R F Dearden; Play and Pleasure, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 37–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1971.tb0044.

R F Dearden; Theory and Practice in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

pt. 1. A critique of current educational aims.--pt. 2. Reason.--pt. 3. Education and reason.

Care ethics takes as central the discerning of needs in those being cared for and attempts to meet those needs. Perceptive caring agents are more likely to be able to identify needs in those for whom they are caring. The identification of needs is no small matter, not least in teaching encounters. This paper modestly proposes that at least some of the needs a caring agent should attempt to meet are a function of the identity of the patient of caring (...) action. Taking Nel Noddings’ account of care ethics as representative, I present it in outline. This leads to the needs-identification problematic. Following this I turn to Soran Reader’s account of needs. I interpret this to offer what I designate as identity as ‘what-ness’. Such an understanding of identity-based needs is a starting point for the caring agent but a more nuanced account, of identity as ‘who-ness’, is argued to be preferable. Identity as ‘who-ness’, as expressed in Paul Ricoeur’s work, advances the discussion, culminating in his concept of the ‘capable human being’. Having brought this aspect of Ricoeur’s thought into conversation with care ethics, I offer an account of identity-based needs conducive to the broader aims of the care ethical project. Finally, I consider what this bolstered account of care ethics might say about a brief and illustrative teaching encounter. (shrink)

R F Dearden; Competition in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 6, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–133, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

Is there such a thing as philosophical nonsense? For the best part of a century now philosophers have been accusing each other of talking nonsense. This practice presupposes that people can be wrong in thinking they mean anything by what they say, that there can be an illusion of meaning. But the assumption that illusions of meaning are possible has not, the author believes, been seriously examined; nor has the problem of how such illusions could be diagnosed been satisfactorily answered. (...) This book extends the work of a number of recent writers on Wittgenstein who have advocated an 'austere' view of nonsense, but in a more sceptical direction than they have taken. It argues that nonsensicalism is radically misguided and should be abandoned. The possibility that illusions of meaning occur outside philosophy - in dreams, in certain hoaxes, in madness or under the influence of drugs - is also examined. IAN DEARDEN read philosophy at Downing College, Cambridge, and Bedford College, London. He taught philosophy at Bedford College, the City University, the Polytechnic of North London and the University of Essex, and also for the London University Department of Extra-Mural Studies. (shrink)

This note examines the case of a group of gay men who, having engaged in consensual sexual acts together, became known as the `Bolton Seven' following their conviction in 1998 for offences of buggery and/or gross indecency. More particularly the note scrutinises the implications of the ages of the participants (one of whom, at 17 $\tfrac{1}{2}$ , was unable to give lawful consent to sexual intercourse with a man) in the light of the enactment of Part I of the Sex (...) Offenders Act 1997 which introduces a system of compulsory registration by some convicted and cautioned sex offenders with the police (including men convicted of, or cautioned for, buggery or gross indecency). The note explores the justification for inclusion of these offences within the remit of the1997 Act together with the cultural construction of gay men as predatory and as constituting a risk to younger members of society. It also analyses some of the effects of the registration requirement in terms of it constituting a potential violation of fundamental rights such as equality and respect for private life. This discussion is located particularly within the context of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the U.K. (shrink)

R F Dearden; Theory and Practice in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

R F Dearden; Happiness and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1968.

A critical and constructive discussion of philosophical questions which have particular bearing on the formulation of educational aims.

R F Dearden; Competition in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 6, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–133, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

R F Dearden; Education and Politics, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 149–156, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.198.

R F Dearden; Education and Politics, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 149–156, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.198.

R F Dearden; Happiness and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 2, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 17–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1968.

R F Dearden; Freedom and the Development of Autonomy: a reply to Victor Quinn, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 271–27.

R F Dearden; Play and Pleasure, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 37–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1971.tb0044.

R F Dearden; Freedom and the Development of Autonomy: a reply to Victor Quinn, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 271–27.

This volume critically and constructively discusses philosophical questions which have particular bearing on the formulation of educational aims. The book is divided into three major parts: the first deals with the nature of education, and discusses the various general aims, such as 'mental health', 'socialization' and 'creativity' which have been thought to characterize it; the second section is concerned with the nature of reason and its relationship to feeling, will and action; finally the development of different aspects of reason in (...) an educational context is considered. (shrink)