they are good candidates to connect that quantum image with the manifest image of the world. However, to the extent that some (...) form of realism about the wave function is also necessary, one needs to endorse also the idea that the wave function refers to some kind of power. In the second part, I discuss some difficulties raised by the recent proposal that in Bohmian mechanics this power is holistically possessed by all the particles in the universe. (shrink)

Helen Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the sorts of things there are in the mind--events, processes, and states. She offers a fresh investigation of these three categories, clarifying the distinctions between them, and argues that the category of state has been very widely and seriously misunderstood.

The number of available legal documents has presented an enormous growth in recent years, and the digital processing of such materials is prompting the necessity of systems that support the automatic relevant information extraction. This work presents a system for ontology-based information extraction from natural language texts, able to identify a set of legal events. The system is based on an innovative methodology based on domain ontology of legal events and a set of linguistic rules, integrated through inference (...) mechanism, resulting in a flexible approach and scalable approach. A case study with the use of documents from the Superior Court in Brazil is related, with satisfactory results in precision and recall. (shrink)

As scholars have recently suggested, rhetoric has long been remiss when it comes to nondiscursive concerns beyond its traditional purview. While many have sought to broaden rhetoric's scope, no one has yet undertaken a nondiscursive rhetorical investigation of social change in an effort to reconcile the tension between a critique of agency and the perception of human responsibility. This article undertakes such a critique through Alain Badiou's concept of the event, a concept that, I contend, offers the discipline a (...) means of rethinking the opposition between relativism and flat ontology. Analyzing the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi through the frame of the event, I regard Bouazizi's act as an ontic occurrence exerting influence over protestors across the Arab world while demanding collective recognition to emerge as an event. (shrink)

Consider the most recent Yale-Harvard football game, an event which occurred on 11/20/21 in New Haven, lasting about three hours. This event, like many college football games before, was composed of four quarters, each of which was composed of possessions, each of which was composed of downs, each of which was composed of particular movements, tackles and decisions of the individual players. Each of these parts of the game was itself an event, occurring in a smaller region (...) of space and time than the game itself. Each of these events involved material objects like players, helmets, jerseys, etc. Each had causes and effects, and each instantiated qualitative properties, such as being a kickoff or being a tackle. These are paradigmatic examples of events. Events are many and varied; some other examples include the melting of an ice cube, the birth of a horse, the supernova of a star, the presidential election campaign and a winter snowstorm. Each of these took place in a certain region of spacetime, had other events as parts, involved certain objects, had causes and effects, and instantiated properties. Objects and their properties are not the only furniture in the world. Events are a crucial part of our manifest and scientific pictures of the world. We go to football games, think about and participate in elections, eagerly anticipate the birth of a child, and quantify over and explain such things in our scientific theories. Yet, events have received insufficient attention from metaphysicians. Some philosophers have been skeptical of events, holding that talk of events can be paraphrased away, or that events can be reduced to objects and properties.1 When philosophers have accepted events, their motivations have usually been extrinsic—events are introduced in order to play a role in a larger philosophical system. This tendency has led philosophers to miss a number of interesting features of events. In this paper, I wish to reverse that trend by developing an ontology of events which is not an afterthought with respect to another philosophical project. In so doing, I will provide answers to substantive metaphysical questions about the relations in which events stand and their identity conditions. In the next section, I identify four basic relations in which events stand: parthood, involvement, causation and instantiation, focusing in particular on involvement. Then, I argue that events are individuated by their involvements, and criticize the identity conditions which have been offered by other philosophers, notably Quine, Davidson and Kim. I then conclude. (shrink)

A medical intervention is a medical procedure or application intended to relieve or prevent illness or injury. Examples of medical interventions include vaccination and drug administration. After a medical intervention, adverse events (AEs) may occur which lie outside the intended consequences of the intervention. The representation and analysis of AEs are critical to the improvement of public health. Description: The Ontology of Adverse Events (OAE), previously named Adverse Event Ontology (AEO), is a community-driven ontology developed to (...) standardize and integrate data relating to AEs arising subsequent to medical interventions, as well as to support computer-assisted reasoning. OAE has over 3,000 terms with unique identifiers, including terms imported from existing ontologies and more than 1,800 OAE-specific terms. In OAE, the term ‘adverse event’ denotes a pathological bodily process in a patient that occurs after a medical intervention. Causal adverse events are defined by OAE as those events that are causal consequences of a medical intervention. OAE represents various adverse events based on patient anatomic regions and clinical outcomes, including symptoms, signs, and abnormal processes. OAE has been used in the analysis of several different sorts of vaccine and drug adverse event data. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo ingresa en la ontología del acontecer y recorre cuatro momentos. En primer lugar, distingue la visión del mundo en general, propia de la llamada “metafísica” de la visión del ser como acontecer, y busca un diálogo entre la perspectiva del ser en la metafísica y ontología de Hans-Georg Gadamer. En segundo lugar, analiza la estructura del acontecer o el modo como se despliega el movimiento del sentido, para determinar la lógica de la pregunta como estructura del acontecer. (...) En tercer lugar, entabla un diálogo entre la idea de acontecer y la categoría de finitud, para evidenciar que, cuando se piensa en una ontología del acontecer, esta remite a la determinación de la finitud. Y, finalmente, plantea algunas líneas de desarrollo para profundizar en esta investigación. ABSTRACT The articles discusses the ontology of the event and covers four moments. First, it identifies the general worldview typical of the “metaphysics” of being as event, and seeks to establish a dialogue between the perspective of being in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s metaphysics and his ontology. Secondly, it analyzes the structure of the event or the way in which the movement of meaning unfolds, in order to determine the logic of the question as structure of the event. Third, through a dialogue between the idea of event and the category of finitude, the article shows that thinking the ontology of the event leads to the determination of finitude. Finally, the article suggests a few lines of inquiry for further in-depth research of this topic. (shrink)

James Bahoh proposes a new methodology for explaining Heidegger's philosophy that solves a set of interpretive problems in his difficult later work and led to substantial inconsistencies in the scholarship. Bahoh reconstructs Heidegger's concept of event in relation to his theories of history, truth, difference, ground and time-space.

In his book Persons and Objects, Professor Chisholm undertakes to show the satisfactoriness of an ontology which does not admit the existence of concrete events, such as sneezings, runnings, etc. He attempts to show that if we allow the existence of states of affairs, these being everlastingly existing entities, we need not acknowledge the existence of those perishing entities which are concrete events. I n this paper I discuss the tenability of this contention, considering especially whether the reductions that (...) Chisholm offers cope satisfactorily with the phenomena of tense. I conclude that they do not. My conclusion is that, at this point in history, we do not know whether ontology can do without concrete events. (shrink)

In his book Persons and Objects, Professor Chisholm undertakes to show the satisfactoriness of an ontology which does not admit the existence of concrete events, such as sneezings, runnings, etc. He attempts to show that if we allow the existence of states of affairs, these being everlastingly existing entities, we need not acknowledge the existence of those perishing entities which are concrete events. I n this paper I discuss the tenability of this contention, considering especially whether the reductions that (...) Chisholm offers cope satisfactorily with the phenomena of tense. I conclude that they do not. My conclusion is that, at this point in history, we do not know whether ontology can do without concrete events. (shrink)

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze effectively argues that two types of relation between events govern their ‘evental’ or ‘ideal play’, and ultimately underlie determined substances, that is, worldly individuals and persons. Leibniz calls these relations ‘compossibility’ and ‘incompossibility’. Deleuze calls them ‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’. This paper explores how Deleuze appropriates and extends a number of Leibnizian concepts in order to ground the idea that events have ontological priority over substances ‘all the way down’.

We classify two of Bertrand Russell's theories of events within the point-free ontology. The first of such approaches was presented informally by Russell in ‘The World of Physics and the World of Sense’ (Lecture IV in Our Knowledge of the External World of 1914). Based on this theory, Russell sketched ways to construct instants as collections of events. This paper formalizes Russell's approach from 1914. We will also show that in such a reconstructed theory, we obtain all axioms of (...) Russell's second theory from 1936 and all axioms of Thomason's theory of events from 1989. Russell's work certainly influenced the works of Stanisław Leśniewski, his student Alfred Tarski, and Czesław Lejewski – prominent members of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS). We see our work in the tradition of the research of Leśniewski and Tarski. Building on the technical tools developed in this environment and in the spirit of the traditional research of the LWS, we engage here, in particular, with two classic works by Russell on fundamental ontology. (shrink)

I offer a formal ontological theory where the basic building blocks of the world are timeless events. The composition of events results in processes. Spacetime emerges as the system of all events. Things are construed as bundles of processes. I maintain that such a view is in accord with General Relativity and offers interesting prospects for the foundations of classical and quantum gravity.

In this work, Clayton Crockett rehabilitates Deleuze's position within contemporary political and philosophical thought, advancing an original reading of the thinker's major works and a constructive conception of his philosophical ontology.

Van der Heiden works largely with present-day thinkers such as Badiou, Nancy, Romano, Meillassoux, and Agamben, and examines contemporary thought as it seeks to recover a sense of the absolute, but without recourse to specifically theological underpinnings.

In this paper, I examine some of the most important theories of modern physics that support the notion that events are the basic ontological units of reality. The two main themes of this paper include: (1) physical evidence in support of an ontology of events, and (2) the increasing unification of physical theory until we arrive at the current state of two highly successful theories that are presently disunified within the search for a comprehensive, unified theory. With the revolutionary (...) developments in physics at the end of the nineteenth century, the mechanistic materialism of Newtonian physics began to break down and the ancient trinity of space, time and matter has been gradually replaced by the notion of the energy field. Physicists and philosophers who have held an event ontology specifically for its compatibility with electromagnetism, relativity theory and quantum mechanics include: Albert Einstein, Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, C. D. Broad, W. V. Quine, John Bell, Henry Stapp, and Milič Čapek among many others. For these theorists, events are the most fundamental entities of physical reality in contrast to the Aristotelian tradition which contends that events are secondary or dependent on physical substance. (shrink)

The recent work of Paul Teller and Sunny Auyang in the philosophy of Quantum Field Theory (QFT) has stimulated the search for the fundamental entities in this theory. In QFT, the classical notion of a particle collapses. The theory does not only exclude classical, i.e., spatiotemporally identifiable particles, but it makes particles of the same type conceptually indistinguishable. Teller and Auyang have proposed competing ersatz-ontologies to account for the 'loss of particles': field quanta vs. field events. Both ontologies, however, suffer (...) from serious defects. While quanta lack numerical identity, spatiotemporal localizability, and independence of basis-representations, events--if understood as concrete measurement events--are related to the theory only statistically. I propose an alternative solution: The entities of QFT are events of the type 'Quantum system, S, is in quantum state, Ψ '. These are not point events, but Davidsonian events, i.e., they can be identified by their location within the causal net of the world. (shrink)

Recent Neo-Davidsonian accounts of the semantics of progressive constructions of action verbs reflect an ontological distinction between processes or incomplete events on the one hand, and complete events on the other. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that this putative ontological distinction is beset with problems. The second goal of this paper is to offer the beginnings of a positive proposal that seeks to show how the ontologically austere Davidsonian can account for the truth conditions of (...) progressive constructions without the need for an enriched ontology. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to argue that issues in metaphysics—in particular issues about the nature of states and causation—will have a significant impact in philosophy of mind. As Steward puts it: “the category of state has been so grossly misunderstood that some theories of mind which are supposed to encompass entities traditionally regarded as falling under the category, e.g., beliefs and desires, cannot so much as be sensibly formulated, once we are clearer about the nature of states”. According (...) to Steward, there are two different approaches to the metaphysics of states: a view according to which states are events, and a view according to which states are facts. Steward says that many discussions in philosophy of mind proceed on the basis of the first view, and thus proceed on what she calls the particularist approach. Steward argues that the particularist approach is mistaken, that states are facts, and that if we would recognize this, many of the problems and positions in philosophy of mind would disappear. (shrink)

This paper aims at discussing the usage by Davidson as to events of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. According to Davidson, we are ontologically committed to the existence of events as individuals as we employ literally terms such as ‘Caesar’s death’, for instance. Davidson extends this analysis to actions as well, since actions are human events. One of the consequences of this view is that psychology deals with individual events in a non-lawful way. An alternative view is here proposed, based (...) on a complementary criterion, namely ontological density, according to which from the point of view of a given theory, we can always distinguish between events (or phenomena) and individuals (entities) among the overall occurrences described by the theory. Some consequences of this alternative view of psychology as a science dealing lawfully with general human events are also explored here. (shrink)

The investigation is devoted to the problem of formal representation of logical structure and ontological commitments of natural language event sentences. The specificity of ontological commitments problem with regard to natural and formal languages is shown. The alternative approaches to the formal representation of event sentences (argument approach, davidsonian and neodavidsonian approaches, operator approach) are characterized with respect to their key features from formal logical and ontological points of view. The difference in the logical structure of sentences expressing (...) events by verb phrases and by nominalization is depicted. The role of a paraphrase in formal representation of natural language phenomena is discussed, as well as the notions of “hermeneutic" and “revolutionary" approaches in logic-semantical analysis introduced by J. Burgess and G. Rosen. It is shown that the neodavidsonian approach with regard to verb phrases is an example of “revolutionary" approach because it changes the original logical structure of natural language sentences. The analysis of ontological commitments shows that there is no bound event variable in the logical structure of verb phrases at sentence level but it's included in the internal semantic structure of a verb. The possible ways to the logical interpretation of the natural language mechanism of the dynamic shift between verb-based and nomi- nalized sentences are outlined. (shrink)

The innovation of Alain Badiou’s theory of change, which has attracted a great amount of attention from scholars working in disciplines across humanities, social sciences, and art over the past two decades, cannot be appreciated independently of the account of situations prior to an event’s irruption, namely, the order of being that is conceived using modern set theory in his treatise on general ontology. Retracing the meticulous systematicity with which pre-evental situations are conceived in Being and Event, (...) this paper offers a reconstruction of Badiou’s general ontology that points toward the potential therein for articulating an account of structures and situations that may be qualified as social. (shrink)

I will compare Huayan Buddhism's metaphysical vision ith that of A.N. Whitehead, both of them emphasizing that events in dynamic relation constitute the fundamental elements of reality. In Huayan Buddhism, all events are organically related to each ot and thereby constitute a harmonious and dynamic network of existents as metaphorized by Indra's Net of Jewels, in which one jewel reflects many other jewels and many reflect one. In Whitehead's view, events, or actual entities in Process and Reality, constitute the basic (...) elements of the universe that are in the proces of creativity in which many are integrated into one while adding a new one to the many. The purpose of this comparative work is to philoophically articulate an ontology ofdynamic relation in support of a theory of strangification. (shrink)

The philosophy of action is about agents and actions. As such, it has both a metaphysical and an ethical dimension. My dissertation is divided into three papers. ;The first is wholly metaphysical, concentrating on the ontology of actions. I explore the relationship between actions reported by a certain class of "by" -sentences and argue that the relationship is identity. ;The second paper concerns the bearing that ontological conclusions about actions have on ethics. I argue that, except for the claim (...) that there are no such entities as actions, ontological conclusions about actions do not make a substantive difference to ethical theory. ;In the third paper, I concentrate on the ethical issue of an agent's responsibility for her actions. I argue that an agent is responsible only if she could have done otherwise, as long as "could have done otherwise" is interpreted as meaning "would have done otherwise if she had so chosen.". (shrink)