This article provides a brief introduction to some contemporary challenges found in the intersection of bioethics and international criminal law involving genetic privacy, organ trafficking, genetic engineering, and cloning. These challenges push us to re-evaluate the question of whether the international criminal law should hold corporations criminally liable. I argue that a minimalist and Strawsonian conception of corporate responsibility could be useful for deterring the wrongs outlined in first few sections and in answering compelling objections to (...) class='Hi'>corporate criminal liability. (shrink)

According to the Finnish Penal Code a corporation may be sentenced to a corporate fine if a person who is part of its statutory organ or other management or who exercises actual decision-making authority therein 1) has been an accomplice in an offence or allowed the commission of the offence, or 2) if the care and diligence necessary for the prevention of the offence has not been observed in the operations of the corporation. Criminal liability of legal (...) persons is based on the intentional or negligent acts of individuals who are in a certain relationship with the corporation. The Finnish legal doctrine clearly rejects the identification theory according to which an individual is considered as acting not for a company but as a company. According to Finnish scholarly writings, the acts of an individual offender could be attributed to the legal person under certain conditions not as acts of the legal person but as acts of the individual for the company. Nonetheless, Finnish law does not abandon the fault requirement. In this respect, Finnish law differs from the traditional common law theory of vicarious liability. (shrink)

Acting as part of a corporation may allow an individual more easily to rationalize participating in a harmful act, but there are countervailing forces in corporate action that increase moral oversight and accountability. Making use of group agency to explain membership as a special feature of some corporate agents, I argue that when someone becomes a member of an organized group like a company, their own moral responsibility becomes entangled with the decisions of other members of the company, (...) whether or not they intend this effect. This moral entanglement in corporate decision-making explains why individuals have a moral obligation to act in their role as a corporate officer when they would not have an obligation to act in a personal capacity even if they had identical knowledge. The entanglement affects the individual’s own moral status and the moral status of the company itself. Moral entanglement of corporate decision-makers provides a principled explanation for a rule that is present in corporate criminal law that corporate officers with knowledge that another employee is about to commit a crime must actively intervene, and cannot rely on their status as bystanders. (shrink)

The extent of a company’s responsibility for the criminal conduct of its employees, as far as such a concept is legally recognised at all, differs between jurisdictions. There has been a shift in r...

The 3rd Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations appears to have generated significant consensus around its approach to business and human rights. This state of harmony relies mainly upon a narrow mandate limiting the endeavour largely to a mapping exercise. It also relies upon a process of 'operationalisation' that is yet to be undertaken despite the recent release of a 4th Report. After a brief presentation of the main parameters of the framework proposed by (...) the 3rd Report and of its precarious advantage over other similar initiatives, this article takes a close look at the main link that needs to be operationalised: i.e. the link between corporate responsibility for human rights and the concept of legal and criminal responsibility. The article then addresses the constitutive elements of the concept of responsibility to shed light upon the responsibility of business organisations in a human rights law context. It looks at the innovative ways in which the concept of corporate criminal responsibility has been dealt with in various domestic jurisdictions and at the new paradigms of corporate agency resulting in the process. Building on this inquiry, the analysis focusses on the way in which the legal discourse acquires new dimensions of corporate responsibility by moving away from an individualistic perspective. On the basis of this, the article suggests conceptual tools that can become instrumental in the process of the operationalisation of the 3rd Report, albeit at the likely cost of rendering the consensus around it more fragile. (shrink)

The responsible corporate officer doctrine is, as a formal matter, an instance of strict criminal liability: the government need not prove the defendant’s mens rea in order to obtain a conviction, and the defendant may not escape conviction by proving lack of mens rea. Formal strict liability is sometimes consistent with retributive principles, especially when the strict liability pertains to the grading of an offense. But is strict liability consistent with retributive principles when it (...) pertains, not to grading, but to whether the defendant has crossed the threshold from noncriminal to criminal conduct? In this essay, I review the two most plausible arguments supporting an affirmative answer in the context of the RCO doctrine. First, perhaps this doctrine reflects a rule-like form of negligence, akin to a rule that prohibits selling alcohol to a minor. Second, perhaps this doctrine expresses a duty to use extraordinary care to prevent a harm. Neither argument is persuasive. The first argument, although valid in some circumstances, fails to explain and justify the RCO doctrine. The second argument, a duty to use extraordinary care, is also inadequate. If “extraordinary care” simply means a flexibly applied negligence standard that considers the burdens and benefits of taking a precaution, it is problematic in premising criminal liability on ordinary negligence. If instead it refers to a higher duty or standard of care, it has many possible forms, such as requiring only a very slight deviation from a permissible or justifiable standard of conduct, placing a “thumb” on the scale of the Learned Hand test, identifying an epistemic standard more demanding than a reasonable person test, or recognizing a standard that is insensitive to individual capacities. However, some of these variations present a gratuitous or incoherent understanding of “negligence,” and none of them sufficiently explain and justify the RCO doctrine. (shrink)

This article puts forward a theory of corporate criminal responsibility as the shared responsibility of the members of a team for wrongdoing committed by one of their number in the pursuit of their common goals. The theory of team member responsibility advanced in this article differs from theories—such as those of Peter French and Phillip Pettit—under which corporate or group responsibility is viewed as the responsibility of the corporation or group as an autonomous moral person. Instead, this (...) article defends a conception of a collectivity as a kind of relationship among individuals; under this conception, a collectivity is something more than the sum of its members, but not something having an autonomous existence apart from its members. To develop this idea, the article employs the concept of a team. Where individuals participate in a team, doing their part towards a collective goal, they are entitled to share in the credit for the positive achievements resulting from their combined actions, and they also share in the discredit for negative achievements of the group. This is so for each member, regardless of whether the member's individual contribution was a but-for cause of the group's achievement. Further, in the specific case of corporate teams, team member responsibility can help to explain why there should be liability of the corporate entity for crimes committed by members of the corporation (a group which typically includes its employees, officers, directors and, in some circumstances, its shareholders) in the pursuit of the corporation's goals. (shrink)

How can we know whether we are punishing the same corporation that committed some past crime? Though central to corporate criminal justice, legal theorists and philosophers have yet to address the basic question of how corporate identity persists through time. Simple cases, where crime and punishment are close in time and the corporation has changed little, can mislead us into thinking an answer is always easy to come by. The issue becomes more complicated when corporate criminals (...) undergo any number of transformations—rebranding, spinning-off a division, merging, changing ownership, changing management, swapping lines of business, etc. These changes are common among all corporations, including those trying to conceal or limit liability for past crimes. This article takes a first step toward developing a workable and philosophically satisfying theory of corporate personal identity and discusses its prospects for fulfilling the retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrent purposes of criminal law. (shrink)

The originality of this volume lies in the interdisciplinary synergies that emerge through the issues it explores and the approaches it adopts. It offers legal and ethical reflections on the criminal qualification of a series of conducts ranging from human experimentation and non-consensual medical interventions to organ transplant trafficking and marketing of human body parts. It also considers procedural matters, notably related to psychiatric and medical evidence. In so doing, it combines legal and other types of conceptualizations to examine (...) such contemporary issues as rights of the LGBTIQ population, access to medical care, corporate criminal liability, rights of children and Islamic jurisprudence. (shrink)

Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine conferring liability from one party onto another because the latter stands in some relationship of authority over the former. Though originally a doctrine of tort law, for the past century it has been used within the criminal law, especially to the end of securing criminal liability for corporations. Here, I argue that on at least one prominent conception of criminal responsibility, we are not justified in using this doctrine in (...) this way. Firms are not answerable for the crimes committed by their employees, because firms cannot answer as to why the crime was committed; they lack the authority to offer the employee’s reasons for action. Though this rules out respondeat superior as a general principle, I show contexts in which vicarious liability is still appropriate in the criminal law, and I respond to a number of other concerns raised by this picture. (shrink)

Some progress has been made in recent decades to articulate corporate social responsibility (CSR) and, more recently, to associate CSR with international enforcement of human rights. This progress continues to be hampered, however, by the ability of a multinational corporation (MNC) that violates human rights not only to shift liability from itself to a nation-state but even to win compensation from that nation-state for loss of profits due to restrictions on its business activities. In the process, the nation-state’s (...) sovereignty is diminishing; and, in effect, though still attributed to nation-states, it is being transferred to the MNC. The main aim of this article is (1) to draw on normative considerations to claim that this MNC proto-sovereignty should be modified and (2) to contend that this can eventually be accomplished by adding to corporate adoption of CSR guidelines a regimen of global human rights enforcement. I base this contention on expectations about the internationalization of corporate criminal law and the globalization of civil society in general and of NGOs in particular. I consider various jurisdictions but I focus on US jurisprudence. (shrink)

Should we in the moral community accept the modern business corporation as one of us? French answers 'yes'. In this book, French investigates the metaphysical foundations of the application of our established moral principles to corporations as moral persons.

Some societies used to impose liability on inanimate objects, a practice we’d now regard as silly and confused. When we punish corporations today, are we making similar mistakes? Here I consider some important sources of philosophical skepticism about imposing criminal liability on corporations, and I argue that they admit of answers, which places punishing corporations on stronger footing than punishing inanimate objects. First, I consider the eligibility challenge, which asserts that corporations are not the right kind of (...) thing to be punished. Second, the reductionist challenge insists that corporate culpability always reduces to individual culpability. I suggest that progress can be made in addressing these challenges by asking the right law-focused questions and attending to recent developments in criminal law theory and moral philosophy. (shrink)

In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding (...) doctrine—including broadening of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principal obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability. (shrink)

Cécile Fabre's monumental work Cosmopolitan Peace offers a thorough investigation of the responsibilities that agents incur through their involvement in armed conflict. However, her analysis fails to acknowledge the central role that states play in initiating and orchestrating acts of war. I argue that states are corporate moral agents, who are morally responsible for their own wrongdoings during an unjust war, and that this argument is compatible with Fabre's cosmopolitan premises. I then suggest that a systematic account of (...) class='Hi'>criminal liability in the aftermath of a war should acknowledge the role that states play in orchestrating wars and committing war crimes. (shrink)

Catholic doctrine’s strict prohibition on abortion can lead clinicians or institutions to conscientiously refuse to provide abortion, although a legal duty to provide abortion would apply to anyone who refused. Conscientious refusals by clinicians to end a pregnancy can constitute murder or reckless homicide under American law if a woman dies as a result of such a refusal. Such refusals are not immunized from criminal liability by the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion or by statutes (...) that confer immunity from criminal homicide prosecution. Core principles of the rule of law require the state to protect the lives of all persons equally and to place the life and health of persons above any the interests of providers have in moral integrity or in respecting the moral status of prenatal humans. In some states criminal liability related to conscientious objection also applies to corporate hospital officials. (shrink)

The article is a review of A.P. Simester, ed., Appraising Strict Liability. We strongly recommend the book for the sophistication of the contributors’ analyses, and the contribution the book makes to clarifying the normative issues at stake in strict liability legal regimes. The review focuses on the more philosophical essays in the book. The specific issues from the book identified in the review are: the rights-based character of the prohibition on conviction without moral fault; the importance of the (...) principle of proportionality; due diligence defences; the instrumental worth of strict liability in relation to quasi-criminal regulation; the faultiness of genuinely creating risks. (shrink)

In 2021, there was a significant amendment to the legislation on medical experimentation. In particular, Chapter 4 of the Law of December 5, 1996 on the Profession of Physician and Dentist (Journal of Laws 2023, item 1516) was amended, in which the prerequisites of legally relevant consent given by the participant in the experiment or by other entities that express a position on their behalf were specified. In addition, procedures related to the opinion of the research project by the so-called (...) bioethics committee were described. Its members were obliged to maintain confidentiality with regard to information obtained in connection with the fulfilled function. These norms became protected by criminal sanctions, set forth in the amended Article 58 of the law. New generic types of criminal acts were introduced, primarily aimed at protecting the participant's right to self-determination, the voluntariness of participation in the experiment, and the confidentiality of data submitted by the experimenters in their proposals to bioethics committees. These norms fill in the gaps that have existed so far in the criminal law protection of these values. The article systematically discusses the generic types of criminal acts that have been penalized in Article 58 (4) to (6) of the referenced law. Their object of protection, object side, subject, subject side, punishability and potential confluence with other regulations are presented. The historical-dogmatic justification for the introduction of these regulations is also shown. (shrink)

Many criminal law scholars have criticized the responsible corporate officer doctrine as a form of strict and vicarious liability. It is neither. It is merely a doctrine that supplies a duty in instances of omissions. Siding with Todd Aagaard in this debate, I argue that a proper reading of the cases yields that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is just duty supplying, and does not allow for strict liability when the underlying statute requires mens rea. (...) After analyzing Dotterweich, Park, and their progeny, I probe the depths of this duty-supplying doctrine, including to whom the duty is owed, whether the duty is grounded in statute, cause of peril, or contract, and what the content of the duty is. Although the responsible corporate officer doctrine unveils questions we may have about duty generally, it is no more problematic than other duty-supplying doctrines in the criminal law. (shrink)

This article focuses on the problem of criminal liability for unlawful engagement in economic activities, analyses the emergence and development of this norm in criminal law and the ways of its optimal explanation. Special attention is paid to the problem of identification of illegality of activities, based on specific tax and economic regulation. The study concludes that criminal liability must be limited to a violation of fundamental requirements for the legality of business, and does not (...) include particular abuses occurring in legal business. The author also deals with the criteria of delimitation of criminal and administrative liability for unlawful engagement in economic activities. Under Article 202(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, application of criminal liability is limited by two alternative conditions: either a person illegally undertakes activity in entrepreneurial way or on a large scale. According to the paper, the above-mentioned regulation lacks clarity and leads to the risk of unfounded prosecutions. The author gives practical examples, where on the basis of inexplicable criterion of an entrepreneurial way, criminal charges are filed in respect of petty economic activities. Such practice is incompatible with the purposes and principles of criminal law. The paper proposes to delete the criterion of an entrepreneurial way from the definition, leaving the possibility of criminal liability only in case of large scale illegal economic activity. The article also substantiates the conclusion that prohibited business activities provided for in Article 202(2) of the Criminal Code actually defies logical explanation and should be removed from the regulation. At the end of the article, the author offers a sample of optimal legal wording of unlawful engagement in economic activities in criminal law. (shrink)

This article presents the conception of negligent account management, analyses the rules of the criminal act that govern criminal liability for negligent account management, by focussing on the form of guilt and the problem of its content. The plenary session’s conclusion that the two offences – failure to administer bookkeeping and failure to protect the bookkeeping documents – can be committed both intentionally and negligently is disputed in this article. The adoption of the new Criminal Code (...) in 2000, setting the form of guilt and its content in criminal cases for negligent account management, posed no significant problems – the court practice and legal literature followed the attitude that this crime could be committed only negligently. According to Article 16(4) of the Criminal Code 2000, a person is punished for negligent commission of a crime or a misdemeanour only in individual cases stipulated in the Special Part of the Criminal Code. The problem was that no “individual case” was foreseen in Article 223 of the Criminal Code that imposed liability for negligent bookkeeping. This created preconditions for deviating from pre-existing case-law under which this crime could be qualified as negligent. Only in 2009 the Criminal Division of the Lithuanian Supreme Court concluded in its plenary session that Article 223 of the Criminal Code provided liability for criminal record-keeping and accounting only if committed negligently as a form of guilt, and other activities pursuant to this Article might be committed intentionally and recklessly. The plenary session identified a loophole of criminal law and created preconditions for the formation of uniform court practice. Only the legislator can remove the loophole of criminal law identified by the Supreme Court of Lithuania. The author states that all of the acts named in Article 223 of the Criminal Code can be committed negligently and suggests applying the rule contained in Article 16(4) of the Criminal Code to Article 223 of the Criminal Code. All of these findings are based on historical, grammatical and logical interpretation of the “neglect” concept and the analysis of Articles 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code. (shrink)

The modern Lithuanian legal doctrine recognises that criminal liability is a last resort (ultima ratio) protecting the society from various law violations. This idea has got deep roots in criminology and is obviously based on the position of rational approach towards the state criminal policy. However, it is not clear whether it is of obligatory legal status to the legislature and the courts. This article attempts to present the idea of a last resort as a concept based (...) on the constitutional principles of the rule of law, justice, proportionality and rationality in the legislation and case law. The author concludes that the main precursors of the ultima ratio principle are the German legal doctrine of protection of legal goods (Rechtsgüterschutz) and Harm principle respected in the common law tradition, as well as the need for protection of human rights in the democratic world. These concepts raise the duty of the legislator to justify the act of criminalisation by legitimate purpose and to comply with certain constitutional limits of application of criminal law. The idea of criminal liability as a last resort is recognised both in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (obiter dictum) and in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania reasoning particular decisions in criminal cases, especially delimiting criminal and other types of legal liability. The author concludes that the fact of discrepancy of criminal law to ultima ratio test can be one of the arguments in support of its objection to the Constitution and even the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. At the same time, the author of the article has found that many norms of the Criminal Code are in conflict with the idea of a last resort. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the demands of retributive desert, strict criminal liability is sometimes defensible when the strict liability pertains, not to whether conduct is to be criminalized at all, but to the seriousness of the actor’s crime. Suppose an actor commits an intentional assault or rape, and accidentally brings about a death. Punishing the actor more seriously because the death resulted is sometimes justifiable, even absent proof of his independent culpability as to the death. But what punishment is proportionate (...) for such an actor? Should he be punished as harshly as an intentional or knowing killer? This article offers a framework for analysing these difficult questions. After rejecting a broad forfeiture justification for strict liability in grading, it articulates a more promising set of arguments, premised on the actor’s ‘change of normative position’ by choosing to commit a crime. Three principles of culpability sometimes justify strict liability in grading: holistic culpability, attention to the degree of unjustifiability of the risk, and rough comparability in culpability. Strict liability in grading can be appropriate when the risk of committing the more serious crime (i) is a risk intrinsic to the less serious crime or (ii) is minimally foreseeable. The article also addresses the relevance of moral luck, ie the principle that the fortuitous occurrence of a result or circumstance increases the actor’s just deserts. Even if moral luck is recognized, it cannot fully justify strict liability in grading. (shrink)

In this contribution we will explore some of the implications of the vision of Ambient Intelligence (AmI) for law and legal philosophy. AmI creates an environment that monitors and anticipates human behaviour with the aim of customised adaptation of the environment to a person’s inferred preferences. Such an environment depends on distributed human and non-human intelligence that raises a host of unsettling questions around causality, subjectivity, agency and (criminal) liability. After discussing the vision of AmI we will present (...) relevant research in the field of philosophy of technology, inspired by the post-phenomenological position taken by Don Ihde and the constructivist realism of Bruno Latour. We will posit the need to conceptualise technological normativity in comparison with legal normativity, claiming that this is necessary to develop democratic accountability for the implications of emerging technologies like AmI. Lastly we will investigate to what extent technological devices and infrastructures can and should be used to achieve compliance with the criminal law, and we will discuss some of the implications of non-human distributed intelligence for criminal liability. (shrink)

Criminal liability of legal entities was legitimized in the Republic of Lithuania eight years ago, and in the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 8 June 2009, a conclusive confirmation on its accordance with the Constitution was made. It should be noted that the extension of the concept of criminal offense subject has received considerable attention of Lithuanian scientists. It was obvious that this penal law novel would cause many problems and, surely, it has become a reason (...) of many doubts in the judicial practice. However, despite the fact that a fairly broad scientific analysis of the topic under consideration has been made, none of the Lithuanian authors has ever addressed the issue regarding the sources of the criminal liability of legal entities. (shrink)

In the absence of any institution for imposing legal liability on global business, the idea of instituting a cosmopolitan court for international corporate offenses is advocated. The proposal is then critically examined and defended in light of a number of key objections. Having both civil and criminal jurisdiction, such a tribunal could benefit domestic and international legal systems, multinational corporations, and victims of transnational and international corporate misdeeds. By laying down minimal global standards of corporate (...) liability, resolving conflicts between the regulatory activities of national legal systems, and affording redress for aggrieved parties in countries with inadequate legal infrastructures, the tribunal would promote the objectives of compensatory, distributive, procedural and retributive justice at the global level. Moreover, the court would assist corporations by translating compliance with minimum ethical standards to the bottom line. Ethical corporations will gain competitive advantage relative to unscrupulous firms, since the latter'ss activities will be sanctioned. The international community need not leave obedience to basic norms up to the voluntary good-will and discretion of multinational firms. (shrink)

In Complicity and the Rwandan Genocide ( 2010b ), Larry May argues that complicity can be the basis for criminal liability if two conditions are met: First, the person’s actions or inactions must contribute to the harm in question, and secondly, the person must know that his actions or inactions risk contributing to this harm. May also states that the threshold for guilt for criminal liability is higher than for moral responsibility. I agree with this latter (...) claim, but I think that it casts doubt on May’s account of criminal liability, particular in so-called performance cases in which low-level participants merely fail to help. This is because it is far from clear that passive non-helpers are morally responsible for their participation in widespread harms. Situationism purports to show that passive bystanders typically are not morally responsible for their role in such harms, because they were behaving reasonably subject to the constraints they faced. In this paper, I assess this claim, and defend it on the basis of O. W. Holmes’ standard of the reasonable person as a guide to judging criminal complicity. Finally, I provide a situationist account of the Rwandan genocide, which focuses on the systemic causes and primary perpetrators of the genocide, rather than low-level participants. (shrink)

Commentators seemingly agree about what negligence is—and how it is contrasted from recklessness. They also appear to concur about whether particular examples (both real and hypothetical) portray negligence. I am less confident about each of these matters. I explore the distinction between recklessness and negligence by examining a type of case that has generated a good deal of critical discussion: those in which a defendant forgets that he has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm. Even in this limited (...) kind of example, no single perspective on blame and liability proves to be defensible. Nonetheless, a discussion of this type of case is helpful because it enables us to appreciate the difficulties in understanding the nature of negligence and the ensuing uncertainty about whether penal liability for negligence is ever warranted. (shrink)

This article analyzes the origins of the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine: the trial of Joseph Dotterweich. That doctrine holds that an officer may be personally liable for the criminal act of a subordinate if the officer was, in some indefinite way, able to prevent the violation. Applying this doctrine, the prosecution of Dotterweich entailed strict liability for a strict liability offense. The underlying offenses—the interstate sale of one misbranded and adulterated drug and one misbranded drug—were said (...) to be strict liability offenses. And then, with respect to Dotterweich as the corporation’s general manager, the government argued that he was strictly liable because he stood in “responsible relation” to the company’s acts. The government never tried to prove that the company, Buffalo Pharmacal, was negligent, nor did it try to prove that Dotterweich was negligent in his supervision of the employees of Buffalo Pharmacal. The prosecutor and judge were candid about this theory throughout the trial, although the judge conceded that it seemed bizarre and unfair. The defense lawyer repeatedly sought to inject what became known throughout the trial as the “question of good faith,” but was circumvented at almost every turn. What would thus seem to be the crux of any criminal trial—the personal fault of the defendant—was carefully shorn from the jury’s consideration. The government’s theory was so at odds with intuitive notions of liability and blame that, as one probes into the case, and looks at the language used in the government’s appellate briefs, imputations of moral fault inevitably crept in. Yet the government was not entitled to make such accusations, as it had pruned moral considerations from the trial. The article argues that the responsible corporate officer doctrine can never enjoy a secure place in our legal system. First, the doctrine is at a minimum in tension with, and often in direct opposition to, basic principles of the criminal law; and second, the doctrine fails, when followed to its logical conclusions, to accord with basic notions of fair play. The article concludes that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is either unnecessary, in cases in which the evidence establishes personal fault, or unjust, in cases in which it creates liability in the absence of personal fault through the unspecified notion of “responsibility.” The Dotterweich case illustrates what is contemplated by the latter possibility, and why it is problematic in any judicial system that purports, in the words of the Model Penal Code, “to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”. (shrink)

Certainly principles of criminal liability may be understood as rules or norms outlining orders or prohibitions and standing out among other norms with their weight, for legal culture, legal doctrine, etc. In such a classic approach they are norms defining basic rights and obligations in the applicable criminal law. However, is it the only possible and cognitively interesting meaning of the word “principle” in jurisprudence? From the semiotic point of view, they can occur in three forms: special-kind (...) norms, teleological directives, rules which constitute valid performance of conventional activities. In an extra-directival sense these principles may be understood as models-descriptions of shaping the system of criminal law. From a theoretical and practical point of view principles addressed to the legislator are extremely weighty—they can be called rules constructing the system of criminal liability. These all problems are discussed in the article. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the demands of retributive desert, strict criminal liability is sometimes defensible when the strict liability pertains, not to whether conduct is to be criminalized at all, but to the seriousness of the actor’s crime. Suppose an actor commits an intentional assault or rape, and accidentally brings about a death. Punishing the actor more seriously because the death resulted is sometimes justifiable, even absent proof of his independent culpability as to the death. But what punishment is proportionate (...) for such an actor? Should he be punished as harshly as an intentional or knowing killer? This article offers a framework for analysing these difficult questions. After rejecting a broad forfeiture justification for strict liability in grading, it articulates a more promising set of arguments, premised on the actor’s ‘change of normative position’ by choosing to commit a crime. Three principles of culpability sometimes justify strict liability in grading: holistic culpability, attention to the degree of unjustifiability of the risk, and rough comparability in culpability. Strict liability in grading can be appropriate when the risk of committing the more serious crime (i) is a risk intrinsic to the less serious crime or (ii) is minimally foreseeable. The article also addresses the relevance of moral luck, ie the principle that the fortuitous occurrence of a result or circumstance increases the actor’s just deserts. Even if moral luck is recognized, it cannot fully justify strict liability in grading. (shrink)

The article attempts to answer the following questions: What criminal law, if any, is applied in outer space when a crime is committed there? How will the issues of demarcation of criminal jurisdiction be resolved? Who and how will investigate such crimes? Which international or national institution will decide the issue of criminal prosecution and application of sanctions for crimes in space? Basing on the analysis of the sources of space and international law, it was concluded that (...) today there is no detailed procedure for investigating and bringing to criminal responsibility for committing a crime in space. There is also no international legal act that would establish a list of space criminal offenses. To solve existing problems, it is suggested to adopt the Convention on Criminal Liability for Space Crimes and to create a Space Criminal Statute (code). The article also claims that the creation of a World Space Union on regulating the commercial space activities will help in solving many issues in the field of research. (shrink)

Antony Duff has argued that an important precondition of criminal liability is that the state has the moral standing to call the offender to account. Conditions of severe social injustice, if allowed or perpetuated by the state, can undermine this standing. Duff’s argument appeals to the ordinary idea that a person’s own behaviour can sometimes negate his standing to call others to account. It is argued that this is an important issue, but that the analogy with individual standing (...) is problematic. Moreover, Duff’s account of standing needs to address two interconnected issues: first, when and in what way the state can lose its standing to call offenders to account, and second, over what range of offences. Key Words: criminal liability • Duff • punishment • social injustice. (shrink)

: The paper discusses the contribution that the neuroscience of action can offer to the legal understanding of action control and responsibility in the case of adult individuals. In particular, we address the issues that follow. What are the cognitive capacities that agents must display in order to be held liable to punishment in criminal law? Is the legal model of liability to punishment compatible with a scientifically informed understanding of voluntary behaviour? To what extent should the law (...) take into account people’s subjective feelings about their own actions? As a result of our analyses, we indicate some areas where the contribution of the neuroscience of action to the law is potentially relevant. We focus on the subjectivity mechanisms of action control, specifically the requirement that the agent must violate the law voluntarily in order to be held responsible, and on the factors that modulate the wrongdoer’s experience of agency. Overall, we advocate more cross-disciplinary work, aimed to bridge the gap between conceptual boundaries, on the theme of responsibility for actions. Keywords : Responsibility; Neurolaw; Sense of Agency; Criminal Law; Criminal Liability La responsabilità tra neuroscienza e diritto penale. La componente di controllo dell’imputabilità penale Riassunto : L’articolo discute il contributo che la neuroscienza dell’azione può offrire ai temi del controllo dell’azione e della responsabilità in ambito legale, nel caso degli individui adulti. In particolare, ci occuperemo delle questioni che seguono. Quali sono le abilità cognitive che un agente deve possedere per esser considerato penalmente responsabile e quindi punibile? Il modello legalistico della responsabilità è compatibile con il modello scientifico-naturalistico del comportamento umano? Fino a che punto variazioni nel senso di controllo soggettivo sulle azioni dovrebbero essere considerate un parametro rilevante in sede penale? Sulla scorta della nostra analisi, indicheremo alcune aree nelle quali il contributo della neuroscienza dell’azione a questioni legate al tema della responsabilità legale potrebbe rivelarsi rilevante. L’articolo si concentra sui meccanismi che regolano il senso soggettivo di controllo dell’azione – in particolare il requisito secondo il quale l’agente deve violare la legge volontariamente per essere ritenuto responsabile –, e sui fattori che modulano il senso di agentività del colpevole. In conclusione, difenderemo l’appropriatezza di una più ampia riflessione multi-disciplinare volta a ridurre le incompatibilità fra differenti approcci al tema della responsabilità per le nostre azioni. Parole chiave : Responsabilità; Neurodiritto; Senso di agentività; Diritto penale; Imputabilità penale. (shrink)

The act of “embezzlement” provided for in Article 183 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania gives rise to a number of both theoretical and practical problems. First of all, various authors do not agree whether embezzlement constitutes a substantive or formal element. In the author’s opinion, embezzlement is deemed complete when possession of the property of others is taken illegally and there is a real possibility, perceived by the perpetrator, to manage it, to use it or (...) to dispose of it or misappropriation is made of a property right, giving the perpetrator a possibility to receive other persons’ property or property benefit immediately or in the future, to treat the property of others as one’s own. That is, when a real possibility, perceived by the perpetrator, to treat the property of others as one’s own arises but not when the damage is caused. In this case, particular importance is adduced to the condition that the perpetrator must clearly perceive his/her possibility to treat the property of others as one’s own. In case such a possibility has not been perceived by the perpetrator, we cannot state that embezzlement is complete. The moment of completeness and the fact that in practice there may be cases where no real damage is caused to a legal entity when the perpetrator embezzles property of the former (see the example in footnote 15), show that the criminal act provided for in Article 183 of the Criminal Code contains a formal element. When evaluating practical problems, the article overviews two rulings of the Supreme Court of Lithuania that are of particular importance for the formation of the case-law. Before the ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 8 May 2012, this court used to formulate somewhat erroneous case-law in examining cases concerning accusations raised on the basis of Article 183 of the Criminal Code. In cases where the head (shareholder) of a company was accused of embezzlement and used all the “cashed” funds of the company only for the interests and benefit of the company, the court used to evaluate the factual circumstances of the case not as indicative of the fault of the defendant, but only as indicative of the purpose of his/her act. Even if it was determined that the perpetrator did not perceive the real possibility to treat the company’s property as his/her own and always used to regard the property which came to his/her disposal as the company’s property, the court used to qualify the perpetrator’s act as embezzlement, by reasoning that the purpose of the perpetrator’s act was not a circumstance relevant for such qualification. It can be stated that in such a manner the court failed to distinguish between the concept of purpose and the concept of fault, failed to evaluate the features of the subjective part individually, and assessed them in their entirety. Due to such a mistake, the court created an impression that the concepts of fault and purpose in the case were confused. By its ruling of 8 May 2012 the Supreme Court of Lithuania corrected those mistakes, however, its instruction to investigate whether “cashed” funds were not used “for personal needs” and whether the company suffered damage introduced a confusion into the investigation of cases of this type and their examination in court, as the concept of “personal needs” was not absolutely clear, whereas the fact of suffering damage was not necessary in order to qualify an act under Article 183 of the Criminal Code. In the author’s opinion, the Supreme Court of Lithuania should pronounce clearly that the cases where the head (shareholder) of the company has not perceived the real possibility to treat the other person’s property as his/her own will not be regarded as property embezzlement and there will be no deliberation in the person’s act. The absence of such perception would be confirmed by the fact that the perpetrator has used absolutely all “cashed” money of the legal entity only for the interest and benefit of the company. (shrink)