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William Ramsey [29]William M. Ramsey [6]William Max Ramsey [2]
  1. Representation Reconsidered.William M. Ramsey - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Cognitive representation is the single most important explanatory notion in the sciences of the mind and has served as the cornerstone for the so-called 'cognitive revolution'. This book critically examines the ways in which philosophers and cognitive scientists appeal to representations in their theories, and argues that there is considerable confusion about the nature of representational states. This has led to an excessive over-application of the notion - especially in many of the fresher theories in computational neuroscience. Representation Reconsidered shows (...)
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  2. Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry.Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.) - 1998 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgments. Yet, despite the important role intuitions play in philosophy, there has been little reflection on fundamental questions concerning the sort of data intuitions provide, how they are supposed to lead us to the truth, and why we should treat them as important. In addition, recent psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical inquiry. Rethinking Intuition brings together a (...)
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  3. Must cognition be representational?William Ramsey - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4197-4214.
    In various contexts and for various reasons, writers often define cognitive processes and architectures as those involving representational states and structures. Similarly, cognitive theories are also often delineated as those that invoke representations. In this paper, I present several reasons for rejecting this way of demarcating the cognitive. Some of the reasons against defining cognition in representational terms are that doing so needlessly restricts our theorizing, it undermines the empirical status of the representational theory of mind, and it encourages wildly (...)
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  4. Philosophy and Connectionist Theory.William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. M. Rumelhart (eds.) - 1991 - Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
    The philosophy of cognitive science has recently become one of the most exciting and fastest growing domains of philosophical inquiry and analysis. Until the early 1980s, nearly all of the models developed treated cognitive processes -- like problem solving, language comprehension, memory, and higher visual processing -- as rule-governed symbol manipulation. However, this situation has changed dramatically over the last half dozen years. In that period there has been an enormous shift of attention toward connectionist models of cognition that are (...)
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  5. Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & J. Garon - 1991 - In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 499-533.
  6. Prototypes and conceptual analysis.William Ramsey - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):59-70.
    In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that conceptual analysis, as it is commonly practiced, is committed to certain assumptions about the nature of our intuitive categorization judgments. I then try to show how these assumptions clash with contemporary accounts of concept representation in cognitive psychology. After entertaining an objection to my argument, I close by considering ways in which conceptual analysis might be altered (...)
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  7. Connectionism, eliminativism and the future of folk psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen Stich & Joseph Garon - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:499-533.
  8.  75
    What eliminative materialism isn’t.William M. Ramsey - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11707-11728.
    In this paper my aim is to get clearer on what eliminative materialism actually does and does not entail. I look closely at one cluster of views that is often described as a form of eliminativism in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science and try to show that this characterization is a mistake. More specifically, I look at conceptions of eliminativism recently endorsed by writers such as Edouard Machery, Paul Griffiths, Valerie Hardcastle and others, and argue that although these views do (...)
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  9.  60
    The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence.Keith Frankish & William M. Ramsey (eds.) - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    Artificial intelligence, or AI, is a cross-disciplinary approach to understanding, modeling, and creating intelligence of various forms. It is a critical branch of cognitive science, and its influence is increasingly being felt in other areas, including the humanities. AI applications are transforming the way we interact with each other and with our environment, and work in artificially modeling intelligence is offering new insights into the human mind and revealing new forms mentality can take. This volume of original essays presents the (...)
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  10. Eliminative materialism.William Ramsey - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Eliminative materialism (or eliminativism) is the radical claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist. Descartes famously challenged much of what we take for granted, but he insisted that, for the most part, we can be confident about the content of our own minds. Eliminative materialists go further than Descartes on this point, since they challenge of the existence of various (...)
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  11.  45
    The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science.Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.) - 2012 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Cognitive science is a cross-disciplinary enterprise devoted to understanding the nature of the mind. In recent years, investigators in philosophy, psychology, the neurosciences, artificial intelligence, and a host of other disciplines have come to appreciate how much they can learn from one another about the various dimensions of cognition. The result has been the emergence of one of the most exciting and fruitful areas of inter-disciplinary research in the history of science. This volume of original essays surveys foundational, theoretical, and (...)
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  12. Do connectionist representations earn their explanatory keep?William Ramsey - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):34-66.
    In this paper I assess the explanatory role of internal representations in connectionist models of cognition. Focusing on both the internal‘hidden’units and the connection weights between units, I argue that the standard reasons for viewing these components as representations are inadequate to bestow an explanatorily useful notion of representation. Hence, nothing would be lost from connectionist accounts of cognitive processes if we were to stop viewing the weights and hidden units as internal representations.
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  13.  85
    Intuitions as Evidence Facilitators.William Ramsey - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):76-99.
    There is currently an important debate about whether philosophical intuitions are intended as evidence for the theories philosophers promote. On one side are those who argue that philosophers do rely on intuitions as evidence; on the other side are those who deny any such role for philosophical intuitions. This paper argues that both sides of this debate are partially right and partially wrong. Intuitive judgments do not, as psychological states, function as evidence in most well-known philosophical thought experiments. Philosophers nevertheless (...)
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  14.  43
    Do Connectionist Representations Earn Their Explanatory Keep?William Ramsey - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):34-66.
    In this paper I assess the explanatory role of internal representations in connectionist models of cognition. Focusing on both the internal‘hidden’units and the connection weights between units, I argue that the standard reasons for viewing these components as representations are inadequate to bestow an explanatorily useful notion of representation. Hence, nothing would be lost from connectionist accounts of cognitive processes if we were to stop viewing the weights and hidden units as internal representations.
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  15. Preface.Michael DePaul & William Ramsey - 1998 - In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
     
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  16.  76
    The Hard Problem of Content is Neither.William Max Ramsey - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    For the past 40 years, philosophers have generally assumed that a key to understanding mental representation is to develop a naturalistic theory of representational content. This has led to an outlook where the importance of content has been heavily inflated, while the significance of the representational vehicles has been somewhat downplayed. However, the success of this enterprise has been thwarted by a number of mysterious and allegedly non-naturalizable, irreducible dimensions of representational content. The challenge of addressing these difficulties has come (...)
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  17.  77
    How not to build a hybrid: Simulation vs. fact-finding.William Ramsey - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):775-795.
    In accounting for the way we explain and predict behavior, two major positions are the theory-theory and the simulation theory. Recently, several authors have advocated a hybrid position, where elements of both theory and simulation are part of the account. One popular strategy for incorporating simulation is to note that we sometimes assign mental states to others by performing cognitive operations in ourselves that mirror what has occurred in the target. In this article, I argue that this way of thinking (...)
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  18. Connectionism and three levels of nativism.William Ramsey & Stephen P. Stich - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):177-205.
    Along with the increasing popularity of connectionist language models has come a number of provocative suggestions about the challenge these models present to Chomsky's arguments for nativism. The aim of this paper is to assess these claims. We begin by reconstructing Chomsky's argument from the poverty of the stimulus and arguing that it is best understood as three related arguments, with increasingly strong conclusions. Next, we provide a brief introduction to connectionism and give a quick survey of recent efforts to (...)
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  19. Where does the self‐refutation objection take us?William Ramsey - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):453-65.
    Eliminative materialism is the position that common?sense psychology is false and that beliefs and desires, like witches and demons, do not exist. One of the most popular criticisms of this view is that it is self?refuting or, in some sense, incoherent. Hence, it is often claimed that eliminativism is not only implausible, but necessarily false. Below, I assess the merits of this objection and find it seriously wanting. I argue that the self?refutation objection is (at best) a misleading reformulation of (...)
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  20.  10
    Was Rorty an Eliminative Materialist?William Ramsey - 2020 - In Alan Malachowski (ed.), A companion to Rorty. Hoboken: Wiley. pp. 25–42.
    Early in his career Richard Rorty became well known for advocating what became known as eliminative materialism. This position depended on the radical idea that the main elements of commonsense psychology, including ordinary sensations, do not really exist. This chapter argues that on a closer reading of Rorty's relevant articles, it is clear that Rorty was not an eliminative materialist in any normal sense, but rather a more conventional materialist who made some misguided claims about what mind–brain identity involves.
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  21. Rethinking distributed representation.William Ramsey - 1995 - Acta Analytica 10 (14):9-25.
  22. Multiple realizability intuitions and the functionalist conception of the mind.William Ramsey - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):53-73.
    A popular argument supporting functionalism has been what is commonly called the “multiple realizability” argument. One version of this argument uses thought experiments designed to show that minds could be composed of different types of material. This article offers a metaphilosophical analysis of this argument and shows that it fails to provide a strong case for functionalism. The multiple realizability argument is best understood as an inference‐to‐the‐best‐explanation argument, whereby a functionalist account of our mental concepts serves to explain our multiple (...)
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  23.  44
    Distributed representation and causal modularity: A rejoinder to Forster and Saidel.William Ramsey - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):453-61.
    In “Connectionism and the fats of folk psychology”, Forster and Saidel argue that the central claim of Ramsey, Stich and Garon (1991)—that distributed connectionist models are incompatible with the causal discreteness of folk psychology—is mistaken. To establish their claim, they offer an intriguing model which allegedly shows how distributed representations can function in a causally discrete manner. They also challenge our position regarding projectibility of folk psychology. In this essay, I offer a response to their account and show how their (...)
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  24.  35
    Parallelism and Functionalism.William M. Ramsey - 1989 - Cognitive Science 13 (1):139-144.
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  25.  72
    Bigotry and Religious Belief.William M. Ramsey - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):125-151.
    Attacks on religious doctrines are often characterized as a form of bigotry and traditional analyses of the concept support this view. I argue that regarding such attacks as bigotry is inconsistent with a variety of contemporary moral attitudes and social goals. I offer an improved account of when we should ascribe bigotry – one that is more coherent with views on tolerance and the importance of open debate. This account focuses upon the justification for hostile attitudes and also limits the (...)
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  26.  45
    Responses to 'computationalism'.1Imre Balogh, Brian Beakley, Paul Churchland, Michael Gorman, Stevan Harnad, David Mertz, H. H. Pattee, William Ramsey, John Ringen, Georg Schwarz, Brian Slator, Alan Strudler & Charles Wallis - 1990 - Social Epistemology 4 (2):155 – 199.
  27. Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen Stich & Joseph Garon - 1995 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. pp. 311.
  28.  42
    Belief and cognitive architecture.William Ramsey - 1992 - Dialogue 31 (1):115-120.
    Considerable debate in philosophy of psychology has recently focussed upon two central themes. One concerns the ontological status of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires, the other on the proper computational account of cognitive architecture. In the ontological debate, the two most prominent positions are eliminativism, which claims that commonsense psychology is false because there are no such things as beliefs and desires; and versions of intentional realism, which counters that beliefs and desires actually do exist in the mind/brain. In (...)
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  29.  70
    Conceptual Analysis and the Connectionist Account of Concepts.William Ramsey - 1996 - In J. Ezquerro A. Clark (ed.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 35--57.
  30. Hold manufacturing : why you may be wrong about what's right.William Ramsey - 2010 - In Stephen E. Schmid (ed.), Climbing - Philosophy for Everyone: Because It's There. Wiley-Blackwell.
  31.  1
    Hold Manufacturing.William Ramsey - 2010-09-24 - In Fritz Allhoff & Stephen E. Schmid (eds.), Climbing ‐ Philosophy for Everyone. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 145–157.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Practical Ethics Practical Ethics and Hold Manufacturing Reason 1: Rock Modification is Acceptable Only for Safety Reasons Reason 2: Hold Manufacturing Violates Important Environmental Commitments Reason 3: Hold Manufacturing Harms Future Generations of Good Climbers Reason 4: This is a Slippery Slope; Any Acceptance of Manufacturing Will Lead to Abuses Conclusion.
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  32. Perception.William Ramsey - unknown
    Philosophical work on perception traditionally concerns whether perceptual acquaintance with things in the world is compatible with the possibility of illusions and hallucinations. Given that you cannot tell definitively if you are hallucinating, how are you ever acquainted with things like tomatoes, barns, collisions, colors, sounds, and odors?
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  33.  53
    Stich and his Critics – ed. Dominic Murphy and Michael Bishop.William Ramsey - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):650-653.
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  34.  71
    Review of Richard menary (ed.), The Extended Mind[REVIEW]William Ramsey - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (12).
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  35.  26
    The harmonic mind: From neural computation to optimality-theoretic grammar-volume 1: Cognitive architecture and volume 2: Linguistic and philosophical implications. [REVIEW]William Ramsey - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (3):172-184.