Trust, risk, and the social contract

Synthese 160 (1):21-25 (2008)
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Abstract

The problem of trust is discussed in terms of David Hume’s meadow-draining example. This is analyzed in terms of rational choice, evolutionary game theory and a dynamic model of social network formation. The kind of explanation that postulates an innate predisposition to trust is seen to be unnecessary when social network dynamics is taken into account.

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Brian Skyrms
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Hume’s Theory of Business Ethics Revisited.William Kline - 2012 - Journal of Business Ethics 105 (2):163-174.
Epistemology and economics.Jeffrey Helzner - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):781-786.

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