In this paper we will show how “weighted path integral” proposed by Mensky and Kent can emerge out of Ghirardi Rimini Weber model.

Scientific discourse is rife with passages that appear to be ordinary descriptions of systems of interest in a particular discipline. Equally, the pages of textbooks and journals are filled with discussions of the properties and the behavior of those systems. Students of mechanics investigate at length the dynamical properties of a system consisting of two or three spinning spheres with homogenous mass distributions gravitationally interacting only with each other. Population biologists study the evolution of one species procreating at a constant (...) rate in an isolated ecosystem. And when studying the exchange of goods, economists consider a situation in which there are only two goods, two perfectly rational agents, no restrictions on available information, no transaction costs, no money, and dealings are done immediately. Their surface structure notwithstanding, no competent scientist would mistake descriptions of such systems as descriptions of an actual system: we know very well that there are no such systems. These descriptions are descriptions of a model-system, and scientists use model-systems to represent parts or aspects of the world they are interested in. Following common practice, I refer to those parts or aspects as target-systems. What are we to make of this? Is discourse about such models merely a picturesque and ultimately dispensable façon de parler? This was the view of some early twentieth century philosophers. Duhem (1906) famously guarded against confusing model building with scientific theorizing and argued that model building has no real place in science, beyond a minor heuristic role. The aim of science was, instead, to construct theories, with theories understood as classificatory or representative structures systematically presented and formulated in precise symbolic.. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new classification algorithm for the partitioning of a conceptual space. All the algorithms which have been used until now have mostly been based on the theory of Voronoi diagrams. This paper proposes an approach based on potential theory, with the criteria for measuring similarities between objects in the conceptual space being based on the Newtonian potential function. The notion of a fuzzy prototype, which generalizes the previous definition of a prototype, is introduced. Furthermore, the necessary conditions (...) that a natural concept must meet are discussed. Instead of convexity, as proposed by Gärdenfors, the notion of geodesically convex sets is used. Thus, if a concept corresponds to a set which is geodesically convex, it is a natural concept. This definition applies, for example, if the conceptual space is an Euclidean space. As a by-product of the construction of the algorithm, an extension of the conceptual space to d-dimensional Riemannian manifolds is obtained. (shrink)

Purpose of the article: Most regional macroeconomic processes may not be adequately analyzed without accounting for their spatial nature: regional distances, interactions between neighbors, spill-over effects and interdependencies. This contribution focuses on various factors ruling unemployment dynamics in the Visegrad Group countries and their major economic partners: Germany and Austria. The analysis is performed at the NUTS2 level. Methodology/methods: Spatial econometrics is a unique tool for a broad range of quantitative analyses and evaluations. Spatial econometric models are based on geo-coded (...) data. Spatial econometrics and regional competitiveness paradigms are combined into different types of regression model specifications describing unemployment dynamics. Alternative spatial structures are used for verification of stability in estimated model properties. Scientific aim: We aim to provide a detailed empirical evaluation of spatially determined factors of regional unemployment dynamics, along with insight into the robustness of such approach. Both conceptually and parametrically varying neighbor definitions are used to provide evidence for model evaluation. Findings: We find strong positive spatial dependence patterns in the estimated models, robust against varying neighborhood definitions. Our results strongly support the importance of regional and potentially cross-border cooperation in macroeconomic policies addressing unemployment. The estimated models also underline the importance of using spatial models, by pointing out the bias in OLS-estimated models. Conclusions and limits: Spatial approach to econometric analysis provides important insight and robustness to a broad range of unemployment analyses that may be carried out using regional data. At the same time, it should be noted that this article focuses mostly on the spatial and stability aspects of model estimation, while leaving out other interesting topics such as spill-over effects calculations as based on estimated models. Also, estimations provided in this article might benefit from spatial panel data-based methods - once data availability issues are sorted. (shrink)

Der thematisch scharf umgrenzte Sammelband ist von grundlegender Bedeutung füuuml;r die Ästhetik der Gegenwart und vervollstäauml;ndigt Ingardens großen Entwurf einer philosophisch begründeten Theorie des Kunstwerks. Im Mittelpunkt der Eröouml;rterungen stehen das ästhetische Erlebnis, das Form-Inhalt-Problem im literarischen Kunstwerk und vor allem der Fragenkomplex des ästhetischen Wertes.

This provocative, interdisciplinary, and transnational collection delves deeply into the educational and public intellectual hallmarks of Stuart M. Hall, a core figure in the development of the post-War British New Left, of Cultural Studies at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies and later, of the Open University. It opens new vistas on both critical educational studies and cultural studies through interviews with, and essays by, leading writers, shedding light on the under-appreciated public pedagogical and cultural politics of the New Left, (...) of Thatcherism, and of Rightist, neo-colonial, diasporic, and neo-liberal formations in Jamaica, the UK, Australia, North America, and Brazil. Intimate and moving, the contributors describe Hall’s diasporic formation as a courageous ‘artist’ and educator of cultural politics and social movements, showing both the reach and the relevance of his public pedagogies in the construction of alternatives to essentialist racial politics and the despairing cynicism of neo-liberalism. With contributors and interviewees including Leslie G. Roman, Michael W. Apple, Avtar Brah, John Clarke, Annette Henry, Lawrence Grossberg, Luis Gandin, and Fazal Rizvi, _Hallmarks: The Cultural Politics and Public Pedagogies of Stuart Hall_ reveals that neither cultural politics nor public pedagogies are stable or self-evident constructs. Each legitimates and requires the other as part of a longer radical democratic project for social justice. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education. _. (shrink)

Il est commun, aujourd'hui, d'associer la démocratie au consensus, et ce d'une double manière : d'une part en admettant qu'elle est le meilleur régime politique possible, d'autre part en considérant que l'accord vaut intrinsèquement mieux que le désaccord, et l'entente que le conflit: La qualité de la démocratie tiendrait à ses débats publics, qui à la fois rendent possible la confrontation des points de vue, tout en y mettant fin par l'obtention de consensus éclairés et légitimés par la règle de (...) la majorité. Et si le conflit, au contraire, dans certaines conditions, devait servir de principe à la vie politique? Il ne suffit pas de vivre en démocratie pour rendre la démocratie vivante. La démocratie n'est pas un régime mais un questionnement. Elle exige des citoyens une interrogation continue sur le bien commun à suivre. Machiavel n'était pas un démocrate. Mais c'est étrangement en actualisant sa pensée, dans le sillage des travaux de Lefort, qu'il est possible d'associer le conflit civil avec l'imaginaire social pour redynamiser la démocratie par la tension conflictuelle entre l'idéologie et l'utopie. Penser la démocratie à partir de ce que donne à penser Machiavel : voilà ce que s'efforce de faire Sébastien Roman, pour proposer dans une perspective républicaine le modèle d'un espace public dissensuel."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Este artículo se centra en la música en el entorno Fluxus entendida como creación artística de aproximación a la conquista del espacio y de superación de los límites sonoros, en aras a potenciar su expresión a través de la acción del intérprete y la utilización de artefactos. El resultado de todo ello fue un repertorio de imágenes de una gran potencia connotativa en el panorama artístico de los años sesenta.

Alessandro Stavru, Il potere dell’apparenza. Percorso storico-critico nell’estetica antica.

Einleitung, Begriff und Vorgeschichte der ästhetischen Humanitätsidee -- Gotthold Ephraim Lessing -- Moses Mendelssohn -- Christian Garve -- Johann Gottfried Herder -- Die Scheidung der Humanitätsidee von der ästhetischen Theorie in der Kantschen Tranzendentalphilosophie.

The article is concerned with D. Davidson\'s semantic views. The aim of the article is to explain some misunderstandings that have arisen in the course of reception of these views. The author tries to prove that according to Davidson semantic properties and relations do not come under classical definitions, but under contextual ones, like in L. Wittgenstein\'s semantics. Hence the interpretation presented by J. Kmita is incorrect, whereas that by R. Rorty is right. Causal explanation of semantics is out of (...) the question; hence Rorty\'s interpretation is false with respect to this point. Propositions talk about what they talk about, so Kmita is wrong. According to Davidson the concept of reference is permissible, so Putnam is wrong in his interpretation. Moreover, there is only one logic semantics and for all languages it is the same, hence Kmita is wrong when he says that Davidson\'s interpreter arbitrarily pushes foreign semantics into his own. He is also wrong when he puts in Davidson\'s mouth the conviction that non-determination of a translation does not consist in impossibility to cognize foreign semantics. (shrink)

OBJECTIVE PREDICATION The author claims that there are two kinds of predicates that are used to describe cognitive states of mind like beliefs or perception. Using some of them, one can describe the cognitive states of mind directly, whereas using some others, one can describe these states in comparison with one’s own. For example, one can say that a person has a belief or one can say that that person’s belief is according to his own beliefs. In the latter situation, (...) he uses the predicate “to know”. The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John knows that p” are as follows: (1) Peter believes that John believes that p; (2) Peter believes that p; (3) Peter believes that the reasons for which John believes that p have a good justification. In a similar way one can ascribe to somebody a visual impression of an object x or to compare that person’s impressions with his own cognitive states. In the latter situation one uses the predicate “to see” (to perceive). The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John can see x” are the following: (I) Peter believes that John has visual impression of object x; (II) Peter believes that object x exists; (III) Peter believes that this that John has visual impression of object x is according to the laws of vision. When one uses predicates that describe cognitive states of mind of a person (possession of beliefs or sensory impressions), one speaks subjectively, whereas when one speaks objectively, he uses predicates that allow him to compare cognitive states of mind of a person with his own. Keywords: PREDICATION, BELIEFS, PERCEPTION. (shrink)

Let us ask: do the objects we think that exist, really exist? Davidson concludes, from rejection of dualism of content and conceptual scheme, that most of them really exist (coherentialism). Unfortunately, his reasoning is wrong, because though the rejection makes it impossible to doubt our knowledge as a whole, it is still possible to doubt all its elements one after another. The two main points of Davidson's theory are the following: (1) disquotationism (semantic terms are used only to speak about (...) speaking) and (2) ostensivism (words refer to what they refer to independently of what it could be; their meanings are established as the result of the process of learning). (1) and (2) are the real reasons for Davidson's coherentialism. Ostensivism apparently allows to avoid the problem of induction, though it only transforms the problem into the question of ostension. Moreover, consistent ostensivism makes analytic sentences impossible. Yet it is claimed, that ostensivism is wrong in general, because besides ostensives there are also categorials (expressions, meanings of which belong to certain ontological categories) and without the latter logic and mathematics would be impossible. Davison's coherentialism is wrong because it is not true that one cannot have any believes without having any language. Hence, no theory of language is crucial as far as existence is concerned. It is shown considering ascription of believes to mute persons and learning languages by children. Coherentialism lets Davidson bring down the idea of a demon that could make us see the world completely different than it is and not know if it is true. (shrink)

The objection raised by Davidson against Kuhn in article "On the Very Idea of Conceptual Scheme" that the argument presented in "The Structure of Scientific Revolution" was inconsistent is incorrect. Kuhn's conception belongs to psychology and sociology and his work could be titled "An Outline of Psychology and Sociology of Scientific Research". Consequently he is interested only and only in psychologi-cal reasons that affect scientists' theoretical decisions. E.g. his considerations concerning neutral observational language are polemous against thesis that language like (...) that could be somehow useful for interpretation of what scientists do and also against thesis that it could be useful for scientists themselves. The difficulty of un-derstanding above paradigmata does not consist on conceptual schemata meant logically as Davidson reads it but on different cognitive attitude and different manual sets of concepts. To explain the controversy logical and psychological concepts of meaning are distinguished. Davidson means the proper, Kuhn does the latter. Psy-chological meaning concists on what associations and feelings are evocated by utterances in the recever's mind. When Kuhn says that after a revolution scientists live in another world he means only that the language with witch they describe the reality has different psychological meaning. And this is that kind of meaning that cannot be translated and is lost when you discuss above paradigmata. From Kuhn's point of view it is possible to translate logical meaning of scientific utterances from before a revolution, and he does it. The psychological meaning can be only described but not translated. (shrink)