We attempt to extend the nominalistic project initiated in Hartry Field's Science Without Numbers to modern physical theories based in differential geometry.

In this paper the system IL for relative interpretability is studied.

We investigate the problem of how nonnatural entities are represented by examining university students’ concepts of God, both professed theological beliefs and concepts used in comprehension of narratives. In three story processing tasks, subjects often used an anthropomorphic God concept that is inconsistent with stated theological beliefs; and drastically distorted the narratives without any awareness of doing so. By heightening subjects’ awareness of their theological beliefs, we were able to manipulate the degree of anthropomorphization. This tendency to anthropomorphize may be (...) generalizable to other agents. God (and possibly other agents) is unintentionally anthropomorphized in some contexts, perhaps as a means of representing poorly understood.. (shrink)

In this paper I bring up some ideas on how to search for religious healing through criticism to the concepts of "belief" and "symbolic efficiency". With this purpose, its presented a brief overview of the imbrication between cure and religion in the Brazilian religious field, indicating the vitality of this relationship in the contemporary context, followed by two episodes of healing narrative in which I was personally involved. In the end, I argue that contrary to what the concept of belief (...) might suggest, therapeutic efficacy does not constitute “a discourse on" intervention on the bodies and on the world, but on the practical conditions for mobilizing the truth. The concept of belief does not constitute a good tool for understanding the diversity of implicated mediators of assemblages of healing, nor enables us to understand the intricacies of religious-therapeutic effectiveness. In anthropology, similar critique has also been made to the concept of symbolic efficacy as a conceptual tool for understanding transformations not only of "souls," but also of bodies. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qu'un 'philosophe', au regard de l'histoire et singulièrement du XXIe siècle? Frank Pierobon, en s'appuyant sur son propre parcours et aussi sur ses dix années d'engagement dans la riche aventure des Matins-Philo à Bruxelles, tente d'apporter une réponse située à la question. Loin des imageries populaires, il fait du philosophe un homme de métier et de savoir-être dont toute l'existence oscillerait entre la création de concepts et, en même temps, une quête incessante du désir de sens. Un texte (...) court et fulgurant qui redit que nul n'est dispensé de philosopher. (shrink)

Avatar, le film de James Cameron (2009), aura ete un succes commercial d'une ampleur exceptionnelle, a considerer davantage comme le symptome d'une certaine societe en crise spirituelle, que comme l'expression personnelle d'un createur, fut-il exceptionnel. Sur cette base, Frank Pierobon, au terme d'une deconstruction tres poussee, en extrait l'embleme de notre postmodernite finissante: un Deus ex Fantasma, soit une derisoire redemption par le reve, faute de tout autre salut.

The article attempts to develop a diagonal towards classical readings of the humanism of early Marx. Traditionally, referring to early Marx meant to either affirm a substantialist conception of human beings or to criticize the same conception by insisting on a break between early and late Marx. By presenting a lecture badiousienne of early Marxian texts, the article shows how an affirmative reference to man as species-being and as part of a ‘generic humanity’ can be thought without falling back into (...) the substantialist traps of classical humanism. In a systematic and forced construction of the Marxian idea of the evental character of actual communist action and of universal production, the article shows how Marx’s concept of human species life can be understood as the central source of a transformed thinking of humanism. Consequently, neither Badiou nor Marx will be rendered as classical humanists or pure anti-humanists, rather the early Marxian thought will be presented as a philosophical armoury of in-humanism that is still of great use for sharpening one’s conceptual tools. (shrink)

In order to rescue human intentionality and mental causation from determinism and reductionism, it is necessary to clarify what we mean by intentionality, which is often coloured by a problematic, one-sided instrumentalism in both current theory and the wider culture. Rethinking this narrow instrumentalism requires distinguishing clearly between what has been termed 'means-end'and 'constituent- end'human practices and appreciating the primacy of the latter in human affairs. It also requires appreciation of the fact that social enquiry itself is a form of (...) practice that is shaped by at its core, and shapes in turn, the aims and practices of the human community. (shrink)

Motivated by Hoff and Stiglitz’s :753–763, 2004) theory, we examine empirically how the creation of “rules of the game” affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy. Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006, we find that the post-privatization performance of firms depends on institutional factors. Before 2003, we observe severe post-privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse PPP. However, from 2003, when the State issued (...) regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement, the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined, and PPP improved. We find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement. (shrink)

A re-examination of determinism and compatibilism and incompatibilism in free will debates.

Stand-up specials seem to resemble news reporting and documentary film in that they appear prima facie to be mere documentation of an event designed to give viewers the sense of what happened at a place at a time. Closer examination, however, throws doubt upon this transparency claim and it is argued that filmic realism is not the proper lens through which to understand stand-up specials, that they represent a more artistic medium in which the director of the special needs to (...) be seen as an artist along with the comedian. (shrink)

Ever since the works of Alfred Tarski and Frank Ramsey, two views on truth have seemed very attractive to many people. On the one hand, the correspondence theory of truth seemed to be quite promising, mostly, perhaps, for its ability to accomodate a realistic attitude towards truth. On the other hand, a minimalist conception seemed appropriate since it made things so simple and unmysterious. So even though there are many more theories of truth around - the identity theory, the (...) prosentential theory, etc. -, it is fair to say that these two views have acquired the status of the main contenders in the field. Most recently, John Searle and David Lewis have taken sides on the issue. Searle defends a new version of the correspondence theory which takes facts to be the correspondents of true statements, whereas Lewis wants to hold on to a minimalist conception of truth - allowing for an appendix of purely ontological claims that he extracts from the correspondence theory. What is new is that both have tried to see the correspondence theory not as a rival to the minimalist conception, but rather as essentially compatible with it. Still, in the end, Searle arrives at his version of the correspondence theory, and Lewis votes for minimalism. Both philosophers have sympathy with the spirit of the correspondence theory, to say the least. So one wonders why it is that they come to so different conclusions. Both start from the spirit of the correspondence theory, and both see it as essentially compatible with the heart of the minimalist conceptions, and still is there no agreement on what theory is to be accepted in the end. (shrink)

Fatalism in times of universalized assthetization -- Protestant fatalism: predestination as emancipation -- Ren the fatalist: abolishing (Aristotelian) freedom -- From Kant to Schmid (and back): the end of all things -- Ending with the worst: Hegel and absolute fatalism -- After the end: Freud against the illusion of psychical freedom.

La conception qu'Emmanuel Kant se faisait des mathematiques etait en parfaite consonance avec l'opinion philosophique la plus courante au XVIIIe siecle a l'egard de cette science. Il conviendrait par consequent de tenir davantage compte de l'histoire des idees scientifiques, ce qui permettrait de faire remarquer que la pensee kantienne releve d'un paradigme scientifique plus ancien, celui de la geometrie euclidienne (ou l'image reste intimement articulee au signe), alors que les critiques ordinairement adressees au Kant mathematicien s'appuient indirectement sur l'heritage de (...) la revolution algebrique par lequel le signe est desormais dissocie de l'image. Il convenait donc d'examiner dans le plus grand detail la maniere dont, a travers son oeuvre, Kant recevait et discutait les conceptions mathematiques de son temps, et en particulier la tension marquee entre la geometrie et l'arithmetique. Ce faisant, il redevient possible de recontextualiser le concept kantien d'intuition par rapport aux evidences de son temps, qui ne sont plus tout a fait les notres. Les reticences de Kant vis-a-vis des concepts les plus problematiques de l'algebre se laissent ainsi interpreter a nouveaux frais, faisant ressortir la signification de l'architectonique. (shrink)

Can the need for incentives justify inequality? Starting from this question, Frank Vandenbroucke examines a conception of justice in which both equality and responsibility are involved. In the first part of the inquiry, which explores the implementation of that conception of justice, the justification of incentives assumes that agents make personal choices based only upon their own interests. The second part of the book challenges the idea that a normative conception of distributive justice can be based on that traditional (...) assumption, i.e. that personal choices are not the subject matter of justice. Thus, Vandenbroucke questions the Rawlsian idea that the primary subject of a theory of justice is the basic structure of society, and not the individual conduct of its citizens. For a society to be really just, the ethos of individual conduct has to serve justice. Non-mathematical readers can skip the formal model proposed in Chapter 3 and understand the rest of the book. (shrink)