In 2011, Hibbard suggested an intelligence measure for agents who compete in an adversarial sequence prediction game. We argue that Hibbard’s idea should actually be considered as two separate ideas: first, that the intelligence of such agents can be measured based on the growth rates of the runtimes of the competitors that they defeat; and second, one specific (somewhat arbitrary) method for measuring said growth rates. Whereas Hibbard’s intelligence measure is based on the latter growth-rate-measuring method, we (...) survey other methods for measuring function growth rates, and exhibit the resulting Hibbard-like intelligence measures and taxonomies. Of particular interest, we obtain intelligence taxonomies based on Big-O and Big-Theta notation systems, which taxonomies are novel in that they challenge conventional notions of what an intelligence measure should look like. We discuss how intelligence measurement of sequence predictors can indirectly serve as intelligence measurement for agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGIs). (shrink)

Traditional approaches to modeling cognitive systems are computational, based on utilizing the standard tools and concepts of the theory of computation. More recently, a number of philosophers have argued that cognition is too subtle or complex for these tools to handle. These philosophers propose an alternative based on dynamical systems theory. Proponents of this view characterize dynamical systems as (i) utilizing continuous rather than discrete mathematics, and, as a result, (ii) being computationally more powerful than traditional computational automata. Indeed, the (...) logical possibility of such super-powerful systems has been demonstrated in the form of analog artificial neural networks. In this paper I consider three arguments against the nomological possibility of these automata. While the first two arguments fail, the third succeeds. In particular, the presence of noise reduces the computational power of analog networks to that of traditional computational automata, and noise is a pervasive feature of information processing in biological systems. Consequently, as an empirical thesis, the proposed dynamical alternative is under-motivated: What is required is an account of how continuously valued systems could be realized in physical systems despite the ubiquity of noise. (shrink)

The ‘received view’ of the analog–digital distinction holds that analog representations are continuous while digital representations are discrete. In this paper I first provide support for the received view by showing how it (1) emerges from the theory of computation, and (2) explains engineering practices. Second, I critically assess several recently offered alternatives, arguing that to the degree they are justified they demonstrate not that the received view is incorrect, but rather that distinct senses of the terms have become entrenched (...) specific fields, perhaps most notably in the cognitive psychology of mental imagery. (shrink)

Embedded and embodied approaches to cognition urge that (1) complicated internal representations may be avoided by letting features of the environment drive behavior, and (2) environmental structures can play an enabling role in cognition, allowing prior cognitive processes to solve novel tasks. Such approaches are thus in a natural position to oppose the ‘thesis of linguistic structuring’: The claim that the ability to use language results in a wholesale recapitulation of linguistic structure in onboard mental representation. Prominent examples of researchers (...) adopting this critical stance include Andy Clark, Michael Wheeler, and Mark Rowlands. But is such opposition warranted? Since each of these authors advocate accounts of mental representation that are broadly connectionist, I survey research on formal language computation in artificial neural networks, and argue that results indicate a strong form of the linguistic structuring thesis is true: Internal representational systems recapitulate significant linguistic structure, even on a connectionist account of mental representation. I conclude by sketching how my conclusion can nonetheless be viewed as consistent with and complimentary to an embedded/embodied account of the role of linguistic structure in cognition. (shrink)

: Recently developed projective models of consciousness and its contents challenge received schemas in which all contents of consciousness are held to be well contained in the skull. Working our way into this from several angles, it becomes evident that there are inconsistencies in how we frame classes of mental contents which are arguably equivalent in being. Particular examples of imagery, of dancing and of words, are brought forward to highlight the clash in our apprehensive assumptions, focusing on possible cognitive (...) as well as psychological costs of such inconsistency. A coherent way to blend the container and projector schemas is pointed out; yet such a blend does not support the standard claim for any kind of purely inner voice, contained but not projected. Conscious reflection may in all instances depend on projection, with reflection in imagery - visual, audible, even tactile and otherwise felt - placed just the far side of what can schematically be grasped as the sensory horizon where, in the space-time just beyond here and now, our imaginative expectations backstop recognition of here-now present things. Resumo: Os modelos projetivos de consciência e de seus conteúdos, recentemente desenvolvidos, desafiam os esquemas tradicionais, nos quais todos os conteúdos da consciência são mantidos bem contidos dentro do crânio. Trabalhando desta forma, a partir de vários ângulos, torna-se evidente que existem inconsistências na forma como emolduramos classes de conteúdos mentais que são possivelmente equivalentes em seu ser. Exemplos particulares de imagens, de dança e de palavras são apresentados para ressaltar o choque em nossas suposições apreensivas, focalizando possíveis custos cognitivos e psicológicos de tal inconsistência. Uma maneira coerente de misturar os esquemas do “continente” e do “projetor” é apontada; no entanto, tal combinação não suporta as exigências gerais, encontradas na literatura, para qualquer tipo de fala puramente interna, que esteja contida, mas não projetada. A reflexão consciente pode, em todos os casos, depender da projeção, com reflexo na imagem - visual, audível, até tátil e sentida - situada apenas no lado distante do que pode ser esquematicamente compreendido como o horizonte sensorial onde, no espaço-tempo e agora, nossas expectativas imaginativas apóiam o reconhecimento das coisas presentes e atuais. (shrink)

FOREWORD Every spirit makes its house, but afterwards the house confines the spirit. Conduct of Life: Fate, Ralph Waldo Emerson. The duty of an anthologist, ...

Some researchers claim that simulations of the emergence of communication in populations of autonomous agents provide empirical support for 'use' theories of meaning. I argue that this claim faces at least two major challenges. First, the empirical adequacy of such simulations must be justified, or the inference from simulation results to real-world linguistic behavior must be dropped; and second, the proffered simulations are in fact compatible with all of the competing theories of meaning surveyed, suggesting that theories of meaning are (...) not the kinds of theories for which simulations provide evidence. To conclude, I consider what impact this has on the project of developing a naturalized theory of language. (shrink)

This article examines the notorious mid-nineteenth-century American trial of Amelia Norman, who was acquitted - very much against the weight of the evidence - of attempting to kill the man who seduced her. In particular, we explore the role in the trial and its aftermath of the affective energies and cultural expectations set in motion by best-selling American sentimental novels like Hannah Foster's "The Coquette" and Susanna Rowson's "Charlotte Temple." In Norman's case, once newspapers, defense lawyers, and reformers such as (...) Lydia Maria Child recast the defendant as a sentimental heroine, the trial became about seduction, not attempted murder. The sentimental emplotment of Norman's life marshaled a powerful set of emotional responses and moral judgments on her behalf. For example, Norman claimed insanity. And since sentimental heroines are supposed to go mad when they are seduced and abandoned, the jury was prepared to interpret her symptoms according to her lawyers' very strategy for establishing her innocence. Ultimately, however, Norman embodied the plight of the sentimental heroine at the same time that she contested her fictional counterpart's fate. In this way, her trial spectacularized the disparity which the sentimental novel conjures up and displaces but never resolves. Going further, the common law theory of coverture, which severely limited the legal personhood of married women, has received a great deal of scholarly attention. Cases like Norman's remind us that unmarried women were also subject to draconian constraints on their legal personhood. The tort of seduction is a key example. Legal historians trace the development of the seduction tort from its common-law origins, when men's property interest in women's bodies formed the basis of the cause of action, to 1851, when Field Code authors (including Norman's lawyer, David Graham) persuaded several states to grant seduced women standing to bring their own cause of action. Consequently, courts were forced to reckon with the seduced woman as a moral agent capable of consenting to sex. As trials like Norman's demonstrate, sentimental novels helped lay the groundwork for this shift in the law by elucidating a subjectivity for the seduced woman. Yet the doctrinal implications of Norman's precedent-setting trial had a second, more ambiguous strain. Other women facing similar charges used the same legal strategy to gain acquittals in a substantial number of cases. Indeed, Norman's sentimental strategy proved so powerful that men on trial for killing their wives' seducers appropriated it to bring their own stories before juries and to reinforce male sexual norms through the so-called honor defense. In the end, then, Norman's trial fostered legal reform, but it also suggested - as Lydia Maria Child's fictionalization of the case in "Rosenglory" recognized - that only sustained and multifaceted efforts to change cultural as well as legal norms could improve the sexual status of women. In addition to its legal, literary, and historical insights that it provides, we also intend this article to contribute to debates on the nature of scholarship in law and literature. Scholars such as Wai Chee Dimock have argued for a focus on the historical and historically shifting relations between law and literature - a view we endorse. Where we differ from Dimock is in our diversion of attention away from abstract ideas of law laid out by treatise writers and philosophers in favor of law experienced and manipulated by individuals. So, too, we are interested less in representations of concepts such as justice in legal and literary texts than we are in the ways in which literature (broadly conceived) can create provisional and fragile opportunities for concrete instantiations of justice and even generate legal change (for good or ill). We would argue that to the extent legal change motivates rather than simply mirrors cultural change, it needs literature to be effective. This project, then, responds to Gregg Crane's call for attention to the complex and slippery historical interactions of law and literature that shape and are shaped by an ever changing cultural idiom of justice. The extended story of Amelia Norman, in short, not only constitutes a case study in the inescapable interaction between the overlapping and interdependent discourses of law and literature, but also reveals the literary and legal consequences of that interaction. (shrink)

Target articles are evaluated in light of the consideration of intentionality. It is argued that behaviorism lost its hegemony in psychology, not precisely because it eschewed investigation of mental phenomena, but rather because it failed to give an adequate account of adaptation. Behaviorism, along with other orientations, views the explanation of adaptation as a central concern of psychology, but a full account of adaptation cannot be given without appeal to a construct which behaviorism could not assimilate. This is the construct (...) of intentionality. Intentionality is necessary to give an adequate account of adaptation. (shrink)

Sorgner recently wrote in this journal that Nietzsche’s overhuman and the posthuman envisioned by transhumanists are similar at a fundamental level. However, the overhuman is an ideal limit of human progress that can never be reached, whereas posthumans will be a reality, the next stages in human progress. Some transhumanists are concerned that human improvement technologies will create radical inequality. Hobbes’s prescription for a social contract to bring stability and security to human society makes him more a useful antecedent than (...) Nietzsche for those transhumanists. (shrink)

Our paper explores how the affective energies and cultural expectations set in motion by best-selling American sentimental novels like Hannah Foster's The Coquette and Susanna Rowson's Charlotte Temple informed the notorious mid-nineteenth-century American trial of Amelia Norman, who attempted to kill the man who seduced her. Once newspapers, defense lawyers, and reformers such as Lydia Maria Child recast the defendant as a sentimental heroine, the trial became about seduction, and Norman was acquitted against the weight of the evidence. Sentimental novels (...) turn on the contrast between the passive victim status of the heroine and the active libidinal quest of the rake-villain. As Cathy Davidson points out, this fiction is "about silence, subservience, stasis (the accepted attributes of women as traditionally defined) in contradistinction to conflicting impulses toward independence, action, and self expression (the ideals of the new American nation)." The seduction plot diverts attention from this disparity by establishing an affective solidarity between heroine and reader and elevating the ruined woman to a tragic status. The sentimental emplotment of Norman's life marshaled a powerful set of emotional responses and moral judgements on her behalf. Norman claimed insanity. And since sentimental heroines are supposed to go mad when they are seduced and abandoned, the jury was prepared to interpret her symptoms according to her lawyers' very strategy for establishing her innocence. Ultimately, however, Norman embodied the plight of the sentimental heroine at the same time that she contested her fictional counterpart's fate. In this way, her trial spectacularized the disparity which the sentimental novel conjures up and displaces but never resolves. The common law theory of coverture, which severely limited the legal personhood of married women, has received a great deal of scholarly attention. Cases like Norman's remind us that unmarried women were also subject to draconian constraints on their legal personhood. The tort of seduction is a key example. Legal historians trace the development of the seduction tort from its common-law origins, when men's property interest in women's bodies formed the basis of the cause of action, to 1851, when Field Code authors (including Norman's lawyer David Graham) persuaded several states to grant seduced women standing to bring their own cause of action. Consequently, courts were forced to reckon with the seduced woman as a moral agent capable of consenting to sex. As trials like Norman's demonstrate, sentimental novels helped lay the groundwork for this shift in the law by elucidating a subjectivity for the seduced woman. Yet the doctrinal implications of Norman's precedent-setting trial had a second, more ambiguous strain. Norman's sentimental strategy proved so powerful that men on trial for killing their wive's seducers appropriated it to bring their own stories before juries and to reinforce male sexual norms. In the end, then, Norman's trial fostered legal reform, but it also suggested - as Child's fictionalization of the case in "Rosenglory" recognized - that only sustained and multifaceted efforts to change cultural as well as legal norms could improve the sexual status of women. Scholars such as Wai Chee Dimock have argued for a focus "on the historical and historically shifting relations between law and literature" - a view we endorse. Where we differ from Dimock is in our diversion of attention away from abstract ideas of law laid out by treatise writers and philosophers in favor of law experienced and manipulated by individuals. So, too, we are interested less in representations of concepts such as justice in legal and literary texts than we are in the ways in which literature (broadly conceived) can create provisional and fragile opportunities for concrete instantiations of justice and even generate legal change (for good or ill). Going further, we would argue that to the extent legal change motivates rather than simply mirrors cultural change, it needs literature to be effective. Thus, we see no need to characterize - and indeed reject the depiction of - law as "a limited arena" in which ideas of morality have little place. This project, then, responds to Gregg Crane's call for attention to "the complex and slippery historical interactions of law and literature that shape and are shaped by an ever changing cultural idiom of justice." The extended story of Amelia Norman not only constitutes a case study in the inescapable interaction between the overlapping and interdependent discourses of law and literature, but also reveals the literary and legal consequences of that interaction. (shrink)

Can the use of terror as a political weapon ever be justified? What are the political implications of the struggle to define the concept of "terrorism"? Was the attack on the USS Cole a terrorist act? What role do the intentions of the terrorist and the state of mind of the victims play? Does the modern concept of the nation-state necessarily require the radical devaluation of the use of terror for political ends? With Robert Rafalko, Philip Devine, and Scott (...) class='Hi'>Hibbard. (shrink)

The United States has rejected climate reparations requests from other nations by claiming historical ignorance of the global effects of anthropogenic climate change. This objection to climate reparations, called the epistemic objection in this paper, appeals to a concept of fairness concerning moral responsibility which can be traced back to Aristotle's distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions. However, on closer examination, the epistemic objection fails to fulfill Aristotle's criteria for excusable involuntary actions, and therefore the authors of this paper conclude (...) that claims of ignorance concerning climate change do not provide a substantial objection to climate reparation requests. (shrink)

Can the use of terror as a political weapon ever be justified? What are the political implications of the struggle to define the concept of "terrorism"? Was the attack on the USS Cole a terrorist act? What role do the intentions of the terrorist and the state of mind of the victims play? Does the modern concept of the nation-state necessarily require the radical devaluation of the use of terror for political ends? With Robert Rafalko, Philip Devine, and Scott (...) class='Hi'>Hibbard. (shrink)

Who gets to use force and when? How are we supposed to justify the use of violence in achieving political goals and establishing and maintaining political communities and structures? With Anthony Ellis , David Garren , and Scott Hibbard.

Whit Stillman’s films depict characters attempting to gain relevant knowledge of their historical situation so that they can shape their lives. Through an analysis of scenes from each of Stillman’s films, this essay demonstrates that historical knowledge is presented as a kind of self-understanding in the films. That historical knowledge is useful for gaining control over one’s future as well as for properly evaluating one’s life reveals a philosophically interesting approach to self-knowledge. Stillman’s complex approach of layering contexts further (...) suggests an elusive account of the self. (shrink)

I find myself ambivalent with respect to the line of argument that Schonbein offers. I certainly want to acknowledge and emphasize at the outset that Schonbein’s discussion has brought to the fore a number of central, compelling and intriguing issues regarding the nature of the dynamical approach to cognition. Though there is much that seems right in this essay, perhaps my view is that the paper invites more questions than it answers. My remarks here then are in the spirit of (...) scouting some of the surrounding terrain in order to see just what Schonbein’s claim is and what arguments or options may be open to the dynamicist. (shrink)

앙리의 현상학은 두 가지 말, ‘삶의 말’과 ‘세계의 말’을 상정한다. 따라서 앙리의 현상학에서도 두 가지 언어를 상정하는 다른 철학에서와 마찬가지로 두 언어 사이에 번역의 문제가 발생한다. 문제는 앙리가 반복해서 밝히고 있는 바, 삶은 결코 자신을 세계 속에서 보여주지 않는다는 사실이다. 따라서 앙리의 현상학 역시 세계의 말로 작성되고 세계 속에서 전개되는 철학인 한, 삶의 나타남을 드러내려는 앙리 현상학의 기획은 그 자체로 모순인 것처럼 보인다. 앙리의 현상학에서 번역의 문제는 단순히 하나의 문제가 아니라, 앙리 현상학의 가능성 자체를 위협하는 심각한 문제로 제기된다. 그러나 앙리 (...) 현상학의 주된 주장 가운데 하나인 ‘나타남의 이중성’, 즉 세계와 삶의 본질적 동시성에 대한 이해는 이 문제에 대한 답을 제시해 준다. 본 글에서는 앙리 현상학에서 삶에 대한 번역 가능성의 문제가 어떻게 해결되는지, 보다 정확히 말하자면, 어떻게 이 문제가 앙리 현상학의 체계 속에서 일종의 거짓문제로 밝혀짐으로써 해결되기보다는 해소되어 버리는지 살펴볼 것이다. (shrink)

Whit the aim of clariflying what exactly is the human phenomenon of akrasía or incontinence in the fullest sense, in Nicomachean Ethics VII.4-10 Aristotle introduces a type of incontinence by analogy, that is, incontinence due to thymós or courage. Despite his intentions, the explanation of the latter only complicates understanding the former, and the reader ends up without a clear understandingof either. The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the subject of akrasía due to thymós, (...) trying, specifically, to answer three questions: what exactly is this passion? Who are worse, those who get carried away by their appetites or those who get carried away by their anger, and why? Finally, are we responsible for the mistakes we make in a fit of anger? (shrink)

ACCORDING TO HUSSERL, THE REVOLUTION brought about by the new mathematical science of the seventeenth century was primarily an ontological one: a shift in the conception of the real. That Husserl opposes the new Galilean-Cartesian ontology is clear. This much is evident from the potent rhetoric of the Crisis declaiming Galileo as an "entdeckender und verdeckender Genius", forgetful of the lifeworld, failing to grasp what the mathematical-empirical method he brought to such a degree of perfection actually achieves. Indeed, even without (...) the ringing Crisis passages, one could already expect that Husserl, the phenomenologist, would oppose the Platonizing scientific realism of a Galileo or a Descartes. However, Husserl's critique of Galileo poses many puzzling questions, questions which are not directly addressed in the Crisis, and which can be answered only in terms of the broader position outlined by Husserl elsewhere. To whit: what is the more precise content of Husserl's objections against Galileo, and how are these justified? Further, if scientific realism is to be rejected on phenomenological grounds, does this imply that a phenomenological approach is necessarily instrumentalist? Finally, what solution does Husserl's thought offer to the realism/instrumentalism debate? (shrink)

The Two Faces of Stoicism: Rousseau and Freud AMI~LIE OKSENBERG RORTY Nor do the Stoics mean that the soul of their wisest man resists the first visions and sudden fantasies that surprise [him]: but [he] rather consents that, as it were to a natural subjection, he yields .... So likewise in other passions, always provided his opinions remain safe and whole, and.., his reason admit no tainting or alteration, and he in no whit consents to his fright and sufferance. (...) Montaigne, Essays, I. 1 THE STOICS ARE A WEIGHTY EMBARRASSMENT to their friends who, like myself, want to defend them from the charges that their views are at best vague or ludicrous, perhaps offensive or inconsistent. There is no doubt that some of their pronouncements seem material for Aristophanic comedy, others callous and yet others incoherent. And there is also no doubt that they openly defy common sense and deliberately change the terminology they inherit, introduc- ing neologisms ad hoc. And yet, and yet -- it is no accident that they continue, rightly continue, to have a powerful hold on ordinary belief and acute philo- sophical reflection. Here -- in what is itself a parody -- are some of the commonplaces famil- iarly attributed to the Stoics.' First, the notorious matter of Stoic apatheia. Diogenes Laertius reports that I believe, but cannot here argue, that despite the signficant differences between early, middle and late Stoics, the classical Stoics shared a common agenda. It is.. (shrink)

Proceedings of the papers presented at the Symposium on "Revisiting Turing and his Test: Comprehensiveness, Qualia, and the Real World" at the 2012 AISB and IACAP Symposium that was held in the Turing year 2012, 2–6 July at the University of Birmingham, UK. Ten papers. - http://www.pt-ai.org/turing-test --- Daniel Devatman Hromada: From Taxonomy of Turing Test-Consistent Scenarios Towards Attribution of Legal Status to Meta-modular Artificial Autonomous Agents - Michael Zillich: My Robot is Smarter than Your Robot: On the Need for (...) a Total Turing Test for Robots - Adam Linson, Chris Dobbyn and Robin Laney: Interactive Intelligence: Behaviour-based AI, Musical HCI and the Turing Test - Javier Insa, Jose Hernandez-Orallo, Sergio España - David Dowe and M.Victoria Hernandez-Lloreda: The anYnt Project Intelligence Test (Demo) - Jose Hernandez-Orallo, Javier Insa, David Dowe and Bill Hibbard: Turing Machines and Recursive Turing Tests — Francesco Bianchini and Domenica Bruni: What Language for Turing Test in the Age of Qualia? - Paul Schweizer: Could there be a Turing Test for Qualia? - Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti: Jazz and Machine Consciousness: Towards a New Turing Test - William York and Jerry Swan: Taking Turing Seriously (But Not Literally) - Hajo Greif: Laws of Form and the Force of Function: Variations on the Turing Test. (shrink)

Nadie puede negar que la figura de Edmund Husserl constituye la llave de acceso para el horizonte filosófico de nuestro tiempo, tanto en su versión continental como analítica. Pero ¿en qué medida un mismo planteamiento pudo dar suelo y sustento al despliegue de corrientes tan distintas? Aunque mucho se ha trabajado ya para desembrollar el renovado sentido que filosofía y ciencia adquieren en su propuesta, el camino que siguió para llegar a esas conclusiones todavía no goza de suficiente claridad. Por (...) ello, en este artículo nos hemos propuesto esclarecer algunos intersticios de la transformación de su pensamiento, tomando como hilo conductor las preocupaciones de juventud que, a la larga, desembocarán en la formulación de su contundente crítica al conocimiento. Para lograr nuestro objetivo daremos seguimiento al itinerario husserliano, comenzando por la Filosofía de la aritmética, para luego finalizar con su concepción de la filosofía como la más estricta de las ciencias. Nobody can deny that the figure of Edmund Husserl represents the key to the philosophical horizon of our time in both version, as continental as analytical one. But, how can the same approach give ground and support to the development of such diverse topics? Although much work has been done to explain the renewed sense that science and philosophy acquire inside their proposal, the way Husserl reached that conclusion is not sufficiently clear yet. That is why in this article we intend to clarify some aspects of his thought transformation, keeping it up whit his early concerns that will lead, inevitably, in his critique of knowledge. To achieve this, we will follow the husserlian itinerary from The philosophy of arithmetic to his conception of philosophy as the strictest science. (shrink)

Introduction The act of caring in nursing requires previous deliberation and decision, however this perception only arises when an ethical problem emerges. Objective: Identify ethical problems of nurses action in the area of beginning of human life Method: Exploratory and descriptive method, with a qualitative approach. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect data, who were submitted to content analysis. The sample was constituted by 26 nurses. Results 18 categories of problem areas and 56 ethical problems in early human life were (...) identified. The results obtained are very diverse, including areas such as termination of pregnancy, informed consent or maintaining privacy. However, other problem areas also emerge and numerous new subcategories/ethical problems, including: dealing with miscarriage, extreme situations, minors’ pregnancy, serious malformations detected at birth, consent regarding care during childbirth, Non- identification of a ethical problem, nurse social recognition and non-involvement of the person in labour. Conclusion Nurses face different ethical problems that impact their lives. We intend to contribute in helping to make decisions in this field, which the outset is of hope and joy, but which hides, behind this evidence, countless situations of suffering for everyone involved. The identification of ethical problems in this field, it is the first step to reflect about theme and helping decision-making for nurses that are taking care in this area of beginning of human life, when confronted whit the same type of ethical problems. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide an intuitive semantics for systems of justification logic which allows us to cope with the distinction between implicit and explicit justifiers. The paper is subdivided into three sections. In the first one, the distinction between implicit and explicit justifiers is presented and connected with a proof-theoretic distinction between two ways of interpreting sequences of sentences; that is, as sequences of axioms in a certain set and as sequences proofs constructed from that set (...) of axioms. In the second section, a basic system of justification logic for implicit and explicit justifiers is analyzed and some significant facts about it are proved. In the final section, an adequate semantics is proposed, and the system is proved to be sound and complete whit respect to it. (shrink)

In a now famous thought experiment, Frank jackson asked us t0 imagine an omniscient scientist, Mary, who is coniincd in a black-and-white room and then released into the world 0f color . Assuming that she is omniscicnt in respect of all physical facts—roughiy, all the facts available to physics and all the facts that they in turn Hx or determine-physicalism would suggest that there is no new fact Mary can discover after emancipation; physicalism holds that all facts are physical in (...) the relevant sense . Yet we cannot help but feel that coming out of that room would be an occasion of dramatic enlightenment and, in particular, an occasion for learning facts to do with how red or yellow or blue 100ks or, as it is usually said, with what it is like t0 sec red or yellow or blue. Many in the black-and—whit<—: room knew all the physical facts about the world, where these may be taken to include three sorts of color facts: objcctual facts, as to what surface colors different objects have, assuming as I shall do throughout—that colors are properties of objects; intentional facts, as to which colors different objects 0r apparent objects are represented as having in the subjc-:ct’s experience, rightly or wrongly; and nonintentional facts, about what such color experiences are like in their effects on subiccts—wh<—:ther they are comforting, or arousing, or whatever. But, according to the argument, Mary didn’t know how any color looks or, equivalently, what color experience is like in itself, not just in its effects O1'1 subjects. This particular nonintentional fact about the quality of color c-zxpc-2ri<—:ncc-—this phenomenal fact, as it is often describcd—she did not. (shrink)