This article demonstrates that emotion concepts—including the so‐called basic ones, such as anger or sadness—can be defined in terms of universal semantic primitives such as “good”, “bad”, “do”, “happen”, “know”, and “want”, in terms of which all areas of meaning, in all languages, can be rigorously and revealingly portrayed.The definitions proposed here take the form of certain prototypical scripts or scenarios, formulated in terms of thoughts, wants, and feelings. These scripts, however, can be seen as formulas providing rigorous (...) specifications of necessary and sufficient conditions (not for emotions as such, but for emotion concepts), and they do not support the idea that boundaries between emotion concepts are “fuzzy.” On the contrary, the small set of universal semantic primitives employed here (which has emerged from two decades of empirical investigations by the author and colleagues) demonstrates that even apparent synonyms such as sad and unhappy embody different—and fully specifiable—conceptual structures. (shrink)

A central question for philosophical psychology is which mental faculties form natural kinds. There is hot debate over the kind status of faculties as diverse as consciousness, seeing, concepts, emotions, constancy and the senses. In this paper, I take emotions and concepts as my main focus, and argue that questions over the kind status of these faculties are complicated by the undeservedly overlooked fact that natural kinds are indeterminate in certain ways. I will show that indeterminacy issues have (...) led to an impasse in the debates over emotions and concepts. I first consider and reject one way of resolving this impasse. I then suggest a different method, which places more emphasis on a close analysis of predictive and explanatory practices in psychology. I argue that when we apply this method, a new position emerges: that it is indeterminate whether concepts or emotions are natural kinds. They are neither determinately natural kinds, nor determinately not natural kinds. Along the way, we will see that natural kinds have been put to two completely different theoretical uses, which are often been blurred together, and that they are ill-suited to fulfil one of them. (shrink)

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2008.

Although we have gained great insight into the variety of cultural influences on emotion concept prototypes from a plethora of studies examining such cross-cultural effects, there has been relatively little academic focus on the nature of emotion concept prototypes within a cultural perspective. Our discussion of the nature of emotion concept prototypes centres on essentialist versus non-essentialist principles. We argue that at a general, decontextualised level, essentialist and non-essentialist principles predict similarity in the structure of emotion (...) concept prototypes. We further argue that context is central in assessments of the nature of emotion concept prototypes from a cultural perspective. Rather than asking how emotion concept prototypes differ as a consequence of how certain influences might vary from one culture to another, a key question is whether emotion concept prototypes vary in different contexts within and between cultures and what this might inform us about the nature of emotion concept prototypes. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they (...) are experienced. People consider that emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

The process by which emotion concepts are learned is largely unexplored. Hoemann, Devlin, and Barrett and Shablack, Stein, and Lindquist argue that emotion concepts are learned throug...

“Parting is such sweet sorrow.” Taste metaphors provide a rich vocabulary for describing emotional experience, potentially serving as an adaptive mechanism for conveying abstract emotional concepts using concrete verbal references to our shared experience. We theorized that the popularity of these expressions results from the close association with hedonic valence shared by these two domains of experience. To explore the possibility that this affective quality underlies the semantic similarity of these domains, we used a behavioral “odd-one-out” task in an (...) online sample of 1059 participants in order to examine the semantic similarity of concepts related to emotion, taste, and color, another rich source of sensory metaphors. We found that the semantic similarity of emotion and taste concepts was greater than that of emotion and color concepts. Importantly, the similarity of taste and emotion concepts was strongly related to their similarity in hedonic valence, a relationship which was also significantly greater than that present between color and emotion. These results suggest that the common core of valence between taste and emotion concepts allows us to bridge the conceptual divide between our shared sensory environment and our internal emotional experience. (shrink)

Emotion development research centrally concerns capacities to produce emotions and to think about them. We distinguish these enterprises and consider a novel account of how they might be related. On one recent account, the capacity to have emotions of various kinds comes by way of the acquisition of emotion concepts. This account relies on a constructionist theory of emotions and an embodied theory of emotion concepts. We explicate these elements, then raise a challenge for the (...) approach. It appears to be incompatible with various familiar ways in which cognitions about one’s own emotions can come apart from episodes of emotion. (shrink)

The Turing Test is routinely understood as a behaviourist test for machine intelligence. Diane Proudfoot has argued for an alternative interpretation. According to Proudfoot, Turing’s claim that intelligence is what he calls ‘an emotional concept’ indicates that he conceived of intelligence in response-dependence terms. As she puts it: ‘Turing’s criterion for “thinking” is…: x is intelligent if in the actual world, in an unrestricted computer-imitates-human game, x appears intelligent to an average interrogator’. The role of the famous test is thus (...) to provide the conditions in which to examine the average interrogator’s responses. I shall argue that Proudfoot’s analysis falls short. The philosophical literature contains two main models of response-dependence, what I shall call the transparency model and the reference-fixing model. Proudfoot resists the thought that Turing might have endorsed one of these models to the exclusion of the other. But the details of her own analysis indicate that she is, in fact, committed to the claim that Turing’s account of intelligence is grounded in a transparency model, rather than a reference-fixing one. By contrast, I shall argue that while Turing did indeed conceive of intelligence in response-dependence terms, his account is grounded in a reference-fixing model, rather than a transparency one. This is fortunate, because, as an account of intelligence, the transparency model is arguably problematic in a way that the reference-fixing model isn’t. (shrink)

선진유가는 다양한 시도를 통해 유가의 이론적 기반을 강화하며, 이 과정에서 정감을 적극적으로 활용한다. 예의 근본이 어디에 위치하는지에 대한 문제를 탐구할 때에 선진유 가는 예의 근본이 진실한 정감에 있다고 주장한다. 예의 형식은 변할 수 있지만 그 안에 내재된 진실한 정감은 영원히 변하지 않아야 한다고 믿었기 때문이다. 나아가 선진유가는 정감의 연쇄적인 작용을 분석하며 하늘의 법칙에서부터 본성․정감․구체적인 행동까지 의 과정을 모식화하여 인간을 해석하는데 정감을 활용한다. 한편, 선진유가는 인간의 내면 에 주목하여 이상적인 정치에 관해 논의를 시도한다. 선진유가는 위정자가 도덕적 정감을 정치적 영역으로 확장시킬 수 (...) 있다면 이상적인 정치를 실현할 수 있다고 강력히 주장한다. 이는 도덕적인 정감을 기반으로 한 행동과 결정이 정치의 성패를 결정한다는 신념을 나타 내며, 정치적인 행위가 도덕적 가치와 일치할 때에만 바람직한 결과를 얻을 수 있다고 믿 은 것이다. 다시 말해 선진유가는 정감을 통해 인간의 내면을 이해하고, 이를 기반으로 한 이상적인 정치를 추구하는 철학적인 방식을 제시하고 있다. (shrink)

The question of how people represent emotions is eminently important for a number of different domains of psychological research. The present study tested the assumption that emotion concepts are represented similar to theories in that they are comprised of a set of causally interrelated features. Using emotional scenarios and investigating the emotion concepts of anger, anxiety, and sadness it was found that people's representations of emotion concepts essentially involved the representation of the causal relation (...) of emotion features and that the causal status of a feature determined the feature's centrality in the concept. Moreover, people's representations of emotion concepts corresponded to basic assumptions of cognitive emotion theories, namely that cognitive appraisals cause other surface features of emotion, like expression and behaviour. By providing evidence for a theory-based representation, the present results show that the classical and the prototype approach are insufficient to model the representation of emotion concepts. (shrink)

The Influence of Emotional and Non-emotional Concepts Activation on Information Processing and Unintentional Memorizing The aim of the work is to compare mechanisms of semantic and emotional processing and memory. Targets were primed by category name. The congruency of prime and target was manipulated. The reaction time of lexical decisions and the effects of unintentional memorizing of word targets were measured. Activation of semantic and emotional nodes leads to faster processing of related concepts: congruent targets are processed faster (...) than incongruent. Processing congruent primed emotional concepts depends on their modality: anger and joy words are processed faster than sadness. Thus, congruently primed activating emotional concepts are processed differently from congruently primed deactivating concepts. The effectiveness of unintentional memory of emotional and non-emotional concepts is based on different mechanisms: congruently primed emotional words are better remembered than incongruently primed. The results are discussed in the framework of spreading activation theory and theory of emotional memory. (shrink)

In § 49 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant puts forward a view that the feeling of pleasure in the experience of the beautiful can be stimulated not merely by perceptual properties, but by ideas and thoughts as well. The aim of this paper is to argue that aesthetic ideas fill in the emptiness that abstract and emotion concepts on their own would have without empirical intuitions. That is, aesthetic ideas make these concepts more (...) accessible to us, by creating image schemas that allow us to think about these abstract concepts in a way linked to sensory experience, thereby imbuing them with a more substantive meaning and understanding. (shrink)

On the assumption that shame is a universal emotion, cross-cultural research on shame relies on translations assumed to be equivalent in meaning. Our studies here questioned that assumption. In three studies,shamewas compared to its translations in Spanish and in Malayalam. American English speakers usedshamefor the emotional reaction to moral failures and its use correlated positively withguilt, whereasvergüenzaandnanakeduwere used less for moral stories and their use correlated less with the guilt words. In comparison with Spanish and Malayalam speakers’ ratings of (...) their translations, American English speakers ratedshameandguiltto be more similar to each other. (shrink)

Cognitive impairment, alterations in mood, emotion dysregulation are just a few of the consequences of depression. Despite depression being reported as the most common mental disorder worldwide, examining depression or risks of depression is still challenging. Emotional reactivity has been observed to predict the risk of depression, but the results have been mixed for negative emotional reactivity. To better understand the emotional response conflict, we asked our participants to describe their feeling in meaningful sentences alongside reporting their reactions to (...) the emotionally evocative words. We presented a word on the screen and asked participants to perform two tasks, rate their feeling after reading the word using the self-assessment manikin scale, and describe their feeling using the property generation task. The emotional content was analyzed using a novel machine-learning algorithm approach. We performed these two tasks in blocks and randomized their order across participants. Beck Depression Inventory was used to categorize participants into self-reported non-depressed and depressed groups. Compared to the ND, the D group reported reduced positive emotional reactivity when presented with extremely pleasant words regardless of their arousal levels. However, no significant difference was observed between the D and ND groups for negative emotional reactivity. In contrast, we observed increased sadness and inclination toward low negative context from descriptive content by the D compared to the ND group. The positive content analyses showed mixed results. The contrasting results between the emotional reactivity and emotional content analyses demand further examination between cohorts of self-reported depressive symptoms, no-symptoms, and MDD patients to better examine the risks of depression and help design early interventions. (shrink)

Ruba and Repacholi review an important debate in the emotion development literature: whether infants can perceive and understand facial configurations as instances of discrete emotion catego...

In this book Mark Wynn argues that the landscape of philosophical theology looks rather different from the perspective of a re-conceived theory of emotion. In matters of religion, we do not need to opt for objective content over emotional form or vice versa. On the contrary, these strategies are mistaken at root, since form and content are not properly separable here - because 'inwardness' may contribute to 'thought-content', or because emotional feelings can themselves constitute thoughts; or because, to put (...) the point a further way, in religious contexts, perception and conception are often infused by feeling. Wynn uses this perspective to forge a distinctive approach to a range of established topics in philosophy of religion, notably: religious experience; the problem of evil; the relationship of religion and ethics, and religion and art; and in general, the connection of 'feeling' to doctrine and tradition. (shrink)

Theories of emotion have often maintained artificial boundaries: for instance, that cognition and emotion are separable, and that an emotion concept is separable from the emotional events that comprise its category (e.g. “fear” is distinct from instances of fear). Over the past several years, research has dissolved these artificial boundaries, suggesting instead that conceptual construction is a domain-general process—a process by which the brain makes meaning of the world. The brain constructs emotion concepts, but also (...) cognitions and perceptions, all in the service of guiding action. In this view, concepts are multimodal constructions, dynamically prepared from a set of highly variable instances. This approach obviates old questions (e.g. how does cognition regulate emotion?) but generates new ones (e.g. how does a brain learn emotion concepts?). In this paper, we review this constructionist, predictive coding account of emotion, considering its implications for health and well-being, culture and development. (shrink)

This review takes a historical perspective on concepts in the psychology of motivation and emotion, and surveys recent developments, debates and applications. Old debates over emotion have recently risen again. For example, are emotions necessarily subjective feelings? Do animals have emotions? I review evidence that emotions exist also as core psychological processes, which have objectively detectable features, and which can occur either with subjective feelings or without them. Evidence is offered also that studies of emotion in (...) animals can give new insights into human emotions. Beyond emotion, motivation concepts also have changed over decades, and debates still continue. Motivation was once thought in terms of aversive drives, and reward was thought of in terms of drive reduction. Motivation-as-drive concepts were largely replaced by motivation-as-incentive concepts, yet aversive drive concepts still occasionally surface in motivation neuroscience today. Among incentive motivation concepts, incentive salience is a core process, mediated by brain mesocorticolimbic systems (dopamine-related systems) and sometimes called ‘wanting’ (in quotation marks), to distinguish it from cognitive forms of desire (wanting without quotation marks). Incentive salience as ‘wanting’ is separable also from pleasure ‘liking’ for the same reward, which has important implications for several human clinical disorders. Ordinarily, incentive salience adds motivational urgency to cognitive desires, but ‘wanting’ and cognitive desires can dissociate in some conditions. Excessive incentive salience can cause addictions, in which excessive ‘wanting’ can diverge from cognitive desires. Conversely, lack of incentive salience may cause motivational forms of anhedonia in depression or schizophrenia, whereas a negatively-valenced form of ‘fearful salience’ may contribute to paranoia. Finally, negative ‘fear’ and ‘disgust’ have both partial overlap but also important neural differences. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ. Cet article examine plusieurs façons de comprendre les émotions comme des réactions évaluatives. Il existe un consensus dans les sciences affectives qui veut que les émotions paradigmatiques soient faites de quatre composants : catégorisation du stimulus, tendances à l’action, changements corporels et aspect phénoménal. L’article expose les quatre principales théories dans la philosophie contemporaine des émotions et montre qu’elles ont tendance à se focaliser sur l’un ou l’autre des quatre composants des émotions pour expliquer leur nature évaluative. La conclusion (...) est qu’il est possible de rendre compte des émotions comme réactions évaluatives à ces quatre niveaux et que, pour cette raison, les conceptions présentées sont plus complémentaires qu’on ne le suppose généralement. ABSTRACT. This article examines several ways of understanding emotions as evaluative reactions. There is a consensus in affective sciences that paradigmatic emotions are made up of four components: appraisal process, action tendencies, bodily changes, and phenomenal character. The article outlines the four main theories in contemporary philosophy of emotions and shows that they tend to focus on one of the four components of emotions to explain their evaluative nature. The conclusion is that it is possible to account for emotions as evaluative reactions through the four components and that, for this reason, the theories presented are more complementary than is generally assumed. (shrink)

The study of emotional concepts stands at a very interesting intersection between the theoretical debate about the nature of emotions and the debate about the nature of processing concrete concepts and abstract concepts. On the one hand, it is debated whether it is possible to differentiate basic emotions from secondary emotions and, on the other hand, whether emotional concepts differ from abstract concepts. In this regard, the prototypical perceptual aspects are considered an important factor both (...) for the differentiation between concrete and abstract concepts and for the differentiation between basic and secondary emotions (facial expressions). Thus, the objective has been to determine if (a) the presence or absence of a prototypical perceptual referent, and (b) the type of concept (referring to emotion and not referring to emotion), produce differences between concepts of basic emotions, secondary emotions and concepts not related to emotions, concrete and abstract, in the tasks of qualification of concreteness, imageability and availability of context and the task of the list of properties, that have been used in previous studies. A total of 86 university students from the suburbs of La Serena - Coquimbo (Chile), all native Spanish speakers, participated in the study. The results show that in the perception of concreteness and in the total of enumerated properties, emotional concepts presented similar results to abstract concepts not related to emotion and there was no difference between basic and secondary emotion concepts. In imageability and context availability, emotional concepts were perceived as different from and more concrete than abstract concepts. In addition, the cause-effect type attributes allowed to clearly differentiate emotional concepts from those not related to emotion and to differentiate between basic and secondary emotion concepts. These types of attributes appear almost exclusively in emotional concepts and are more frequent in basic emotions. These results are partially consistent with the predictions of Neurocultural and Conceptual Act theories about emotions. (shrink)

Many authors have argued that emotions serve an epistemic role in our moral practice. Some argue that this epistemic connection is so strong that creatures who do not share our affective nature will be unable to grasp our moral concepts. I argue that even if this sort of incommensurability does result from the role of affect in morality, incommensurability does not in itself entail relativism. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that one must share our emotions (...) and concerns to be able to apply our moral concept successfully. Finally, I briefly investigate whether the moral realist can seek aid and comfort from Davidsonian arguments to the effect that incommensurability in ethics is in principle impossible, and decide that these arguments are not successful. I conclude that the epistemic role our emotions play in moral discourse does not relativize morality. (shrink)

Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting that information to us in a way susceptible of conscious articulation and, sometimes, even despite our consciously held and internally justified judgment that the situation contains no such reasons. In this paper, I want to explore the implications of the fact that emotions show varying degrees of integration with our conscious agency—from (...) none at all to quite substantial—for our understanding of our rationality, and in particular for the traditional assumption that weakness of the will is necessarily irrational. (shrink)

Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting that information to us in a way susceptible of conscious articulation and, sometimes, even despite our consciously held and internally justified judgment that the situation contains no such reasons. In this paper, I want to explore the implications of the fact that emotions show varying degrees of integration with our conscious agency—from (...) none at all to quite substantial—for our understanding of our rationality, and in particular for the traditional assumption that weakness of the will is necessarily irrational. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to illuminate the limitations of adopting thick ethical concepts to support the rationality of moral emotion. To this end, I shall first of all concentrate on whether emotions, especially moral emotions are thick concepts and can be analysed into both evaluative and descriptive components. Secondly,I shall examine Gibbard’s thesis that to judge an act wrong is to think guilt and anger warranted. I then raise the following question. If we identify moral (...) considerations with anger in particular, it overly emphasizes one seemingly arbitrary emotion. In other words, I doubt whether ‘other’s anger’ can be the general concept corresponding to thick concepts such as courage or generosity. My doubt about the objectivity of Gibbard’s moral emotion depends on Bernard Williams’doubt about ethical objectivity in terms of a critical notice of the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts. Finally, I shall pose a challenge to the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts on the ground that it is not in fact a clear one. I shall argue that it is impossible clearly to classify various ethical concepts either as thick or thin. This is because, I shall argue, as Scheffler points out, “any division of ethical concepts into the two categories of the thick and the thin is itself a considerable oversimplication.” Indeed, I shall argue, our ethical vocabulary is tragically rich with an irreconcilable plurality of values. If my analysis is right, I argue Gibbard’s attempt to appeal to thick concepts to explain the rationality of moral emotion is open to question. (shrink)

The target articles and commentaries reveal considerable support for the view that the term “emotion” names neither a natural kind nor a coherent psychological category. This brief response revisits a couple of historical points about the meanings of “emotion,” as well as the ancient debate between Stoicism and Christianity.

This is an observational exploratory study assessing self-concept and its association with depression, anxiety, satisfaction with life, and quality of life 6 months after experiencing a traumatic brain injury. Participants were 33 patients who suffered a traumatic brain injury 6 months before the assessment. The measures used in this study were the Repertory Grid Technique, Patient Health Questionnaire-9, Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7, Satisfaction With Life Scale, and the Quality of Life after Brain Injury. We calculated Euclidean distances to assess differences in (...) pre-and post-injury self-perception, as well as the proportion of opposed pole construct rating and polarization to understand how they are associated with the scores of the other offered measures. We found that the distance between the present and ideal self, as well as the distance between the present self and the self before the lesion showed moderate positive correlations with depression, and negative correlations with satisfaction with life and quality of life. Also, for the present and self before the lesion, the proportion of opposed pole ratings was correlated with depression symptoms, quality, and satisfaction with life, while for the present self and the ideal self this proportion was correlated with all the measures. The proportion of polarization of the present self and the total polarization was negatively correlated with symptom measures. The repertory grid might facilitate a greater understanding of self-concept after traumatic brain injury. This information could be used to guide treatments that address the emotions related to distances observed in the perception of the self. (shrink)

This article analyses the concept of ?aesthetic emotion? in John Dewey's Art as experience. The analysis shows that Dewey's line of investigation offers valuable insights as to the role of emotion in experience: it shows emotion as an integral part and structuring force, as a cultural and historical category. However, the notion of aesthetic emotion is characterized by a fundamental ambiguity. There is a conflict between a mechanical and an organic understanding of emotion, a confusion (...) of emotion as structure and of emotion as process, of emotion as content and as agency. The central problem may consist of the conception of aesthetic experience as the ideal. While evil and despair are thereby excluded from the art, everyday life is left wanting, as it cannot live up to the ideal. (shrink)

Verifying that conceptualisations of emotions are consistent across languages and cultures is a critical precondition for meaningful cross-cultural research on emotional experience. For achievement...

ABSTRACTRecent discussions in the field of moral cognition suggest that the relationship between emotion and judgment-formation can be described in three separate ways: firstly, it narrows our atte...

In this article, I outline a relational-developmental conception of emotion that situates emotional activity within a broader conception of persons as holistic, relational beings. In this model, emotions consist of felt forms of engagement with the world. As felt aspects of ongoing action, uninhibited emotional experiences are not private states that are inaccessible to other people; instead, they are revealed directly through their bodily expressions. As multicomponent processes, emotional experiences exhibit both continuity and dramatic change in development. Building on (...) these ideas, I describe an intersubjective methodology for studying developmental changes in the structure of emotional experience. I illustrate the approach with an analysis of developmental changes in the structure of anger from birth to adulthood. (shrink)

Les êtres humains tracent les contours de leur vie individuelle, sociale et politique dans un réseau de langage. L’utilisation de la langue préside à tout ce qu’ils font, à la manière dont ils agissent et pensent. Charles Taylor explore ces dimensions anthropologiques du langage. Cet article traite de trois différents aspects de cette anthropologie fondée sur le langage et met à l’épreuve les considérations de Taylor à l’aide de trois questions distinctes touchant à la relation entre le langage et la (...) vie des êtres humains. Il s’agit d’abord de comprendre comment sa vision constitutive du langage peut être liée à sa critique de l’approche médiationnelle du langage. L’article aborde ensuite la relation entre le langage et les concepts et, enfin, la question des émotions. (shrink)

Are mass emotions and shared feelings two different phenomena? In this paper, I investigate two different forms of corporeal interaction; one bipolar and one unipolar. In the bipolar type, two individuals give different impulses, which are aligned with each other. In the unipolar type, the impulse derives from a thing, a task or a person. This impulse creates an identical corporeal dynamic in those involved. This synchronization of the corporeal directions leads to corporeal resonance and a reciprocal intensification. The shared (...) experience of feelings is a part of unipolar corporeal interaction since the impulse for the corporeal dynamic of the individuals departs from one and the same feeling. According to Max Scheler’s analysis of emotional contagion, contagion comes about through imitation; it is merely a fallacy to believe the other person’s feeling is one’s own. In this paper, I argue that emotional contagion and shared feelings cannot be distinguished by virtue of this criterion of genuineness and instead belong to the same type of corporeal interaction. On the whole, I question the assumption that feelings are solely personal states. Individual and collective feelings can only be distinguished unambiguously through concepts, whereas affective phenomena are always tied to others, to norms and discourse. (shrink)

헤겔은 자신의 전체론적 정신 모델을 통해 감정의 개념을 발전시킨다. 감정은 감각과 신체화와 더불어 발생한다. 감각이 대상에 대한 지향적 관계에서 발생한다면, 감정은 감각에 대한 나의 현상적 의식을 의미하며 신체화는 감각과 감정에 동반된다. 감각-감정-신체화는 동시적인 현상이지 단계적인 과정이 아니다. 헤겔에 따르면 인간의 정신은 감각-감정-신체화 현상을 ‘습관’이라는 과정을 통해 자기에 복속시킨다. 이 과정이 없다면 정신은 감각-감정-신체화라는 자동적인 과정에 갇혀 있게 된다. 하지만 반복되는 이 과정의 경험을 통해 정신은 이 과정 자체를 습관화한다. 이를 통해 정신은 대부분의 감각-감정-신체화 과정을 의식하지 않게 된다. 더 나아가 정신은 (...) 감각-감정-신체화에 의해 영향을 받는 수동적인 상태가 아니라 능동적인 주체로 발전한다. 감각과 감정, 신체화는 정신이 자신의 내면을 표현하는 상징적 기호가 된다. 감각과 감정, 신체적 변화는 정신에게 발생하는 것이 아니다. 오히려 정신은 이들을 통해 자신을 표현한다. 물론 정신이 표현하려는 의미와 상징적 기호로서의 감각, 감정, 신체적 변화는 불일치하다. 이점에서 인지주의의 딜레마가 발생한다. 인지주의의 딜레마는 우리가 감정을 인지주의적으로 해석할 때 발생한다. 이에 따르면 감정은 인지주의적인 내용을 가지지만, 동일한 인지주의적 내용이 서로 다른 감정을 발생시킬 수 있다. 더 나아가 동일한 감정이 서로 다른 인지주의적 내용을 전제로 할 수도 있다. 이러한 인지주의의 딜레마는 헤겔의 감정이론으로 해결되는 것이 아니라 해소된다. (shrink)

The concept of work engagement has aroused the interest of many scholars. However, there has been limited academic research in examining how authentic leadership can influence WE, which consequently influences organizational citizenship behavior and task performance. In particular, this study divides WE into cognitive engagement, emotional engagement, and physical engagement to fully reflect the engagement theory. This study introduces three dimensions of WE and tests the theoretical model to validate cognitive engagement, emotional engagement, and physical engagement. Empirical testing using a (...) survey of 151 employees of retail travel agencies in Taiwan revealed that the AL can influence cognitive engagement, emotional engagement, and physical engagement, and also OCB and TP. These analysis results can assist vendors to implement OCB and TP through WE and AL. (shrink)