Los Comités Hospitalarios de Bioética (CHB) tienen la atribución de emitir sugerencias al personal de salud, ante casos clínicos difíciles que involucran problemas y/o dilemas bioéticos. A nivel mundial, y también en México, se encontró poca literatura relacionada, generando en ocasiones cierto grado de incertidumbre en los profesionales de la salud para su resolución. Objetivo: describir los motivos de presentación de casos clínicos de pacientes ante el CHB en un hospital de segundo nivel, desde junio de 2007 a junio (...) de 2018. Método: estudio observacional, descriptivo, retrospectivo y transversal; la muestra fue por conveniencia y se obtuvieron 48 registros de minutas. Resultados: el motivo de consulta más frecuente ante los CHB fue el apoyo en la decisión para la limitación del esfuerzo terapéutico, con 24 casos (50%). Se identificaron 34 dilemas bioéticos (71%) y 14 problemas bioéticos (29%). Conclusiones: ayudará a los servicios médicos tratantes a identificar e intervenir oportunamente, al basarse en situaciones previas sobre dilemas y/o problemas bioéticos. (shrink)

The article proposes to discuss the categories of "purity" and "impurity" as tools for structuring reality and constructing identities in the context of Enochic Judaism in the Second Temple period. Investigate them, in a special way, from the Myth of the Watchers narrated in the Book of the Watchers, which composes the apocalyptic literature of 1 Enoch. Both the homogeneity verified in the lineage guaranteed the purity of the race and, consequently, the establishment of the identity, as well as the (...) cosmic subversion, resulting from displacements of pre-established places, structured the notion of impurity. The article presents Enochic Judaism based on research that took place after the 1980s. Enochic Literature is the literary space from which we are led to discussion around the pure and impure as categories of understanding of reality in the perspective of this movement. The article uses the researches of the anthropologist Mary Douglas, to propose an analysis of the Myth of the Watchers and their readings. The article assumes that, in a sense, the plurality perceived in the Second Temple period establishes possibilities of thinking the faith in the history of the Jewish tradition. This apocalyptic movement has influenced other religious movements, among them, the Early Christianity, which is why some religious experiences, whose roots are in the Judeo-Christian tradition, can be better evaluated. (shrink)

La relación entre los predicadores judíos Juan el Bautista y Jesús de Nazaret es definida por la mayoría de estudiosos del Nuevo Testamento e historiadores del cristianismo en términos de “contraste” o “diferencia radical”. el objetivo del presente artículo es doble: por un lado, exponer de modo detallado los numerosos paralelismos fenomenológicos que las fuentes permiten establecer entre estos dos predicadores palestinos coetáneos; por otro, reconsiderar algunas supuestas diferencias que, según muchos estudiosos, obligarían a establecer un contraste entre esos predicadores, (...) lo cual permitirá concluir que tales diferencias o no existen o no son lo bastante relevantes como para justificar las afirmaciones al uso. De este modo, es posible demostrar que la difundida opinión acerca de una tajante oposición entre Juan y Jesús carece de fundamento, siendo el resultado de una distorsión de los datos disponibles debida a prejuicios ideológicos –más específicamente, teológicos–. (shrink)

Explaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have approached it by focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment relation. In this paper, I offer a suggestion for a radical embodied account of agency that combines ecological psychology with (...) recent trends in enactive cognitive science. According to this proposal, while enactivism focuses primarily on describing how our acquired sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting our tendency to act upon some affordances instead of others, ecological psychology focuses on studying how perceptual information contributes to the actualization of the sensorimotor schemes and habits without mediating representations, inferences, and computations. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how this ecological-enactive theory of agency can account for how socio-cultural norms shape human agency. (shrink)

Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its ‘pick up’ in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and cognition. Motivated by worries about the tenability of classical views of informational content and its processing, these authors claim that ecological psychology needs to be “RECtified” so as to explicitly resist representational readings. In (...) this paper, we argue against this call for RECtification. To do so, we offer a detailed analysis of the notion of perceptual information and other related notions such as specificity and meaning, as they are presented in the specialized ecological literature. We defend that these notions, if properly understood, remain free of any representational commitment. Ecological psychology, we conclude, does not need to be RECtified. (shrink)

According to F. Adams [this journal, vol. 68, 2018] cognition cannot be realized in plants or bacteria. In his view, plants and bacteria respond to the here-and-now in a hardwired, inflexible manner, and are therefore incapable of cognitive activity. This article takes issue with the pursuit of plant cognition from the perspective of an empirically informed philosophy of plant neurobiology. As we argue, empirical evidence shows, contra Adams, that plant behavior is in many ways analogous to animal behavior. This renders (...) plants suitable to be described as cognitive agents in a non-metaphorical way. Sections two to four review the arguments offered by Adams in light of scientific evidence on plant adaptive behavior, decision-making, anticipation, as well as learning and memory. Section five introduces the ‘phyto-nervous’ system of plants. To conclude, section six resituates the quest for plant cognition into a broader approach in cognitive science, as represented by enactive and ecological schools of thought. Overall, we aim to motivate the idea that plants may be considered genuine cognitive agents. Our hope is to help propel public awareness and discussion of plant intelligence once appropriately stripped of anthropocentric preconceptions of the sort that Adams' position appears to exemplify. (shrink)

La pandemia de Covid-19 ha puesto a prueba a todos los sistemas de salud. La crisis que provocó ha impactado a la sociedad, economía y, en general, a todas las actividades humanas. Los cuidados paliativos y la bioética tienen un papel fundamental en el manejo de la nueva enfermedad Covid-19, que no tiene aún tratamiento conocido. Los principios de la bioética, sumados a la práctica de los cuidados paliativos han sido el soporte de la pandemia. Los pacientes recuperados y aquellos (...) muertos a causa del Covid-19 han requerido en algún momento de medidas de soporte y paliación, ya sea en unidades hospitalarias o en su domicilio. Es deseable que se impulsen estas herramientas: la paliación y la ética de la vida, ya que no sólo las soluciones que permiten cuidar la vida y la salud provienen de la tecnología, y no deben ser mutuamente excluyentes. A un año del inicio de la pandemia, hay muchas preguntas por responder, mucha investigación por hacer. Sin duda, el año 2020 dará motivos de reflexión a todos los seres humanos y, en especial, a los responsables de cuidar la salud. (shrink)

Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that (...) stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use. (shrink)

The present study aims to analyze the psychometric properties of the Goal orientation Scales in a sample of 2,170 Ecuadorian undergraduate students. The Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory Factor Analysis supported the four-factor structure of the GOS, and the scale exhibited an adequate factorial invariance for gender. The multidimensional Rasch analysis revealed that one item showed misfit, and the distribution of items did not correspond well with the levels of achievement goals. The current research addresses a formal gap related to (...) the validation of the GOS in a Latin American country and provides advanced psychometric information to further improve the scale for its application to Spanish-speaking samples. (shrink)

Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the similarities that hold between two or more items—e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on—in order to perform some cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to cognitive neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cognition can be understood through the lens of radical enactivism and why doing so has advantages over its representationalist rival, which posits the existence of structural representations or S-representations. Specifically, it is (...) argued that there are problems both with accounting for the content of S-representations and with understanding how neurally-based structural similarities can work as representations in guiding intelligent behavior. Finally, with these clarifications in place, it is revealed how radical enactivism can commit to an account of similarity-based cognition in its understanding of neurodynamics. (shrink)

Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the similarities that hold between two or more items—e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on—in order to perform some cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to cognitive neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cognition can be understood through the lens of radical enactivism and why doing so has advantages over its representationalist rival, which posits the existence of structural representations or S-representations. Specifically, it is (...) argued that there are problems both with accounting for the content of S-representations and with understanding how neurally-based structural similarities can work as representations in guiding intelligent behavior. Finally, with these clarifications in place, it is revealed how radical enactivism can commit to an account of similarity-based cognition in its understanding of neurodynamics. (shrink)

Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the similarities that hold between two or more items—e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on—in order to perform some cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to cognitive neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cognition can be understood through the lens of radical enactivism and why doing so has advantages over its representationalist rival, which posits the existence of structural representations or S-representations. Specifically, it is (...) argued that there are problems both with accounting for the content of S-representations and with understanding how neurally-based structural similarities can work as representations in guiding intelligent behavior. Finally, with these clarifications in place, it is revealed how radical enactivism can commit to an account of similarity-based cognition in its understanding of neurodynamics. (shrink)

In the last years, we have attended to different attempts to extend the notion of affordance to include mental or cognitive actions. In short, the idea is that our capacity to perform some cognitive functions such as counting, imagining, mathematical reasoning, and so on, is preceded by our awareness of cognitive or mental affordances. In this paper, we analyze two of these attempts, Mental Affordance Hypothesis, and cognitive horizons, and conclude that they fail to deliver their promise. Our argument is (...) two-fold. First, we show that both proposals lack an explanation for how these affordances can be perceived or experienced by the individuals. Second, we argue, focusing on the examples provided by the authors, that the introduction of cognitive affordances is not justified on explanatory grounds. In other words, neither of these proposals offers a compelling justification for thinking that performing said “mental acts” requires the perception of mental or cognitive affordances. Hence, the existence of mental or cognitive affordances remains both scientifically mysterious and explanatorily unjustified. (shrink)

Although it is a common claim in the ecological psychology literature that our perception of the environment’s affordances is influenced by socio-cultural norms, an explanation of how this is possible remains to be offered. In this paper, I outline an account of this phenomenon by focusing on the ecological theory of perceptual learning. Two main theses are defended. First, I argue that to account for how socio-cultural norms can influence perception, we must pay attention not only to the education of (...) attention but to the education of intention too. Consequently, I offer some ideas about how intention can be socio-normatively educated. Secondly, I hold that the education of intention occurs via the acquisition of habit-based preferences for particular actions. I claim that once we understand how these habit-based preferences relate to socio-cultural norms, the hypothesis that norms must be represented in the individual’s mind for them to influence affordance perception is no longer needed. If this hypothesis is on the right track, we can have an explanation for how perception can be normatively shaped and direct (non-mediated by internal representations and inferences) at the same time. (shrink)

According to ecological psychology, agency is a crucial feature of living organisms: therefore many ecological psychologists maintain that explaining agency is one of the core aims of the discipline. This paper aims to contribute to this goal by arguing that an ecological understanding of agency requires an account of intention. So far, intentions have not played a dominant role in ecological accounts of agency. The reluctance to integrate a notion of intention seems to be motivated by the widespread assumption that (...) intentions should be understood as internal states with representational content. This assumption goes against two main tenets of ecological psychology: its anti-representationalist stance and its claim that perception is direct (in the sense of not being mediated by inferential processes). Ecological psychology thus needs a different answer to the question what intentions are. In this paper, we aim to show that Elizabeth Anscombe’s theory of intention can be fruitfully brought to bear on an ecological theory of agency. We will argue that Anscombe’s account can meet the two challenges of bringing intentions into the framework of ecological psychology: firstly it can explain what intentions are, if not representational states; and, secondly, it can show how our perception of affordances is guided by intention without undermining the idea of direct perception. (shrink)

Resumen: Este ensayo analiza los desafíos que plantea el desarrollo de la competencia comunicativa intercultural en el marco de la formación de profesores en el contexto poscolonial chileno. A partir de una revisión de antecedentes bibliográficos se reconoce que la preparación de los nuevos educadores no ha logrado implementar de manera transversal el enfoque educativo intercultural. Esto ha permitido conservar la hegemonía de la monoculturalidad eurocéntrica, generando que los profesores en formación mantengan una comprensión insuficiente de las culturas presentes en (...) la sala de clases. Con el propósito de aportar a la discusión crítica, se reflexiona acerca de las posibilidades que entrega la CCI en la búsqueda de nuevas formas de conocer y comunicar que confronten la educación monocultural, para avanzar en la construcción de procesos educativos interculturales, ya sea en territorios indígenas o en los nuevos contextos que surgen por la inmigración.: This paper explores the challenges posed by the development of intercultural communicative competence in relation to teacher training in the postcolonial Chilean context. Through a review of bibliographic sources it is recognized that the preparation of new teachers has failed to transversely implement an intercultural educational approach. This has allowed Chile to keep the hegemony of eurocentric monoculturality, resulting in these teachers’ insufficient understanding of the cultures present in the classroom. In order to contribute to this critical discussion in the field, this paper reflects on the possibilities that ICC provides when seeking new ways of knowing and of communicating that confront monocultural education and develop intercultural educational processes, either in indigenous territories or in the new immigration contexts. (shrink)

In this paper, we evaluate the pragmatic turn towards embodied, enactive thinking in cognitive science, in the context of recent empirical research on the memory palace technique. The memory palace is a powerful method for remembering yet it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to clarify its efficacy. Second, the technique faces significant practical challenges to its users. Virtual reality devices are sometimes presented as a way to solve these practical challenges, but currently fall short of delivering (...) on that promise. We address both issues in this paper. First, we argue that an embodied, enactive approach to memory can better help us understand the effectiveness of the memory palace. Second, we present design recommendations for a virtual memory palace. Our theoretical proposal and design recommendations contribute to solving both problems and provide reasons for preferring an embodied, enactive account over an information-processing treatment of the memory palace. (shrink)

A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines ecological psychology and the Deweyan theory of habits. According to our proposal, skilful performance can be understood as composed of sequences of mutually coherent, task-specific perceptual-motor habits. Such habits play (...) a crucial role in simplifying both our exploration of the perceptual environment and our decision-making. However, we argue that what keeps habits situated, precluding them from becoming rote and automatic, are not mental representations but the agent's conscious attention to the affordances of the environment. It is because the agent is not acting on autopilot but constantly searching for new information for affordances that she can control her behavior, adapting previously learned habits to the current circumstances. We defend that our account provides the resources needed to understand how skilled action can be intelligent (flexible, adaptive, context-sensitive) without having any representational cognitive processes built into them. (shrink)

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é discutir uma releitura do layout de argumentos proposto originalmente por Stephen Toulmin e desenvolvido posteriormente por Toulmin; Rieke; Janik no sentido de enquadrá-lo como: um instrumento útil para a análise da configuração funcional da argumentação epistêmica e, por conseguinte, para a avaliação da consistência da argumentação, o que está ligado à faceta justificatória de tal atividade; um instrumento válido para a análise do dissenso e do dialogismo, característicos da faceta comunicativa da argumentação, no que (...) diz respeito ao funcionamento da prova retórica do logos, um dos principais fatores envolvidos no processo de conquista da adesão. Nesse sentido, procedemos a uma reconceptualização dos componentes do layout de argumentos - Alegação, Dados, Garantia, Base, Qualificador e Refutação - e propomos uma noção de movimento argumentativo compatível com a nossa abordagem, que busca ser linguística, discursiva e cognitivamente coerente, respondendo a requisitos teóricos e analíticos ligados tanto à faceta justificatória quanto comunicativa da argumentação. ABSTRACT This paper aims to discuss a reframing of Toulmin’s layout of arguments, originally proposed in The Uses of Argument and further developed in An Introduction to Reasoning. In this approach, we conceive of the layout as: a useful instrument for analyzing the functional configuration of epistemic argumentation and, thus, for evaluating consistency, a dimension of analysis pertaining to the justificatory facet of argumentation; a valid instrument for analyzing dissension and dialogism, fundamental elements of the communicative facet of argumentation, in terms of the functioning of logos, one of the rhetorical proofs involved in the process of achieving adherence. Hence, we reconceptualize the components of the layout - Claim, Data, Warrant, Backing, Qualifier and Rebuttal - and propose a notion of argumentative move compatible with our approach, which aims at achieving linguistic, discursive and cognitive coherence and at responding to the theoretical and analytical requirements involved in the consideration of the justificatory and communicative facets of argumentation. (shrink)

The organizational climate is the work environment conceived by emotions and motivation of an organization and, an optimal way of increasing participation is with working groups in the dependencies to improve: objectives, processes, conflicts, leadership. Thus the objective was to determine the characterization of variables. The method incorporates the quantitative approach, non -experimental design, descriptive level, applied and transversal type, analysis and deductive methods. The results show, there is a high organizational climate level, due to the contribution of three dimensions (...) or aspects that are: economic conditions, management values and organizational policies. (shrink)

Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.

NAVEGAR É PRECISO; VIVER NÃO É PRECISO: A LIBERDADE DE LOCOMOÇÃO NA INTERNET.

1. La concepción materialista de la historia.

A Série Investigação Filosófica é uma série de livros de traduções de verbetes da Enciclopédia de Filosofia da Stanford (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) e de outras plataformas internacionalmente reconhecidas, que intenciona servir tanto como material didático para os professores das diferentes sub-áreas e níveis da Filosofia quanto como material de estudo para a pesquisa e para concursos da área. Nós, professores, sabemos o quão difícil é encontrar bom material em português para indicarmos. E há uma certa deficiência na graduação brasileira (...) de filosofia, principalmente em localizações menos favorecidas, com relação ao conhecimento de outras línguas, como o inglês e o francês. Tentamos, então, suprir essa deficiência, ao introduzirmos essas traduções ao público de língua portuguesa, sem nenhuma finalidade comercial e meramente pela glória da filosofia. (shrink)

“Toda la literatura consiste en un esfuerzo para hacer real la vida. Como todos saben, incluso cuando actúan sin saber, la vida es absolutamente irreal, en su realidad directa; los campos, la ciudades, las ideas, son cosas absolutamente ficticias, hijas de nuestra compleja sensación de nosotros mismos. Son intrasmisibles todas las impresiones salvo si las hacemos literarias”. La luz de originalidad de este fragmento de Bernardo Soares, heterónimo de Fernando Pessoa, suscita una intuición que permite descubrir y considerar que cuando (...) escribimos literatura lo hacemos para que todo aquello que vivimos sea real. Porque la realidad suele ser, a veces, tan atribulada que es necesario ponerle la ilusión de la literatura. Esta advertencia del poeta de los heterónimos sugiere que para poder comunicar nuestras impresiones y sentimientos, tenemos que traducirlos a literatura; que, en gran medida, la transmisión de sentimientos es, en el fondo, un acontecer de modelos literarios que se toman de la literatura para llevarlos a la vida real y no al contrario. (shrink)