In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Generational Timescapes and Biotic Kinship in Omar El Akkad's American WarMichael Boyden (bio)References to future generations and how they might be impacted by decisions in the present abound in climate change communication—from scholarship dealing with the energy transition and climate control, to international agreements, and to public debates in civil society generally. One oft-noted reason why generational views are so frequently invoked in such contexts is that they (...) serve to make tangible otherwise intractable problems so vast in proportion that they tend to confound conventional ways of allocating ethical responsibilities and considerability. Conjuring the ways in which our choices and actions affect the quality of life of concrete individuals to whom we are connected by means of kinship ties awakens the present generation's sense of obligation toward the future.As a number of scholars have noted, however, generational views might also hamper our ability to work toward the kind of sustained transformation of the global economy that is required to ensure that Earth remains inhabitable in the future. In philosophy, political science, and adjacent fields, critiques of generational discourse have revolved around the limitations of governing models of ethics, as in discussions of Derek Parfit's "repugnant conclusion" (388) and in efforts to find new models of distributive justice that depart from utilitarian and contractualist approaches.1 In turn, scholars working in the interdisciplinary frameworks of critical posthumanism and queer feminism have attempted to rethink notions of kinship in ways that consider the ethical value of the nonhuman world and identities not grounded in biological kinship.2In this article, I argue that climate change fiction has the potential to [End Page 11] dramatize the conflicting valences of generational discourse—in ways that less layered, nonfictional narratives often fail to do—and in doing so points up the possibility of conceiving of environmental ethics in a different, less kinship-based fashion. Using Omar El Akkad's American War (2017) as my tutor text, I will argue that this novel presents a potent critique of the kind of generational discourse prevalent in debates about global warming today.My analysis is meant to show how El Akkad's novel, which adopts a markedly transcultural perspective that questions Western exceptionalism, brings out the limitations of—and visualizes alternatives to—the generational schemes through which the consequences of anthropogenic climate change are rendered intelligible. At the same time, I suggest, the novel offers pathways toward conceiving an ecocentric ethical framework that does not reproduce the anthropocentric assumptions of generational discourse.Climate Change and Generational DiscourseI start by defining more closely what we mean when we talk about generations. Political scientist Jonathan White has usefully distinguished three strands of generational views that tend to blend into each other in recent debates on climate change but that deserve to be kept analytically separate. The first of these is the genealogical understanding of generations, which pertains to familial "relations between individuals in their specificity" (765). This genealogical conception of generations has been with us for a long time. It is present, for instance, in biblical texts and classical historiography, which invoke family bonds to justify a given social order. Genealogical views are equally present, however, in modern evolutionary thinking and in the ordinary understanding of the generations of a family. The second strand identified by White is the sociological understanding of generations, which refers to "social groups defined by an apparent unity of ideas and attributes, irrespective of personal ties" (765). Sociological generations convey differences between young and old, or progressive and backward-looking forces, in times of societal transformation. Scholars trace this sociological conception of generations back to the nineteenth century, when the forces of industrialism and nationalism [End Page 12] magnified experiential divergences among social groups. Finally, White considers philosophical generations, which refer to "a society at different moments of existence" (765). Here, we may think of postrevolutionary contexts, when the clock is figuratively turned to zero and a new understanding of the social order emerges. Contrary to genealogical and sociological schemes, such philosophical generations are not grounded in a specific empirical formation; rather, they constitute a conceptual formula for organizing the (long-term) future.What makes generational... (shrink)

It is desirable that the antecedents of existing, highly specialised, evolutionary mechanisms in animals be sought. The study of the lower Metazoa and especially of their simpler reproductive processes suggests that asexual reproduction is the primitive evolutionary mechanism from which the more advanced sexual mechanisms have evolved. A study of the metagenetic cycles of Coelenterata and Platyhelminthes seems to throw much light upon their prophylogeny and indicates that: Such cycles seem to provide the closest possible recapitulatory parallelism between phylogeny and (...) ontogeny. The Hydrozoa are ancestral to the other classes of Coelenterata. The polypoid adult is more primitive than the medusoid adult. The sporocysts, rediae and scolices represent the more primitive types of adults in their respective ontogenies and phylogenies.On avance la théorie qu'il y a eu une évolution des mécanismes évolutionnaires depuis les stades primitifs jusqu'aux stades avancés. D'après cette théorie les premières étapes dans l'évolution des Métazoaires inférieurs se sont effectuées par la reproduction asexuelle avant que les mecanismes sexuels très spécialisés se soient manifestés.Des preuves à l'appui de cette théorie découlent: de la rencontre actuelle d'une reproduction asexuelle chez des animaux, avec l'indication que sa simplicité est, dans la plupart des cas, originelle, et des cycles d'évolution des Coelentérés et Platyhelminthes qui sont métagénésiques. Leurs cycles peuvent s'interpréter comme partant de stades reproductifs asexuels pour évoluer vers des formes se reproduisant sexuellement.On croit que les organismes ne pouvant se reproduire que sexuellement sont plus avancés que ceux qui peuvent se reproduire asexuellement, ou à la fois sexuellement et asexuellement.Cette théorie a d'importantes implications pour l'étude de la métagenèse, de la récapitulation et de la phylogénie chez les Métazoaires inférieurs; elle exemplifie, dans l'étude de ces phénomènes, la nouvelle orientation qu'on a appelée Prophylogénie.In dieser Arbeit wird eine Theorie entwickelt, die besagt, dass eine Fortentwicklung der Evolutionsmechanismen von primitiven zu fortgeschrittenen Stufen besteht. Dieser Theorie nach haben sich die niedrigeren Metazoen ursprünglich nur ungeschlechtlich entwickelt und fortgepflanzt. Erst später haben sich die höchst spezialisierten geschlechtlichen Mechanismen entwickelt.Belege für diese Theorie sind: Noch heute kommt die geschlechtslose Fortpflanzung in Tieren vor, was dafür spricht, dass ihre Einfachheit in den meisten Fällen ursprünglich ist. Die Lebenskreisläufe der Metagenetischen Coelenteraten und Platyhelminthen lassen sich interpretieren als bestehend aus ursprünglich ungeschlechtlichen Fortpflanzungsstufen, die jedoch später in Formen mit geschlechtlicher Fortpflanzung übergehen.Es wird behauptet, dass Organismen mit nur geschlechtlicher Fortpflanzung weiter fortgeschritten sind als solche mit nur ungeschlechtlicher oder mit sowohl ungeschlechtlicher als auch geschlechtlicher Fortpflanzung.Diese Theorie ist wichtig für das Studium der Metagenese, Rekapitulation und Phylogenie in den niedrigen Metazoen und veranschaulicht die Prophylogenie, d.h. die neue Methode im Studium dieser Erscheinungen. (shrink)

This article offers an exploratory quantitative analysis of the conceptual career of climate in US English over the period 1800–2010. Our aim is to qualify two, closely related arguments circulating in Environmental Humanities scholarship regarding the concept’s history, namely that we only started to think of climate as a global entity aft er the introduction of general circulation models during the final quarter of the twentieth century, and, second, that climatic change only became an issue of environmental concern once scientists (...) began to approach climate as a global model. While we do not dispute that the computer revolution resulted in a significantly new understanding of climate, our analysis points to a longer process of singularization and growing abstraction starting in the early nineteenth century that might help to nuance and deepen insights developed in environmental history. (shrink)

Through a series of accidents the cowardly potter becomes known as the bravest man in the Rajah's kingdom.

ArgumentThe administration of mountain expeditions from the ground created special managerial problems. The Harvard College Observatory's Boyden Expeditions of 1887–1890 sent men and materiel to three sites: Pike's Peak, Colorado; Mount Wilson, California; and Chosica, Peru. Their goal was to test sites in order to find a suitable site for a permanent Boyden station to conduct astrophysical work in service of Harvard's preexisting projects. The logistical difficulties of living on the mountainside combined with the organizational difficulties of administrating (...) a station at a distance. The men who lived on the mountain were professionally vulnerable, and often cut off from their home observatory both by the weather conditions at their own altitude and local politics on the ground below them. Only when an unbroken line of communication could be established between the mountain station and the Harvard Observatory could the astronomers on both ends work together to create a successful expedition. (shrink)

This volume contains the English translation of Felix Kaufmann's (1895-1945) main work Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften (1936). In this book, Kaufmann develops a general theory of knowledge of the social sciences in his role as a cross-border commuter between Husserl's phenomenology, Kelsen's pure theory of law and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. This multilayered inquiry connects the value-oriented reflections of a general philosophy of science with the specificity of the methods and theories of the social sciences, as opposed to (...) abstract natural science and psychology. The core focus of the study is the attempt to elucidate how and under what conditions scientific knowledge about social facts, empirically justified and theoretically embedded, can be obtained. The empirical basis of knowledge within the social sciences forms a phenomenological concept of experience. According to Kaufmann, this concept of experience exhibits a complex structure. Within the meaning-interpretation of human action as the core of knowledge in the social sciences, this structure reaches out across the isolated act of verification toward the synthesis of external and internal experiences. The book opens with a detailed and useful introduction by Ingeborg K. Helling, which introduces the historical and theoretical background of Kaufmann's study and specifically illuminates his relation to Alfred Schütz and John Dewey. Finally, it contains interviews with and letters to members of his family, colleagues and students. (shrink)

Research papers, chiefly on ancient Indic philosophy, and a few on Indian civilization.

On the method of Saint Giovanni Bosco, 1815-1888, in guidance and counselling.

As part of a defense of a physicalist view of experiences, David Papineau has offered an explanation for the intuition that properties found in experiences are distinct from neural properties. After providing some necessary background, I argue that Papineau’s explanation is not the best explanation of the distinctness intuition. An alternative explanation that is compatible with dualism is offered. Unlike Papineau’s explanation, this alternative does not require us to suppose that the distinctness intuition rests on fallacious reasoning. Relations of the (...) alternative explanation to representationalism and to cases of genuine property identity are discussed. (shrink)

The first English-language collection devoted to Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.

It is Frege's third contribution that makes the point of departure for the present paper. Not merely did Frege show how to manipulate symbols more exactly; he also gave a searching account of what these symbols mean. Consider a philosophical problem that arises out of the simplest arithmetic. When we say that 5 = 2 + 3, what do we mean? Do we mean that 5 is identical with 2 + 3? But in some ways 5 and 2 + 3 (...) are obviously different. Or do we mean that 5 and 2 + 3 are equal but not identical, equality being a relation that falls short of complete identity? But in that case, some ordinary ways of speaking in mathematics must be false. Suppose a pupil is asked for the positive square root of 25. The phrasing of the question implies that there is one and only one. No doubt he may answer, '5'. But then it follows that the answer '2 + 3' is not allowable, since ex hypothesi 5 and 2 + 3, though equal, are not identical. Yet ordinarily the answer '2 + 3' would be regarded as strange but not as wrong. (shrink)

The PEIRCE EDITION contains large sections of previously unpublished material in addition to selected published works. Each volume includes a brief historical and biographical introduction, extensive editorial and textual notes, and a full chronological list of all of Peirce’s writings, published and unpublished, during the period covered.