La béatitude et le désir chez Duns Scot: beatitudo est frui summo bono

Quaestio 15:649-664 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper we examine the idea of beatitudo in Duns Scotus. We begin with the Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum, where the Doctor Subtilis presents a conception of the act of intellective knowledge through the natural meaning of beatitude. Taking up the famous incipit of the Metaphysics, Duns Scotus develops the idea of a maximum desiderium and a maxima scientia as a way of human and natural perfection. In conceiving this desiderium naturale as form of ultimate realization, he sees it as similar to the knowledge of immaterial substances in statu viae. His definition of beatitudo also disagrees with the Thomist doctrine, developing it a priori as a cognitio intuitiva, making it possible for humans to achieve happiness in statu viae. In contrast, in Ordinatio IV, dist. 49, Scotus emphasizes the value of beatitude in its ethical and theological sense, taking recourse to the Augustinian and Boethian definitions in order to understand its nature as the full expression of the intellective, volitional a...

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