English abstract: On last day of the year 1999, Russia has entered another era of despotism, that of Vladimir Putin. During his reign, the Putin‘s clan has undermined and infiltrated the mass media, the parliament and the judicial system. Deliberate violation of basic citizen‘s rights, compulsory acquisition of property, government-funded racket, misuse of mass media to scarify and to disinform the peoples belong to the diabolic methods of self-constituted disposers. All this lawlessness has led to exorbitant corruption, mass poverty, economic (...) stagnation, and escalation of crimes. The actual manuscript investigates the roots of Putinism putting the person of Vladimir Putin in the focus of investigation. -/- Russian abstract: В 1999 году, в последний день столетия и тысячелетия, Россия вступила в новую эру деспотизма, эру Владимира Путина. В продолжение его правления, клан Путина коррумпировал и инфильтрировал средства массовой информации, парламент, правовую систему. Умышленное нарушение основных гражданских прав, конфискация собственности, государственный рэкет, злоупотребление средств массовой информации с целью запугивания и дезинформации населения стали дьявольскими методами самоназванных правителей. Всё это привело к безмерной продажности, массовой бедности, экономической стагнации и взрыву преступности. Данный манускрипт исследует корни Путинизма, помещая личность Владимира Путина в центр исследования. (shrink)

The economic crisis has created a basically new situation. Russia should reduce its geopolitical ambitions, which have emerged in the last few years, as well as its national budget. The illusions of might, based on the possession of expensive commodities that everyone needs, are fading. There is no doubt that in a couple of years the demand for energy resources will grow again. But until then, Russia will have to go through another period of difficulties, whose outcome is not clear. (...) Depending on its outcome, Putin's epoch will be viewed either as a time of lost opportunities, or as the eve of a real revival of Russia as a modern great power. (shrink)

When Putin became president at the beginning of the 21st century, Russia was in shambles. Putin saw his task to be two fold. First, to recreate the Russian state – that had been seriously weakened by Boris Yeltsin. Second, he set out to reestablish Russia as an important international actor. His approach to dealing with those two tasks was heavily influenced by his approach to dealing with political problems. He is determined, but non ideological. He believes that Russia is unique (...) and that only "Russian" solutions will resolve the country’s problems. Most of all, Putin sees himself as a "problem solver," something that comes from his years in the KGB. And while much remains to be done, he did a lot to solve Russia’s problems. The power of the state has been restored, and Russia is taken far more seriously on the international stage than it was in 2000. What is amazing, given all of the criticism he has received in the West for his "undemocratic" actions, his standings in the polls for the eight years he was in office remained above 70%, something a Western politician can only dream of. (shrink)

In this essay, the author regards the individual as the chief courier of History, and Mr. Putin, the immediate cause of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – distinguishing his agency from broad precipitating socio-historical causes that deny inwardness, individuality, and free-will. A dark puppeteer, Mr. Putin is more sinister than Plato’s puppeteers (Allegory of the Cave). This invasion raises at least three questions: (1) Why has the west not responded as much to other recent non-western wars and genocides? Why have Europe’s (...) former colonies not protested Russia more vigorously? (2) Why do armed forces obey cultishly, the commands of autocratic heads of state? (3) How do we prevent autocrats from occupying positions of power? Western hedonism and Putin’s puritanism are opposites that cannot resolve one another. Moreover, Ukraine reminds us that non-violence, patriotism, defiance – even war – cannot be moral absolutes. Depending on the context, they are good, evil, or something in between. (shrink)

If one did not recognize the name of the author, the first question would be: which view of Putin’s system is he opposing? Is it the view that the ex-KGB Vladimir Putin is a kleptocrat working...

Vladimir Putin has been in power in Russia for two decades. He served two four-year terms as president from 2000 to 2008, followed by a term as prime minister until 2012. He returned to the preside...

Vladimir Putin's image functions as a political talisman far outside of the borders of his own country. By studying material objects, fan fiction and digital media, this book traces the satirical uses of Putin's public persona, notably how he stands as a foil for other world leaders. It argues that the internet is crucial to the creation of contemporary Putin memorabilia and that these items show a continued political engagement by young people, even as some political scientists and media experts (...) decry what they see as the opposite. The book further addresses the ways in which explicit sexual references about government officials are being used as everyday political commentary in the United States. Turning a critical eye to Putin kitsch shows how the number of such references skyrocketed during the 2016 US Presidential election campaign, and suggests that the phenomenon is likely to still be important when Americans next return to the polls. Finally, the internet makes possible a totally new kind of kitsch--the virtual kind. An examination of how the Russian president's image circulates via memes and parodies, as well as through apps and games, suggests that political culture has become increasingly participatory in the last decade. (shrink)

The revival of dissidence was one of the paradoxes of the Putin era. During the terminal crisis of the Soviet Union and the early years of the Yeltsin presidency, the dissidents of the 1970s were celebrated as prophets of democracy and Russian nationhood. But unlike their East Central European counterparts, they achieved little political success in the post-Communist era. Despite Boris Yeltsin's pose as a disciple of Sakharov and his courtship of Solzhenitsyn, the most prominent dissidents were at the margins (...) of politics by the late 1990s. To many observers, they were relics of another age. Yet under the increasingly.. (shrink)

If one did not recognize the name of the author, the first question would be: which view of Putin’s system is he opposing? Is it the view that the ex-KGB Vladimir Putin is a kleptocrat working...

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was met with condemnation from the European Union and the United States as an "unprovoked and unjustified military aggression" that undermines the liberal international order. However, some international relations scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, argue that Russia had genuine security concerns with regard to Ukraine and that the invasion was a response to the threat of NATO membership for Ukraine. Both liberal and realist perspectives on the invasion rely on the assumption of rational, (...) cost-benefit calculations by actors, but cultural factors and irreconcilable non-material interests may also be at play in shaping the actions and motivations of states. Understanding the cultural and national identity factors at play in the invasion of Ukraine is complex and difficult, but they cannot be ignored in attempting to understand and address the conflict. (shrink)

War crimes are being committed in Ukraine today, but who should be held responsible? By looking at the literature on responsibility and violence by Philippa Foot and John Harris, this article argues that there are grounds for holding Vladimir Putin responsible for war crimes in Ukraine, even if he did not give the command for these crimes and other atrocities to be carried out.

This article analyses the new demographic programme that was announced by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in 2006. The main goal of this programme is to encourage fertility, especially the birth of a second child. New benefits should elevate the status of wome taking maternity leave, who might otherwise suffer from discrimination in the family. The housewife is considered to be dependent and `degraded'. We argue that this demographic politics recalls continuity with soviet gender politics centred on the support of (...) wage-earning working mothers. The programme provokes different critiques. Liberal critics argue that the programme is a populist one and it may have undesired economic and social consequences. Conservative critics want to encourage more traditional `woman' and `family' roles in society. Feminist critics argue that this politcs would reinforce both the inferior position of women on the labour market and gender imbalances on the symbolic level. (shrink)

Gender and populism have been extensively theorized separately, but there has not been sufficient study of the way that gender undergirds populism, strengthening its diverse manifestations. Focusing on the cases of Vladimir Putin and Recep T. Erdoğan, we argue that their political performance allows them to project a right-wing populism that hides much of its political program in an ostentatious masculine posturing that has the virtue of being relatively malleable. This political masculinity allows them to position themselves at different points (...) in time as outsiders yet insiders, bad boys yet good fathers. In their early years Putin and Erdogan established themselves as transgressive outsiders who developed a profile of power by building up their masculine, working-class biographies. As their power became consolidated, they turned to a more paternal role, fostering a conservative gender order while attacking the masculinity of their opponents and casting them as outsiders. In this way over the years they have combined political performances that have both breached the conventional gender norms and also upheld and reinforced them. The result is a Janus-faced masculinity of outsiders-yet-insiders, bad-boys-yet-good-fathers, which establishes that the leader is both the same as other men and also different from them, standing above the citizenry, mediating and fostering a conservative political order. Understanding this gender performance also helps to explain the paradox of “electoral authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51–65, 2002; Schedler 2006), demonstrating how performed political masculinity can support and connect the cult of a popularly elected leader with conservative social and political gender norms. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDespite their differences in age, professional career and political background, Milošević and Putin share similar views on one of the main consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the USSR: the involuntary dispersal of Serbs and Russians into different foreign states. This is a study of the segments of Milošević’s and Putin’s speeches referring to Kosovo and to Crimea respectively. The study analyses their rhetorical devices and thematic content, using the analytical framework and instruments for the analysis of nationalist discourses (...) developed by the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis. The speeches, it is argued here, share a topos of sacralisation of the land based on the ancestors’ holy or glorious deeds which proclaims the land to be sacred to the chosen nation. This creates a ‘national entitlement’ to the land in a depoliticised and highly personalised setting. (shrink)

The study delves into the foreign policy plans of Alexei Navalny, the Russian politician who is currently commonly regarded as the most prominent opposition leader and the sole plausible alternative to Vladimir Putin. Drawing on his interviews, public speeches, media publications and electoral manifestos, the author analyses his foreign policy views alongside three topics, that is, Russia’s policies towards disputed lands and states in the post-Soviet area (Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria), the country’s foreign policy orientation and priorities (especially (...) regarding relations with the West) and assessment of the Putin regime’s foreign policy. Following this, the author speculates on the likely foundations of Russia’s foreign policy under Navalny’s possible presidency and their implications for the West. (shrink)

In her recent book We Modern People, Anindita Banerjee suggests that in prerevolutionary Russia, science fiction substantially shaped the way people thought about and understood modernity and modernization.1 This same sort of connection between the structures of science and social life is still with us in the present day. Over the past decade, the proportion of science fiction books compared with other publications in Russia has increased considerably; indeed, according to some reports as many as five hundred science fiction novels (...) are published every year in Russia.2 And as was the case with prerevolutionary and Soviet science fiction, science fiction in Russia today deals with issues inspired by social and even.. (shrink)

This article seeks to historicize both the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the debate on realism occasioned by Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014. Using the research of Gerard Toal on Russia’s construction of its security interests in the post-Soviet spaces that include Ukraine, the article argues that neorealist geopolitical explanations fail to do justice to the roles of contingency and culture in setting Russia’s so-called ‘red lines.’ It also identifies an agency problem in realism: realists not only (...) fail to do justice to the agency of small states like Ukraine in this conflict but elide the moral and practical agency of decisionmakers like Russian President Vladmir Putin. The article also suggests that the current realism debate is the tip of an iceberg: realism has long had a problem specifying the relation of its theory to its practice. The article concludes by discussing the long shadow of 19th century imperial history over contemporary discussions of spheres of influence and great power status. (shrink)

As Russian influence in Italy grows, Putin’s ‘Trojan horse’ in the EU reflects several societal trends, molding perceptions of a foreign policy appropriate for Italy.

Vladimir Putin’s legitimation of Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine raises questions about traditional understandings of nation and empire. Should we contrast the two in terms of values and practices? In this case, Putin uses both nationalist and Imperialist rhetoric to justify his actions. My essay questions how we understand nation and empire using the example of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. How did this empire develop laws, institutions and administrative practices to manage conflicts and claims around language use and nationalism? (...) How did Austria’s governments rule a multi-lingual, multi-confessional society effectively, without resorting to brutal policies of nationalization? When nationalist conflicts arose in different settings, how and why did they originate? I conclude that in European terms, Imperial Austria and even nationalist Hungary apparently managed daily-life issues around diverse language use and religious practice far more humanely and effectively than did the successor nation states after 1918. (shrink)

The usefulness of ‘realism’ in explaining Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine has become a keenly contested debate not only in International Relations but in wider public intellectual discourse since the onset of the war in February 2022. At the centre of this debate is the punditry of John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist who is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago. This article argues that although Mearsheimer is indeed a realist, his offensive realism is but (...) one of many different realist theories that can forward an explanation of the Ukraine War. Beyond the apparent hegemony of structural realism (the branch of realism to which Mearsheimer’s offensive realism belongs), it is argued that classical and neoclassical realist frameworks can provide more nuanced and, ultimately, convincing arguments as to why Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine. This is because both classical and neoclassical realism can incorporate insights from non-realist studies—such as the concepts of civilization and ontological security—and combine them into an overarching power politics framework. Although neither classical nor neoclassical realism is flawless in their explanations, they demonstrate that realism does not just have to be about international power structures but can offer multivariate accounts of why a state, like Russia, decided to act, such as invading Ukraine. (shrink)

That certain paper bills have monetary value, that Vladimir Putin is the president of Russia, and that Prince Philip is the husband of Queen Elizabeth II: such facts are commonly called ‘institutional facts’. IFF are, by definition, facts that exist by virtue of collective recognition. The standard view or tacit belief is that such facts really exist. In this paper we argue, however, that they really do not—they really are just well-established illusions. We confront realism about IFF with six criteria (...) of existence, three established and three less so but highly intuitive. We argue that they all tell against the existence of IFF. An obvious objection to IFF non-realism is that since people’s behaviour clearly reflects the existence of IFF, denying their existence leaves an explanatory gap. We reject this argument by introducing a variant of the so-called ‘Thomas Theorem,’ which says that when people collectively recognize a fact as existing, they largely behave accordingly, regardless of whether that fact really exists or not. (shrink)

This paper argues that we ought to distinguish between ‘assisted’ gestation and ‘delegating’ gestation—and that the relevant difference does not depend on whether it is another human or technological system doing the work.1 In the philosophy of action, there is an important theoretical gap between S ‘helping A to φ’ and S ‘φ-ing on behalf of A’: the former is an instance of joint agency while the latter is an individual’s action. This matters because if the latter counts as an (...) intentional action, then only S is being said to have acted intentionally while, if the former is an intentional action, then both S and A have acted intentionally—which might have consequences for responsibility attributions, for example. To put it brutally, it is the difference between Belarus supporting Putin’s invasion and Belarus doing Putin’s dirty work—and you do not have to be a Russian mother to see that these two alternatives will have very different consequences. In another context, the economics of outsourcing is also built around the same theoretical distinction. But does this matter to gestation and reproduction? It does, argues this paper. Insisting on an ‘assisted’ reproduction framework2–8 reinforces patriarchal stereotypes and continues to put undue burdens on prospective mothers both by perpetuating the stereotype of women as needing help and also by implicating them in an action that might genuinely not be theirs. Delegation, on the other hand, empowers parents—who are in charge, rather than needing help. Furthermore, an action-theoretical delegation framework might be better placed to regulate and anticipate future technological developments, …. (shrink)

One way of characterising the present political conjuncture - worldwide, not just in Europe and North America - is to point to the rise to power of politicians best described as demagogues. Trump, Duterte, Putin, Modi, as well as the leaders of Europe's neo-fascist racists have in common not just certain policies and attitudes, but, significantly, a political style: that of the demagogue. Thinking through that term, ‘demagogue', is instructive in helping us to understand this phenomenon, no less historically than (...) politically. (shrink)

Liberalism in Russia is one of the most complex, multifaced and, indeed, controversial phenomena in the history of political thought. Values and practices traditionally associated with Western liberalism—such as individual freedom, property rights, or the rule of law—have often emerged ambiguously in the Russian historical experience through different dimensions and combinations. Economic and political liberalism have often appeared disjointed, and liberal projects have been shaped by local circumstances, evolved in response to secular challenges and developed within often rapidly-changing institutional and (...) international settings. This third volume of the Reset DOC “Russia Workshop” collects a selection of the Dimensions and Challenges of Russian Liberalism conference proceedings, providing a broad set of insights into the Russian liberal experience through a dialogue between past and present, and intellectual and empirical contextualization, involving historians, jurists, political scientists and theorists. The first part focuses on the Imperial period, analyzing the political philosophy and peculiarities of pre-revolutionary Russian liberalism, its relations with the rule of law, and its institutionalization within the Constitutional Democratic Party. The second part focuses on Soviet times, when liberal undercurrents emerged under the surface of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology. After Stalin’s death, the “thaw intelligentsia” of Soviet dissidents and human rights defenders represented a new liberal dimension in late Soviet history, while the reforms of Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” became a substitute for liberalism in the final decade of the USSR. The third part focuses on the “time of troubles” under the Yeltsin presidency, and assesses the impact of liberal values and ethics, the bureaucratic difficulties in adapting to change, and the paradoxes of liberal reforms during the transition to post-Soviet Russia. Despite Russian liberals having begun to draw lessons from previous failures, their project was severely challenged by the rise of Vladimir Putin. Hence, the fourth part focuses on the 2000s, when the liberal alternative in Russian politics confronted the ascendance of Putin, surviving in parts of Russian culture and in the mindset of technocrats and “system liberals”. Today, however, the Russian liberal project faces the limits of reform cycles of public administration, suffers from a lack of federalist attitude in politics and is externally challenged from an illiberal world order. All this asks us to consider: what is the likelihood of a “reboot” of Russian liberalism? (shrink)

_A groundbreaking examination of a central question in international relations: Do states act rationally?_ To understand world politics, you need to understand how states think. Are states rational? Much of international relations theory assumes that they are. But many scholars believe that political leaders rarely act rationally. The issue is crucial for both the study and practice of international politics, for only if states are rational can scholars and policymakers understand and predict their behavior. John J. Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato (...) argue that rational decisions in international politics rest on credible theories about how the world works and emerge from deliberative decision‑making processes. Using these criteria, they conclude that most states are rational most of the time, even if they are not always successful. Mearsheimer and Rosato make the case for their position, examining whether past and present world leaders, including George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, have acted rationally in the context of momentous historical events, including both world wars, the Cold War, and the post–Cold War era. By examining this fundamental concept in a novel and comprehensive manner, Mearsheimer and Rosato show how leaders think, and how to make policy for dealing with other states. (shrink)

Cyberspeak, the language of cybernetics, or its metalanguage to be more precise, consists of words that are both explaining and describing human/animal and machine forms of control and communication, while in newspeak, words were value-laden, which means they had strong positive or negative connotations connected to their use. For example, a 'spy' could only be a foreign agent, while a Russian one was a 'patriot'. First, it will be shown how there are still remnants of cyberspeak in modern science, pinpointing (...) its cybernetic background and shaping our thoughts without us realizing they had any cybernetic origin whatsoever. Second, it will be investigated how newspeak, as its counterpart, can be analyzed from the theory of speech acts. Third, the current war in Ukraine allowed us a brief analysis of newspeak present in Russian public communication today (Putin's speeches), which will again be connected to their performative aspect. (shrink)

The topic may initially suggest that massive reductionism is pursued with it. Why this is not the case, can be explained as follows: 'Dictatorship of the proletariat', 'bureaucracy' and 'bureaucratization' are key terms through which new aspects, facts and connections of the questions about socialism can be opened again and again.

This article deals with the relations in the triangle state–society–business in modern Russia. It is shown against Russian historical background, that the absolutist state in this country could never be identified with the society and these relations were shaped under its strong domination. The ethics of rule-following characteristic for market economy in general did not develop in Russia. The breakdown of communist Russia and market reforms proceeding since 1992 did not change this situation significantly. The period of political alliance between (...) big business and government was followed by restoration of state dominance in somewhat modified forms. Both periods were characterized by corruption, which contrary to Putin’s slogans, increases in Russia. In the article I show the evolution of Putin administration’s policy which changed from emphasizing and improving legal institutions to selective use of legal norms depending on personal loyalty. Main forms of state exploitation of Russian business are described. The conclusion is that Russian experience of balancing state and market should be called negative. (shrink)

Conceptul de dreptate socială este unul dintre cele mai controversate concepte ale filosofiei politice. Foarte puține aspecte legate de acest concept nu sunt înconjurate de controverse și dezbateri argumentative. Unele dintre cele mai importante astfel de controverse sunt cele legate de definirea, de specificarea și de legitimitatea lui. Prima este, în esență, o controversă în privința răspunsului la următoarea întrebare: care este conceptul care surprinde cel mai bine trăsătura fundamentală a dreptății și nedreptății sociale? A doua este o controversă în (...) privința exigențelor sau a principiilor „corecte” ale dreptății sociale. În sfărșit, a treia este o controversă pe marginea acceptabilității conceptului de dreptate socială. În studiul de față prezint pe scurt principalele idei, poziții și argumente invocate de filosofii politici recenți în cadrul fiecăreia dintre aceste controverse. (shrink)

As a mono-energy-economy, Russia’s fortunes are closely linked to the price of energy. That same link explains why when energy prices hit record highs, there was such strong public support for Vladimir Putin. But when energy prices plummeted in late 2008, Russia found itself with an economic downturn which brought with it, factory closings, worker layoffs and political grumbling. Because of Russia’s inexperience with economic upheaval, Russia is likely to go through greater turmoil and political uncertainty if not unrest, than (...) more traditional market economies which over the years have had to learn how to deal with economic cycles of this sort. (shrink)

The Decline of LiberalismFrom the perspective of the Russian political philosopher Konstantin Krylov, Russia’s civilizational order is not liberal—in most respects, it is the very opposite of liberal. At the same time, Russia has, over the course of centuries, failed to properly come into its own as its own civilizational type. From Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin, Russia has lingered in a stunted, oversimplified version of its own “Northern” national idea even as it has repeatedly taken up, like children (...) playing at dress-up, the civilizational ideas of others. Like much of the rest of the world, Russia at present is playing at liberalism.1 Writing in the late 1990s (the reader is urged to keep in mind that Krylov’s theory was formulated and put on paper not today but twenty-five years ago), Krylov predicted that Russia’s dalliance with liberalism would play itself out within a decade or so and that by about 2030 Russia would finally come into its own as a civilization of the “Northern” type. What Krylov means by this is something we will get to in due course. (shrink)