The criterion of truth is the measure of the truthfulness and reliability of our knowledge. It is also the basis for determining the correctness of our concepts and how much our perceptions, ideas, and concepts accord with objective reality. Idealism holds to the idea that the criterion of truth does not involve the integration between theory as created by human intelligence and objective reality, but rather that the criterion of truth involves the "clarity and (...) correctness" of perception, viewpoints, and concepts by the subject. For instance, the Machists 1 think that the criterion of truth is experience, however, they neither interpret experience from a materialistic viewpoint, nor view experience as the result of humans interacting with nature as they reform it. The Machists view experience as a summary of perceptions and as the subjective experience of humans. In this sense, perception must be tested by perception itself. In attempting to escape the trap of solipsism , they proposed "collective experience" as the criterion of truth. According to such a view, anything that involves "common significance," that is, anything acknowledged by everyone, is the truth. Lenin exposed the absurdity of idealist theory by pointing out that by following the view of "socially formed experience" it is very easy to consider as normal the most absurd and farcical notions, such as ghosts, for such beliefs are also a form of human "experience." Religion also possesses a "common significance," for innumerable people believe in ghosts and miracles, etc. Nevertheless, religion does not become the truth because of this. The concept of the "criterion of truth" held by the Machists played a dominant role in modern bourgeois philosophy. Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey, along with other reactionaries in philosophy all denied scientific criteria. They would rather that the masses remain ignorant of how to understand and determine the truth. (shrink)

Thirteen essays on the treatment of a criterion for truth by such classical writers as Parmenides, Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Philo, Epicurius, the Stoics, Plotinus, and Ptolemy, whose neglected Greek work on the subject is included here, along with an annotated English translation. The price $LB12.50, has been estimated to US $24. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The debate about the criterion of truth has always been closely linked with the battle lines of philosophy. Philosophers of different philosophical lines use different criteria of truth, each of which is consistent with the criterion of truth common to its philosophical line. Idealist philosophies advocate the primacy of thinking [, implying more the structure or process of thought, as compared to "thought" , implying a more or less coherent idea, viewpoint, or system, the result (...) of thinking - Tr.] and regard the material world as secondary, believing that human thought and truth are dropped from heaven, or are generated by the subjective consciousness itself. The idealist criterion of truth is sought in thought itself. Idealist philosophers cannot use the criterion of practice because the entire theory of idealism, including its view of truth, is made up wholly of subjective and empty constructs which would not pass the test of practice. If idealist philosophy used the criterion of practice it would undoubtedly refute itself. Only the materialist philosophical line is linked by its very nature with the criterion of practice. Materialism affirms the primacy of the material world, and the secondary nature of thinking as a reflection of the material world, regarding truth as a correct or accurate reflection of objective things. To test whether or not such a reflection is correct, it is not permissible to appeal to thought itself; we must rely on social practice. To discuss the truth of thinking, separate from social practice, would be to abandon materialism and fall into idealism. Therefore we say that the materialist philosophical line, as part of its basic fundamental nature, embraces the acceptance of the criterion of practice, or we say that it is fundamentally linked to the criterion of practice. Of course, to say that the materialist philosophical line is fundamentally linked to the criterion of practice is not to say that every materialist is able to consciously adopt the criterion of practice, rather that materialism ought to use social practice as the criterion of truth. Only in this way can one maintain a thoroughgoing materialism. However, ought to is one thing, while reality is quite another. In reality, the materialists coming before Marx did not self-consciously adopt the criterion of practice, but for the most part used subjective criteria. For example, the well-known materialist [Ludwig] Feuerbach [1804-18721 thought that "agreement of the majority" or "common opinion" was a criterion of truth. "Agreement" and "opinion" are subjective, and such a theory of the criterion of truth stands in contradiction to the materialist line that Feuerbach advocated. With a criterion of that sort, not only would it be impossible to validate the objective truth that Feuerbach sought; on the contrary, one could refute objective truth totally, refute the materialist line. Since subjective criteria of truth solve the problem of truth within the subjective realm and must refute the objective nature of truth, subjective criteria of truth are therefore fundamentally incompatible with the materialist line of thought. Only the criterion of practice accepts objective truth, and is compatible with the materialist line of thought. That materialists before Marx were unable to self-consciously employ the criterion of practice and used subjective criteria of truth reveals the limited and partial nature of materialism. By introducing social practice into the theory of knowledge and by determining that practice is the criterion of truth, thereby overcoming the limitations and incompleteness of the old materialism, Marxism developed the materialist theory of knowledge into a completely scientific theory. This was an enormous contribution to the history of philosophy. However, the acceptance or rejection of the criterion of practice is not a minor problem, but rather a major problem that affects all philosophical lines of thought. To uphold the criterion of practice is to stand on the side of materialism. On the other hand, to use the criterion of thought to refute the criterion of practice is to fall into idealism. (shrink)

In his recent book, The Coherence Theory of Truth, Nicholas Rescher emphasizes the difference between the question of the criterion of truth and the question of the nature of truth. A particular position concerning the criterion of truth, he says, may leave open a variety of options on the question of the nature of truth. There have been several recent attempts to defend coherence theories of rational justification in which coherence is held to (...) be a criterion of truth, but the coherence theory of the nature of truth has been resisted because of the supposed metaphysical implications of such a position. In this paper I shall consider whether the coherence theory of justification can be adequately defended apart from a commitment to the coherence theory of truth. I shall argue that coherence as the criterion of truth does entail that coherence is the nature of truth, that the coherence theory of justification is correct, and that therefore the coherence theory of truth is correct. (shrink)

The absolute self-evidence of consciousness is due to the fact that the object of consciousness is present or immanent in it. We may therefore formulate the absolutely certain starting point of philosophy as follows: knowledge about an object immanent in consciousness is absolutely certain in so far as it is the actual testimony of the object about itself, and does not go beyond that which is present in consciousness. The criterion of the absolute certainty of such knowledge is self (...) evidence, i.e. the fact that it consists entirely of what is present in consciousness. To doubt such knowledge is absurd because it is not a copy of the object, it is not a symbol of it, but simply and directly contains the object itself as known. I designate the act of the immediate contemplation of objects by the term intuition. According to the epistemological theory which I began to work out in 1903 all our trustworthy knowledge is obtained by means of such immediate observation of objects as they are in themselves; I therefore call my theory of knowledge Intuitivism. (shrink)

The age-old question “What is truth?” is not an unambiguous one. There are at least two different meanings. In one sense, it is a semantic question about the meaning of the word “truth” and/or a metaphysical question about the nature of the property of truth, that is, how truth can be defined in terms of other notions, if it is definable at all. In another sense, it is an epistemological question about the criterion or test (...) of truth, that is, how we can recognize or accept (empirical) propositions as true. Ayer, in Language, Truth and Logic (LTL) and some other articles, tried to convince us that when we attempt to elucidate a theory of truth, we are only engaging in the epistemological project of finding the criterion of truth. This anti-semantical and anti-metaphysical view is based on Ayer’s (radical) deflationism about truth. In this chapter, I will argue that since Ayer did not accept that the criterion of truth is intimately related to the concept of truth, he can be seen as a deflationist about the nature of truth and as an advocate of a certain (Schlickian) kind of correspondence conception about the criterion of truth. His position would not be tenable if he had maintained what some of his contemporaries accepted, namely that there is a close connection between the two truth-theoretical tasks: the definitional and the criterial one. (shrink)

This article may be of significant interest to those who may want to reconsider Aristotelian principles in the light of the philosophy of science---i. e., the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy of sensation as harmonizable with recent findings in the physics/chemistry/physiology of sensation, especially in correlation with research in colorimetry and spectrophotometry. Primarily metaphysical and epistemological in orientation, this paper makes a case for “methodological realism”---viz., how evidence may be grasped, judged, and interpreted in a way that recognizes extemal sense objects to (...) be criteria for verifying statements made about these objects. Amongst the matters and/or problems, considered philosophically, historically, and scientifically, in the course of the article, are: the kinds of sensible qualities discoverable by us; the problem of “immediate” sensation; an analysis of the intemal process of sensation, investigated in conjunction with insights from Aquinas and today’s science; objective/subjective aspects of sensation; causality in sensation; sceptical positions regarding sensation; the problem of sense error; a critique of Descartes’s assumptions about sensation; a sumrnary of conclusions, based on this examination. (shrink)

This article may be of significant interest to those who may want to reconsider Aristotelian principles in the light of the philosophy of science---i. e., the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy of sensation as harmonizable with recent findings in the physics/chemistry/physiology of sensation, especially in correlation with research in colorimetry and spectrophotometry. Primarily metaphysical and epistemological in orientation, this paper makes a case for “methodological realism”---viz., how evidence may be grasped, judged, and interpreted in a way that recognizes extemal sense objects to (...) be criteria for verifying statements made about these objects. Amongst the matters and/or problems, considered philosophically, historically, and scientifically, in the course of the article, are: the kinds of sensible qualities discoverable by us; the problem of “immediate” sensation; an analysis of the intemal process of sensation, investigated in conjunction with insights from Aquinas and today’s science; objective/subjective aspects of sensation; causality in sensation; sceptical positions regarding sensation; the problem of sense error; a critique of Descartes’s assumptions about sensation; a sumrnary of conclusions, based on this examination. (shrink)

What is the criterion of truth? This is a question that was resolved long ago by the revolutionary teachers of the proletariat. But as a result of damage done by the "Gang of Four" and a mass of distorted propaganda in the media under their control, it has become muddled beyond compare in recent years. In order to deepen the criticism of the "Gang of Four" and eradicate the remnants of their poison and influence, it is very important (...) to clear this up and sort it out. (shrink)

In this paper I examine, and reject, one of the chief philosophical arguments that purports to show that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is incompatible with possessing any beliefs. That argument, first put forward by Jonathan Barnes and since accepted by many philosophers, focuses on the skeptic's resolute suspension of judgment concerning one philosophical issue, namely whether criteria of truth exist. In short, the argument holds that, because skeptics suspend judgment whether criteria of truth exist, they have no basis on which (...) to discriminate between their impressions, which is a necessary condition for belief formation. I show that this argument fails because it misunderstands both the nature of criteria of truth and the epistemic consequences of suspending judgment concerning their existence. Thus, I clear the main philosophical obstacle preventing an interpretation of Pyrrhonism as consistent with possessing beliefs (associated most famously with Michael Frede). (shrink)

What is the criterion of truth? This is a question that was resolved long ago by the revolutionary teachers of the proletariat. But as a result of damage done by the "Gang of Four" and a mass of distorted propaganda in the media under their control, it has become muddled beyond compare in recent years. In order to deepen the criticism of the "Gang of Four" and eradicate the remnants of their poison and influence, it is very important (...) to clear this up and sort it out. (shrink)

The thesis that social practice is the only criterion by which to judge truth has now become common sense in Marxist philosophy. However, the formulation of the thesis came as a result of the long period of exploration and struggle over the issue of the criterion of truth in the history of human knowledge. In Europe, the criterion has varied from the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, through the capitalist philosophy of modern times, to Marxist (...) philosophy, according to the different philosophical lines and different viewpoints on truth. In a nutshell, in the Middle Ages, the criterion was the religious inquisition based on dogmas in the "Bible." In opposing the ecclesiastic theology of the Middle Ages, capitalist philosophers in modern times presented "judgment by rationality." On the issue of the criterion of truth, some of them stressed rationality, while others emphasized experience. Only when Marxist philosophy proposed judgment on the basis of social practice was the issue truly resolved scientifically. (shrink)

In 1845, while developing a new world view, Marx introduced practice as the criterion of truth: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."1 Whether a theory (...) correctly reflects the objectively existing objects with which it concerns itself, and whether it is the truth, cannot be determined within the sphere of thinking, or by means of theoretical argument, but only on the basis of testing in social practice. This is a basic principle and characteristic feature of Marxist philosophy. (shrink)

I enjoyed reading Max Kölbel's deep and interesting paper. I have learned a lot about points and arguments I am not entirely familiar with, and it has helped me to articulate better my own intuitions about the subject. In particular I share with him the intuition I would now articulate as follows: there are contents p of utterances of declarative sentences like, for instance, 'Licorice is tasty', such that it is not an objective matter whether p. This is the claim (...) that there are non-objective truths and falsehoods, and it is a plain consequence of global truth-evaluability, i.e. the view according to which the content of utterances of all declarative sentences are truth-evaluable. For in this case one, unless radical objectivist, has to accept that for some such contents it is not an objective matter if they are true nor it is an objective matter if they are false. And Kölbel has presented some reasons for such global truth-evaluability: philosophical and linguistic semantics presupposes it, classical logical validity presupposes it, and we do in fact attribute truth to contents of utterances of declarative sentences of any sort. (shrink)

Response to Max Kölbel: "A Criterion for Objectivity", Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2.

This paper discusses ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας, which later Epicureans are supposed to have elevated to a fourth criterion of truth to complement perceptions, preconceptions and feelings. By examining Epicurus’ extant writings, the paper distinguishes three different senses of the term: ‘thought in general’, ‘act of attention’ and ‘mental perception’. It is argued that only the sense ‘mental perception’ yields a plausible reading of ἐπιβολαί as a criterion of truth. The paper then turns to the textual evidence (...) on ἐπιβολαί in later authors. While the term ἐπιβολή is not used by Cicero, Lucretius and Philodemus in the sense of mental perception, it is argued that this still is the most plausible way of understanding ἐπιβολή as a criterion of truth. (shrink)

During the recent discussions concerning the problem of the criterion of truth, some comrades have said: In real life we use a great many criteria to distinguish between true and false, such as the criterion for distinguishing between the fragrant flowers and the poison ivy [i.e., ideologically correct and incorrect], the criterion for distinguishing what is revolutionary from what is counterrevolutionary, the criterion for determining successors to manage the proletarian revolution, etc. Although these criteria are (...) derived from practice, in themselves they are not practice but things of the subjective realm. Do they function in reality as criteria to test truth? (shrink)

A survey of Bayle's skeptical arguments regarding Descartes' criterion of truth, which Bayle refers to as "evidence." Bayle's arguments for degrees of evidence, as well as for the necessity and sufficiency of possessing a high degree of evidence in order to form virtuous beliefs, are surveyed as well.