Kungmin yulli t'ŭkkang -- Ch'oe Che-u non -- Silla munhwa wa p'ungnyu chŏngsin.

1. Pŏmbu ŭi p'ungnyu chŏngsin ch'ŏnmyŏng kwa "Hwarang oesa" kusang : kungmin todŏk seugi wa kwallyŏn hayŏ -- 2. Nae ka ponŭn Pŏmbu wa Pak Chŏng-hŭi ŭi sasŭng kwan'gye : Pak Chŏng-hŭi chipkwŏn ch'ogi ŭi chŏngch'i kihoek kwa kwallyŏn hayŏ -- 3. Han t'ojong sasangga ŭi sam kwa saenggak : iyagi ka innŭn Pŏmbu kim chŏngsŏl yŏnbo -- 4. Samin chŏngdam : chŏngch'i, kyŏngje, munhwa e kŏlch'yŏ -- 5. Yŏhaenggi : kurŭm ttara mul ttara ch'ŏlli rŭl kada.

This book is not a conventional introduction to the philosophy of mind, nor is it a contribution to the physicalist/ dualist debate. Instead The Representational Theory of Mind demonstrates that we can construct physicalist theories of important aspects of our mental life. Its aim is to explain and defend a physicalist theory of intelligence in two parts: the first six chapters consist of an exposition, elaboration and defence of human sentience (the functionalist theory of mind), and the second part considers (...) rivals and objections to this theory. Kim Sterelny aims to introduce people to this area of philosophy by exemplifying it, to show that philosophical and empirical investigations can be synthesized to the benefit of both. --From publisher's description. (shrink)

Wie manifestierte sich die Idee der Menschenrechte im Comité sur les principes philosophiques des droits de l'homme der Unesco in den Jahren 1947/48? Die vorliegende Studie rekonstruiert die Entstehung des Komitees, zeichnet seine Arbeit nach und bestimmt seine Wirkung. Dabei werden einerseits die Faktoren erarbeitet, die auf das Komitee einwirkten und seine Diskussion der Menschenrechte beeinflussten; andererseits soll die Rückwirkung des Komitees auf die internationale Politik sichtbar gemacht werden. Die Diskussion über eine philosophische Begründung der Menschenrechte unmittelbar nach dem Ende (...) des Zweiten Weltkriegs steht dabei ebenso im Mittelpunkt wie Kooperation und Konflikt zwischen dem Komitee und dem UN-Menschenrechtsausschuss, der zur gleichen Zeit über die Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte debattierte. Gleichzeitig ist die Studie ein Beitrag zur frühen Geschichte der Unesco und zur Funktionsstruktur internationaler Regierungsorganisationen. (shrink)

Philosophers ask just whose expression, if anyone’s, we hear in lyric poetry. Walton provides a novel possibility: it’s the reader who “uses” the poem (just as a speech giver uses a speech) who makes the language expressive. But worries arise once we consider poems in particular social or political settings, those which require a strong self-other distinction, or those with expressions that should not be disassociated from the subjects whose experience they draw from. One way to meet this challenge is (...) to consider the poem expressive of a plural subject, which frees us from looking for a particular individual whose voice we hear in the work, whether she be fictional or actual. Some lyrics give voice to a group whose experience is attended to in the work. This may be done through a posited fictional speaker, but the ontology of the speaker is shown to be less important. Attending to a group whose concerns are voiced allows us to explain how poems can manage to address our-worldly concerns even when lacking actual persons whose expressions we encounter in the poems. (shrink)

This volume explores the reorganisation of knowledge taking place in the course of Galileo's research process extending over a period of more than thirty years, pursued within a network of exchanges with his contemporaries, and documented by a vast collection of research notes. It has revealed the challenging objects that motivated and shaped Galileo's thinking and closely followed the knowledge reorganization engendered by theses challenges. It has thus turned out, for example, that the problem of reducing the properties of pendulum (...) motion to the laws governing naturally accelerated motion on inclined planes was the mainspring for the formation of Galileo's comprehensive theory of naturally accelerated motion. (shrink)

An observation of Hume’s has received a lot of attention over the last decade and a half: Although we can standardly imagine the most implausible scenarios, we encounter resistance when imagining propositions at odds with established moral (or perhaps more generally evaluative) convictions. The literature is ripe with ‘solutions’ to this so-called ‘Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’. Few, however, question the plausibility of the empirical assumption at the heart of the puzzle. In this paper, we explore empirically whether the difficulty we (...) witness in imagining certain propositions is indeed due to claim type (evaluative v. non-evaluative) or whether it is much rather driven by mundane features of content. Our findings suggest that claim type plays but a marginal role, and that there might hence not be much of a ‘puzzle’ to be solved. (shrink)

Structural injustice broadly refers to objectionable outcomes produced by generally accepted social structures for members of particular social groups. But theorists of structural injustice have said relatively little about why certain outcomes are objectionable, and many theorists suggestively connect structural injustice to a worry about oppression without explaining their precise normative concerns. I provide a normative analysis of structural injustice that addresses this gap and clarifies its connection to oppression. On this view, there are two kinds of structural injustice, each (...) grounded in a distinct moral concern. One is a freedom-based concern for how social structures harmfully constrain members of a social group, depriving them of the means to develop and exercise their capacities. The other is an equality-based concern for how social structures subordinate a social group to others in hierarchies of power, standing, and esteem. By disentangling these concerns, this account shows that our social structures contain multiple kinds of injustice that do not necessarily travel together; some social groups experience unfreedom without being subordinated to others, and indeed their unfreedom is intertwined with their dominant position over subordinated groups. Furthermore, against prevailing philosophical accounts, this analysis shows that there are good reasons to understand oppression primarily as an issue of inequality rather than an issue of unfreedom. (shrink)

1. Chŏngch'i ch'ŏrhak kwa chŏngsin punsŏkhak ŭi mannam -- 2. Han'gugin ŭi chamjae ŭisik kwa chŏngch'i pyŏngni.

This book is part of the growing field of practical approaches to philosophical questions relating to identity, agency and ethics, working across continental and analytical traditions. Kim Atkins explains and justifies the basis of the practical approach through an explication of the structures of human embodiment and an account of how those structures necessitate a narrative model of selfhood, understanding and ethics. She highlights how recent work on agency and autonomy implicitly draws upon conceptions of embodiment and intersubjectivity that underpin (...) the narrative view. (shrink)

The philosophy of mind has always been a staple of the philosophy curriculum. But it has never held a more important place than it does today, with both traditional problems and new topics often sparked by the developments in the psychological, cognitive, and computer sciences. Jaegwon Kim’s Philosophy of Mind is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Now in its second edition, Kim explores, maps, and interprets this complex and exciting terrain. Designed as an introduction to the field for (...) upper-level undergraduates and graduate students, Philosophy of Mind focuses on the mind/body problem and related issues, some touching on the status of psychology and cognitive science. The second edition features a new chapter on Cartesian substance dualism-a perspective that has been little discussed in the mainstream philosophy of mind and almost entirely ignored in most introductory books in philosophy of mind. In addition, all the chapters have been revised and updated to reflect the trends and developments of the last decade. Throughout the text, Kim allows readers to come to their own terms with the central problems of the mind. At the same time, the author’s own emerging views are on display and serve to move the discussion forward. Comprehensive, clear, and fair, Philosophy of Mind is a model of philosophical exposition. It is a major contribution to the study and teaching of the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The essays collected in this volume address a range of issues that arise when the focus of philosophical reflection on identity is shifted from metaphysical to practical and evaluative concerns. They also explore the usefulness of the notion of narrative for articulating and responding to these issues. The chapters, written by an outstanding roster of international scholars, address a range of complex philosophical issues concerning the relationship between practical and metaphysical identity, the embodied dimensions of the first-personal perspective, the kind (...) of reflexive agency involved in the self-constitution of one’s practical identity, the relationship between practical identity and normativity, and the temporal dimensions of identity and selfhood. In addressing these issues, contributors engage with debates in the literatures on personal identity, phenomenology, moral psychology, action theory, normative ethical theory, and feminist philosophy. (shrink)

This book is part of the growing field of practical approaches to philosophical questions relating to identity, agency and ethics--approaches which work across continental and analytical traditions and which Atkins justifies through an explication of how the structures of human embodiment necessitate a narrative model of selfhood, understanding, and ethics.

Although informed consent is important in clinical research, questions persist regarding when it is necessary, what it requires, and how it should be obtained. The standard view in research ethics is that the function of informed consent is to respect individual autonomy. However, consent processes are multidimensional and serve other ethical functions as well. These functions deserve particular attention when barriers to consent exist. We argue that consent serves seven ethically important and conceptually distinct functions. The first four functions pertain (...) principally to individual participants: (1) providing transparency; (2) allowing control and authorization; (3) promoting concordance with participants' values; and (4) protecting and promoting welfare interests. Three other functions are systemic or policy focused: (5) promoting trust; (6) satisfying regulatory requirements; and (7) promoting integrity in research. Reframing consent around these functions can guide approaches to consent that are context sensitive and that maximize achievable goals. (shrink)

Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two directions of fit are supposed to be determinations of one and the same determinable two-place relation, differing only in the ordering of favored terms. But there is no such determinable (...) because of ineliminable asymmetries between the way that beliefs “aim at truth” and the way that desires “aim at realization.” This essay traces the ills of direction of fit theory to a misunderstanding of Anscombe and proposes a cure that distinguishes theoretical and practical thought by appeal to a distinction between thought in the form of a state and thought in the form of an event. (shrink)

Completely revised and updated in its Second Edition, Language and Reality provides students, philosophers and cognitive scientists with a lucid and provocative introduction to the philosophy of language.

This study pragmatically makes a descriptive analysis of metadiscourse in academic lectures from the perspective of the relevance-adaptation theory. Based on the relevance theory and the adaptation theory, the relevance-adaptation model is constructed to explore the occurrence, the pragmatic description and the role of metadiscourse in academic lectures. The data is collected from George Lakoff’s 10 academic lectures on cognitive linguistics at Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in 2004 and some academic lectures audio-taped in classrooms. The results of the (...) study show that 1) the occurrence of metadiscourse in academic lectures is pervasive; 2) the process of choosing appropriate metadiscourse is dynamic and the result of searching for relevance and making contextual adaptations – the process of searching for relevance of metadiscourse is measured in terms of three pairs of the distinctions, namely, contextual effect and processing effort, explicature and implicature, and conceptual meaning and procedural meaning, and contextual adaptations of metadiscourse are constrained by such factors as linguistic reality, psychological motivations and social conventions; 3) the role of metadiscourse in academic lectures is an active discourse constructor. (shrink)

Anknüpfend an den Beitrag von U. Steinvorth in Heft 1/1980 wird die Auffassung vertreten, daß die moderne allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie bisher keine überzeugende Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Status der Politischen Wissenschaft und ihrer theoretischen Erzeugnisse gegeben hat. In diesem Beitrag wird in Auseinandersetzung mit Steinvorth u. a. hervorgehoben: Analog zu der These, daß in der Politik Vernünftigkeit nicht auf Rationalität reduziert werden darf, ist es weder möglich noch wünschenswert, für alle spezifischen politischen Wertungen einen Erklärungstyp zu begründen oder als (...) verbindlich vorzuschreiben. Die Wissenschaftstheorie muß sich in bezug auf die Frage nach dem Status "politischer" Theorien mit einem Theorietypus beschäftigen, der ein neues Abgrenzungskriterium voraussetzt, nämlich einen spezifischen Satz von Prinzipien und Regeln zur Konstruktion politikwissenschaftlicher Theorien. (shrink)

Is Anscombean practical knowledge independent of what the agent actually does on an occasion? Failure to understand Anscombe’s answer to this question is a major obstacle to appreciating the subtlety and plausibility of her view. I argue that Anscombe’s answer is negative, and turns on the nature of mistakes in performance, and reveals a distinctive implicit metaphysics of mind and knowledge, structured by related capacities and exercises of capacities. If my interpretation is correct, then practical knowledge shares features with knowledge-how (...) and knowledge-that, but deserves its own epistemic category. (shrink)