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  1. Mental Action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.
    Just as bodily actions are things you do with your body, mental actions are things you do with your mind. Both are different from things that merely happen to you. Where does the idea of mental action come from? What are mental actions? And why do they matter in philosophy? These are the three main questions answered in this paper. Section 1 introduces mental action through a brief history of the topic in philosophy. Section 2 explains what it is to (...)
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  • Practical Knowledge First.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.
    This idea that what is distinctive of intentional performances (or at least of those intentional performances that amount to skilled actions) is one’s practical knowledge in it —i.e., knowledge of what one is doing while doing it— famously traces back to Anscombe ([]1963] 2000). While many philosophers have theorized about Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge (e.g., Setiya (2008), Thompson et al. (2011), Schwenkler (2019), O’Brien (2007)), there is a wide disagreement about how to understand it. This paper investigates how best (...)
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  • “I Do What Happens”: The Productive Character of Practical Knowledge.Rory O’Connell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):670-686.
    Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “practical knowledge” into contemporary philosophy. Philosophers of action have criticized Anscombe’s negative characterization of such knowledge as “non-observational,” but have recently come to pay more attention to her positive characterization of practical knowledge as “the cause of what it understands.” I argue that two recent Anscombean accounts of practical knowledge, “Formalism” and “Normativism,” each fail to explain the productive character of practical knowledge in a way that secures its status as non-observational. I argue that (...)
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  • Practical Knowledge and Error in Action.Christian Kietzmann - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):586-606.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 3, Page 586-606, November 2021.
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  • Anscombe's and von Wright's Non‐Causalist Response to Davidson's Challenge.Christian Kietzmann - forthcoming - Philosophical Investigations.
    Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.
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