La tragédie, disons après Nietzsche, écrit le moment de la déchirure d’avec la nature. Elle porte la tension entre ce qui subsiste de nature et ce qui s’impose de substitution. Blessure se cicatrisant elle panse l’irritation entre ce qui s’achève et l’oubli. Or, en deçà de ce qui s’achève et l’oubli, se trouve la déchirure de la crise qui est précisément ce que la tragédie écrit. Dès les premières pages de La Naissance de la tragédie Nietzsche montre comment la nature (...) s’achève dans l’individu... (shrink)

There are few aphorisms in Minima Moralia that display a less sympathetic attitude towards their subject than “They, the people”(§ 7). Adorno denounces the “amor intellectualis for [the] kitchen personnel” in the subsequent aphorism, but “They, the people” already seems to confirm all suspicions about the alleged elitism of critical theory. The idea that intellectuals mostly encounter those less educated when “illiterates come to intellectuals wanting letters written for them” is laughable, even for the 1950s, and the claim that, among (...) the “underdogs”,“envy and spite surpass anything seen among literati or musical directors”(ibid.) oozes with contempt, no matter how much Adorno insists that these alleged character deficits result from the social structures in which uneducated, working class people find themselves. Yet the point of Adorno’s remarks is not to disprove a deferential form of a Lukácsian “standpoint theory …. (shrink)

A tale of two commissions -- Disciplining disorder -- Transparent fictions -- Conscientious objections -- A failed experiment -- Stem cells, interrupted.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 1 Seiten: 363-378.

This article argues that considerations of moral psychology support the traditional stringency of the rule according to which fiduciaries who get involved in a potential conflict of interest shall be stripped of all their gains. The application of the rule, regardless of good faith on the part of the fiduciary, is being contested by courts and academia alike. The article is focused on the ‘deterrence’ justification for the rule, and argues that its unusual strictness should be read as a response (...) to a substantial risk of conscious-silencing self-deception. Given the knowledge gap between them, the principal is very much dependent on the fiduciary's personal integrity but, in the grip of self-deception, the fiduciary's inner checks break down so that manipulative transactions are approved as harmless ones. Two distinctive features of the fiduciary relationship increase the chances that even a professional and virtuous fiduciary will be moved by self-deception to misapprehend the harm which a conflict of interest might cause to the principal: first, the wide discretion in the application of the fiduciary's duty to specific situations; and, second, the power gap between the fiduciary and the principal which enhances the temptation to exploit the fiduciary's position. This risk can only be averted by the more stringent version of the rule, as it is only by preventing the fiduciary from ever considering the legitimacy of a specific conflict of interest that we can hinder the process of reflection which is so prone to being subverted by self-deception. (shrink)

As the other entries in this section have surely made clear, Carolyn McLeod's outstanding monograph, Conscience in Reproductive Health Care: Prioritizing Patient Interests, is fertile ground for fruitful philosophical analyses of issues pertaining to conscience, trust, autonomy, and more, all of which are sure to be of great interest and benefit to scholars in areas such as bioethics, health policy, and feminist ethics. Conscience in Reproductive Health Care provides a compelling response to a timely bioethical dilemma: What do we do (...) when healthcare providers refuse certain health services to patients on grounds of conscience? McLeod contends that healthcare providers, in light of their fiduciary... (shrink)

De la certitude sensible au savoir absolu, la conscience est à l'épreuve d'un procès phénoménologique. Ce procès se déploie à travers une expérience se concevant en tant qu'effectuation d'un principe que nous avons défini comme un principe d'effectuation. Chaque figure de la conscience est un moment de l'effectuation du principe articulant la certitude et la vérité, le sujet et l'objet, l'immédiateté et la médiation, le singulier et l'universel. Il s'agit de la dialectique de la négativité qui s'opère comme une dynamique (...) de conversion du savoir le plus "immédiat" et le plus "abstrait" en savoir effectif. Des figurations denses rythment le mouvement d'autodétermination de la conscience dans son devenir conscience universelle et rationnelle. C'est cette odyssée de la conscience que nous avons explorée en partant de l'hypothèse d'un principe d'effectuation à l'oeuvre dans le philosopher hegelien, particulièrement dans La Phénoménologie de l'esprit. De la conversion de la certitude en vérité, résulte l'effectivité du savoir conceptuel comme ultime figure du procès phénoménologique de l'esprit. Mettre en relief ce processus à travers la succession dialectique des figures de l'esprit dans sa conscience, tel est l'objectif de cet ouvrage. (shrink)

William Ames (1576-1633) a incarné une autorité fondamentale pour les puritains qui ont émigré en Nouvelle-Angleterre. Dans son œuvre, il a la singularité d’allier ses convictions religieuses à une mentalité ramiste. Ames considère la méthode de Ramus comme une manière adéquate de comprendre l’acquisition et la transmission des savoirs. Le système ramiste s’applique aussi au domaine de la théologie et à certaines questions liées au gouvernement de l’individu. Cet article vise à mettre en lumière cette combinaison entre le puritanisme et (...) le ramisme qui caractériserait une façon bien particulière de concevoir le gouvernement de l’individu : un modèle qui renforce la volonté de l’individu et sa capacité de contrôle, en tant qu’instruments essentiels de gouvernement, et qui renferme un objectif émancipateur et égalitaire. (shrink)

Dans la continuité de leurs travaux communs des années 1980, Ernesto Laclau et Chantal Mouffe ont développé parallèlement une nouvelle théorie du populisme. Cet article la définit comme une double ontologie du politique, qui fait droit à la fois à l’inimitié, ou dimension dissociative, et à la délibération, ou dimension associative du politique. Pour distinguer leur approche des populismes de droite, Laclau et Mouffe recourent à un anti-essentialisme intransigeant qui écarte l’histoire des éléments décisifs pour la construction d’un sujet politique. (...) Ce faisant, ils assimilent les mouvements anticoloniaux et antiracistes conséquents au conservatisme ou à la réaction. Une insuffisante problématisation de la question raciale et du militantisme antiraciste, souvent invoqué mais jamais analysé par les auteurs, sont à la source de ces confusions. Cela exige une reformulation du populisme de gauche dont la question du pluralisme pourrait fournir le point de départ. (shrink)

Dostoevskij’s underground parody of confession paradoxically recovers an Orthodox morality by constructing an unorthodox model of authority and authorship. The authenticity and authority of underground discourse are both contingent on self-conscious parody, which also mediates Orthodox community or sobornost’. This essay critically reconsiders ethical, aesthetic and cultural dimensions of the self-conscious interpolation of literary and religious discourses in Dostoevskij’s Notes from Underground. Arguing with and against Bakhtinian readings, it re-examines the underground narrator’s secularized, Romanticized sensibilities, cynical critique of humanism, sacrilegious (...) modes of laughter, usurpation of authority, internalization of dialogue, literary stylization and parody, aesthetic and moral self-critique, and, finally, insistence on “a new word.”. (shrink)

Si pour Husserl la conscience est la source du sens, la phénoménologie semble ainsi revenir à une pure analyse du travail constitutif de la conscience qui détermine la constitution du monde. Ce sens de la phénoménologie est bien différent de celui de Hegel. En effet, la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit rappelle une véritable conjonction de la conscience avec le contexte qui l’entoure et montre comment le développement de la conscience émerge de sa relation avec son contexte ainsi qu’avec l’histoire. Bien que (...) Levinas s’inscrive ouvertement dans la tradition de Husserl et que plusieurs de ses textes engagent ouvertement un dialogue avec Husserl, le but de cet article est de montrer que la conception de la conscience de Levinas implique une distance avec Husserl en engageant dans sa conception de la phénoménologie une conception hégélienne, selon une approche où la conscience n’est pas donnée comme point de départ pour la description des phénomènes, mais émerge en même temps qu’elle se rapporte à ses phénomènes. Par conséquent, nous soutenons qu’il est possible de démontrer que dans un certain sens dans Totalité et infini, il est possible de parler d’une Phénoménologie de l’Esprit qui est en cours. (shrink)

Smith, Wesley J The growth in policies that force healthcare workers to participate in activities that are deemed both immoral and unprofessional as against the sanctity of human life has given rise to the need for bringing about conscience in health care. The need for fashioning proper conscience clauses and challenges faced in its implementation are highlighted.

Oxford Legal Philosophy publishes the best new work in philosophically-oriented legal theory. It commissions and solicits monographs in all branches of the subject, including works on philosophical issues in all areas of public and private law, and in the national, transnational, and international realms; studies of the nature of law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning; treatments of problems in political morality as they bear on law; and explorations in the nature and development of legal philosophy itself. The series represents diverse (...) traditions of thought but always with an emphasis on rigour and originality. It sets the standard in contemporary jurisprudence.This book shows that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection.Part I explores the morality of conviction and conscience. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument begins with the communicative principle of conscientiousness. According to the CPC, having a conscientious moral conviction means not just acting consistently with our beliefs and judging ourselves and others by a common moral standard. It also means not seeking to evade the consequences of our beliefs and being willing to communicate them to others. The conviction argument shows that, as a constrained, communicative practice, civil disobedience has a better claim than private objection does to the protections that liberal societies give to conscientious dissent. This view reverses the standard liberal picture which sees private 'conscientious' objection as a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing.The conscience argument is narrower and shows that genuinely morally responsive civil disobedience honours the best of our moral responsibilities and is protected by a duty-based moral right of conscience.Part II translates the conviction argument and conscience argument into two legal defences. The first is a demands-of-conviction defence. The second is a necessity defence. Both of these defences apply more readily to civil disobedience than to private disobedience. Part II also examines lawful punishment, showing that, even when punishment is justifiable, civil disobedients have a moral right not to be punished. (shrink)

Conscience in Reproductive Health Care responds to the growing worldwide trend of health care professionals conscientiously refusing to provide abortions and similar reproductive health services in countries where these services are legal and professionally accepted. Carolyn McLeod argues that conscientious objectors in health care should prioritize the interests of patients in receiving care over their own interest in acting on their conscience. She defends this "prioritizing approach" to conscientious objection over the more popular "compromise approach" without downplaying the importance of (...) health care professionals having a conscience or the moral complexity of their conscientious refusals. McLeod's central argument is that health care professionals who are gatekeepers of services such as abortions are fiduciaries for their patients and for the public they are licensed to serve. As such, they owe a duty of loyalty to these beneficiaries and should give primacy to their beneficiaries' interests in accessing care. This conclusion is informed by what McLeod believes is morally at stake for the main parties to the conflicts generated by conscientious refusals: the objector and the patient. What is at stake, according to McLeod, depends on the relevant socio-political context, but typically includes the objector's integrity and the patient's interest in avoiding harm. (shrink)

_Conscience and Corporate Culture_ advances the constructive dialogue on a moral conscience for corporations. Written for educators in the field of business ethics and practicing corporate executives, the book serves as a platform on a subject profoundly difficult and timely. Written from the unique vantage point of an author who is a philosopher, professor of business administration, and a corporate consultant A vital resource for both educators in the field of business ethics and practicing corporate executives Forwards the constructive dialogue (...) on a moral conscience for corporations Offers a philosophical and practical approach to considering business ethics. (shrink)