The problem of colour exclusion is not fatal to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, nor was it the catalyst for his later philosophy. The remarks in the Tractatus about the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two colours at a point in the visual field sit comfortably with the remarks in the rest of the book, the discussion of mathematical physics above all. Furthermore Wittgenstein’s second thoughts about the impossibility were a consequence, not the cause, of the subsequent turn in (...) his philosophy. (shrink)

The paper aims at comparing Wittgenstein’s discussion of color exclusion in his to Johnson’s doctrine of determinable and determinate expounded in his. I first summarize Wittgenstein’s developments about the incompatibility of elementary propositions and about the logic of color statements. In the second part, I present and discuss Johnson’s doctrine in relation to Wittgenstein’s development. In a third conclusive moment, drawing on a early work of Prior, I argue that the distinction made by Wittgenstein and Johnson between (...) predication and determination should be looked at from a long term historical perspective. (shrink)

The paper argues, in a nutshell, that Wittgenstein’s reconsideration, after Ramsey’s review, of the Tractatus provides the rationale for the methodological reflections from the former’s manuscripts, which are less sceptical than Schlick’s, on the viability of a phenomenological philosophy. The argument proceeds like this. Section 1 exposes a charge against a Tractarian account of logical syntax: for Ramsey, early Wittgenstein holds unjustifiably that any proposition taken to exhibit logical impossibility, like the impossibility of a fleck of two colours, is analysable (...) into formal contradiction. Section 2 explores ways in which Ramsey’s charge is taken on board by Wittgenstein’s 1929 “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, while bringing forth the view that propositions like “This is of two colours” cannot be analysed into formal contradiction. Section 3 reconstructs a mirror image of early Wittgenstein’s approach to colour-exclusion, from Schlick’s claim that propositions like “This cannot be of two colours” exhibit logical necessity and amount to formal tautologies. Section 4 isolates two responses two Schlick’s approach to colour-exclusion, suggesting that it is not more viable than early Wittgenstein’s. Section 5 assesses the rationale of Wittgenstein’s reflections on phenomenology, as informed by his approaches to colour-exclusion from early onwards. (shrink)

In 1929, Wittgenstein reconsidered the vexing color-Incompatibility problem: explaining how and why more than one color cannot be at a single time and place. He continued discussing the problem in 1930 and later. He offered solutions in the "tractatus", In 1929 and in 1930. Are the solutions the same? clearly not, Because the 1929 solution differs from his earlier one. However, I argue that the 1930 solution is substantially identical with that of 1929 and that the 1929-30 solution (...) is continuous with the "tractatus" as well as some later doctrines. Therefore 1929-30 marks a period of intellectual ferment rather than massive abandonment of his earlier views. (shrink)

Social exclusion can cause negative changes on human beings both in the physiological and psychological aspects. Although considerable efforts have been devoted to study its effects on consumption behavior, little attention has been paid to the consequence that social exclusion might have on consumer’s color preference and the underlying mechanisms. Such social events can change individual’s behavior. This work examines the influence of social exclusion on consumers’ color preference as well as the moderation and mediation (...) effects via three experiments: Experiment 1 studies the impacts of social exclusion on consumer color choice. To further validate the robustness of the results, experiment 2 is designed by replicating the findings of experiment 1 in another product category and instructed the participants to choose products with different colors. Meanwhile, the mediation effect of self-threat is examined. In Experiment 3, the moderation effect of self-construal is investigated via a 2 × 2 × between-subjects design. Our results indicate that social exclusion makes people prefer warm colors rather than cold colors. However, these effects would be mediated by self-threat, which could be further moderated by self-construal. The present study establishes the relationship between social exclusion and consumers’ color preference, which is expected to provide guidance for companies to improve product design and promotion strategies to adapt to various contexts. (shrink)

It is widely believed that some a priori necessary truths are not analytic in the sense of transformable by substitution of synonyms into logical truths. One much-cited example comes from the supposed incompatibility between colour predicates. The idea is that sentences like “Nothing is both blue all over (or uniformly or at a point) and also red” are not transformable into a logical truth in the same way as “Nothing is both a bachelor and married” because the requisite conceptual link (...) between “bachelor” and “not married” is absent between “blue” and “not red”. This paper examines whether colour exclusion may be more like the bachelor case than it initially appears. It transpires that the most promising line of thought is not, however, as has been argued at length in the literature, that “blue” in some more or less convoluted way manages to mean “not red”. Instead it is suggested that the requisite conceptual link may reside in the oft-ignored qualifications (“all over”, “uniformly”, etc.), without which there is no incompatibility in the first place. (shrink)

Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processes.

Vision scientists are interested in three diverse entities: physical stimuli, neural states, and consciously perceived colors, and in the mapping rules among the three. In this worldview, the three kinds of entities have coequal status, and views that attribute color exclusively to one or another of them, such as color realism, have no appeal.

Wittgenstein’s atomist picture, as embodied in his Tractatus, is initially very appealing. However, it faces the famous colour-exclusion problem. In this paper, I shall explain when the atomist picture can be defended in the face of that problem; and, in the light of this, why the atomist picture should be rejected. I outline the atomist picture in Section 1. In Section 2, I present a very simple necessary and sufficient condition for the tenability of the atomist picture. The condition (...) is: logical space is a power of two. In Sections 3 and 4, I outline the colour-exclusion problem, and then show how the cardinality-condition supplies a response to exclusion problems. In Section 5, I explain how this amounts to a distillation of a proposal due to Moss, which goes back to Carruthers. And in Section 6, I show how all this vindicates Wittgenstein’s ultimate rejection of the atomist picture. The brief reason is that we have no guarantee that there are any solutions to a given exclusion problem but, if there are any, then there are far too many. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to clarify Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thesis that colours possess logical structures, focusing on his ‘puzzle proposition’ that “there can be a bluish green but not a reddish green”, (2) to compare modeltheoretical and gametheoretical approaches to the colour exclusion problem. What is gained, then, is a new gametheoretical framework for the logic of ‘forbidden’ (e.g., reddish green and bluish yellow) colours. My larger aim is to discuss phenomenological principles of the demarcation of (...) the bounds of logic as formal ontology of abstract objects. (shrink)

This paper articulates a deflationary interpretation of the notions of meaning and necessity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. This interpretation is developed through a new account of the socalled color‐exclusion problem and of why the formalism of the Tractatus fails to solve it. According to my analysis, this failure calls into question whether the limits of the sayable and the thinkable can be drawn from within language and thought by means of a purely formal logical analysis. I argue that the (...) lesson to learn from the color‐exclusion problem concerns the limitations of a formal logical analysis of language in eliminating the philosophical mythologies formed around the notions of meaning and necessity, and more generally the limitations of formalism as a deflationary strategy in philosophy. (shrink)

This paper articulates a deflationary interpretation of the notions of meaning and necessity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. This interpretation is developed through a new account of the socalled color‐exclusion problem and of why the formalism of the Tractatus fails to solve it. According to my analysis, this failure calls into question whether the limits of the sayable and the thinkable can be drawn from within language and thought by means of a purely formal logical analysis. I argue that the (...) lesson to learn from the color‐exclusion problem concerns the limitations of a formal logical analysis of language in eliminating the philosophical mythologies formed around the notions of meaning and necessity, and more generally the limitations of formalism as a deflationary strategy in philosophy. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish was a contemporary critic of the mechanistic theories of matter that came to dominate seventeenth-century thought and the proponent of a distinctive form of non-mechanistic materialism. Colour was a central issue both to the mechanistic theories of matter that Cavendish opposed and to the non-mechanistic alternative that she defended. This chapter considers the form of colour realism that Cavendish developed to complement her non-mechanistic materialism, and uses her criticisms of contemporary views of colour to try to better understand (...) the experimental approach to natural philosophy associated with writers like Hooke and Boyle. Allen argues that Cavendish’s discussion of colour in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy helps to show that there was a close connection between experimental philosophy and mechanistic theories of matter, and that, at least in the middle of the seventeenth century, experimental and speculative forms of mechanism were not mutually exclusive. (shrink)

In my book, The Rights of Others, I developed a discourse-theoretic approach to questions of political membership in liberal democracies, which include practices of citizenship, as well as of immigration, refuge and asylum. This article revisits five issues in response to various criticisms. How can we justify democratic exclusions? Is there a `right to membership' and how can it be reconciled with the different practices of various constitutional democracies? Is there a distinction between normatively acceptable and normatively problematic restrictions on (...) political membership? Does the concept of `democratic iterations' describe normative or empirical processes? How plausible is the binarism of the national and the global? I argue that democratic exclusions can be justified by not discriminating against would-be citizens and immigrants on the basis of ascriptive criteria. Ascriptive characteristics, like one's sex and skin colour, are not the product of one's voluntary doings. Democratic iterations are empirical processes which can be judged in the light of normative criteria deriving from discourse theory. Furthermore, while the binarism of national and global is problematical, alternative configurations of political membership at the present are not more defensible. (shrink)

This essay explores the intersection of racism, racial embodiment theory and the recent hostility aimed at immigrants and foreigners in the United States, especially the targeting of people of Latin American descent and Latino/as. Anti-immigrant and anti-foreigner sentiment is racist. It is the embodiment of racial privilege for those who wield it and the materiality of racial difference for those it is used against. This manifestation of racial privilege and difference rests upon a redrawing of the color line that (...) is meant towards preserving exclusive categories of political membership. The charge of racism, however, is elided by the fact that this hostility takes the form of a specious embracement of law and lawfulness. “Illegal” in this sense not only captures the actions of those who enter the United States through clandestine or informal means, but, in light of the history of immigration and citizen- ship law, the term operates as a racial trope that designates non-white status, thus marginalizing and alienating certain immigrants from ongoing nation-formation processes. I explain the source for anti-immigrant hostility in the United States, which I take to be connected to the longevity of white normativity as the basis for American identity. I then critically assess how the idea of national belonging is crucial to the perpetuation of white-ways-of-being, especially when citizenship has historically been a venue for the embodiment of racial and even colonial privilege. I conclude by posing several questions about the nature of racial identities and racism that suggest new avenues for further research on racial embodiment in a “postracial” era. pp. 65–90. (shrink)

Research on the U.S. women’s movement has documented the difficulties of cross-racial work between White women and women of racial/ethnic minorities. Less understood is how racial/ethnic minorities do cross-racial work among themselves to construct a collective identity of “women of color” that encourages solidarity across race, class, and other statuses. Drawing on research from the reproductive justice movement, I examine how women of color organizations that strive for intersectional praxis negotiate sameness and difference. I identify two different logics (...) at work within women of color organizations: the first relies on a presumption of “same difference” that emphasizes similar experiences of gender and race oppression; the second accords greater recognition to the “difference-in-sameness” that structures constituents’ lived experiences. While the former can reproduce precisely those forms of silencing and exclusion that women of color organizations seek to challenge, the second remains a ongoing process. The article concludes that women of color organizations must strive continuously to actively negotiate, rather than assume, commonality if they are to avoid reproducing various forms of marginalization and inequality. (shrink)

The African debate on HIV/AIDS has been approached in terms that either foreground its biomedical implications, on the one hand, or its economic challenges, on the other. From the biomedical perspective, HIV/AIDS is a health problem, calling for appropriate behaviour modification strategies; from the economic perspective, however, HIV/AIDS in Africa is viewed as a structural effect of capitalist-induced poverty. This article aims at providing a philosophical basis for understanding the African debate on HIV/AIDS. Its primary contention is that, in order (...) to understand the African experience of HIV/AIDS, we need to overcome the crippling legacy of the modernist-colonialist discourse on Africa, in which “reason” is invariably regarded as the exclusive privilege of the (“white”) Western philosophical “mind”. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 (4) 2007: pp. 388-402. (shrink)

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to show how both the presentation and limitation of visual choices in massively multiplayer online role‐playing games (MMORPG) avatar creation interfaces tends to exclude or favor different real life social groups.Design/methodology/approachA novel method combining both quantitative and critical analysis of the syntagmatic‐paradigmatic structure of MMORPG avatar creation interfaces is used to inform the findings of this study.FindingsThis study concludes that as cultural interfaces, current fantasy themed MMORPGs remediate socially exclusive values both from fantasy literature (...) and from their own game lore. The socially exclusive values deal largely with extreme and immutable racial and sexual dimorphism.Research limitations/implicationsInterfaces which present users with color palettes and/or smooth slider‐based body modifiers do not lend themselves well to this method of analysis. In addition to this, only a handful of the popular MMORPGs are analyzed within the body of this work.Practical implicationsThis paper demonstrates that MMORPG players and designers need to be more aware about how they are constructing and embedding social values in their worlds. Avatars are critical conduits for online social dynamics and embedding socially exclusive values may transfer negative ideologies from old media to new.Originality/valueThis paper offers one of the earliest critiques of embedded values in avatar creation interfaces of MMORPGs. The paper aims to begin discussion on an overlooked area of now popular media that has not received any critical attention regarding its embedded messages of social inclusiveness or exclusiveness. (shrink)

Affect misattribution occurs when affective cues color subsequent unrelated evaluations. Research suggests that affect misattribution decreases when one is aware that affective cues are unrelated to the evaluation at hand. We propose that affect misattribution may even occur when one is aware that affective cues are irrelevant, as long as the source of these cues seems ambiguous. When source ambiguity exists, affective cues may freely influence upcoming unrelated evaluations. We examined this using an adapted affect misattribution procedure where pleasant (...) and unpleasant responses served as affective cues that could influence later evaluations of unrelated targets. These affective cues were either perceived as reflecting a single source , or as reflecting two sources suggesting source ambiguity. Results show that misattribution of affect decreased when participants perceived affective cues as representing one source rather than two. (shrink)

Despite myths of color-blindness in the Netherlands, Black women are marginalized by mainstream expectations of racial and cultural homogeneity. I use Amsterdam Black Women as a case study to illustrate the lived experiences of women affected by this exclusion. In this space, women freely critique Dutch society through mundane moments of truth-telling, venting, and joking, which enable individual problems to rise to a community level. I explore how subtle configurations of Black feminist organizing can be key sites of (...) healing, experimentation, and political engagement. This research complicates how we understand experiences of misogynoir when race consciousness is blended in a transnational context and how Amsterdam Black Women has made possible the refusal of Dutch norms that require members to accept their oppression silently and support false narratives of progressiveness and color-blindness. (shrink)

Determining the nature of binding in grapheme-color synaesthesia has consequences for understanding the neural basis of synaesthesia and visual awareness in general. We evaluated type- and token-based letter-color binding using a synaesthetic version of the object-reviewing paradigm. Although mean response times failed to reveal any significant differences between synaesthetes and control participants, RT analyses with ex-Gaussian distributions revealed that the response facilitation in the synaesthesia group reflected type representations exclusively, while response facilitation in the control group, who learned (...) letter-color associations, was dominated by token representations. Thus, letter-color associations in associator synaesthetes are type-based, and do not involve binding to object tokens, consistent with their subjective reports. Contrary to recent studies that failed to find differences between synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes with behavioral measures, response time distribution analyses indicate that color sensations in synaesthetes are not simply the extreme form of normal letter-color associations, and cannot be attributed to demand characteristics. (shrink)

In this article we investigate how Latino immigrant farmers in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States navigate United States Department of Agriculture programs, which necessitate standardizing farming practices and an acceptance of bureaucracy for participation. We show how Latino immigrant farmers’ agrarian norms and practices are at odds with the state’s requirement for agrarian standardization. This interview-based study builds on existing historical analyses of farmers of color in the United States, and the ways in which their farming practices (...) and racialized identities are often unseen by and illegible to the state. This disjuncture leads to the increased racial exclusion of immigrant farmers from USDA opportunities. Such exclusions impede the transition to a “new era of civil rights,” as has been proclaimed by USDA leadership. Although efforts to address institutionalized racism on a national level may be genuine, they have failed to acknowledge this schism between rural Latino immigrants and the state, thereby inhibiting a meaningful transition in the fields, and continuing a legacy of unequal access to agrarian opportunities for non-white immigrant farmers. (shrink)

Naomi Zack’s unique and important collection, Women of Color and Philosophy, brings together for the first time the voices of twelve philosophers who are women of color. She begins with the premise that the work of women of color who do philosophy in academe, but who do not write exclusively on issues of race, ethnicity, and gender, merits a collection of its own. It’s rare that women of color pursue philosophy in academic contexts; Zack counts at (...) most thirty among the ten thousand members of the American Philosophical Association. Women of color in philosophy often suffer an initial lack of credibility with colleagues and students, their success is often attributed to affirmative action, and the merit of their research is often questioned. They are expected to teach classes on race and gender, and asked to serve on endless committees vouching for the diversity of university programs and policies. But Zack’s collection is not about the philosophical import of these professional considerations. The idea underlying her anthology is that social identity is relevant to both philosophical activity and the production of ideas even when an author does not address race and gender. -/- This landmark volume is divided into three sections intended to reflect three critical themes: direct critiques of traditional academic philosophy; new and original applications of philosophical methods to social issues; and the fresh interpretation of traditional philosophy in ways that suggest new areas of study. (shrink)

Professional philosophy in the US remains relatively homogenous. I use four anecdotes to amplify some of the practices that may contribute to the dearth of underrepresented philosophers. Each anecdote highlights a different problem—lack of proper mentoring, stereotype threat, difficulties navigating sexism, and a sense of exclusion. Although I discuss each of these issues separately, it is certainly the case that these can and often do occur concurrently. I offer preliminary thoughts on how these problems could be addressed while keeping (...) in mind that philosophy in the US is a microcosm of the larger US society. (shrink)

Our question is: how do things look to the color-blind? But what does that mean? Who are the “color-blind”? Approximately 7% of males and fewer than 1% of females (of European descent1) have some form of inherited defect of color vision, and as a result are unable to discriminate some colored stimuli that most of us can tell apart. (‘Color defective’ is an alternative term that is often used; we will continue to speak with the vulgar.) (...) Color vision defects constitute a spectrum of disorders with varying degrees and types of departure from normal human color vision. One form of color vision defect is dichromacy: by mixing together only two lights, the dichromat can match any light, unlike normal trichromatic humans who need to mix three. The most common form of dichromacy (afflicting about 2% of males) is red-green color blindness, or red-green dichromacy, which itself comes in two varieties. A red-green dichromat will not be able to distinguish some pairs of stimuli that respectively appear red and green to those with normal color vision. For simplicity we will concentrate almost exclusively on red-green color blindness.2 In a philosophical context our question is liable to be taken two ways. First, it can be straightforwardly taken as a question about visible properties of external objects like.. (shrink)

This essay puts in conversation some of Seyla Benhabib’s insights about exiled, stateless and migrant populations with ongoing discussions in critical race theory about the racial exclusions of indigenous populations and populations of colour not only in the foundations of Western modern states but also in their contemporary functioning today. The essay locates these exclusions not only in the failures of states but also in their proper functioning, that is, in their very design and constitutive structures, focusing for this purpose (...) on what is described as constitutive exclusions. The essay argues that the relationship between legal agency and social and political agency needs further articulation within Benhabib’s jurisgenerative politics in order to properly address constitutive exclusions. (shrink)

Para responder a la pregunta: ¿Qué es la literatura?, Sartre propone el concepto de unidad como su característica exclusiva que la relaciona con la sociedad por la vía del compromiso. Se analiza tal exclusividad, así como las objeciones de Adorno a la noción de compromiso, para encontrar, en medio de sus grandes diferencias, algunas afinidades que permitan establecer las relaciones entre la literatura y la sociedad. In response to the question "What is literature?", Sartre proposes the concept of unity as (...) the exclusive characteristic that relates it to society by means of commitment. This exclusivity is analyzed, along with Adorno's objections to the notion of commitment. In the midst of great differences, some affinities are found that permit the establishment of the relationship between literature and society. (shrink)

in their book American Philosophy: From Wounded Knee to the Present, contemporary philosophers Erin McKenna and Scott Pratt identify "living in a context of difference" as the central philosophical issue in the history of the United States. They credit W. E. B. Du Bois with having identified racial difference as one particular version of this general issue: "Du Bois once declared that the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line—the problem of the coexistence of (...) differences that figure in our existence as members of communities". For McKenna and Pratt, this continues to be the central philosophical problem in the United States, and perhaps globally, today: "From the... (shrink)

One of the reasons colours, or better the conceptual organisation of the colour system, could be relevant to the philosophy of logic is that they necessitate some mutilation of truth tables by restricting truth functionality. This paper argues that the so-called ‘Colour Exclusion Problem’, the first great challenge for Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, is a legitimate philosophical motivation for a systematic mutilation of truth tables. It shows how one can express, through these mutilations, some intensional logical relations usually expressed by the (...) Aristotelian Square of Oppositions, as contrariety and subcontrariety. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, the first paragraph of the review: "In 1995, Leonard Harris published an article for which he received death threats, exposing the white supremacist underpinnings of institutionalized philosophy in the United States: “There are those [...] who doubt that the Ku Klux Klan created American Philosophy [...] However, even without [that] belief [...] there are reasons to think that American Philosophy is compatible with the wishes of the Klan” (Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (...) 68(5): 1995, 135). If more tempered in tone, "Reframing the Practice of Philosophy" testifies to the abiding white dominance and white solipsism of the discipline. In the latest of “the indefatigable George Yancy’s collections,” contributors make effective use of autobiography to “articulat[e] the lived interiority” of experiences of exclusion, marginalization, and tokenism reflected in statistics which reveal the “paucity of African Americans and Latinos/as in the field of philosophy in the United States”--which remains a “predominantly white and male field” (45, 4, 1, 2). Fifteen years ago, 1% of U.S. philosophers were black; still today only 1% are. Less than 30 are Black women, “doubly disadvantaged in the profession by the intersection of race and gender” (49). Only 3.8% of graduate students in philosophy are Latin@, and only “half a dozen” are “established professional philosophers” (169). As Grant Silva writes in his review published in the "APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy", “more honest conversations like [those staged in "Reframing the Practice of Philosophy] must take place in order for our field to reinvent itself along more equitable lines, assuming that this is indeed a collective goal” (2012, 8). The unbearable whiteness of academic philosophy, means, as Charles Mills puts it, that transforming the discipline is “going to be a long haul” (65)... (shrink)

This paper illustrates what a philosophical and a logical investigation of colors amounts to in contrast to other kinds of color analysis such as physical, physiological, chemical, psychological or cultural analysis of colors. Neither a philosophical nor a logical analysis of colors is concerned with specific aspects of colors. Rather, these kinds of color analysis are concerned with what one might call “logical foundations of color theory”. I will illustrate this first by considering philosophical and then logical (...) analysis of colors. (shrink)

Wittgenstein on colour exclusion : not fatally mistaken / Andrew Lugg -- Dummett's criticism of the context principle / Philip A. Ebert -- What is wrong with classical negation? / Nils Kürbis -- Plain particulars / Ernâni Magalhães -- Frege and the description theory : an attempt at rehabilitation / Ari Maunu -- Die Moralpille : über Risiken und Nebenwirkungen denken Sie eigenständig nach und fragen Ihren Philosophen oder Ihre Philosophin / Dorothee Bleisch --Agency & the pill that makes (...) us moral / Philip Fox -- Breaking good : is there a patent recipe for cooking up the moral pill? / David Heering. (shrink)

This article considers an interpretative model for the study of Heraclitus, which was first put forward by Alexander Mourelatos in 1973, and draws upon a related model put forward by Julius Moravcsik beginning in 1983. I further develop this combined model and provide a motivation for an interpretation of Heraclitus. This is also of interest for modern metaphysics due to the recurrence of structurally similar problems, including the ‘colour exclusion’ problem that was faced by Wittgenstein. Further, I employ the (...) model to shed new light on Heraclitus’ image of the river, while relating potential readings to various contemporary metaphysical views. (shrink)

This paper argues for a physicalistic interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein's general conception of world and language analysis is interpreted and exemplified in relation to the historical background of the psychophysical analysis of sense data and, in particular, color analysis. Three of his main principles of analysis—the principle of independence, the context principle and the principle of atomism—are interpreted and justified on the background of physicalism. From his proof of color exclusion in the Tractatus, it is (...) shown that Wittgenstein had a detailed conception of how philosophy should fulfil the task of distinguishing between sense and nonsense using physicalistic presuppositions. (shrink)

We advocate here that the tractarian image of Logic was the great responsible for its collapse. We examine then some mentions of colors in Wittgenstein´s first book to show that its logic holds a conflict between truth-functionality (explicitly assumed and advocated there) and a (hidden) holism. This antagonism was already set in the very formulation of its ontology. Wittgenstein himself admits he did not notice this by the time of the Tractatus ´ elaboration. If he had noticed it, he could (...) have anticipated the Color Exclusion Problem. We discuss also unexpected interferences of space and time in the environment, which presented both the special kind of color exclusion (to be found in other systems) and his original notions of Logic. This shows inter alia that the image of coordinate system was modulating both the logical space notion in the Tractatus and its natural development in several systems of propositions [ Satzsysteme ] in his return to Philosophy. (shrink)

It is argued that the Tractatus Project of Logical Atomism, in which the world is conceived of as the totality of independent atomic facts, can usefully be understood by conceiving of each fact as a bit in logical space. Wittgenstein himself thinks in terms of logical space. His elementary propositions, which express atomic facts, are interpreted as tuples of co-ordinates which specify the location of a bit in logical space. He says that signs for elementary propositions are arrangements of names. (...) Here, the names are understood as numerical symbols specifying coordinates. It is argued that, using this approach, the so-called colour-exclusion problem, which was Wittgensteins reason for abandoning the Tractatus, is in fact soluble. However, if logical space is a continuum then some coordinates will need to be expressed by numerical symbols that are infinite in size. How is this to be understood in Tractatus terms? It is shown that, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein did recognise the possibility of infinite propositions and sentences expressing them. At first sight his approach to infinite sentences, and the approach of the present paper, seem to differ, but it is argued that the difference is superficial. Finally, we address the question of whether Logical Atomism is viable and this raises issues concerning its relationship to natural science. (shrink)

The first section of the paper argues that, in the context of Wittgenstein’s intentional understanding of the truth-functional construction of sentences, the independence of elementary sentences is required for every application of a truth-operation to have the same significance. The second section of the paper presents a ‘top-down’ interpretation of Tractarian analysis. There is no characterization of the bottom level of analysis apart from the general sentence-form; the only constraint on analysis is that apparently manifest logical relationships among colloquial sentences (...) with sense be represented or otherwise accommodated using only the logical resources built into the general sentence-form. The third section of the paper considers how those logical resources might be applied in Tractarian analysis. Central here is the use of form-series to construct infinitary truth-functions. The section develops a view of Tractarian complexes which accommodates some colloquially manifest logical relations as presuppositions that are made explicit in analysis. Finally, I note that Tractarian analysis, as presented in this paper, is immune to the ‘color exclusion’ objection as formulated in Wittgenstein’s 1929 paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form.”. (shrink)

The paper examines the invariance principles proposed by the analytical and phenomenological traditions for demarcating the boundaries of formal and regional ontologies. The principle of invariance with respect to isomorphic transformations, generalizing Alfred Tarski’s criterion for logical concepts, is extended to formal ontology as the theory of manifolds in its phenomenological interpretation. Isomorphism types, which are abstract individuals of the highest order, hypostases of forms of all possible ontologies, are considered as model-theoretical analogs of manifolds. The correlativity of the phenomenological (...) principles of demarcation of ontological regions and the criterion of invariance with respect to isomorphic transformations is demonstrated, leading to the convergence of logic and formal mathematics in both traditions and, at the same time, to the exclusion of geometry from formal ontology. Particular attention is paid to the discussion of the analytical and phenomenological traditions of the synthetic (material) a priori and the contribution that Wittgenstein’s doctrine on internal relations at different stages of its evolution makes to this discussion. The paper reveals the basis for later Wittgenstein’s criticism of his earlier project of creating a phenomenological language for expressing internal regional relations (such as the colours exclusion). The paper shows how Wittgenstein’s doubts about the possibility of an ideal notation based on the dichotomy of the logical and phenomenological led him to the study of invariants arising in language games. These invariants are not determined by the special properties of the categorical objects of formal ontology or the structures of regional subject matter, but are stable equilibria generated by the “consensus of actions.” New perspectives are outlined that are opened for logic and phenomenology by switching focus from the invariants of ontological structures to the invariants of structured interactions of various agents. (shrink)

The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. -/- Wittgenstein’s writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein’s return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these (...) works indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein’s few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. -/- Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein's thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein's writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein's return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these works (...) indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein's return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein's few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. Wittgenstein's Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

It is often held that Wittgenstein had to introduce numbers in elementary propositions due to problems related to the so-called colour-exclusion problem. I argue in this paper that he had other reasons for introducing them, reasons that arise from an investigation of the continuity of visual space and what Wittgenstein refers to as ‘intensional infinity’. In addition, I argue that the introduction of numbers by this route was prior to introducing them _via_ the colour-exclusion problem. To conclude, I (...) discuss two problems that Wittgenstein faced in the writings before _Some Remarks on Logical Form _, problems that are independent of the colour-exclusion problem but dependent on the introduction of numbers in elementary propositions. (shrink)

By 1929, after the full acknowledgment of the colour–exclusion problem, Wittgenstein had to admit that material incompatibilities presented in conceptual systems could not be reduced to formal tautologies and contradictions. Wittgenstein then, in his middle period, had to examine the kind of negation which, for instance, colour systems should render, which expose not just one but many or, in some cases, infinite inferentially articulated alternatives. Here, inspired by Brandom’s inferentialism, I explore the idea that Wittgenstein, in his middle period, (...) advocated a form of inferentialism based on the inferentially articulated content of propositions in Satzsysteme. At that time, Wittgenstein suggested that every sentence should be logically connected to many others. I call this feature inferential thickness. Therefore, I use Löf’s normative read of verificationism to explain Middle Wittgenstein’s holist solution to problems concerning the use of negation related to material incompatibilities and determination of propositional sense. I also investigate the distinction between contrariety and contradiction and some possible connections to a mandatory restriction of the principle of excluded middle in Satzsysteme. (shrink)

When we open our eyes, the world seems full of colored opaque objects, light sources, and transparent volumes. One historically popular view, _eliminativism_, is that the world is not in this respect as it appears to be: nothing has any color. Color _realism_, the denial of eliminativism, comes in three mutually exclusive varieties, which may be taken to exhaust the space of plausible realist theories. Acccording to _dispositionalism_, colors are _psychological_ dispositions: dispositions to produce certain kinds of visual (...) experiences. According to both _primitivism_ and _physicalism_, colors are not psychological dispositions; they differ in that primitivism says that no reductive analysis of the colors is possible, whereas physicalism says that they are physical properties. This paper is a defense of physicalism about color. (shrink)

Hering’s opponent-colors theory suggests that our color sensations are produced by three mechanisms: a red–green mechanism, a yellow–blue mechanism, and a white–black mechanism. The first two mechanisms give rise to our sensations of hued colors; the third mechanism gives rise to our sensations of hueless colors. Noticeably, whereas the pair of colors produced by each of the hued mechanisms do not mix to yield a phenomenal intermediate (i.e., there are no greenish reds, reddish greens, yellowish blues, or bluish yellows), (...) the colors produced by the hueless mechanism, white and black, do have a phenomenal intermediate—gray. This different behavior of the white–black mechanism poses a problem for Hering’s theory. Several attempts to fix this problem have been suggested. This paper focuses on the suggestion made by Paul Heggelund a century after Hering proposed his theory. In Heggelund’s amendment of Hering’s theory, the hueless colors are not confined to the one-dimensional gamut between black and white, but rather require two components for their full description: a light–dark (or luminous–black) component, where light and dark are mutually exclusive sensations, and a white component, which doesn’t have an opponent counterpart. Here I show that although Heggelund’s theory indeed provides a solution to the problem that the hueless colors pose to Hering’s theory, it is not self-consistent. I go on to revise Heggelund’s theory to obtain a consistent opponent-colors theory. (shrink)

An article explicating Wittgenstein's logical atomism and surveying the relevant secondary literature.

Within the rather large Wittgenstein-collection at the Austrian National Library are 14 letters to Ludwig Wittgenstein from his uncle Paul (1848-1928), written between 1914 and 1923. The last of these letters, written on 1st March 1923, contains a little surprise. On the backside of this letter, the logical remarks and draft graphics which are recorded are obviously penned by the hand of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

A good portion of the work in the ontology of color focuses on color properties, trying to figure out how they are related to more straightforwardly physical properties. Another focus is realism: are ordinary material objects such as pumpkins really colored? A third emphasis is the nature of what is referred to by the terms ‘what it’s like’ or ‘phenomenal character’, as applied to color. In contrast, this essay is exclusively about select color tokens. I will (...) be arguing that whether or not ordinary objects such as pumpkins are colored, regardless of what the true theory of color properties is, and independently of any talk of phenomenal character or what-it’s-likeness, some afterimage experiences are very hard to fit into any plausible ontology, physicalist or not. (shrink)

Downward causation is commonly held to create problems for ontologically emergent properties. In this paper I describe two novel examples of ontologically emergent properties and show how they avoid two main problems of downward causation, the causal exclusion problem and the causal closure problem. One example involves an object whose colour does not logically supervene on the colours of its atomic parts. The other example is inspired by quantum entanglement cases but avoids controversies regarding quantum mechanics. These examples show (...) that the causal exclusion problem can be avoided, in one case by showing how it is possible to interact with an object without interacting with its atomic parts. I accept that emergence cannot be reconciled with causal closure, but argue that violations of causal closure do not entail violations of the base-level laws. Only the latter would conflict with empirical science. (shrink)