Brian Skyrms offers a fascinating demonstration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses various scientific tools to investigate how meaning and communication develop. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life, transmitting and processing information. That is how humans and animals think and interact.

Brian Skyrms constructs a theory of "dynamic deliberation" and uses it to investigate rational decision-making in cases of strategic interaction. This illuminating book will be of great interest to all those in many disciplines who use decision theory and game theory to study human behavior and thought. Skyrms begins by discussing the Bayesian theory of individual rational decision and the classical theory of games, which at first glance seem antithetical in the criteria used for determining action. In (...) his effort to show how methods for dealing with information feedback can be productively combined, the author skillfully leads us through the mazes of equilibrium selection, the Nash equilibria for normal and extensive forms, structural stability, causal decision theory, dynamic probability, the revision of beliefs, and, finally, good habits for decision. The author provides many clarifying illustrations and a handy appendix called "Deliberational Dynamics on Your Personal Computer." His powerful model has important implications for understanding the rational origins of convention and the social contract, the logic of nuclear deterrence, the theory of good habits, and the varied strategies of political and economic behavior. (shrink)

In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming (...) to understand the social contract. The book is not technical and requires no special background knowledge. As such, it could be enjoyed by students and professionals in a wide range of disciplines: political science, philosophy, decision theory, economics and biology. (shrink)

Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is (...) so much greater. Thus, rational agents are pulled in one direction by considerations of risk and in another by considerations of mutual benefit. Written with Skyrms's characteristic clarity and verve, this intriguing book will be eagerly sought out by students and professionals in philosophy, political science, economics, sociology and evolutionary biology. (shrink)

This definitive survey of the hottest issues in inductive logic sets the stage for further classroom discussion.

Preface. I. BASICS OF LOGIC. Introduction. The Structure of Simple Statements. The Structure of Complex Statements. Simple and Complex Properties. Validity. 2. PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC. Introduction. Arguments. Logic. Inductive versus Deductive Logic. Epistemic Probability. Probability and the Problems of Inductive Logic. 3. THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEM OF INDUCTION. Introduction. Hume’s Argument. The Inductive Justification of Induction. The Pragmatic Justification of Induction. Summary. IV. THE GOODMAN PARADOX AND THE NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION. Introduction. Regularities and Projection. The Goodman Paradox. The Goodman (...) Paradox, Regularity, and the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature. Summary. 5. MILL’S METHODS OF EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY AND THE NATURE OF CAUSALITY. Introduction. Causality and Necessary and Sufficient Conditions. Mill’s Methods. The Direct Method of Agreement. The Inverse Method of Agreement. The Method of Difference. The Combined Methods. The Application of Mill’s Methods. Sufficient Conditions and Functional Relationships. Lawlike and Accidental Conditions. 6. THE PROBABILITY CALCULUS. Introduction. Probability, Arguments, Statements, and Properties. Disjunction and Negation Rules. Conjunction Rules and Conditional Probability. Expected Value of a Gamble. Bayes’ Theorem. Probability and Causality. 7. KINDS OF PROBABILITY. Introduction. Rational Degree of Belief. Utility. Ramsey. Relative Frequency. Chance. 8. PROBABILITY AND SCIENTIFIC INDUCTIVE LOGIC. Introduction. Hypothesis and Deduction. Quantity and Variety of Evidence. Total Evidence. Convergence to the Truth. ANSWERS TO SELECTED EXERCISES. INDEX. (shrink)

Brian Skyrms applies adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory, investigating altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling. Correlation is seen to be fundamental. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.

The question of coherence of rules for changing degrees of belief in the light of new evidence is studied, with special attention being given to cases in which evidence is uncertain. Belief change by the rule of conditionalization on an appropriate proposition and belief change by "probability kinematics" on an appropriate partition are shown to have like status.

Propositional content arises from the practice of signaling with information transfer when a signaling process settles into some sort of a pattern, and eventually what we call meaning or propositional content crystallizes out. We give an evolutionary account of this process.

Maher (1992b) advances an objection to dynamic Dutch-book arguments, partly inspired by the discussion in Levi (1987; in particular by Levi's case 2, p. 204). Informally, the objection is that the decision maker will "see the dutch book coming" and consequently refuse to bet, thus escaping the Dutch book. Maher makes this explicit by modeling the decision maker's choices as a sequential decision problem. On this basis he claims that there is a mistake in dynamic coherence arguments. There is really (...) no formal mistake in classical dynamic coherence arguments, but the discussions in Maher and Levi do suggest interesting ways in which the definition of dynamic coherence might be strengthened. Such a strengthened "sequentialized" notion of dynamic coherence is explored here. It so happens that even on the strengthened standards for a Dutch book, the classic dynamic coherence argument for conditioning still goes through. (shrink)

The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may be (...) selected, and (2) under conditions of perfect correlation a strictly efficient strategy must be selected. (shrink)

The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume’s meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.

If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..." Rousseau's story of the hunt leaves many questions open. What are the values of a hare and of an individual's share of the deer given a successful hunt? What is the probability that (...) the hunt will be successful if all participants remain faithful to the hunt? Might two deer hunters decide to chase the hare? (shrink)

This contribution is part of the special series of Inaugural Articles by members of the National Academy of Sciences elected on April 27, 1999.

Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.

even if an equilibrium is asymptotically stable, that is no guarantee that the system will reach that equilibrium unless we know that the system's initial state is sufficiently close to the equilibrium. Global stability of an equilibrium, when we have it, gives the equilibrium a much more powerful explanatory role. An equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable if the dynamics carries every possible initial state in the interior of the state space to that equilibrium. If an equilibrium is globally stable, it (...) can have.. (shrink)

We consider the following signaling game. Nature plays first from the set {1, 2}. Player 1 (the Sender) sees this and plays from the set {A, B}. Player 2 (the Receiver) sees only Player 1’s play and plays from the set {1, 2}. Both players win if Player 2’s play equals Nature’s play and lose otherwise. Players are told whether they have won or lost, and the game is repeated. An urn scheme for learning coordination in this game is as (...) follows. Each node of the desicion tree for Players 1 and 2 contains an urn with balls of two colors for the two possible decisions. Players make decisions by drawing from the appropriate urns. After a win, each ball that was drawn is reinforced by adding another of the same color to the urn. A number of equilibria are possible for this game other than the optimal ones. However, we show that the urn scheme achieves asymptotically optimal coordination. (shrink)

The papers collected here are, with three exceptions, those presented at a conference on probability and causation held at the University of California at Irvine on July 15-19, 1985. The exceptions are that David Freedman and Abner Shimony were not able to contribute the papers that they presented to this volume, and that Clark Glymour who was not able to attend the conference did contribute a paper. We would like to thank the National Science Foundation and the School of Humanities (...) of the University of California at Irvine for generous support. WILLIAM HARPER University of Western Ontario BRIAN SKYRMS University of California at Irvine VII INTRODUCTION TO CAUSATION, CHANCE, AND CREDENCE The search for causes is so central to science that it has sometimes been taken as the defining attribute of the scientific enterprise. Yet even after twenty-five centuries of philosophical analysis the meaning of "cause" is still a matter of controversy, among scientists as well as philosophers. Part of the problem is that the servicable concepts of causation built out of Necessity, Sufficiency, Locality, and Temporal Precedence were constructed for a deterministic world-view which has been obsolete since the advent of quantum theory. A physically credible theory of causation must be, at basis, statistical. And statistical analyses of caus­ ation may be of interest even when an underlying deterministic theory is assumed, as in classical statistical mechanics. (shrink)

Does the philosophy of Radical Probabilism have enough structure to enable it to address fundamental epistemological questions? The requirement of dynamic coherence provides the structure for radical probabilist epistemology. This structure is sufficient to establish (i) the value of knowledge and (ii) long run convergence of degrees of belief.

Carnap's Inductive Logic, like most philosophical discussions of induction, is designed for the case of independent trials. To take account of periodicities, and more generally of order, the account must be extended. From both a physical and a probabilistic point of view, the first and fundamental step is to extend Carnap's inductive logic to the case of finite Markov chains. Kuipers (1988) and Martin (1967) suggest a natural way in which this can be done. The probabilistic character of Carnapian inductive (...) logic(s) for Markov chains and their relationship to Carnap's inductive logic(s) is discussed at various levels of Bayesian analysis. (shrink)

In this article, we aim to illustrate evolutionary explanations for the emergence of framing effects, discussed in detail in Cristina Bicchieri’s The Grammar of Society . We show how framing effects might evolve which coalesce two economically distinct interactions into a single one, leading to apparently irrational behavior in each individual interaction. Here we consider the now well-known example of the ultimatum game, and show how this ‘irrational’ behavior might result from a single norm which governs behavior in multiple games. (...) We also show how framing effects might result in radically different play in strategically identical situations. We consider the Hawk-Dove game (the game of chicken) and also the Nash bargaining game. Here arbitrary tags or signals might result in one party doing better than another. (shrink)

Utilitarianism is one of the most famous ethical doctrines, based on the ideal of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. But Utilitarians and their opponents lack a clear scientific and philosophical understanding of its foundations, the measurement and aggregation of utility. This is what The Pursuit of Happiness now offers.