Da natureza afetiva da forma na obra de arte.--Forma e personalidade.--Panorama da pintura moderna.

Criticism and interpretation by Yaḥyá ibn Ḥabash Suhrawardī,1152 or 3-1191 on philosophy of Islam and Sufism.

Memoirs of a political thinker from Nepal.

本书以对道德的重视和人的觉醒为二大主线, 揭示了春秋时期思想文化的转型以及这一转型对儒学的形成及其对整个中国古代思想文化基本特征确立的历史意义.

Commentary on Tarkasaṅgraha of Annambhaṭṭa, 17th cent., work on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy; critical edition with complete text.

Commentary, with text, on Bādarāyaṇa's Brahmasūtra, basic work of the Vedanta school in Hindu philosophy.

马忠林(1914~ ),东北师范大学数学系教授,中国数学会会员,吉林省数学会常务理事,日本三大学数学教育学研究会名誉会长.

Study of Advaitabrahmasiddhi, work on Advaita by Sadānandayati, 17th cent.

Explanation of the stages of refuge, the principle practice of Bon.

Account of Bonpo Geshe degree (equivalent to Doctor of Philosophy) presentation according to Zhwa-dkar Gʹyung-drung Bon-gyi-bshad-sgrub-ʼdus-paʼi-sde in Solan, India, education system and its related documents.

Exegetical notes on 1st chapter of Bon Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of wisdom) philosophy parallel to Buddhist.

Exegetical notes on 2nd, 3rd, and 4th chapters of Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of wisdom) text of Bon philosophical doctrine.

Commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, aphoristic work on Vedanta philosophy; includes Śrībhāṣyabhāvacandrika supercommentary and text of Brahmasūtra.

Classical commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, basic work of the Vedanta philosophy from Madhva view point.

Commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, based on Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has attracted an increasing amount of attention, both positive and negative. Its potential applications in healthcare are indeed manifold and revolutionary, and within the realm of medical imaging and radiology (which will be the focus of this paper), significant increases in accuracy and speed, as well as significant savings in cost, stand to be gained through the adoption of this technology. Because of its novelty, a norm of keeping humans “in the loop” wherever AI mechanisms are deployed (...) has become synonymous with good ethical practice in some circles. It has been argued that keeping humans “in the loop” is important for reasons of safety, accountability, and the maintenance of institutional trust. However, as the application of machine learning for the detection of lumbar spinal stenosis (LSS) in this paper’s case study reveals, there are some scenarios where an insistence on keeping humans in the loop (or in other words, the resistance to automation) seems unwarranted and could possibly lead us to miss out on very real and important opportunities in healthcare—particularly in low-resource settings. It is important to acknowledge these opportunity costs of resisting automation in such contexts, where better options may be unavailable. Using an AI model based on convolutional neural networks developed by a team of researchers at NUH/NUS medical school in Singapore for automated detection and classification of the lumbar spinal canal, lateral recess, and neural foraminal narrowing in an MRI scan of the spine to diagnose LSS, we will aim to demonstrate that where certain criteria hold (e.g., the AI is as accurate or better than human experts, risks are low in the event of an error, the gain in wellbeing is significant, and the task being automated is not essentially or importantly human), it is both morally permissible and even desirable to kick the humans out of the loop. (shrink)

Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we present (...) the second-person standpoint of morality, first as Darwall conceives of it, and then as we reinterpret it from a naturalistic approach. Then we synthesize Tomasello’s evolutionary account of morality, and Darwall’s objections to it. To reply to those objections, building on Tomasello’s proposal, we argue that the motivation to be impartial, and the feeling of obligation to comply with normative requirements, appeared when humans anticipated and, critically, internalized others’ sanctions to the violation of social norms. Consequently, we posit that social norms and sanctions appeared first at the community level, and only after that were they internalized in the form of self-directed reactive attitudes. Finally, we derive some corollaries that follow from our proposal. (shrink)

In this paper, we take Darwall’s analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral (...) psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall’s work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms. (shrink)

Communication strategies to shape public opinion can be applied to the philosophical program of conceptual engineering. I propose to look for answers to the implementation challenge for conceptual engineering on similar challenges that arise in other contexts, such as that of social movements. I claim that conceptual engineering is successfully practiced in other areas with direct consequences on the political landscape, and that we can apply to philosophy what we might learn from those successful practices. With that end in mind, (...) I explain the psychological approach to conceptual engineering. I present what has been called “the implementation challenge”, which is the problem that emerges from the possibility of control over the content of our concepts. The challenge consists in that if there is not such a control, conceptual engineering is not implementable. Then, I review some of the reactions that have been given to that challenge, and I defend the feasibility of conceptual engineering appealing to the collective action frames that social movements endorse as an instance of a successful kind of conceptual engineering and derive some strategies that might be of use for conceptual engineering in philosophy. Finally, I reply to some anticipated objections to my proposal. (shrink)

The study of corporate social responsibility has been the object of much research in recent decades, although there is a need to continue investigating its benefits as a marketing tool. In the current work we adopt a multi-dimensional perspective of social responsibility, and we carry out market research to determine the perceptions of users of mobile telephone services about economic, legal, ethical and social aspects of their operating companies. With these data we determine the structure and components of the concept (...) of social responsibility. Subsequently, this is related with the overall evaluation of the service and loyalty by means of a model of structural equations, in order to determine the influence of corporate social responsibility on these concepts, and hence its benefits as a commercial tool. (shrink)

We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.

Treatise on the doctrine of the Rāmānandīs, Vaishnava sect.

On verse work on the doctrine of the Rāmānandīs.

The book questions two key dichotomies: that of the apparent and real, and that of the internal and external. This leads to revised notions of the structure of experience and the object of knowledge. Our world is experienced as possibilities of action, and to know is to know what to do. A further consequence is that the mind is best considered as a property of organisms' interactions with their environment. The unit of analysis is the loop of action and perception, (...) and the central concept is the notion of habit of action, which provides the embodied basis of cognition as the anticipation of action. This holds for non-linguistic tacit meanings as well as for linguistic meanings. Habit of action is a teleological notion and thus opens a possibility for defining intentionality and normativity in terms of the soft naturalism adopted in the book. The mind is embodied, and this embodiment determines our physical perspective on the world. Our sensory organs and other instruments give us instrumental access to the world, and this access is epistemic in character. The distinction between the physical and conceptual viewpoint allows us to define truth as the correspondence with operational fit. This embodied epistemic truth is however not a sign of antirealism, as the instrumentally accessed theoretical objects are precisely those objects that experimental science deals with.. (shrink)

Ma Weilong's article appeared in the Shanghai daily newspaper Shibao . Shibao was an organ of late Qing constitutional reformists founded in June of 1904. Little is known about Ma since he was not a regular Shibao journalist. Ma was not the first to mention issues of rights in the pages of Shibao. Between April and July 1907 the newspaper devoted a series of editorials to the subject of constitutional rights. This included a translation of the full text of the (...) French Declaration of the Rights of Man, which was prefaced by a brief explanation of the concept of natural rights and its implications for the citizens of a constitutional nation. While Ma says that natural rights are innate, he simultaneously requires that citizens develop adequate "political abilities" before they can merit any rights. (shrink)

Emotional contagion is a phenomenon that has attracted much interest in recent times. However, the main approach on offer, the mimicry theory, fails to properly account for its many facets. In particular, we focus on two shortcomings: the elicitation of emotional contagion is not context-independent, and there can be cases of emotional contagion without motor mimicry. We contend that a general theory of emotion elicitation is better suited to account for these features, because of its multi-level appraisal component. From this (...) standpoint, emotional contagion is viewed as a particular kind of emotional response that involves the same components and processes of emotional responses in general. (shrink)

In the West, the mission of cultural studies is often inextricably linked with practice, or intervention. Stuart Hall, the British scholar of cultural studies, believed that cultural studies is essentially "a sort of practice in which one constantly gives thought to intervening in the world, and the purpose of practice is always to reform, to effect change, and to have practical and actual effect on things."1.