What do human beings desire? Desire is diverse, multi-layered, often contradictory, directed to the most various goals: from the satisfaction of the simplest, biologically-related needs, such as hunger, thirst, or sexuality, to elaborate forms of desire for self-realization, social recognition or religious experience. But what is the ultimate goal of desire? Is there such a goal? The book examines desire as a phenomenon in the intersection area of anthropological and psychological philosophy. It deals with the anthropological principle, indicated in Plato (...) and formulated by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, according to which all desire is ultimately directed to a Supreme Good or God. It critically reconsiders this principle by taking into account current phenomenology, empirical psychology and neuroscience. -/- . (shrink)

Spinoza es un filósofo que, en pleno siglo XVII, propone una reforma no sólo del pensamiento, sino también, por y en virtud de ésta, una respecto del deseo. Este término aparece en Ética tanto con la noción de cupiditas, esencia del hombre, sinónimo de términos como potencia, acción y virtud, pero también con desiderium, cuya traducción más literal es la de deseo, pero que bajo el cuño interpretativo de su obra, ha sido traducida al español con términos como frustración, (...) anhelo, añoranza, nostalgia. Se pretende establecer aquí la distinción entre ambos y situar de modo tentativo las consecuencias ontológicas, éticas y políticas del afecto de desiderium como base para pensar la propiedad como posesión –en su vinculación con el amor- en el marco de la Ética. (shrink)

L'uomo non si può compiere, per il teologo francese Henri de Lubac, se non in Dio, sia Origine (creatore) e Fine ultimo. Qualunque meta finita quindi è destinata a rivelarsi come non appagante. Lo sostenevano già non solo Agostino e i Padri della Chiesa, ma anche Tommaso d'Aquino , col concetto di “desiderium naturale videndi Deum”, poi dimenticato dai tomisti moderni, e riscoperto appunto da de Lubac.

In order to understand the reactions to the publication in 1893 of l’Action by Maurice Blondel, we should investigate the philosophical climate at the end of the 19th century both at French universities and in ecclesiastical circles. In the latter, Blondel was suspected of modernism because he criticised Thomist metaphysics as losing itself in abstractions because of its distance from life. Did this perhaps show contempt of the metaphysical abilities of the intellect? In his own philosophy, moreover, Blondel presented the (...) supernatural as absolutely necessary and yet as absolutely impossible. Was this overrating the intellect? If human reason in explaining human nature deals with the metaphysical level, does not this reduce the metaphysical to the merely natural level? Blondel’s philosophy did indeed owe a debt to the method of immanence, which he thought capable of speaking about what medieval man knew as desiderium naturale Dei . At French universities, on the other hand, the principle of immanence had been raised to a quasi-dogma. The neo-Cartesians agreed with the neo-Kantians that philosophy should limit itself to that part of worldly reality which reason can master. The criticism from both sides were due to a misunderstanding of Blondel’s intentions. He intended to work out a metaphysics of the will. Within this framework, it was his conviction that all forms of thinking are threatened by abstraction as soon as they refuse to acknowledge that thinking is related to the dynamics of the will, albeit different trom the act of volition. Blondel’s metaphysics of the will is based on an extensive phenomenology of action, whose existential impact goes together with a rigorous dialectical line of reasoning. As the dialectics of Hegel’s Phänomenologie searches for the adequacy between consecutive certainties and ultimate truth, so Blondel’s dialectics goes in search of the adequacy between the consecutive aims of the will and the ultimate goal of the will’s dynamics. We discuss this analogy in the awareness that Blondel is not a Catholic Hegel. As to the theological discussion of the supernatural within a philosophical perspective, Bouillard’s interpretation is succinctly presented. (shrink)

The word 'metaphysics' includes the affirmation of a difference, of a 'distanciation' which is first and foremost towards the sensible world considered after the manner of positivism: the encyclical Fides et ratio interprets the word 'metaphysics' in this way. The logic of 'distanciation' is that of analogy, which exercises the power of intellectus as distinct from ratio. The soul of metalogic as analogy is desiderium, the original affective disposition of spirit.

The desire of knowledge constitutes, as it is well known, the opening ‘theme’ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This article focuses on the figure of Dominic of Flanders, one of the commentators of Aristotle’s Metaphysics who much developed this topic. Dominicus deals with it in the second question of the first book of his commentary. What makes the interest of Dominic’s account is its originality, in so far as, according to him, the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics aims to stress the very primacy (...) of Metaphsyics, and not only, the primacy of science in general. In this sense, the desire of knowledge constitutes for Dominic the most efficacious argument for the primacy of Metaphsyics. However, this is possible only if the desiderium sciendi is related to two other principles: the first is that desirability entails perfection, and the second is that the desirability of an object depends on its intelligibility. (shrink)

The affective knowledge of God is this kind of knowledge that follows human affection. This knowledge comes about on two levels: on the natural human inclination to God and on the religious level of man’s orientation towards God. What is the nature of the affective knowledge of God? What does the passage of ex affectu circa divina in intellectum consist in? It seems that there are three matters: – firstly, since there is a natural inclination towards God in man ( (...) class='Hi'>desiderium naturale vivendi Deum), man will be “restless” as long as he does not recognise or find God, – secondly, who loves God gains a new and more profound knowledge of Divine matters through con-naturalness and inclination, – thirdly, as a result of meeting with God and unification with Him, man experiences certain subjective states that cannot be expressed in words. (shrink)

The understanding of the human person as a natural desire for the beatific vision prompted fierce and convoluted debate between those who, like de Lubac, espoused la nouvelle théologie, and those who sought to maintain the standard view of the nature-grace relationship. This paper attempts to draw attention to the criticisms which Rahner addressed towards la nouvelle théologie, and to suggest that the distinction which Emmanuel Levinas makes between need (besoin) and desire (désir) offers a useful way of progressing the (...) debate and articulating the understanding of the person as desiderium naturale beyond the language of logical and ontological coherence, and in the language of proximity, ethical summons, and responsibility. (shrink)

¿Está suficientemente presente el deseo en la Divina Comedia para tomarlo en consideración? ¿Es realmente la purificación del deseo el núcleo del Purgatorio dantesco? Con estas dos preguntas queremos iluminar el tema del deseo en el poema dantesco. La disertación se enmarcará en el sentido de desiderium aportado por santo Tomás en su Tratado de las pasiones (S. Th., I-II, q.22-48) y en las cuestiones relativas a las potencias del alma (S. Th., I, q.78-80). Con el marco tomista como (...) referencia, estudiaremos la purificación del deseo, especialmente del racional, y la entenderemos como el proceso de ordenación y desvelamiento del deseo último del hombre: contemplar a Dios cara a cara. Para ello, destacaremos la ayuda de la virtud y de la educación de la mirada como dos factores fundamentales para culminar el ascenso por la montaña de la purificación y permitir al alma alcanzar la cumbre de sus deseos en el Paraíso. Como conclusión, señalaremos que la purificación del deseo ilumina nuestra naturaleza y permite lograr la unión real entre Dios y su criatura. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the idea of beatitudo in Duns Scotus. We begin with the Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum, where the Doctor Subtilis presents a conception of the act of intellective knowledge through the natural meaning of beatitude. Taking up the famous incipit of the Metaphysics, Duns Scotus develops the idea of a maximum desiderium and a maxima scientia as a way of human and natural perfection. In conceiving this desiderium naturale as form of ultimate realization, he (...) sees it as similar to the knowledge of immaterial substances in statu viae. His definition of beatitudo also disagrees with the Thomist doctrine, developing it a priori as a cognitio intuitiva, making it possible for humans to achieve happiness in statu viae. In contrast, in Ordinatio IV, dist. 49, Scotus emphasizes the value of beatitude in its ethical and theological sense, taking recourse to the Augustinian and Boethian definitions in order to understand its nature as the full expression of the intellective, volitional a... (shrink)

Between 1934 and 1937 Maurice Blondel, the French Roman Catholic philosopher best known for his 1893 work, Action, published a trilogy of writings. Out of these writings came a theological ontology of tremendous force, creativity, and coherence. The purpose of the present dissertation is to reassess the viability of Blondel's ontology for contemporary theology. The retrieval begins with John Milbank's 1990 investigation of Blondel's early philosophy. While Milbank focuses on the strengths of Blondel, he also highlights some critical weaknesses. The (...) dissertation argues that Blondel later came to recognize and correct these weaknesses in his trilogy. ;La pensee, the first volume of the trilogy, discusses the nature and development of thought. Recognizing the ontological structure of thought leads Blondel to present his doctrine of the transnatural elan for assimilation to God. The transnatural desire for God is compared with Henri de Lubac's notion of naturae desiderium and then applied to the modern problem of the relationship between nature and supernature. ;The second installment of the trilogy, L'etre et les etres , explores the mysterious relation of Being and beings. Blondel situates the discussion within the language of creation, identifying Being as Creator and beings as creatures. The analogy of creation allows him to forge the proper relationship between Being and beings. After Blondel's death, two different schools of thought emerged on the mystery of being: Karl Rahner's Thomism and Jean-Luc Marion's new phenomenology. Each school is reviewed and critiqued from a Blondelian perspective. ;The trilogy concludes with a long-awaited revision of L'action . It begins by distinguishing the idea of action from action itself and establishing the ontological difference of action. Action is presented ontologically as enacted power, which is investigated in its individual, social, and metaphysical forms. Individual action is identified as making, practicing, and contemplating. Social action is studied next, with the conclusion that the social being of enacted power is determined by either a philosophy of peace or violence. Finally, divine action is evaluated with regards to the language of causality and absolute power. Blondel proposes instead to describe God's activity in terms of pure action. (shrink)

In recent years, Karl Rahner's theology of concupiscence as a «pre-ethical appetite» has been subjected to some negative criticism as «un-Thomistic» and as presupposing modern philosophy's dualistic understanding of being. The present essay tries to situate Rahner's interpretation within the theological context of the time when it was originally published; the major debate then was on the nature of the supernatural and the desiderium naturale videndi Deum. It then tries to reconstruct the usage Rahner himself made of Aquinas's theology (...) and Heidegger's philosophy, as presented in the latter's Sein und Zeit . In 1941, Rahner's major contribution consisted in reformulating Aquinas's theology on concupiscence in Heideggerian terminology. The Incarnation and the gift of integrity constituted two benchmarks that Rahner used to test his own understanding of concupiscence. Finally, Rahner's contribution is placed within the context of the Catholic-Lutheran Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification and the definition of concupiscence as presented in the accompanying Official Common Statement. (shrink)

Translators of Aristotle’s and Averroës’ metaphysical works into 14th C Hebrew often associated important philosophical concepts with Hebrew terms that were also used to signify central Jewish and Biblical religious concepts. Here I examine how two such terms, “mofet” and “devequt”, were used to refer to extraordinary, divine wonders and to clinging (in particular to God) respectively in the religious texts, but to Aristotelian demonstration and continuity (especially noetic continuity) respectively in the translations of Averroës’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. (...) This kind of convergence of metaphysical and religious terms makes possible, indeed encourages, a re-interpretation of the religious concepts along Aristotelian lines. Biblical expressions of God’s wonders are thus to be interpreted to refer to Aristotelian demonstration and the mystical desire to cling to God is to refer to unifi cation with the Active Intellect.Translatores, qui Aristotelis et Averrois opera metaphysica in linguam Hebraicam saeculi 14. transferebant, notabilibus conceptibus philosophicis saepe nomina Hebraica assignaverut, quibus et principales notiones religiosae Judaicae ac Biblicae solebant exprimi. In hac dissertatione investigatur, quomodo duo talium nominum, scil. “mofet” et “devequt”, quae in textibus religiosis “extra ordinaria miracula divina” et “adhaerentiam” (praecipue ad Deum) proprie significant, in translationibus Averrois Commentarii Magni in Aristotelis Metaphysicam ad demonstrationem Aristotelicam et continuationem (praecipue noeticam) significandas transumebantur. Huiusmodi nominum metaphysicorum cum religiosis coniunctio conceptus religiosos iuxta sensum Aristotelicum denuo explicari permittit, imo suadet. Hinc dicta Biblica quae miracula Dei olim significaverunt ad demonstrationes Aristotelicas relata sunt; item desiderium mysticum adhaerendi ad Deum de unione cum Intellectu Agenti intellectum est. (shrink)

When a poet's work survives only in fragments our judgement of its merit is bound to be strongly influenced by the arrangement given to the fragments by their editors. And yet some superficial indication of the subject-matter is not infrequently seized upon as though it were a sound basis for so responsible an operation, and horror uacui proving stronger than amor ueri, stronger even than desiderium noua docendi, the ill-founded solution is passed on from one edition to the next (...) although it may be wholly out of character with the author's style and may make a great poet appear a wretched hack. An example of this was given in C.Q. N.S. X , 188 f., where the traditional attribution of a commonplace statement to a speech which called for the very opposite of a commonplace was shown to be mistaken. The standard interpretation of the fragment to be discussed here is no less striking as an instance of injustice done to the poet, even more liable to expose him to ridicule, and perhaps of wider interest as a specimen of stylistic indications unduly neglected. (shrink)

Cicero's Cato, in a passage nicely illustrating that enthusiasm for Greek literature which is said to have come upon him in old age, offers some valuable observations about manure : ‘quid de utilitate loquar stercorandi? dixi in eo libro quern de rebus rusticis scripsi; de qua doctus Hesiodus ne verbum quidem fecit, cum de cultura agri scriberet; at Homerus, qui multis ut mihi videtur ante saeclis fuit, Laertam lenientem desiderium quod capiebat e filio, colentem agrum et eum stercorantem facit.’.

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 221 - 248 One of the peculiarities of Peter Abelard’s analysis of incomplete and non-assertive sentences is his use of the notion of desire: in both _Dialectica_ and _Glosses on Peri hermeneias_ the terms _desiderium_ and _desidero_ move to the foreground side by side with _optatio, expectatio, suspensio_ and the related verbs. Desire plays a structural role in Abelard’s descriptions of the compositional way in which the linguistic message is received, changing step by (...) step from incomplete to complete: the person who receives the incomplete message desires to get further information through other words since he knows that the purpose of such words or sequences of words is to combine with other words in order to form a complete sentence. On the other hand, the expression of the speaker’s attention to his inner affections renders the same semantic content a different complete sentence. (shrink)

Verhack's book De mens en zijn onrust. Over het raadsel van de beweging seeks to develop a metaphysics after the 'end of metaphysics'. Such a metaphysics not only has to take into account Nietzsche's and Heidegger's radical critiques of metaphysics. It also has to avoid the soteriological strategies of traditional metaphysics by searching for a transcendent meaning, to which our finite and resdess human existence is pointing from the inside. Yet in which direction does our human existence transcend itself? By (...) comparing Verhack's answer to this question with Thomas Aquinas' discussion of the desiderium naturale Dei, it is argued that Verhack's post-metaphysical metaphysics is based on a spiritualistic outlook on life. From this line of argument it is shown that this metaphysics threatens to perpetrate the verysame soteriological strategies it tried to avoid, and to pass over the meaning and bearing of 'the end of metaphysics'. (shrink)