This study looks at two central religious issues--the religious ambiguity of the world and the diversity of faiths--and probes their implications for religious beliefs. Author Robert McKim offers a self-critical, open, and tentative approach to beliefs about religious matters.

The religious ambiguity of the world has many aspects, one of which is the hiddenness of God. Theists have proposed a number of explanations of God's hiddenness. Some putative explanations contend that the advantages of God's hiddenness outweigh whatever benefits would result if God's existence and nature were clear to us. Goods of mystery that have received a lot of discussion include human moral autonomy and the ability on our part to exercise control over whether we believe in the existence (...) of God. The extent of the ambiguity that surrounds God's existence, and indeed all important religious matters, combined with our lack of an obviously correct and adequate explanation of this lack, suggest that, even if God exists, it is not important that people believe in God. Another central theme in the book is the significance of religious diversity for religious belief. The character of this diversity is such that it provides people who take a position on religious matters with reason to adopt the "Critical Stance" -- which requires people in all the religious traditions to subject their religious beliefs to critical scrutiny and hold those beliefs in a tentative way.Some contend that religious faith requires complete confidence in what is believed but tentative belief actually is sufficient to sustain many forms of religious commitment. (shrink)

Discussions of the morality of the Gulf War have tended to embrace the traditional theory of the just war uncritically and to apply its tenets in a mechanical and unimaginative fashion. We believe, by contrast, that careful reflection of the Gulf War reveals that certain principles of the traditional theory are oversimplifications that require considerable refinement. Our aims, therefore, are both practical and theoretical. We hope to contribute to a better understanding of the ethics both of war in general and (...) of the Gulf War in particular. (shrink)

Discussions of the morality of the Gulf War have tended to embrace the traditional theory of the just war uncritically and to apply its tenets in a mechanical and unimaginative fashion. We believe, by contrast, that careful reflection of the Gulf War reveals that certain principles of the traditional theory are oversimplifications that require considerable refinement. Our aims, therefore, are both practical and theoretical. We hope to contribute to a better understanding of the ethics both of war in general and (...) of the Gulf War in particular. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, some of today's most eminent political scientists and philosophers address the ethics of nationalism. Rather than focusing on descriptive and prescriptive themes or policy issues, this volume focuses on the deeper moral issues that must be addressed if a policy prescription is to be well grounded.

I examine, and defend, the idea that human experience is religiously ambiguous. Necessary conditions for there to be ambiguity of any sort are presented. The sort of ambiguity that (it is later argued) is exhibited in the area of religion is clarified in a series of stages. Then the case is made for the application of this notion of ambiguity in the case of religion.

Neither the existence of God nor the nature of God is apparent or obvious. If God exists, why is it not entirely clear to everyone that this is so? How can theists explain God's hiddenness, and how plausible are their explanations? God, if God exists, is an omnipotent, morally good, omnipresent being, than whom none greater can be conceived. Surely it is well within the abilities of God to let God's existence and nature be known to us. Why isn't the (...) existence and nature of our Heavenly Father as apparent as, say, the existence of our various earthly fathers? (shrink)

I begin by examining John Hick’s view of the status of the claims of the major world religions about what he calls “the Real,” in particular his view of the status of the theistic claim that the Real is personal, and of the nontheistic claim that the Real is not personalI distinguish Moderate Pluralism, the view that different conceptions of the Real are conceptions of the same thing, from Radical Pluralism, the view that different conceptions all accurately describe the Real. (...) Although there is a bit of uncertainty about this, Hick seems to espouse a version of Moderate Pluralism, a version which I call Noumenal Pluralism. Moderate Pluralism is a coherent view, but Radical Pluralism is not coherent, and the standatd defenses of it ate not convincing. However, the view that the Real has more than one nature, a view which preserves much of Radical Pluralism, seems to be coherent. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, some of today's most eminent political scientists and philosophers address the ethics of nationalism. Rather than focusing on descriptive and prescriptive themes or policy issues, this volume focuses on the deeper moral issues that must be addressed if a policy prescription is to be well grounded.

_Religious Perspectives on Religious Diversity_ addresses fundamental and controversial questions raised by religious diversity. What are members of religious traditions to say about outsiders and about their religions? Discussion of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish perspectives is combined with methodological work.

I argue that peter wenz's claim, That berkeley's view is that abstract ideas are impossible for us but not for god, Is untenable. But the impossibility of God having abstract ideas does not, Contrary to wenz, Entail that there is no room for the divine archetypes in berkeley's system.

In response to various difficulties that confront John Hick’s pluralistic hypothesis, Philip Quinn proposes a recipe for developing more satisfactory pluralistic hypotheses. In this short exploratory paper I examine Quinn’s proposal, identify some problems that it faces, and consider some alternatives.

After some preliminaries ("I") I examine the merits of an argument which is sometimes used in an attempt to show that nuclear deterrence is morally unacceptable ("II-V"). This is the argument that deterrence is wrong because it involves a threat to do something which it is wrong to do. My conclusion is that there is something to this argument, that it is sufficient to establish a "prima facie" case against nuclear deterrence, but that it is not sufficient to establish a (...) conclusive case against nuclear deterrence. (shrink)

The analysis of perceptual religious experience proposed by William Alston does not undermine the case for the Critical Stance. On the contrary, religious diversity is a more serious problem for his doxastic practice epistemology than he recognizes. In general, the outputs of doxastic practices that are functioning in conditions of ambiguity, and in conditions in which there is disagreement, ought to be viewed with some suspicion, even by those who engage in the practices in question.

In her book Natural Saints: How People of Faith Are Working to Save God's Earth Mallory McDuff quotes a member of the religious environmental group Georgia Interfaith Power and Light as saying that:the science of climate change and the environmental crisis is the wakeup call. But faith in God provides the hope that gets us out of bed to do something about it. Faith gives us the hope, joy, and possibility of triumph to "let not our hearts be troubled" but (...) to move forward with action. And ultimately, this hope is what the religious community can offer that the secular environmental groups have not been able to provide.1At the end of her book McDuff revisits much the same theme, writing that "[the] God thing has the... (shrink)

Immanuel Kant, John Hick, and Richard Swinburne, among others, have presented versions of the claim that God must be hidden from us if we are to make morally significant choices. The proposal that an intimate and enduring personal relationship with God would reduce our moral autonomy is especially plausible. Less plausible is the claim that somewhat more evidence than we currently have for the existence of God would be morally harmful. While God's hiddenness cannot be explained adequately in terms of (...) preserving our moral autonomy, there may be a good of mystery in this area that is capable of contributing to an adequate explanation. Especially promising is the idea that it is very valuable that we should be able to choose whether or not to harm others. (shrink)

Some propose that God must be hidden if we are to exercise control over whether we believe that God exists and that our ability to exercise such control is an important good of mystery. All versions of this proposal assume volitionalism, the view that we are able to exercise some control over whether we believe. The more plausible versions assume indirect volitionalism, the view that this control is indirect. Some versions say that it is especially valuable for people to believe (...) that God exists in conditions in which there is religious ambiguity – conditions in which both belief and unbelief are rational. The most plausible versions of this proposal add that there are certain attitudes that inhibit theistic belief, whereas other attitudes facilitate it. (shrink)

Whatever may be the correct way to understand their origins and development, the major religions aspire to providing their members with solutions to many problems, and they aspire to satisfying many needs. For example, the religious traditions offer explanations in certain important areas of enquiry. Thus they propose answers to questions such as these: Why is there a universe? Why do we exist? What sort of beings are we? What will become of us after we die? The proposed answers to (...) such fundamental questions as these constitute the descriptive or cognitive part of religion. The religions also aspire to providing a guide to behavior. They specify how people ought to live, what is important in human life .. (shrink)

Religious traditions disagree deeply about religious matters. And in many religious traditions there are to be found wise people who think carefully and judiciously, who are intelligent, clever, honest, reflective, serious, and so on. This is a fact of religious disagreement. This disagreement is in fact part of the evidence for the religious ambiguity of the world. In addition, disagreement about an issue or area of inquiry provides reason to think that each side has an obligation to adopt the “Critical (...) Stance” with respect to that issue or area of enquiry. The Critical Stance has two main components: the “E‐principle,” which states that each side has an obligation to examine their beliefs, and the “T‐principle,” which states that, given disagreement, each side should hold its beliefs tentatively. (shrink)

What is someone who has a perspective on religious matters to say about those who endorse other perspectives? What should they say about other religions? For example, might some of their beliefs be true? What stage are we human beings at in our religious development? Are we close to maturity, religiously speaking, so that most of the important religious ideas and innovations there will ever be have already appeared? Or are we starting out in our religious evolution, so that religious (...) developments to date are merely the first rude efforts of a species in its religious infancy? (shrink)

The case for the Critical Stance is not undermined by appeals to religious experience. One reason for this is the sheer diversity of religious experiences: members of diverse religious traditions report on experiences that they believe to be supportive of their beliefs. Another reason is that religious experience is normally capable of providing epistemic support for, at most, a subset of the set of beliefs associated with a tradition.

It is unlikely that trust in God is an important good of mystery. Various other putative goods of mystery also are unpromising. These include the alleged good of our engaging in a search for the truth about the existence of God and the alleged good of religious diversity – the point in the latter case being that if the facts of the matter with respect to religion were plain for all to see, there would not be the current rich variety (...) of traditions. The same goes for the claim that God is worthy of worship only if God is hidden. More promising is the possibility that there are “unknown goods of mystery” – goods of mystery that we do not know of, perhaps because we are unable to comprehend them. (shrink)

Tentative belief involves recognition that the belief in question may need revision and may even be false. It is sometimes said that religious faith requires complete confidence and that religious belief is incompatible with the critical self‐scrutiny that I am advocating. However, tentative religious belief is sufficient to sustain many important forms of religious commitment.

The religious ambiguity of the world provides reason to adopt the Critical Stance. In addition, we display respect for others, and appreciation of them as people who acquire and hold their beliefs in a responsible fashion, by adopting the Critical Stance with respect to whatever religious beliefs we may hold.

There are many reasons to believe that, if God exists, God is in large measure hidden from us. The hiddenness of God is one aspect of the religious ambiguity of the world. Since the world is religiously ambiguous, it may reasonably be interpreted either in secular terms or in terms provided by any one of a number of religious traditions. Theists have made many attempts to account for God's hiddenness, some of which contend that the advantages of God's hiddenness outweigh (...) whatever benefits would result if God's existence and nature were clear to us. One such good of clarity may be that belief in God would be more common than is now the case. Other attempts to account for the hiddenness of God appeal to human defectiveness or to divine transcendence. (shrink)

There have been a number of attempts to argue from the ambiguity that surrounds the existence of God to atheism. John Schellenberg offers one such argument: he proposes that a perfectly loving God would not permit nonbelief to be reasonable for anyone who is capable of a personal relationship with God. I contend that arguments of this sort are unconvincing.

If the goods of mystery outweigh the goods of clarity, there is some reason to doubt that any particular good of clarity, such as more people adopting theism here and now, is very important. Theists should acknowledge that it is unlikely that it is part of the goal of human life that we should here and now hold theistic beliefs. If any goods that are essential for human flourishing were dependent on our believing here and now in God's existence, then (...) – if God exists – God would not remain hidden from human beings. For, if God exists, it would be easy for us to be provided with more evidence for the existence of God than we currently have. (shrink)

I begin with an examination of Berkeley’s various suggestions about how to account for the continued existence of physical objects which are unperceived by finite spirits. After dismissing some of these suggestions I attempt to combine others in a unified theory which involves an appeal to what finite perceivers would perceive if they were in the right conditions, to the operation of the will of God, and to the perception of God. I assess the merits, both philosophical and textual, of (...) the unified theory. In the final section I comment on the implications of this theory of continuity for our conception of a Berkeleian physical object. (shrink)

I begin with an examination of Berkeley’s various suggestions about how to account for the continued existence of physical objects which are unperceived by finite spirits. After dismissing some of these suggestions I attempt to combine others in a unified theory which involves an appeal to what finite perceivers would perceive if they were in the right conditions, to the operation of the will of God, and to the perception of God. I assess the merits, both philosophical and textual, of (...) the unified theory. In the final section I comment on the implications of this theory of continuity for our conception of a Berkeleian physical object. (shrink)

Grayling's Berkeley is a fairly commonsensical philosopher whose arguments have often been misunderstood, but have much to be said for them when properly interpreted, and whose views have considerable significance for contemporary philosophy.