This paper aims to discuss the concept of class in the works of Liu Shipei, a Chinese revolutionary intellectual. When discussing the ethnic revolution of Manchuria, Liu first included class in the description of Chinese system, ethics and Chinese society. After he crossed to Japan and accepted the anarchist revolutionary ideas of hardliners, he used class as a broad synonym for hierarchical society and various inequalities. After understanding and recognizing the Marxist class struggle thought, Liu turned his attention to China. (...) Liu started from the issue of Chinese people’s livelihood to find the subject and object of China’s anarchic class revolution. Class became the concept carrier of his narration of class revolution, and its semantic domain was further expanded. Through the analysis, we can see that Liu’s understanding and use of the concept of class is closely related to his revolutionary ideas, and changes accordingly. (shrink)

: This paper aims to discuss the concept of class in the works of Liu Shipei, a Chinese revolutionary intellectual. When discussing the ethnic revolution of Manchuria, Liu first included class in the description of Chinese system, ethics and Chinese society. After he crossed to Japan and accepted the anarchist revolutionary ideas of hardliners, he used class as a broad synonym for hierarchical society and various inequalities. After understanding and recognizing the Marxist class struggle thought, Liu turned his attention to (...) China. Liu started from the issue of Chinese people’s livelihood to find the subject and object of China’s anarchic class revolution. Class became the concept carrier of his narration of class revolution, and its semantic domain was further expanded. Through the analysis, we can see that Liu’s understanding and use of the concept of class is closely related to his revolutionary ideas, and changes accordingly. (shrink)

A groundbreaking collection of contemporary essays from leading international scholars that provides a balanced and expert account of the resurgent debate about substance dualism and its physicalist alternatives. Substance dualism has for some time been dismissed as an archaic and defeated position in philosophy of mind, but in recent years, the topic has experienced a resurgence of scholarly interest and has been restored to contemporary prominence by a growing minority of philosophers prepared to interrogate the core principles upon which past (...) objections and misunderstandings rest. As the first book of its kind to bring together a collection of contemporary writing from top proponents and critics in a pro-contra format, The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism captures this ongoing dialogue and sets the stage for rigorous and lively discourse around dualist and physicalist accounts of human persons in philosophy. Chapters explore emergent, Thomistic, Cartesian, and other forms of substance dualism—broadly conceived—in dialogue with leading varieties of physicalism, including animalism, non-reductive physicalism, and constitution theory. Loose, Menuge, and Moreland pair essays from dualist advocates with astute criticism from physicalist opponents and vice versa, highlighting points of contrast for readers in thematic sections while showcasing today’s leading minds engaged in direct debate. Taken together, essays provide nuanced paths of introduction for students, and capture the imagination of professional philosophers looking to expand their understanding of the subject. Skillfully curated and in touch with contemporary science as well as analytic theology, The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism strikes a measured balanced between advocacy and criticism, and is a first-rate resource for researchers, scholars, and students of philosophy, theology, and neuroscience. (shrink)

Some Christian materialists have argued for the possibility of resurrection given that persons are constituted by bodies, and constitution is not identity. Baker's constitutionist view claims superiority over animalist alternatives but offers only circular accounts of both personal identity over time and personhood. Corcoran's alternative approaches these questions differently but makes use of Zimmerman's ‘Falling Elevator Model’ of resurrection, which is rendered incoherent by its reliance on contingent identity. A recent constitutionist revision of this model succeeds only in exchanging incoherence (...) for absurdity. Despite difficulties for such resurrection accounts, the idea of constitution as a sui generis relation remains attractive among philosophers and Christian materialists in particular. However, Wasserman's deflationary view combines with problems such as extensionality, indiscernibility and the explosion of reality to provide reason to worry that constitution might be just identity after all. If so, then the metaphysics of constitution cannot provide a convenient route between animalism and immaterialism when explaining the possibility of resurrection. (shrink)

Lynne Rudder Baker’s work was driven by commitments to quasi-naturalist materialism and the ontological distinctiveness of human persons. The incompatibility of these commitments is apparent in her constitution view. Baker's “Not-so-simple Simple View” of personal identity is inferior to the Simple View traditionally associated with substance dualism since CV’s underlying account of persons is vacuous. It also entails a dilemma: either indeterminate identity or the problem of the many. Finally, CV also fails to support Baker’s view that human persons do (...) not begin to exist prior to the acquisition of a capacity for conscious, intentional thought. (shrink)

In The disenchantment of the world Marcel Gauchet defined Christianity as the religion of the exodus from religion, which also functions as a paradigm for a political interpretation of religion and the understanding of modern secular politics. However, Gauchet himself asserts that he considers the primitive heteronomous religion as the standard for understanding any religion. I intend to show on the contrary that he is mainly relying on modern auto-critical and hermeneutical Christian religion as the interpretative scheme for all religion (...) and modern politics. This raises the question whether we can ever leave the auto-reflexivity of that auto-critical religion. Can there ever be any religiosity without a religion . If not, does it make sense to speak of religiosity without religion, finding its way out in the political, or do we come across the same aporias: how to define the modern political without empirical politics? I conclude that modern, empirical politics benefit from the auto-critical, self-obliging, ethical attitude of the Christian religion and that the modern constitutional state as well as the religious expression might suffer from leaving it. The alternative seems to be the loss of social cohesion as well as the rise of religious fundamentalism. (shrink)

Based on their critical analysis of Kant's "Critique of Judgment", the authors of this book show from different perspectives in what way the Kantian concept of the sublime is still a main stream of inspiration for contemporary thinking.

Ontological dualism is energetically resisted by a range of Christian scholars including philosophers such as Baker and Corcoran who defend accounts of human persons based on material constitution. Whilst Baker’s view fails to account for diachronic identity, Corcoran’s account of life after death makes use of Zimmerman’s problematic “Falling Elevator Model.” It is argued that Zimmerman’s recent reassessment of the model overestimates its value for materialists. In fact, the model generates either a fatal encounter with the nature of identity, or (...) absurdity. A lack of alternatives is illustrated by anticriterialist proposals. Thus it seems materialism and resurrection belief remain incompatible. (shrink)

Stephen Davis's detailed assessment of the doctrine of the general resurrection suggests that it is the claim that those who have died will persist into a subsequent, embodied life by means of a divine miracle. The dualist's account of resurrection depends on the possibility that the identity of a person over time is preserved by the persistence of a simple immaterial substance with no necessary connection to a particular physical or psychological career. This chapter argues that the seemingly preposterous simulacrum (...) model fails to offer animalists such as van Inwagen an account of the metaphysical possibility of resurrection. Thus the constitution view of persons is unsuccessful in offering the materialist an account of how an individual might die and yet appear again at the Resurrection. However, while dualist accounts ground personal identity in the persistence of a simple immaterial substance (a soul), the uninformativeness of the constitution view has a different and problematic source. (shrink)

Substance dualism is compatible not only with Cartesian dualism but also with a number of nonCartesian alternatives, including several varieties of Thomistic dualism, William Hasker's emergent subject dualism, and the holistic anthropology of E. J. Lowe. Due to recent developments within the philosophy of mind, a renewed interest in historical and contemporary theories of the soul, and a more careful evaluation of what does and does not follow from neuroscience, substance dualism is back on the table for a serious critical (...) reevaluation. This chapter reviews the developments in the philosophy of mind and in scholarship on the soul. It shows that substance dualists and their many critics have been brought together by a shared focus on the nature of mental subjects. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. (shrink)

Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism. I present two difficulties unique to Hudson’s view. The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate (...) adequately prudential concern about one’s future self. More significantly, the second problem of quasi hope demonstrates that even if a temporal parts view can accommodate the possibility of future resurrection it necessarily leaves human beings in the dark about their individual futures and thus incapable of hope. I conclude that whatever its merits in demonstrating the possibility of resurrection, four-dimensionalist materialism cannot accommodate veridical Christian hope. (shrink)

Are we the Citizens of just one empirical world? Have all reminiscences to the transcendental become atavistic in the political domain? This article defends the lasting relevance of the kantian doctrine of analogy for the significance of both religion and politics in post-modern times. The symbolic representation of the indemonstrable concept of practical reason itself functions as well in politics as in religion in the manner of a typology of the law and a legislation, which must be understood as the (...) always indirect representation of the absolute good will. Only this idea avoids the empirical illusions of an imaginary self-sufficient political or religious authority. All authority based on the concept of God as legislator as far as a promulgator of the moral law, with its intrinsic character of obligation, is conceived as unavoidable for the finite reason. Therefore the execution of the king during the French revolution as a legal act in itself is inconceivable as far as it intended the abrogation of the representation of the instance of executive obligation as such. All political doctrines that would claim the installation of the moral kingdom of God on earth are equally chimerical. Since Kant only claims the idea of legislation of practical reason and the guarantee of the viability of morals in the empirical world when evoking God in practical philosophy and calling upon the historical Christian religion, his theological political doctrine goes beyond the ideological political and religious setting of his time and it remains on the contrary a valuable warning for actual political and religious terrorism. (shrink)

In this article the importance of the representational character of politics is illustrated on the basis of the philosophy of Kant. The vanishing of the noumenal in post-modern thinking seems to imply fundamental changes in the sensitive response – aesthetics of the beautiful and the sublime – to politics. In the Kantian paradigm the meaning of our affective response to the violence of (human) nature is ruled by a moral perspective of practical reason. Although the representation of practical reason in (...) the empirical is only possible in an indirect way by means of a schematism of analogy, the corresponding – subjectively teleological – aesthetic feelings both of harmony in the beautiful and of resistance in the sublime do symbolize in a reflective judgement the morally determined character and the objectively conceived teleology of nature in the system of rights of a single state as well as of the cosmopolitan world order. (shrink)

Met de verlichting komt de mens centraal te staan als de verantwoordelijke in het spanningsveld van vrijheid en determinisme. Daarmee dreigt hij zich ook de schuld van alle kwaad op de hals te halen en wordt de theodicee een antropodicee. Hij kan daar op twee manieren onderuit komen: ofwel wordt alle dwingende natuurwetmatigheid secundair en is nog slechts het morele kwaad relevant, ofwel wordt de vrijheid zelf herleid tot het natuurlijk determinisme. Kant wist echter die spanning in het verlichtingsdenken overeind (...) te houden. (shrink)

Routinely dismissed as a defeated position, substance dualism has seen a resurgence. This is partly due to a persistent failure of reductive physicalism to capture mental phenomena and to the instability of nonreductive alternatives. But it is also due to the return of the subject to center stage in the philosophy of mind and to the rich diversity of historical and contemporary theories of the soul. It is therefore time for a serious reevaluation of the merits of substance dualism by (...) both dualists and their physicalist rivals, hence this symposium and the related book, The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. (shrink)

What are historians doing in the laboratory? Looking back over six years of collaborative work, researchers of the Making and Knowing Project at Columbia University discuss their experience with hands‐on reconstruction as a historical method. This work engages practical forms of knowledge—from pigment‐making to metal casting—recorded in the BnF Ms. Fr. 640, an anonymous French manuscript compiled in the later sixteenth century. Bodily encounters with materials and processes of the past offer insights into the material and mental worlds of early (...) modern artists and artisans, and train the eye in the interpretation of historical objects. At the same time, reconstruction contributes to the interpretation of the text: it is only by attempting to implement the instructions of practical or recipe literature that these texts can be understood as vehicles of emergent knowledge that only fully manifests itself in the doing. Overall, our approach to reconstruction mirrors that of the anonymous author‐practitioner, who explored a wide range of techniques through experimenting and writing. (shrink)

I present a new pragmatic theory of loose talk, focussing on the loose use of numbers and measurement expressions. The account explains loose readings as arising from a pragmatic mechanism aimed at restoring relevance to the question under discussion (QUD), appealing to Krifka's notion of a measurement scale. The core motivating observation is that the loose reading of a claim need not be weaker than its literal content, as almost all pragmatic treatments of loose talk (...) have assumed (e.g. Lasersohn). The loosening mechanism described here can be applied to a range of other linguistic phenomena as well. (shrink)

Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson; IX*—Loose Talk, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 153–172, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.

ABSTRACT This paper argues for a version of sceptical invariantism about knowledge on which the acceptability of knowledge-attributing sentences varies with the context of assessment.

Russell ([2022]. “Fancy Loose Talk About Knowledge.” Inquiry 65: 789–820.) defends a novel form of skeptical invariantism, according to which knowledge ascriptions are hardly ever true because they are so demanding, but nonetheless are ordinarily used loosely to communicate truths, where the felicity of loose talk is relative to the context of assessment as well as the context of use. I argue that while there is very good reason to believe that ‘know’ is a demanding term commonly used (...) loosely, we need not and should not conclude that loose use is assessment relative or that knowledge ascriptions are hardly ever true. (shrink)

We show that the loosely guarded and packed fragments of first-order logic have the finite model property. We use a construction of Herwig and Hrushovski. We point out some consequences in temporal predicate logic and algebraic logic.

We show that the loosely guarded and packed fragments of first-order logic have the finite model property. We use a construction of Herwig and Hrushovski. We point out some consequences in temporal predicate logic and algebraic logic.

In non‐literal uses of language, the content an utterance communicates differs from its literal truth conditions. Loose talk is one example of non‐literal language use (amongst many others). For example, what a loose utterance of (1) communicates differs from what it literally expresses: (1) Lena arrived at 9 o'clock. Loose talk is interesting (or so I will argue). It has certain distinctive features which raise important questions about the connection between literal and non‐literal language use. This paper (...) aims to (i.) introduce a range of novel data demonstrating certain overlooked features of loose talk, and (ii.) develop a new theory of the phenomenon which accounts for these data. In particular, this theory is motivated by the need to explain minimal pairs such as (2)-(3): (2) Lena arrived at 9 o'clock, but she did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly. (3) ?? Lena did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly, but she arrived at 9 o'clock. (2) and (3) agree in their truth conditions. Yet they differ in felicity. As such, they constitute a problem for any account which hopes to predict the acceptability of the loose use of a sentence from its truth conditions and the context of utterance alone. Instead, it will be argued, to explain loose talk phenomena we must posit an additional layer of meaning outstripping truth conditions. This layer of meaning is shown to exhibit a range of properties, all of which point to its being semantically encoded. Thus, if correct, the theory provides a new example of how semantic meaning must extend beyond literal, truth‐conditional content. (shrink)

Whereas his contemporaries were explicitly aware that the limits of memory called for scrupulous arrangement of one?s papers, Boyle?s papers remained chaotic throughout his life, necessitating a habitual recourse to memory. This invites consideration of Boyle?s views on the use of memory and notes, taking account of the precepts and options of his day. Like many other early modern virtuosi, Boyle made copious notes comprising both textual extracts and empirical information, but he did not maintain large commonplace books of the (...) kind recommended by Renaissance humanists; nor did he publicize an account of his note?taking methods, as John Locke did. However, through his early contacts with Samuel Hartlib, Boyle was exposed to the ways in which diverse information could be noted, stored and used. Furthermore, his practice exemplified the well?known dual function of notes as both prompting memory and relieving it. Boyle did not pause to write a sustained essay on these issues; nevertheless, scattered throughout his prefaces, advertisements, works, notebooks and manuscripts there are significant comments on his practice of making what he called ?loose notes?. Boyle was aware of the kinds of notes he kept and his reliance on both memory and notes as prompts to reflection and thought. (shrink)

Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson; IX*—Loose Talk, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 153–172, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.

In this article, I develop a loosely Wittgensteinian conception of what it takes for a being, including an AI system, to understand language, and I suggest that current state of the art systems are closer to fulfilling these requirements than one might think. Developing and defending this claim has both empirical and conceptual aspects. The conceptual aspects concern the criteria that are reasonably applied when judging whether some being understands language; the empirical aspects concern the question whether a given being (...) fulfills these criteria. On the conceptual side, the article builds on Glock’s concept of intelligence, Taylor’s conception of intrinsic rightness as well as Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. On the empirical side, it is argued that current transformer-based NNLP models, such as BERT and GPT-3 come close to fulfilling these criteria. (shrink)

What are the Early Memoranda?1 When were they written? What are their sources? What is their purpose and their relation to Hume's works? These questions, usually addressed separately, are in fact tightly interwoven: they require an articulated response that embraces them all. Our response could be summarised as follows: far from being current reading notes, or even less the exhaustive diary of Hume's intellectual experience, the Early Memoranda are most likely second-tier texts, or—as James Harris recently conjectured—"notes taken from notes."2 (...) More generally, the Memoranda, with some possible exceptions, are the result of a selection between those "loose bits of paper" and "uncorrect thoughts"3 which Hume began to... (shrink)

Linda LeMoncheck introduces a new way of thinking and talking about women's sexual pleasures, preferences, and desires. Using the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy, she discusses methods for mediating the tensions among apparently irreconcilable feminist perspectives on women's sexuality and shows how a feminist epistemology and ethic can advance the dialogue in women's sexuality across a broad political spectrum. She argues that in order to capture the diversity and complexity of women's sexual experience, women's sexuality must be examined from two (...) equally compelling perspectives: that of women's sexual oppression under conditions of individual and institutional male dominance; and that of women's sexual liberation, both in terms of each woman's pursuit of sexual agency and self-definition, and in terms of women's sexual liberation as a class. Loose Women, Lecherous Men sheds crucial new light on such much-debated topics as promiscuity, adultery, sexual deviance, prostitution, pornography, sexual harassment, and sexual violence against women. Her book supports a dialogue that encourages both women and men to take up a feminist perspective in exploring the meaning and value of sexuality in their lives. (shrink)

How_more open ways of thinking and operating are beginning to pervade even the largest and most complex institutions, from global corporations to government departments _ The future of business is loose-loose organizations, management styles, brands, thinking, and communications. For example,_Google breaks the traditional rules of branding by changing its logo everyday, Doritos handed over the premium advertising slot in the Superbowl to a couple of amateur filmmakers, and even Pope Benedict XVI has embraced the inclusive "Obama model" of (...) communication with YouTube broadcasts in 27 languages in an attempt to encourage debate. By building on cutting-edge case studies and conversations with the smartest business people from around the globe, this book challenges received wisdom and explains new ways of managing companies, building brands, engaging with customers, and marketing products and services._Shaking up the status quo and showing how prevailing business wisdom needs to change, this book will help_you change_their terms of business, before they are changed for you. (shrink)

There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one is variable (...) strictness. “S knows p” is commonly used loosely to implicate “S is close enough to knowing p for contextually indicated purposes.” A pragmatic account may use a range of semantics, even contextualist. I use an invariant semantics on which knowledge requires complete justification. This combination meets the Moorean constraint as well as any linguistic theory should, and meets the intuition constraint much better than contextualism. There is no need for ad hoc error theories. The variation in conditions of assertability and practical rationality is better explained by variably strict constraints. It will follow that “S knows p” is used loosely to implicate that the condition for asserting “p” and using it in practical reasoning are satisfied. (shrink)