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Color, mental location, and the visual field
Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93 (2001)
Abstract
Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processesAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Quality-space theory in olfaction.Benjamin D. Young, Andreas Keller & David Rosenthal - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
Quality-Space Functionalism about Color.Jacob Berger - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (3):138-164.
Naturalizing grounding: How theories of ground can engage science.Amanda Bryant - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (5):e12489.
The vagueness constraint and the quality space for pain.Daniel Kostic - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.
References found in this work
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas, Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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