This article provides an ISCT analysis of commercial bribery focused on transaction cost economics. In the language of Antitrust, commercial bribery is a form of vertical arrangement subject to the same efficiency analysis that has found other vertical arrangements potentially beneficial to consumers. My analysis shows that actions condemned as commerical bribery in the Honda case may well have benefited Honda's dealer network once promotional free riding and other forms of rent seeking by dealers are considered. I propose that (...) the term "commercial bribery" should be avoided until after an ISCT analysis shows that the community is likely to have been harmed. The term "third-party payments" is a more ethically neutral term with which to begin the analysis. (shrink)

This book examines transaction cost economics, the influential theoretical perspective on organizations and industry that was the subject of Oliver Williamson's seminal book,Markets and Hierarchies. Written by leading economists, sociologists, and political scientists, the essays collected here reflect the fruitful intellectual exchange that is occurring across the major social science disciplines. They examine transaction cost economics' general conceptual orientation, its specific theoretical propositions, its applications to policy, and its use in systematic empirical research. The chapters include classic texts, (...) broad review essays, reflective commentaries, and several new contributions to a wide range of topics, including organizations, regulations and law, institutions, strategic management, game theory, entrepreneurship, innovation, finance, and technical information. The book begins with an overview of theory and research on transaction cost economics, highlighting the specific accomplishments of scholars working within the perspective and emphasizing the enormous influence that transaction cost reasoning exerts on the social sciences. The following section covers conceptual uses for the transaction cost framework and major theoretical or methodological elements within it, such as bounded rationality. While advancing some interesting theoretical propositions, these chapters are in fact more ambitious: each examines a specific field, area, or research program and attempts to fashion a new way of thinking about research questions. In the section on industrial applications, contributors study the application of transaction cost theory to a range of problems in utilities, telecommunications, laser printing, and early international trade. The book closes with four microanalytical chapters that delve into the structures and behaviors of specific aspects of firms and organizations: boards of directors, equity structures, employment models, human resource policies and practices, technology strategies, and innovation events. Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies collects excellent social science work on transaction cost economics, taking stock of its status, charting its future development, and fostering its renewal and evolution. (shrink)

This article provides an ISCT analysis of commercial bribery focused on transaction cost economics. In the language of Antitrust, commercial bribery is a form of vertical arrangement subject to the same efficiency analysis that has found other vertical arrangements potentially beneficial to consumers. My analysis shows that actions condemned as commerical bribery in the Honda case (1996) may well have benefited Honda's dealer network once promotional free riding and other forms of rent seeking by dealers are considered. I propose (...) that the term "commercial bribery" should be avoided until after an ISCT analysis shows that the community is likely to have been harmed. The term "third-party payments" is a more ethically neutral term with which to begin the analysis. (shrink)

Many economic theorists hold that social institutions can lead otherwise irrational agents to approximate the predictions of traditional rational choice theory. But there is little consensus on how institutions do so. I defend an economic internalist account of the institution-actor relationship by explaining economic rationality as a feature of individuals whose decision-making is aided by institutional structures. This approach, known as the subjective transaction costs theory, represents apparently irrational behavior as a rational response to high subjective (...) transaction costs of thinking and deciding. The theory has two attractive features. First, it reconciles rational choice theory with the increasing body of evidence cataloguing putative errors in economic decision-making. Second, it vindicates the explanatory power of individual choice against externalist challenges; the subjective transaction costs theory keeps economic rationality in the head. (shrink)

This qualitative study looks at the complex relationship of transaction costs, norms, and social networks through a comparison of industrial buyer-seller relationships in the United States and Mexico. Despite arguments by transactioncost theorists that the nature of cooperation in business is largely a function of the nature of investments in transaction assets, this article illustrates several cases where the economic logic is attenuated and a mutual orientation develops as the social structure promotes greater trust either because of (...) shared norms or network ties. It also suggests that asset specificity may at times be a product of the social structure in which the transaction is embedded. The article develops theoretical propositions and suggests directions for future research. (shrink)

This qualitative study looks at the complex relationship of transaction costs, norms, and social networks through a comparison of industrial buyer-seller relationships in the United States and Mexico. Despite arguments by transactioncost theorists that the nature of cooperation in business is largely a function of the nature of investments in transaction assets, this article illustrates several cases where the economic logic is attenuated and a mutual orientation develops as the social structure promotes greater trust either because of (...) shared norms or network ties. It also suggests that asset specificity may at times be a product of the social structure in which the transaction is embedded. The article develops theoretical propositions and suggests directions for future research. (shrink)

Increasing the tax compliance of self-employed business owners—particularly of trade-specific service providers such as those involved in construction and repair work—remains an ongoing challenge for tax authorities. From a compliance point of view, cash transactions are particularly problematic when services are paid for on the spot, as these exchanges are difficult to audit. We present experimental evidence testing ten different policy strategies rooted in the enforcement, service, and trust/social paradigms, in a setting that allows payment either via a transaction (...) that directly reports income for tax collection purposes or in cash, where taxes are only collected on reported income. Our sample includes both a typical subject pool of students, as used in most previous studies, and non-students who are active within service industries characterised by the opportunity to engage in cash transactions. While our comparative results show that, for both student and non-student participants, interventions that rely on greater enforcement by the tax authority have the greatest effect on compliance in our cash economy setting, treatments involving cooperative elements may be similarly effective in enhancing tax compliance. Given their effectiveness, cooperative approaches should therefore be considered for addition to the policy mix if implemented at relatively low costs, making both carrot and stick approaches promising to increase compliance in an environment where cash-for-service payments offer a common benefit for small businesses and their customers from implicit collusion that enables tax evasion. (shrink)

We study the effect of transaction costs (e.g., a trading fee or a transaction tax, like the Tobin tax) on the aggregation of private information in financial markets. We analyze a financial market à la Glosten and Milgrom, in which informed and uninformed traders trade in sequence with a market maker. Traders have to pay a cost in order to trade. We show that, eventually, all informed traders decide not to trade, independently of their private information, i.e., (...) an informational cascade occurs. We replicated our financial market in the laboratory. We found that, in the experiment, informational cascades occur when the theory suggests they should. Nevertheless, the ability of the price to aggregate private information is not significantly affected. (JEL C92, D8, G14). (shrink)

New network technologies are framed as eliminating ‘transaction costs’, a notion first developed in economic theory that now drives the design of market systems. However, the actual promise of the elimination of transaction costs seems unfeasible, because of a cyclical pattern in which network technologies that make that promise create processes of institutionalization that create new forms transaction costs. Nonetheless, the promises legitimize the exemption of innovations of network technologies from critical scrutiny.

This paper views corruption as a form of contracting amenable to analysis from the viewpoint of transaction-cost economics. Concepts such as transaction, bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity are shown to apply to cases of corruption. Both market and parochial corruption are hypothesized to vary in accordance with changes in the specificity of assets invested to support the corruption transaction. Evidence from a number of different studies tends to support the hypothesized relation. The implications of the (...) class='Hi'>transaction-cost perspective are developed for policy makers and directions for future research are suggested. (shrink)

As the transaction cost theory of the firm was taking shape in the 1970s, another important movement in economics was emerging: a revival of the ‘Austrian’ tradition in economic theory associated with such economists as Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek . As Oliver Williamson has pointed out, Austrian economics is among the diverse sources for transaction cost economics. In particular, Williamson frequently cites Hayek , particularly Hayek’s emphasis on adaptation as a key problem of economic organisation (...) . Following Williamson’s lead, a reference to Hayek’s ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ has become almost mandatory in discussions of economic organisation . However, there are many other potential links between Austrian and transaction cost economics that have not been explored closely and exploited.This article argues that characteristically Austrian ideas about property, entrepreneurship, economic calculation, tacit knowledge, and the temporal structure of capital have important implications for theories of economic organisation, transaction cost economics in particular. Austrian economists have not, however, devoted substantial attention to the theory of the firm, preferring to focus on business-cycle theory, welfare economics, political economy, comparative economic systems, and other areas. Until recently the theory of the firm was an almost completely neglected area in Austrian economics, but over the last decade, a small Austrian literature on the firm has emerged. While these works cover a wide variety of theoretical and applied topics, their authors share the view that Austrian insights have something to offer students of firm organisation. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to present the author's accounting mechanisms in relation to the transaction costs of a manufacturing enterprise in relation to the financial, managerial and strategic aspects of this process. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the fact that the paper systematizes views on the existing accounting and analytical support in relation to transaction costs, offers various options for constructing accounting, management and strategic accounting of transaction costs, depending (...) on the assessment available for reflection. As a result, the recommended accounting approaches using accounting, management and strategic accounting of transaction costs are presented on the example of an industrial company. Since transaction costs occupy a significant share in the cost structure of business units engaged in production, it is necessary to organize their reflection using modern accounting principles. The complexity of the monetary assessment of such costs causes the complexity of the management process associated with their accounting. This publication is devoted to the problems of accounting, management and strategic accounting of transaction costs at a manufacturing enterprise. The use of an integrated approach based on accounting principles makes it possible to ensure control over transaction costs for solving urgent tasks of management and owners. (shrink)

Stakeholder scholars have long explored how stakeholder relationships differ from economic transactions. We contribute to this ongoing inquiry by developing a conceptual framework of relationality in stakeholder theory that encompasses a stakeholder-theoretic extension of Williamson's contracting schema and a new typology of stakeholder relationships. Premised on understanding relationality as the need for informal human relationships beyond formal governance, our framework locates the key difference between transaction cost economics and stakeholder theory in their treatment of informal relationships. While transaction (...) cost economics perceives informal relationships to be shaped by formal governance structures and enforced by contractual safeguards, stakeholder theory is open to the possibility that some informal relationships between stakeholders may be genuinely moral and thus irreducible to formal governance and contractual safeguards. These stakeholder relationships may lead to unique economic effects described by instrumental stakeholder theory. The difference that we identified between the two literatures shows how stakeholder theory's embrace of relationality surpasses that of transaction cost economics. (shrink)

This paper explores the conditions favouring or inhibiting the implementation of strategic corporate social responsibility policies in the context of global value chains. Using transaction cost theory, we specify the economic and behavioural issues raised by strategic CSR policies. We show that the existence of market rewards for such policies does not constitute a solution per se, but tends to increase the difficulties that value chain members face. Bringing TCT into the analysis of the diffusion of strategic CSR policies (...) in GVCs helps us to make different contributions. We first theoretically identify some limiting conditions of strategic CSR policies in GVCs. We also contribute to developing a more robust theoretical perspective for CSR in GVC research, which remains underdeveloped and mostly driven by empirical case studies. Finally, we shed light on new research questions and topics that could guide major theoretical and empirical investigations in the capacity of GVCs members to bypass the numerous difficulties involved in the implementation of strategic CSR policies. (shrink)

We argue that although halal certification could potentially reduce the high transaction costs related to buying Islamic financial products, in practice these costs are just replaced by transaction costs relating to the certification itself. It takes considerable time (2–3 months) and money (USD 122.000) to obtain a halal certification. Partially, this is because the market is highly concentrated and non-contestable. About 20 individual Sharia scholars control more than half the market, with the top 3 earning (...) an estimated USD 4.5 million in fees per year. Moreover, this market seems plagued with problems, most notably a strong incentive for excessively lenient certification, lack of consensus on what is considered halal and sub-standard governance practices. We discuss solutions to these problems and conclude that a neutral non-profit government entity should assume the role of halal certifiers. (shrink)

This paper outlines different types of knowledge and how they are applied to different problem types. It makes the case that co-created knowledge, generated by innovative and collaborative partnerships of scholars within a transdisciplinary framework is best suited to address the most complex and therefore most important problems in food systems scholarship. It applies Transaction Costs theory to highlight some of the options we scholars face and applies these concepts to the issue of Payments for Ecosystems Services., with (...) an analogy and questions to ponder. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate the legal arrangements involved in UK surrogate motherhood from a transaction-cost perspective. We outline the specific forms the transaction costs take and critically comment on the way in which the UK institutional and organisational arrangements at present adversely influence transaction costs. We then focus specifically on the potential role of surrogacy agencies and look at UK and US evidence on commercial and voluntary agencies. Policy implications follow.

In recent years, copyright governance for short videos has become a hot issue of common concern in the academic community and the industry. Therefore, this study intends to explore the economic aspect of copyright governance in relation to the proliferation of infringing short videos. The short video industry of China has been taken as a case to demonstrate the copyright governance issue. Transaction cost theory has been applied to analyze the economic aspect of copyright governance in terms of four (...) dimensions: bounded rationality, opportunism, environmental uncertainty, and asset specificity. From the perspective of transaction cost economics, the problem of short video infringement is observed to be essentially a market failure due to high transaction costs. In the short video market, substantial transaction costs are incurred in the legal transaction of copyright with these costs considered to be too high. This is especially the case when transaction costs exceed the net proceeds initially expected by short video users from the authorization, making it impossible to carry out the transaction and leading to infringement. To effectively control the copyright infringement of short videos, it is necessary to build a cross-platform information-sharing mechanism to reduce search costs, establish a unified copyright management platform to reduce coordination costs, and give full attention to the role of technical support to reduce regulatory costs. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to present the author's method of digitalization of transactions of solved business tasks to reduce transaction costs of a manufacturing enterprise. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the fact that the elements of digitalization are proposed in the work to reduce the transaction costs of searching for information, negotiating, measuring, and concluding a contract. The introduction of digital technologies into specific business tasks contributes to the optimization of (...) class='Hi'>transaction costs in the modern institutional environment. As a result, the information relationship of the structural divisions of the production company was established during the performance of their functions at all stages of the production cycle from procurement to sales, the functional filling subsystems of the organizational structure were determined. Transaction costs, in accordance with their classification, are structured according to these subsystems, they represent the elements of digitalization recommended for use in the business processes of a manufacturing company to reduce its transaction costs. The introduction of digitalization processes of business tasks into the management structure helps to increase the level of validity and speed of decisions in the subsystems of the organizational structure of the company. (shrink)

Purpose of the study is to determine factors influencing transaction costs on the sharing economy. The article examines the evolution of the fundamental concept of economic theory – transaction costs, under the influence of the expansion of sharing economy. The sharing economy appears to be the result of the further development of the consumption economy, since within the framework of this economic system, the quality of the services provided is improving. The scientific novelty lies in the (...) clarification of the mechanism of mutual development of both the sharing economy and transaction costs. As a result, the importance of the factor of massive use of the Internet and mobile devices by a huge number of people, as influencing the service provision market, was revealed. At the same time, there is no need to overcome various barriers, and entrepreneurs have the opportunity to sell not so much reductions in production costs, but rather a reduction in transaction costs. (shrink)

In the economic literature on the firm, especially in the transaction–cost tradition, a sharp distinction is drawn between so-called “market transactions” and “administered transactions.” This distinction is of enormous importance for business ethics, since market transactions are governed by the competitive logic of the market, whereas administered transactions are subject to the cooperative norms that govern collective action in a bureaucracy. The widespread failure to distinguish between these two types of transactions, and thus to distinguish between adversarial and non-adversarial (...) relations, has led many business ethicists to develop a “uniform” moral code. Yet in market transactions, the checks and balances built into the system of commercial exchange are such as to permit more instrumental forms of behavior. In administered transactions, by contrast, these checks and balances are absent, and thus the institutional context calls for much greater exercise of moral restraint. In this paper, I begin the task of developing an adversarial ethic for business. According to this view, the competitive environment licenses a greater range of “self-interested” behavior, but also imposes its own constraints on the strategies that firms may adopt in the pursuit of their interests. (shrink)

In the economic literature on the firm, especially in the transaction-cost tradition, a sharp distinction is drawn between so-called “market transactions” and “administered transactions.” This distinction is of enormous importance for business ethics, since market transactions are governed by the competitive logic of the market, whereas administered transactions are subject to the cooperative norms that govern collective action in a bureaucracy. The widespread failure to distinguish between these two types of transactions, and thus to distinguish between adversarial and non-adversarial (...) relations, has led many business ethicists to develop a “uniform” moral code. Yet in market transactions, the checks and balances built into the system of commercial exchange are such as to permit more instrumental forms of behavior. In administered transactions, by contrast, these checks and balances are absent, and thus the institutional context calls for much greater exercise of moral restraint. In this paper, I begin the task of developing an adversarial ethic for business. According to this view, the competitive environment licenses a greater range of “self-interested” behavior, but also imposes its own constraints on the strategies that firms may adopt in the pursuit of their interests. (shrink)

This book by one of America's preeminent legal theorists is concerned with the conflict between the goals of justice and economic efficiency in the allocation of risk, especially risk pertaining to safety. The author approaches his subject from the premise that the market is central to liberal political, moral, and legal theory. In the first part of the book, he rejects traditional "rational choice" liberalism in favor of the view that the market operates as a rational way of fostering stable (...) relationships and institutions within communities of individuals with broadly divergent conceptions of the good. However, markets are needed most where they are most difficult to create and sustain, and one way to understand contract law in liberal legal theory, according to Professor Coleman, is as an institution designed to reduce uncertainty and thereby make markets possible. Another target of this book is the prevalent view that tort law helps rectify market failures when transaction costs are too high to permit contracting. The author argues instead that tort law should be understood as a way of rectifying wrongful losses not inefficient exchanges. (shrink)

Systems Theory analyses the world in terms of communications and divides the natural world into environment and systems. Systems are characterised by their high density of communications and tend to become more complex and efficient with time, usually by means of increased specialisation and coordination of functions. Management is an organisational sub-system which models all necessary aspects of organisational activity such that this model may be used for monitoring, prediction and planning of the organisation as a whole. The function of (...) a specific management system depends on its history of selection by interactions with the environment (which includes other systems). The main function of a management system will be a consequence of the most powerful and sustained selection pressure it has experienced. Systems Theory implies a management science which is quantitative and comparative. It is quantitative because it is based upon the measurement and mapping of communications as the basis of analysis; it is comparative because evaluations relate to specific variables measured in a specific spatio-temporal context and subjected to analytic processes of constrained complexity. Selection processes are broadly responsible for the dominance of management in contemporary Western societies. The complexity of management systems will probably continue to increase for as long as the efficiency-enhancing potential of complexity outweighs its increased transaction costs. (shrink)

Why does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over time. We propose an alternative explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and benefits associated with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms, especially those associated with executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Consequently, the deployment of these computational mechanisms (...) carries an opportunity cost – that is, the next-best use to which these systems might be put. We argue that the phenomenology of effort can be understood as the felt output of these cost/benefit computations. In turn, the subjective experience of effort motivates reduced deployment of these computational mechanisms in the service of the present task. These opportunity cost representations, then, together with other cost/benefit calculations, determine effort expended and, everything else equal, result in performance reductions. In making our case for this position, we review alternative explanations for both the phenomenology of effort associated with these tasks and for performance reductions over time. Likewise, we review the broad range of relevant empirical results from across sub-disciplines, especially psychology and neuroscience. We hope that our proposal will help to build links among the diverse fields that have been addressing similar questions from different perspectives, and we emphasize ways in which alternative models might be empirically distinguished. (shrink)

In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms organized as capital-managed and -owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor-managed and -owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalist firms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is (...) more efficient. Empirical research, however, overwhelmingly contradicts this. But employees almost never even attempt to organize worker cooperatives. I critique the explanations of the three leading analysts of the subject (N. Scott Arnold, Henry Hansmann, and Gregory Dow), all of whom offer are different transactions cost accounts, as logically defective and empirically inadequate. I then propose an explanation that has been oddly neglected in the literature, that the rarity of cooperatives is explained by the collective action problem identified by writers such as Mancur Olson. Labor management is a public good that generates the n-person prisoner’s dilemma which gives rational actors the incentive to create it in suboptimal (or no) amounts. I support this by reference to the empirical facts about the origin of existing cooperatives and show that this explanation requires no strong version of a questionable rational choice theory. This explanation is supplemented by the mere exposure or familiarity effect derived from social and cognitive psychology, which turns on the fact that labor managed firms are rare, in part because of the public goods problem, thus unfamiliar, which makes them less attractive and thus more likely to be rare. My account points advocates of labor management towards solutions such as institutional changes in incentives, which, however, themselves involve public goods issues. (shrink)

This paper analyzes a model of sequential parimutuel betting described as a two-horse race with a finite number of noise bettors and a finite number of strategic and symmetrically informed bettors. For generic objective probabilities that the favorite wins the race, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized. Additionally, two explanations for the favorite–longshot bias—according to which favorites win more often than the market's estimate of their winning chances imply—are offered. It is shown that this robust anomalous empirical regularity might (...) be due to the presence of transaction costs and/or to strategic bettors' subjective attitude to probabilities. (shrink)

The view of patents as well-defined property rights is as simplistic as it is ubiquitous. This article argues that in newly arising or immature technologies, patents are subject to intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty that make them very opaque representations of the underlying inventions. The opacity is a result of unsettled legal doctrine and scientific terminology, uncertain commercial and technological prognosis, and leads to considerable ambiguity in property parameters. Patents in immature technologies do not solve Arrow's information paradox of non-rivalrous goods (...) because they do not represent the sharp exclusive right that is central to his thesis. In such cases patents ought to be reclassified in terms of their perceived and actual function as credence goods. The difficulty in discovering the value of these patents necessitates credence verifiers, further increasing the transaction costs of encouraging innovation. The theoretical and empirical implications of credence explored in this article are based primarily on the Anglo-American legal protection of biotechnological inventions, but may be equally relevant to patents in general and patents in other newly arising technologies, in particular. (shrink)

Why does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over time. We propose an alternative explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and benefits associated with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms, especially those associated with executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Consequently, the deployment of these computational mechanisms (...) carries an opportunity cost – that is, the next-best use to which these systems might be put. We argue that the phenomenology of effort can be understood as the felt output of these cost/benefit computations. In turn, the subjective experience of effort motivates reduced deployment of these computational mechanisms in the service of the present task. These opportunity cost representations, then, together with other cost/benefit calculations, determine effort expended and, everything else equal, result in performance reductions. In making our case for this position, we review alternative explanations for both the phenomenology of effort associated with these tasks and for performance reductions over time. Likewise, we review the broad range of relevant empirical results from across sub-disciplines, especially psychology and neuroscience. We hope that our proposal will help to build links among the diverse fields that have been addressing similar questions from different perspectives, and we emphasize ways in which alternative models might be empirically distinguished. (shrink)

This article provides a method for estimating the bounds of transaction costs in horizontal mergers. Consider, for example, a completed monopoly merger in linear Cournot oligopolies with 10 symmetric firms. The method shows that its transaction costs are at most 25% (78%) of total premerger profits if there is zero (100%) excess capacity. Such estimations can be extended in a straightforward manner to other mergers and other oligopoly models. The estimation is based both on the profitability (...) precondition, and on the non-empty core precondition, which postulates that the split of a merger’s profits be in its core. The article shows that the core in linear Cournot oligopolies has a non-empty interior, and indicates that the non-empty core precondition also sheds new lights on understanding important issues such as the stylized fact that mergers are likely to occur in markets plagued by excess capacities; why profitable mergers might not be formed; and why completed mergers might break up in the future. (shrink)

Melanie Sarzano | : In this paper, I compare cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment and argue that confronting these cases generates a dilemma about rationality. This dilemma turns on the idea that subjects are motivated to avoid costly false beliefs, and that both cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment are caused by an interest to avoid forming costly false beliefs. Even though both types of cases can be explained by the same belief-formation mechanism, only self-deceptive (...) beliefs are irrational: the subjects depicted in high-stakes cases typically used in debates on pragmatic encroachment are, on the contrary, rational. If we find ourselves drawn to this dilemma, we are forced either to accept—against most views presented in the literature—that self-deception is rational or to accept that pragmatic encroachment is irrational. Assuming that both conclusions are undesirable, I argue that this dilemma can be solved. In order to solve this dilemma, I suggest and review several hypotheses aimed at explaining the difference in rationality between the two types of cases, the result of which being that the irrationality of self-deceptive beliefs does not entirely depend on their being formed via a motivationally biased process. | : Dans cet article, je compare les cas classiques de duperie de soi aux cas que l’on trouve dans les débats sur la question de l’empiètement pragmatique et défends l’idée selon laquelle ces deux types de cas peuvent être compris comme étant produits par un même mécanisme visant à éviter la formation de croyances fausses coûteuses. Cette comparaison nous mène naturellement à former un dilemme à propos de la rationalité des croyances. Le dilemme repose sur l’idée que bien que ce mécanisme mène à la formation de croyances irrationnelles dans les cas de duperie de soi, il ne semble pas affecter la rationa-lité du sujet dans les cas d’empiètement pragmatique : alors que les sujets autodupés sont irrationnels, les sujets décrits dans les cas d’empiètement pragmatique ne le sont pas. Pour résoudre ce dilemme sans rejeter les présupposés selon lesquels les croyances issues de la duperie de soi sont irrationnelles et que les cas sur lesquels repose l’empiètement pragmatique sont rationnels, je propose plusieurs hypothèses visant à expliquer cette différence, prouvant ainsi que ce dilemme n’est qu’apparent et que l’irrationalité de la duperie de soi ne peut uniquement dépendre de ce mécanisme sous l’influence de considérations pratiques. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive account of what it means to try to quantify health in distributing resources for health care. It examines the concept of QALYs which supposedly makes it more accurate to talk about life in terms of both quality and quantity of years lived when referring to health care policy. It offers an elegant new approach to comparing the costs and benefits of medical interventions. Cost-Utility Analysis is a method designed by economists to aid decision makers (...) distribute scarce resources to areas of health care where they will yield the greatest benefits. Erik Nord questions the feasibility of measuring patients' quality of life meaningfully in numerical terms, as CUA presupposes. He presents an alternative approach called cost-value analysis in which representative samples of the general public express preferences between different health-care programs. In this approach, subjects are allowed to include concerns for fairness that go beyond concerns for efficiency of conventional health economics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper was to contribute to a broader understanding of the cognitive consequences of expressive suppression. Specifically, we examined whether the deteriorating effect of expressive suppression on cognitive functioning is caused by tense arousal enhanced by suppression. Two experiments were performed in order to test this prediction. In both studies we tested the effect of expressive suppression on working memory, as measured with a backwards digit-span task and anagram problem-solving task. In addition, in Study 2 we tested (...) whether expressive suppression degrades memory of the events that emerged during the period of expressive suppression. Both studies were conducted in a similar design: Participants watched a film clip which evoked negative emotions under the instruction to suppress those negative emotions or to simply watch the film. The results of these experiments lead to three conclusions. First, the results reveal that expressive suppression degrades memory of the events that emerged during the period of expressive suppression and leads to poorer performance on working memory tasks, as measured with a backwards digit-span task and anagram problem-solving task. Second, the results indicate that expressive suppression leads to a significant increase in subjective tense arousal. Third, the results support our prediction that expressive suppression decreases cognitive performance through its effects on subjective tense arousal. The results of the Study 1 show that tense arousal activated during expressive suppression of disgust fully mediates the negative effect of suppression on working memory as measured with a backwards digit-span task. The results of Study 2 reveal that subjective tense arousal elicited while suppressing sadness and anxiety mediates both the effect of suppression on working memory - as measured with the anagram task - and memory of the events that occurred during the period of suppression. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive account of what it means to try to quantify health in distributing resources for health care. It examines the concept of QALYs which supposedly makes it more accurate to talk about life in terms of both quality and quantity of years lived when referring to health care policy. It offers an elegant new approach to comparing the costs and benefits of medical interventions. Cost-Utility Analysis is a method designed by economists to aid decision makers (...) distribute scarce resources to areas of health care where they will yield the greatest benefits. Erik Nord questions the feasibility of measuring patients' quality of life meaningfully in numerical terms, as CUA presupposes. He presents an alternative approach called cost-value analysis in which representative samples of the general public express preferences between different health-care programs. In this approach, subjects are allowed to include concerns for fairness that go beyond concerns for efficiency of conventional health economics. (shrink)

The issue of assessing priorities is one that has become the subject of much debate in the National Health Service particularly in the wake of various documents on priorities from central Government. It has become even more so with the prospect of real cuts in expenditure. Economists claim that their science, or perhaps more accurately art can assist in determining not only how best to achieve various ends but also whether and to what extent competing objectives should be pursued. Such (...) choices cannot be made in the absence of some ethical considerations and it is important that health service decision makers (and in particular the medical profession) are aware if the relationship between economics (and especially cost-benefit analysis) and medical ethics. (shrink)

The current paper studies guaranteed cost time-varying formation tracking design and analysis problems of high-order swarm systems subject to intermittent communications. Different from the existing work of the time-varying formation control, the time-varying formation tracking can be achieved while certain performance can be guaranteed, and the impacts of the intermittent communications and switching topologies are considered. First, a new intermittent time-varying formation tracking control protocol with a global performance index is proposed, where not only the formation regulation performances but also (...) the control energy expenditures are involved. The codesign of the gain matrix with the performance index is achieved to compromise the formation regulation performances against control energy expenditures, and the guaranteed cost is determined to restrain the upper bound of the performance index. Then, guaranteed cost time-varying formation tracking design and analysis criteria are given, where the matrix variable of the linear matrix inequality conditions is used to design the gain matrix and to determine the guaranteed cost. Finally, a simulation example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the theoretical results. (shrink)

Tim Maudlin’s argument for the inconsistency of Cramer’s Transactional Interpretation (TI) of quantum theory has been considered in some detail by Joseph Berkovitz, who has provided a possible solution to this challenge at the cost of a significant empirical lacuna on the part of TI. The present paper proposes an alternative solution in which Maudlin’s charge of inconsistency is evaded but at no cost of empirical content on the part of TI. However, Maudlin’s argument is taken as ruling out Cramer’s (...) heuristic “pseudotime” explanation of the realization of one transaction out of many. (shrink)