On fundamentals of Nyaya philosophy with Nūtanāloka autocommentary and Ālokaprakāśa commentary by disciples.

Values and ethics in Yogavāsiṣṭha; a study with complete text with Hindi translation.

Moral and ethical aspects of medical care.

Contributed reserach papers on theory of knowledge in Indian philosophy, presented at seminar organized by Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, Srisadasiva Campus, Orissa.

Commentary on Tshad ma rigs gter, a work on Buddhist logic by Sa-skya Paṇḍi-ṭa Kun-dgaʾ-rgyal-mtshan, 1182-1251.

Filosofi og pædagogik er gamle fæller, og der er et overlap mellem filosofiens historie og pædagogikkens historiske litteratur. Store tænkere som Platon, Aristoteles, Augustin, Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart og Dewey hører hjemme begge steder. I den pædagogiske filosofi kan almene teoretiske og praktisk filosofiske spørgsmål udforskes systematisk og historisk. Gennem diskussioner af sådanne spørgsmål kan man forholde sig mere nysgerrigt, bevidst, begrundet og kritisk til pædagogisk praksis såvel som til pædagogisk teori, empiri og undervisningsteknologi. -/- Fællesskabet er (...) ikke uproblematisk. Pædagogik er ikke filosofi, og pædagogisk filosofi ikke kun pædagogik. Både didaktik og almen pædagogik kan komme i konflikt med pædagogisk filosofi. Hvordan kan almene pædagogiske spørgsmål overhovedet belyses filosofisk, og hvad betyder de for filosofien selv? En pædagogisk filosofisk tilgang forandrer kanon i både pædagogik og filosofi. Udvalget af nøgletekster ændres. Emner, der er værd at diskutere, forskydes. Nye forskningsspørgsmål og prioriteringer viser sig. Et pædagogisk perspektiv på filosofiens udvikling vil fremhæve dens bidrag til at forstå ’den pædagogiske problem- og fænomenverden’, ligesom et filosofisk perspektiv på pædagogikken vil flytte – eller rettere udvide – fokus med hensyn til dens idéhistorie såvel som dens aktuelle teoretiske praksis. Som i al anden filosofi kan man i den pædagogiske filosofi diskutere teoretiske og praktiske, såvel som poetiske og æstetiske spørgsmål; men det er typisk med en særlig vinkel, nemlig den pædagogiske. Man kan således diskutere erkendelse, viden og sandhed, ligeså vel som man kan undersøge ret, retfærdighed og skønhed. Ofte vil det være med en særlig tvist. Den pædagogiske filosofi kan vise sig som særegen både ved sin særlige position og ved at relatere sig til det pædagogiske som genstandsfelt. Hvad denne position og dette genstandsfelt egentlig er, er der dog ingen enighed om. Det kan ikke engang siges at være udelukkende pædagogisk defineret, og derfor må den pædagogiske filosofi forholde sig åbent til begge dele. Studier i pædagogisk filosofi indbyder til denne drøftelse. (shrink)

Et uventet og uformodet bidrag og introduktion til en filosofisk forståelse af den nye globaliserede verdensorden, der kommer fra et nyt sted i denne vores globaliserede verden: Mexiko. Ny og ukendt i hvert fald i en dansk sammenhæng – hverken vores stats- eller udenrigsminister har garanteret hørt om Enrique Dussel før. -/- Forfatteren forholder sig eksplicit til en europæisk filosofisk tradition, men udbygger en egensindig forståelse af både filosofi og dens anvendelse i enmoderne verdensorden – netop på baggrund af en (...) udkantserfaring i forhold til den fremherskende filosofi, politik og verdensforståelse. Hans idéer har et nyt og tankevækkende anderledes perspektiv i forhold til den kendte vestlige forståelsesramme af virkeligheden. -/- Dussel kan sammenlignes med en lang række tænkere og filosoffer, som han også forholder sig til og er inspireret af – blandt de europæiske især Ricœur og Lévinas – men også den nutidige Naomi Klein. Materien er tungere og kræver mere fordybelse, men den er autentisk og fornyende, også pga. forfatterens baggrund, født i Argentina, hvor hans hus blev bombesprængt i 70'erne i sidste århundrede, da det daværende diktatur mente at måtte bekæmpe anderledes tænkende på denne måde – ligesom andre alternative tænkere (f.eks. en Horatio Cerutti Guldberg), der alle emigrerede til Mexiko. (Tekst fra pressemeddelelse) -/- Filosofi kræver universel gyldighed og en frigørelsesfilosofi må derfor kræve frigørelse for alle mennesker. Frihed er dog meget ulige fordelt, og frigørelsesfilosofi tager følgelig parti for dem, der mest tydeligt er ekskluderede fra samfundsmæssige goder og politiske rettigheder: Den tredjeverdens fattige under den globaliserede kapitalisme, oprindelige folk og farvede i racistiske samfund, kvinder i mandschauvinistiske kulturer, illegale immigranter m.fl.. -/- I Enrique Dussels frigørelsesfilosofi skal etik skal derfor ikke blot diskutere formelle principper, men hele tiden medtænke afhjælpelse af materiel lidelse. Politik kan tilsvarende ikke blot understrege demokratiske principper og menneskerettigheder, men må også indeholde en kritik af selve det kapitalistiske økonomiske system, ligesom der skal være en strategi tilforbedring af kårene for de underprivilegerede. Og i en sådan strategi er staten det vigtigste bolværk mod de transnationale selskabers udbytning af verdensressourcer. -/- Med dette bevidst marginale perspektiv kan Dussel desuden vise, at der i vores almindelige kulturarv og filosofi er begreber og tankegange, der bidrager til at tilsløre den herskende globale ulighed. Over for den udbredte opfattelse af historien som en udvikling fra det traditionelle samfund til moderniteten, viser Dussel, at vores modernitet modsvares af underudvikling og globaludbytning, og at dette ikke er et enestående fænomen. Tidligere har f.eks. Spanien udviklet en meget rig og forfinet højkultur med individuel refleksivitet i sit centrum, der kun var mulig ved at udpine den daværende globale periferi, altså indianerne i på det amerikanske kontinent. -/- Dussels fremhævelse af det marginale perspektiv, hans kompromisløse stillingtagen til fordel for den svage part i ethvert menneskeligt forhold og hans stringent logiske ideologikritik har vakt respekt blandt filosoffer ogintellektuelle over hele kloden. Med denne antologi præsenteres Dussels filosofi for første gang for et dansk publikum. -/- Enrique Dussel (f. 1934), født i Argentina og videreudannet i Spanien, Frankrig, Tyskland og Israel. Doktor fra Universidad Complutense i Madrid og Sorbonne iParis. Siden 1975 professor i etik og politisk filosofi på Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Iztapalapa og fra 1976 også på Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, begge i Mexico by. Blandt hans vigtigste værker er Ética de la liberación [Frigørelsesetikken], der er kommet i fem udgaver siden 1998. Flere af hans øvrige værker er oversat til engelsk, tysk og fransk, universiteter over hele verden har udnævnt ham til æresdoktor, og han er hovedtaler på den filosofiske verdenskongres i Korea i 2008. (Bogens bagside tekst - udvidet version). (shrink)

"Mennesket behøver ikke at reflektere på sin egen selvstændiggørelse, det behøver ikke at reflektere på den opgave at blive sig selv, det har bare at realisere sig i den suveræne livsytring, så sørger livsytringen – ikke refleksionen – for at mennesket er sig selv. Kierkegaard tager fejl, når han mener, at kun med en religiøs refleksion kan mennesket løse opgaven at blive et selv, som om vi ikke var udstyret med suveræne livsytringer, der løser opgaven for os." Uddrag fra bogen (...) 'Opgør med Kierkegaard' er Løgstrups hovedværk om Søren Kierkegaard. Den flankeres i Løgstrup Biblioteket af den mindre udgivelse 'Kierkegaards og Heideggers eksistensanalyse og dens forhold til forkyndelsen'. "Det vidunderlige ved den danske teolog K. E. Løgstrups bog ' Opgør med Kierkegaard' fra 1968, som nu bliver genudgivet, er, at han tager Kierkegaard alvorligt. [...] han ser, at der er behov for et opgør med den tænker, som han selv fra sin ungdom har været stærkt påvirket af. Det opgør gennemfører han overbevisende og klart." ♥ ♥ ♥ ♥ ♥ Rune Lykkeberg, Politiken "Der er drama for alle pengene og infight med Kant og Heidegger i K.E. Løgstrups 'Opgør med Kierkegaard', der har næstekærligheden og den etiske fordring i centrum" Information, Peter Tudvad. (shrink)

Supercommentary on Anuvyākhyāna, verse commentary by Madhva, 13th cent., on Brahmasūtra by Bādarāyaṇa, representing Dvaita point of view; with twenty five supercommentaries : Nyāyasudhābindu by Vijayindratīrtha ; Parimaḷa by Rāghavendratīrtha ; Vāgvajra by Pādarājatīrtha ; Gurvarthadīpikā by Vādirājatīrtha ; Ṭippaṇī by Yadupatyācārya ; Vākyārthavivr̥ti by Vaṃśapallī Śrīnivāsācārya ; Ānanda by Galagalī Narasiṃhācārya ; Vivr̥ti by Kambālūru Rāmacandratīrtha ; Ṭippaṇī by Śrīnidhitīrtha ; Vākyārthacandrikā by Vidyādhīsatīrtha ; Śeṣavākyārthacandrikā by Pāṇḍuraṅgī Keśavācārya ; Vākyārtharatnamālā by Pāṇḍuraṅganarasiṃhācārya ; Sudhāvivr̥tti by Satyavrtatīrtha ; Rasakūlaṅkaṣa by (...) Kuṇḍalagiriācārya ; Durghaṭavākyārthavicāra by Satyanāthatīrtha ; Ṭippaṇī by Viṭṭhalabhaṭṭa ; Rasarañjanī by Viṣṇutīrtha ; Laghurasarañjanī by Aḍavī Kr̥ṣṇācārya ; Caṣaka by Mannārī Kr̥ṣṇācārya ; Upasparśa by Erī Bālācārya ; Kāśī ṭippaṇī by Kāśī Ācārya ; Guḍhakar̥trkā by Gudhakaratr̥kācārya ; Pradīpa by Pradīpakāra ; Ṭippaṇī by Pāndhrī Śrīnivāsācārya ; Huggi by Kallāpūra Satyādhirājācārya. (shrink)

Transplantation is a medically successful and cost-effective way to treat people whose organs have failed--but not enough organs are available to meet demand. T. M. Wilkinson explores the major ethical problems raised by policies for acquiring organs. Key topics include the rights of the dead, the role of the family, and the sale of organs.

Partial grounding is often thought to be formally analogous to proper parthood in certain ways. Both relations are typically understood to be asymmetric and transitive, and as such, are thought to be strict partial orders. But how far does this analogy extend? Proper parthood is often said to obey the weak supplementation principle. There is reason to wonder whether partial grounding, or, more precisely, proper partial grounding, obeys a ground-theoretic version of this principle. In what follows, I argue that it (...) does not. The cases that cause problems for the supplementation principle for grounding also serve as counterexamples to another principle, minimality, defended by Paul Audi. (shrink)

A very clear and powerfully argued defence of a most important and surprisingly neglected view."--Derek Parfit, All Souls College, Oxford. "If Dr. Olson is right, we are living animals and what goes on in our minds is wholly irrelevant to questions about our persistence through time....[Should] transform philosophical thinking about personal identity."--Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame.

This paper studies the state of charge estimation of supercapacitors and lithium batteries in the hybrid energy storage system of electric vehicles. According to the energy storage principle of the electric vehicle composite energy storage system, the circuit models of supercapacitors and lithium batteries were established, respectively, and the model parameters were identified online using the recursive least square method and Kalman filtering algorithm. Then, the online estimation of SOC was completed based on the Kalman filtering algorithm and unscented Kalman (...) filtering algorithm. Finally, the experimental platform for SOC estimation was built and Matlab was used for calculation and analysis. The experimental results showed that the SOC estimation results reached a high accuracy, and the variation range of estimation error was [−0.94%, 0.34%]. For lithium batteries, the recursive least square method is combined with the 2RC model to obtain the optimal result, and the estimation error is within the range of [−1.16%, 0.85%] in the case of comprehensive weighing accuracy and calculation amount. Moreover, the system has excellent robustness and high reliability. (shrink)

Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I (...) distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist (and conceptualist) proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject. (shrink)

Neuroscience cannot and should not be allowed to replace normative questions with scientific onesOver the past few years considerable attention has been paid to a variety of issues that are now placed collectively under the heading of “Neuroethics”. In both the academic and the popular press there have been discussions about the possibilities and problems offered by cognitive enhancement and neuroimaging as well as debate about the implications of these emerging “neurotechnologies” for morality and the law. This issue of the (...) journal contains eight papers that discuss a broad range of important topics in neuroethics, from cognitive enhancement and the moral status of animals and cyborgs, to the challenges of neurological consults in end of life cases. As these papers demonstrate, advances in neuroscience raise a number of important ethical questions, but can neuroscience help provide any answers?FACT AND VALUEAccording to the received philosophical wisdom, there is a fundamental distinction between fact and value—between how things are and how they ought to be. On the basis of this distinction one cannot draw normative conclusions from descriptive premises because there is nothing in the premises that would warrant such conclusions: from the fact that happiness is desired it does not follow that it ought to be. This received wisdom applies to neuroethics in the following way: whereas neuroscience might be able to identify the neurophysical correlates for evaluative notions such as preferences and attitudes,1,2 lying,3 and the distinction between in control and out of control behaviour,4 neuroscience cannot, in and by itself, provide the basis for their evaluation. The reason for this is that, in the absence of factors external to these neurophysical states, one neurophysical state is no better or worse than another—internal neurophysical states are logically …. (shrink)

It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an (...) exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases. \\\ [Jonathan Dancy] My first four sections concentrate on the second section of Professor Scanlon's contribution, where he lays out his conception of moral principles and of the role they play in theory and practice. I will raise questions on the following issues: 1. Scanlon's initial introduction of the notion of a principle. 2. His rejection of the standard view that principles are concerned with the forbidding, permitting and requiring of actions. 3. His rejection of pro tanto conceptions of principles in favour of a conception of them as conclusive. 4. The resulting account of what it is for a principle to face and survive exceptions. Scanlon's discussion of these matters here both appeals to and is in some respects more detailed than the relevant section of his recent What We Owe to Each Other. The topic is interesting both for the role played by principles in Scanlon's present discussion of intention and permissibility, and more generally because of his account of wrongness: an act is wrong iff it is ruled out by principles that nobody could reasonably reject. The remainder of my contribution is concerned with the ostensible focus of IP, namely the relevance of agent-intentions to the permissibility of what is done. (shrink)

Classical text on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy; with Āloka Sanskrit commentary.

Critical edition with eight commentaries, on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Classical work on the basic concepts and terminology of Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika school in Hindu philosophy; includes Phakkikā commentary by Kṣamākalyāṇagaṇi, 18th cent.

Aphoristic work on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika school of Hindu philosophy; includes Sanskrit commentary with Hindi translation.

Aphoristic work on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika school of Hindu philosophy; includes two Sanskrit commentaries.

Discourses on the Bhagavadgītā, Bhakti, and Hindu ethics.

Contributed research papers on Indic philosophy.