While widely acknowledged as the world's oldest profession, and often glamorized or demonized in the media, prostitution is a critical part of American culture and its economy, as well as a social problem in need of an updated public policy. In Prostitution Policy, Lenore Kuo combines feminist social research and legal studies to tackle issues raised by heterosexual prostitution in the U.S. Through the lens of feminist theory, Kuo examines the milieu of prostitutes and the role of (...) prostitution in contemporary society, and how the interplay of those two works itself out in practice. Moving beyond theoretical analysis of prostitution, Prostitution Policy turns to the complicated problem of formulating a reasonable legal policy that minimizes harm. Kuo discusss criminalization, legalization, and decriminalization as possible approaches, ultimately arguing for a unique form of decriminalization including detailed legal oversight and mandatory social services. (shrink)

Criminalisation of prostitution, and minority rights for disabled persons, are important contemporary political issues. The article examines their intersection by analysing the conditions and arguments for making a legal exception for disabled persons to a general prohibition against purchasing sexual services. It explores the badness of prostitution, focusing on and discussing the argument that prostitution harms prostitutes, considers forms of regulation and the arguments for and against with emphasis on a liberty-based objection to prohibition, and finally presents (...) and analyses three arguments for a legal exception, based on sexual rights, beneficence, and luck egalitarianism, respectively. It concludes that although the general case for and against criminalisation is complicated there is a good case for a legal exception. (shrink)

On some accounts, prostitution is just another form of casual sex and as such not particularly harmful in itself, if regulated properly. I claim that, although casual sex in general is not inher-ently harmful, prostitution in fact is. To show this, I defend an account of sex as joint action characteristically aimed at sexual enjoyment, here understood as a tangible experience of com-munity among partners, and argue that prostitution fails to achieve this good by incentivizing partners to (...) mistreat each other. To substantiate this claim, I explore ways in which prostitution fails on the virtues of temperance, respect, and sincerity. (shrink)

This is an article in feminist ethics which claims to present a middle road between radical feminist critique of prostitution and libertarian feminism defense of the practice. I develop the category of morally risky (in feminist value terms) and argue that prostitution along with marriage and consensual S/M sex falls into the category in male dominant societies.

_Prostitution and Pornography_ examines debates about the sex industry and the adequacy of the liberal response to critiques of the sex industry. The anthology focuses particularly on the very different ways prostitution and pornography are treated. Unlike other books that deal with the sex industry, this volume brings together academics and industry veterans and survivors to discuss the ways prostitution, pornography, and other forms of commercial sex are treated, and to ask questions about the role that ideas about (...) the self, personal identity, and freedom play in our attitudes about the sex industry. (shrink)

Is prostitution immoral? Various philosophers have put forward arguments for thinking so, one of the most notable being that, by engaging in sexual activity with someone for payment, the prostitute instrumentalizes himself or herself. In this paper, I identify two meanings of "instrumentalize" and, with them, two versions of the instrumentalization argument for the immorality of prostitution. I then critique each version of the argument.

The debate concerning prostitution is centered around two main views: the liberal view and the radical feminist view. The typical liberal view is associated with decriminalization and normalization of prostitution; radical feminism stands in favor of prohibition or abolition. Here, I argue that neither of the views is right. My argument does not depend on the plausible (or actual) side effects of prohibition, abolition, or normalization; rather, I am concerned with the ideals involved. I will concede to liberals (...) their claim that prostitution is not harmful in itself. Yet, I will argue that prostitution cannot be thought of as “just another job”. Even if prostitution is not harmful in itself, it can do much harm. I will argue that a policy of vigilance is the most adequate one to adopt with regard of prostitution, given the risk of harm associated with prostitution. A policy of vigilance tries to discriminate between those who take a certain course of action willingly and those who do not. It puts no restraints on those who exercise their genuine will, but protects those who are openly or subtly coerced. (shrink)

Both liberals and feminists have long criticized the paternalistic approach to prostitution found in most jurisdictions in the U.S. In his recent book Prostitution and Liberalism, Peter de Marneffe defends just such an intervention, arguing that the demonstrated harmfulness of a life of prostitution justifies paternalistic policies aimed at reducing the number of women who are involved in it. Although de Marneffe does not endorse the prohibitionist approach typical in the U.S., he argues that the best reasons (...) for alternative approaches to the practice (including some forms of regulated legalization) are necessarily paternalistic. In my paper, I question de Marneffe’s contention that the strongest reasons for state intervention with regard to prostitution are paternalistic in nature. I argue that reasonable state action toward prostitution is best understood not as a paternalistic intervention to remedy some moral or epistemological failure on the part of prostitutes, but rather as an attempt to advance the interests of vulnerable parties more generally concerning what they reasonably desire but could not otherwise ensure. I further argue that such an approach might favor abolitionist over regulatory policies, depending upon how the vulnerable class is defined. (shrink)

I offer an unorthodox argument for the thesis that prostitution is not just a normal job. It has the advantage of being compatible with the claim that humans should have full authority over their sexual life. In fact, it is ultimately the emphasis on this authority that leads the thesis that prostitution is a normal job to collapse. Here is the argument: merchants cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they transact with on the basis of factors like (...) the ethnicity or the religion of their client; but if prostitutes are ‘sex merchants’, then they cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they have sex with on the basis of these factors. Yet everyone should have the full discretionary power to refuse to have sex under any circumstances. (shrink)

This research used a semi-structured interview method and Smith and Osborn's interpretive phenomenological analysis to investigate a female prostitute's experiences of stigma associated with her work. To structure the interview schedule, Seidman's in-depth phenomenologically based interviewing method, which comprises three areas of focus, “focused life history,” “details of the experience” under investigation, and “reflection of the meaning” of the experience, was used as a general guide. Ten broad psychological themes were identified: 1) awareness of engaging in what people think is (...) bad; negative labeling by people who discover she is a prostitute; 3) hiding and lying about her identity as a prostitute to avoid being labeled negatively; 4) hiding and lying about her prostitution identity result in stress, anxiety, and exhaustion; 5) wishing she did not have to hide and lie about being a prostitute; 6) questioning and objecting to the stigmatization of prostitution; 7) managing the sense of stigmatization by persons who know about her prostitution by shifting focus away from devaluing and toward valuable qualities of prostitution; 8) developing occupational esteem and self-esteem through reflection of values; 9) compassion towards other people who suffer from stigma; and 10) resiliency. (shrink)

The virtues and vices examined in Prostitutes, Musicians, and Self-Respect pervade and govern daily life, refer to our own person, and involve strong emotions. Kupfer analyzes such character traits as humility, gratitude, envy and sentimentality and explores themes of self-knowledge and self-respect.

Civil libertarians characterize prostitution as a "victimless crime," and argue that it ought to be legalized. Feminist critics counter that prostitution is not victimless, since it harms the people who do it. Civil libertarians respond that most women freely choose to do this work, and that it is paternalistic for the government to limit a person's liberty for her own good. In this book Peter de Marneffe argues that although most prostitution is voluntary, paternalistic prostitution laws (...) in some form are nonetheless morally justifiable. If prostitution is commonly harmful in the way that feminist critics maintain, then this argument for prostitution laws is not objectionably moralistic and some prostitution laws violate no one's rights. Paternalistic prostitution laws in some form are therefore consistent with the fundamental principles of contemporary liberalism. (shrink)

A common argument against prostitution states that selling sex is harmful because it involves selling something deeply personal and emotional. More and more of us, however, believe that sexual encounters need not be deeply personal and emotional in order to be acceptable—we believe in the acceptability of casual sex. In this paper I argue that if casual sex is acceptable, then we have few or no reasons to reject prostitution. I do so by first examining nine influential arguments (...) to the contrary. These arguments purport to pin down the alleged additional harm brought about by prostitution by appealing to various aspects of its practice, such as its psychology, physiology, economics and social meaning. For each argument I explain why it is unconvincing. I then weight the costs against the benefits of prostitution, and argue that, in sum, prostitution is no more harmful than a long line of occupations that we commonly accept without hesitation. (shrink)

Prostitution in the Eastern Mediterranean World: The Economics of Sex in the Late Antique and Medieval Middle East. By Gary Leiser. London: I.B. Tauris, 2017. Pp. xv + 332. $52.50, £35.

In Sascha Settegast’s recently published article, “Prostitution and the Good of Sex” in Social Theory and Practice, he argues that prostitution is intrinsically harmful. In this article, I object to his argument, making the following three responses to his account: 1) bad sex is not “detrimental to the good life”; 2) bad sex is not necessarily unvirtuous; 3) sex work is work as well as sex, and so must be evaluated as work in addition to as sex.

In ‘Is prostitution harmful?’ I argue that if casual sex is acceptable, then so is prostitution.1 Anna Westin, in ‘The harms of prostitution: critiquing Moen's argument of no-harm’, raises four objections to my view.2 Let me reply to these in turn.Westin's first objection is that it is ‘fundamentally problematic [to] categorise sexual ethics into merely two types’, the type that accepts casual sex and the type that does not. The reason why, she explains, is that this ‘incompletely (...) frames the contemporary discourse in sexual ethics’. She points to the views of Linda McDowell, Roger Scruton, Raja Halwani and the Roman Catholic Church to illustrate the breadth of contemporary ethical theorising about sex.Westin is right that I do not provide an account of contemporary sexual ethics. Neither …. (shrink)

Feminist critics of the stigmatization of prostitution such as Martha Nussbaum and Sybil Schwarzenbach argue that the features of the practice do not, or at least need not, differ essentially from those of other more respected sorts of labor. I argue that even the least degraded forms of the current practice of prostitution remain objectionable on feminist grounds because patrons demand a semblance of sexual self-expression that engages discriminatory beliefs about women's sexuality.

Cet article examine les formes du discours des lettrés chinois sur la prostitution de la fin du XIXe siècle à la Première Guerre mondiale. Il met en lumière le caractère ambivalent de ce discours qui, centré sur les courtisanes - la strate supérieure du monde de la prostitution - constitue une forme d’apologie ou de vision positive de la prostitution. Cette vision a pour partie imprégné la représentation collective de la prostitution en Chine. Toutefois cette représentation (...) univoque masque un discours « en creux » clairement critique, voire méprisant, à l’égard de la prostitution ordinaire. Ce discours ambivalent a donné prise à une remise en cause progressive à mesure que l’évolution sociale et intellectuelle minait le statut des courtisanes et qu’une nouvelle vision issue des nouveaux média (essentiellement la presse) faisait de la prostitution un enjeu du débat public. (shrink)

I agree with Scott A Anderson1 and Rosalind J McDougall2 that many prostitutes suffer significant harms, and that these harms must be taken seriously. Having a background in public outreach for sex workers, I share this concern wholeheartedly.In the article to which Anderson and McDougall respond,3 I ask why prostitutes are harmed: are prostitutes harmed because prostitution itself is harmful or because of contingent ways in which prostitutes are socially and legally treated? This is an important question, since if (...) the latter is the case, then the widespread moral and legal campaign against prostitution, rather than being a legitimate response to something harmful, is itself the source of much suffering and distress. In my article, I argue at length that it is indeed our social and legal treatment of prostitutes that is the dominant source of harm.Neither Anderson nor McDougall seems to take issue with my rebuttal of the nine most central arguments in favour of the view that prostitution itself is harmful. They do, however, raise a number of more general issues, and I shall now address these.A worry raised by Anderson is that in defending the view that prostitution itself is not harmful, I am ‘abstracting away from key facts about the context in which prostitution takes place’, and as such, I ‘fail to recognize how contextual, historical and social’ prostitution really is. I think this is a good objection — so good, in fact, that I raise and discuss it in the article. I formulate the objection as follows: "[The objection] states that my argument is utopian: that prostitution is a complex practice deeply entrenched in a long line of other social and psychological issues, such as gender inequality, poverty, power hierarchies and exploitation, and that … ". (shrink)

Is prostitution immoral? In this book, Rob Lovering argues that it is not. Offering a careful and thorough critique of the many―twenty, to be exact―arguments for prostitution's immorality, Lovering leaves no claim unchallenged. Drawing on the relevant literature along with his own creative thinking, Lovering offers a clear and reasoned moral defense of the world's oldest profession. Lovering demonstrates convincingly, on both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist grounds, that there is nothing immoral about prostitution between consenting adults. The legal (...) implications of this view are also brought to bear on the current discourse surrounding this controversial topic. (shrink)

In her book The Myth of Sacred Prostitution in Antiquity, Stephanie Budin compiles and analyses an impressive array of literary sources which describe, or have been interpreted as describing, several practices that modern scholars have collectively and variously called sacred, ritual, cultic or temple prostitution. In general, as Budin explains, ‘[s]acred prostitution is the sale of a person's body for sexual purposes where some portion of the money or goods received for this transaction belongs to a deity (...) … usually Aphrodite’. Three major subtypes include ‘once-in-a-lifetime prostitution and/or sale of virginity in honor of a goddess’, activity that ‘involves women who are professional prostitutes and who are owned by a deity or a deity's sanctuary’, and ‘a temporary type of sacred prostitution, where the women are either prostitutes for a limited period of time before being married, or only prostitute themselves during certain rituals’. (shrink)

This article aims to present “the state of the question” concerning prostitution. The “state of the question” has a double meaning. On the one hand, it can mean the state of the debate. Treating it as such, one might be inclined to describe and evaluate the various positions by the conclusions they offer, e.g. for or against decriminalization, for or against the Nordic Model, etc. On the other hand, a deeper sense of “the state of the question” concerns what (...) question is it that people are asking and attempting to answer concerning prostitution. This paper is framed around this second sense. By analyzing the orienting question(s) which theorists think they are answering when they defend decriminalization, some form of legalization, or the Nordic model, we gain a powerful basis for understanding and critiquing the various positions on offer. In the end, I argue that the Nordic Model is superior in both its orienting method and its solution. (shrink)

Brecher argues that the practices of selling blood and kidneys are akin to the practices of prostitution and wage-labour since they all involve commodification and, by implication, should be subject to legal prohibition. I suggest that these practices need not involve commodification and that they should only be condemned if people are forced into them because of their lack of power. Rather than these practices being prohibited, I suggest that it would be preferable if they were subject to state (...) regulation in order to protect the weak from exploitation. (shrink)

It is so generally accepted that prostitution is immoral, that this is one of the least discussed of all ethical issues. Few serious philosophical treatments of the subject have been published. Of these, at least one, Lars Ericsson's, ‘Charges against Prostitution’, throws into stark relief the apparent inconsistency of our community attitudes. For it demonstrates that, from the point of view of the simple free market liberalism, to which many subscribe, there is nothing immoral about prostitution. The (...) prostitute is a free agent who sells his or her services on the market at the going price. Why should the exchange of sexual services for money be more unsavoury than other exchanges of fee for service? The desire for sexual gratification is natural, as is the desire for food. So prostitution must be morally on a par with catering. Yet it is hemmed about by restrictions. Prostitutes are social outcasts, they may be pitied but are more often vilified and despised. From the liberal point of view, the moral disgust aroused by prostitution can only be the expression of an archaic and irrational taboo. (shrink)

In 2000, the Netherlands became the first European country to legalize prostitution, a policy supported by Dutch feminists. It distinguishes forced from voluntary prostitution, defining the latter as ‘sex work’, in contrast to feminist positions viewing it as ‘sexual domination’. This article examines the discourses used by parliamentarians in the debates since the 1980s and charts the shift from a traditional moral view to the sex-work frame, creating new meanings of ‘ prostitutes’, ‘clients’ and ‘brothel keepers’ in the (...) process. The new discourse allows for an active female sex worker but desexualizes the nature of the prostitution exchange. Neither does it offer an account of why it is mainly men buying sex from women. The analysis also highlights the contradictions created by the forced/voluntary distinction when speaking of the trafficking of women from poor countries and current anti-migration discourse, as well as the near obliteration of the racial differences between ‘clients’ and ‘workers’ in parliamentary discourse. (shrink)

There has been considerable recent debate about prostitution in Europe that reflects concerns about health, employment and human rights. Legal changes are being introduced in many countries. We focus on two examples in order to discuss the likely implications. A new law in The Netherlands is normalizing aspects of the sex industry through decriminalizing both workers and businesses. In Sweden, on the other hand, prostitution is considered to be a social problem, and a new law criminalizes the purchasers (...) of sexual services in an attempt to reduce demand. Both reforms appear to have had their desired effect at one level; in The Netherlands, health and safety regulations will be introduced as in any other job, and EU sex workers gain full social, legal and employment rights; in Sweden there was initially a tenfold decrease in the numbers of women working visibly on the streets, and some workers have left the industry. However, in both countries, the new legislation has also driven some sex work underground. Many sex workers are excluded by the Dutch system and move underground to become effectively invisible to the authorities. In Sweden sex workers and their clients also become less visible in order that the latter can avoid sanction. Social and economic changes, such as increased migration and the growing use of the Internet will also render the sex industry less visible both to state regulation and to health care workers. The major problems of prostitution for the workers remain exploitation, stigma, abuse and criminalization. These are not unique to the industry, and can only be tackled effectively by the self-organization of sex workers into unions and rights groups, along with full decriminalization. An alternative vision is promised through self-organization and anti-racist actions by sex workers in Germany; normalization and workers’ rights are tackled alongside training programmes for those seeking alternatives. Policy makers throughout Europe would do well to look at their experience and not simply at the clash of legal reforms. (shrink)

This chapter examines applied ethics regarding prostitution and criminalization. It proceeds in three parts. Part one examines different ways of defining prostitution, part two reviews five objections to prostitution that have framed standard debates regarding criminalization, and part three examines issues that have arisen in ethical debates regarding prostitution and criminalization in recent decades. Along the way, the chapter illustrates the extent to which debates in applied ethics regarding the criminalization of prostitution depend in large (...) part on what prostitution is like in a given social context. Further, the chapter emphasizes that satisfactory answers to this question depend not only on empirical evidence but on ethical disagreements regarding underlying concepts such as choice, freedom, and consent. (shrink)

This article provides a comparative analysis of various methodologies employed in building arguments regarding prostitution law and policy, and reflects on the proper aims of legal philosophy more generally. Taking Peter de Marneffe’s Liberalism and Prostitution (OUP 2010 ) as a launching point for these reflections, the article offers a mostly favourable review of the book as a whole, and defends the philosophical method as one (amongst other) valuable ways to argue about prostitution.

Vernae—often but not exclusively taken to be home-born slaves—are usually thought to have had a privileged role within the ancient Roman household. While previous studies have highlighted how these individuals were represented with affection or as surrogate members of the freeborn family, this article uses epigraphic evidence from Pompeii to argue that the reality for at least some vernae was much more grim. A full examination of Pompeian attestations of the word verna reveals that there was a connection to (...) class='Hi'>prostitution in over seventy per cent of extant appearances of the noun. Furthermore, contextualizing this phenomenon within the corpus of prostitution-related graffiti more broadly reveals that verna was the single most commonly used descriptor in advertisements for sexual services at Pompeii. Ultimately, the epigraphic evidence from Pompeii suggests that vernae were not safe from sexual exploitation, and it may have been their status as vernae that made them attractive to those wishing to purchase sex. (shrink)

This contribution analyzes the views of Kant and Fichte on a topic that seems to be far removed from their main philosophical preoccupations: prostitution. Nevertheless, systematic links can be constructed between their major ethical and political presuppositions and their views on prostitution. To understand these views correctly, we must first reconstruct their views on sexuality and marriage. Only then will it become clear why they morally condemn prostitution. Yet moral condemnation does not yet tell us how the (...) legal system should fare with prostitutes and their clients. Whereas Kant is rather silent on this topic - merely saying that the pactum fornicationis should have no legal standing - Fichte draws a distinction between professional prostitutes and hobby prostitutes. Whereas the former are to be excluded from the community, the latter may be tolerated. (shrink)

There are few participants in academic or policy debates over prostitution who would disagree that steps should be taken to improve conditions for those working in prostitution; so Moen1 is in good and plentiful company with respect to his recommendations.I will focus here on the analysis leading up to his conclusions, and with whether it helps us understand why prostitution is so commonly harmful and what it would take to mitigate those harms.i On these matters I am (...) dubious. The question of whether or not prostitution is harmful would seem, manifestly, to be an empirical question, rather than a philosophical issue. I take it that Moen's aim is to clarify the evaluative task, and then to evaluate the arguments that can be made to show prostitution is harmful—tasks which philosophers can responsibly engage in. But I would suggest that Moen's approach to this particular subject oversimplifies it by abstracting away from key facts about the context in which prostitution takes place, and thus that it does not offer as strong a case for normalising prostitution as he hopes.The basic thesis of Moen's essay is that if casual sex is harmless , then the sale of casual sexual services for money is also harmless, or at …. (shrink)

Many “liberal,” or libertarian, accounts of prostitution assert that prostitution is no more intrinsically wrong or harmful than any other type of service work.1 I believe that prostitution violates the Kantian “principle of humanity,” because it reflects a disrespectful attitude, which is expressed in the nonchalant use of the human body as a mere means to achieve some goal.2 I hope to convince my readers, who may not share my moral presuppositions, that prostitution defies the limits (...) of respectful sexual relations, because it proffers a monetary substitute for mutual desire and concern and, hence, that it is a morally questionable and harmful activity.3 In support of these claims, I offer: 1) a discussion of Kantian morality and sexual ethics, 2) an explanation of the minimum criteria for respectful sexual relations, 3) a description of the general dynamic of prostitution, 4) an analysis of the client’s objective, and 5) a phenomenology of prostituted sex. (shrink)

I discuss five lines of argument for the claim that prostitution is wrong: (1) the condemnation of prostitution by positive morality; (2) paternalist objections to it; (3) the claim that some things just aren't for sale and that sex is one of them, which is based either on the view of sex as essentially tied to procreation and marriage, or on the conception of sex as bound up with love; (4) the radical feminist critique of prostitution as (...) a practice that degrades women, and (5) is implicated in the oppression of women. I try to show that none of these objections is valid, and that we still lack a good argument to support the widespread condemnation of prostitution. (shrink)