Modal realism -- Time, space, world -- Existence -- Actuality -- Modal realism and modal tense -- Transworld individuals and their identity -- Existensionalism -- Impossibility -- Proposition and relief -- Fictional worlds -- Epistemology.

Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” (...) the relevant fiction. I wish to defend this pretheoretical intuition. To do so, I need to defend two claims: that fictional individuals do not actually exist, and that they exist “in the world of” the relevant fiction. The aim of this paper is to defend the first claim. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAnother individual’s gaze automatically shifts an observer’s attention to a location. This reflexive response occurs even when the gaze is presented subliminally over a short period. Another’s gaze also increases the preference level for items in the gaze direction; however, it was previously unclear if this effect occurs when the gaze is presented subliminally. This study showed that the preference levels for nonsense figures looked at by a subliminal gaze were significantly greater than those for items that were subliminally looked (...) away from. Targets that were looked at by a subliminal gaze were detected faster ; however, the participants were unable to detect the gaze direction. These results indicate that another individual’s gaze automatically increases the preference levels for items in the gaze direction without conscious awareness. (shrink)

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed joint post-proceedings of three international workshops organized by the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence, held in Tokyo, Japan in June 2006 during the 20th Annual Conference JSAI 2006. The volume starts with eight award winning papers of the JSAI 2006 main conference that are presented along with the 21 revised full workshop papers, carefully reviewed and selected for inclusion in the volume.

Modal realists should fashion their theory by postulating and taking seriously the modal equivalent of tense, or modal tense. This will give them a uniform way to respond to five different objections, one each by Skyrms, Quine, and Peacocke, and two by van Inwagen, and suggest a non-Lewisian path to modal realism.

Affective computing research has advanced emotion recognition systems using facial expressions, voices, gaits, and physiological signals, yet these methods are often impractical. This study integrates mouse cursor motion analysis into affective computing and investigates the idea that movements of the computer cursor can provide information about emotion of the computer user. We extracted 16–26 trajectory features during a choice-reaching task and examined the link between emotion and cursor motions. Participants were induced for positive or negative emotions by music, film clips, (...) or emotional pictures, and they indicated their emotions with questionnaires. Our 10-fold cross-validation analysis shows that statistical models formed from “known” participants could predict nearly 10%–20% of the variance of positive affect and attentiveness ratings of “unknown” participants, suggesting that cursor movement patterns such as the area under curve and direction change help infer emotions of computer users. (shrink)

This article contributes to the critical engagement with luck egalitarianism by advancing two arguments. Firstly, it questions the cogency of the dichotomies – e.g., luck/choice, person/circumstance, agency/structure – and the accompanying moral ideal of pure voluntarism. This makes it difficult for luck egalitarianism to dissect appropriately the inequalities embedded in social relations, such as social networks and involuntary associations, in which voluntariness and contingency as well as agency and structure are intertwined. Secondly, it suggests that the relational approach, which has (...) been developed, inter alia, in the empirical study of inequality, provides a morally and practically adequate perspective on egalitarian justice. The relational approach achieves this by converging upon those in‐between social relations that are irreducible to the macro‐level structure and to micro‐level agency. Moreover, a relationally sensitive perspective on inequality can adeptly respond to the difficulties that luck‐egalitarian theories encounter. (shrink)

Critical examination of Graham Priest's views on nothing.

I argue that Aristotle’s arguments in passages regarding chance in the Physics and in passages about ignorance in action in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics presuppose two different uses of ‘for the sake of something’, which are able to explain respectively the wish or thought of agents and the type or nature of what they actually do. In my view, however, this does not commit Aristotle, in the ‘ignorance’ passages from the two Ethics, to holding that the type or nature (...) of what the agents actually do is for the sake of killing or wounding. (shrink)

It may appear that in order to be any way at all, a thing must exist. A possible – worlds version of this claim goes as follows: (E) For every x, for every possible world w, Fx at w only if x exists at w. Here and later in (R), the letter ‘F’ is used as a schematic letter to be replaced with a one – place predicate. There are two arguments against (E). The first is by analogy. Socrates is (...) widely admired now but he does not exist now. So, it is not the case that for every x, for every time t, Fx at t only if x exists at t. Possible worlds are analogous to times. Therefore, (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1973: 503 – 05 and Salmon 1981: 36 – 40). For the second argument, replace ‘F’ with ‘does not exist’. (E) then says that for every x, for every possible world w, x does not exist at w only if x exists at w. This is obviously false. Therefore (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1977: 498). Despite their considerable appeal, these arguments are not unassailable. The first argument suffers from the weakness inherent in any argument from analogy; the analogy it rests on may not.. (shrink)

闇斎門下の個性豊かな諸家の事跡を通して、垂加神道の史的展開を検討すると共に、『日本書紀』神代巻の解釈に見える思想の根幹を明らかにする。.

Medical metaphors pervade medieval European political writings. No attempt has been made to establish the relationship between bodily imageries of the political community and anatomical and/or physiological knowledge. A survey of bodily metaphors shows that the primacy of the head of the body politic was challenged at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by an alternative view: the pre-eminence of the heart. This coincided with the penetration of Aristotelian physiology into scholastic medicine, which triggered debates over the most (...) important member of the body natural: is it the head or the heart? The medical inspiration for the conceptualization of the body politic illustrates the great impact of the 'Aristotelian revolution' in medieval political thought. (shrink)

Those who object to David Lewis' modal realism express qualms about philosophical respectability of the Lewisian notion of a possible world and its correlate notion of an inhabitant of a possible world. The resulting impression is that these two notions either stand together or fall together. I argue that the Lewisian notion of a possible world is otiose even for a good Lewisian modal realist, and that one can carry out a good Lewisian semantics for modal discourse without Lewisian possible (...) worls. I do so by generalizing Lewis' own idea that restrictions on quantification come and go with the pragmatic wind and relativizing possible worlds as shifting domains of discourse. I then suggest a way to soften the infamous incredulous stare. (shrink)

Strong Nash equilibrium and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium rely on the idea that players are allowed to form coalitions and make joint deviations. Both of these notions consider cases in which any coalition can be formed. Accordingly, there may arise “conflicts of interest” that prevent a player from choosing an action that simultaneously meets the requirements of two coalitions to which he or she belongs. Here, we address this observation by studying an organizational framework such that the coalitional structure is motivated (...) by real-life examples where players cannot form some coalitions and formulated in such a way that no conflicts of interest remain. We define an organization as an ordered collection of partitions of the player set such that any partition is coarser than the partitions that precede it. For any given organization, we introduce the notion of organizational Nash equilibrium. We analyze the existence of equilibrium in a subclass of games with strategic complementarities and illustrate how the proposed notion refines the set of Nash equilibria in some examples of normal form games. (shrink)

A complete list of Finsler, Scott and Boffa sets whose transitive closures contain 1, 2 and 3 elements is given. An algorithm for deciding the identity of hereditarily finite Scott sets is presented. Anti-well-founded sets, i. e., non-well-founded sets whose all maximal ∈-paths are circular, are studied. For example they form transitive inner models of ZFC minus foundation and empty set, and they include uncountably many hereditarily finite awf sets. A complete list of Finsler and Boffa awf sets with 2 (...) and 3 elements in their transitive closure is given. Next the existence of infinite descending ∈-sequences in Aczel universes is shown. Finally a theorem of Ballard and Hrbáček concerning nonstandard Boffa universes of sets is considerably extended. (shrink)

Macroautophagy is a major degradation mechanism of cell components via the lysosome. Macroautophagy greatly contributes to not only cell homeostasis but also the prevention of various diseases. Because macroautophagy proceeds through multi‐step reactions, researchers often face a persistent question of how macroautophagic activity can be measured correctly. To make a straightforward determination of macroautophagic activity, diverse monitoring assays have been developed. Direct measurement of lysosome‐dependent degradation of radioisotopically labeled cell proteins has long been applied. Meanwhile, indirect monitoring procedures have been (...) developed. In these assays, autophagosome marker proteins, microtubule‐associated proteins 1A/1B light chain 3B‐II (LC3B‐II) and gamma‐aminobutyric acid receptor‐associated protein‐II (GABARAP‐II) have been analyzed and the validity of the assays strongly depends on appropriate assessment of the fluctuation of LC3‐II and/or GABARAP‐II levels in the presence or absence of lysosomal inhibitors. This article describes these monitoring methods, paying special attention to the principles and characteristics of each procedure. (shrink)

Approximately thirty years ago, Barbara H. Partee tried to think of counterexamples to David Lewis’s observation that no intransitive verbs appeared to have intensional subject positions. She came up with such verbs as ‘rise,’ ‘change,’ and ‘increase.’ Lewis agreed that they were indeed counterexamples to his observation. He mentioned it to Richard Montague, who incorporated these verbs into his now famous grammatical theory for English.

Mark Jago’s four arguments against Takashi Yagisawa’s extended modal realism are examined and shown to be ineffective. Yagisawa’s device of modal tense renders three of Jago’s arguments harmless, and the correct understanding of predications of modal properties of world stages blocks the fourth one.

It seems to be a challenging task for those non-Western scholars who are deeply immersed in European intellectual resources to theorise multiple forms of modernity and deparochialise political theory. What difficulty awaits us in non-Western contexts, when we attempt to throw off these shackles and to open up alternative views of modernity? To address this question, this article attempts to critically examine Maruyama Masao (丸山眞男, 1914–1996), an influential scholar on the history of Japanese political thought, with respect to his view (...) of Japanese modernity, thereby exploring what obstacles await him in pursuing the multiplicity view of modernity and how he actually or potentially overcomes them. In doing so, I develop two arguments. First, Maruyama's move towards multiple modernities remains incomplete because he fails to throw off the shackles of universal history. Second, however, we can identify an alternative way in his own thought that, though not taken by himself, potentially goes beyond universal history towards multiple modernities. (shrink)

1. Ronri to gengo -- 2-3. Imi to yōsō -- 4. Shinri to imi.