Abstract
Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting that information to us in a way susceptible of conscious articulation and, sometimes, even despite our consciously held and internally justified judgment that the situation contains no such reasons. In this paper, I want to explore the implications of the fact that emotions show varying degrees of integration with our conscious agency—from none at all to quite substantial—for our understanding of our rationality, and in particular for the traditional assumption that weakness of the will is necessarily irrational.
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246100007967
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
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The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A Cognitive–Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment.Adenekan Dedeke - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 126 (3):1-21.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

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