This book's thirty essays explore philosophically the nature and morality of sexual perversion, cybersex, masturbation, homosexuality, contraception, same-sex marriage, promiscuity, pedophilia, date rape, sexual objectification, teacher-student relationships, pornography, and prostitution. Authors include Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Nagel, Alan Goldman, John Finnis, Sallie Tisdale, Robin West, Alan Wertheimer, John Corvino, Cheshire Calhoun, Jerome Neu, and Alan Soble, among others. A valuable resource for sex researchers as well as undergraduate courses in the philosophy of sex.

This is an interesting case in that posthumous reproduction involves complex legal and moral problems. But I do not think it is a hard case, because there is no indication that the patient wished to parent a child with his woman friend, posthumously or otherwise.

‘Treatment’ from which the patient cannot benefit is sometimes administered to a patient so that the comfort of the patient's family or caregivers may be increased. Is this permissible? To answer that question we will explore the interests of the permanently unconscious patient and the potential for such a patient's interests to conflict with those of her family and healthcare providers. We will conclude that in the likely absence of a specific advance directive from the patient providing for such circumstances, (...) treatment for the benefit of the family may be given so long as it is not abusive. However, treatment solely for the comfort of caregivers may not be given without consent of the patient's surrogate decisionmakers. (shrink)

Tort cases in which an actor justifiably takes or damages the property of another have resisted analysis in terms of fault or economic efficiency. I argue that writers such as Jules Coleman and Judith Thomson, who locate the wrongfulness of the necessity torts in the infringement of a property right, have not illuminated the issue of why compensation is owed in these cases. My positive argument locates the wrongfulness of an uncompensated taking in these cases in the actor's interference with (...) the autonomy of the property owner, and justifies compensation as a matter of corrective justice. (shrink)