Léon Brunschvicg's contribution to philosophical thought in fin-de-siècle France receives full explication in the first English-language study on his work. Arguing that Brunschvicg is crucial to understanding the philosophical schools which took root in 20th-century France, Pietro Terzi locates Brunschvicg alongside his contemporary Henri Bergson, as well as the range of thinkers he taught and influenced, including Lévinas, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, and Sartre. Brunschvicg's deep engagement with debates concerning spiritualism and rationalism, neo-Kantian philosophy, and the role of mathematics in (...) philosophy made him the perfect supervisor for a whole host of nascent philosophical ideas which were forming in the work of his students. Terzi outlines Brunchvicg's defence of neo-Kantian judgement, historical analysis and the inextricability of the natural and humanist sciences to any rigorous system of philosophy, with wide-ranging implications for contemporary scholarship. (shrink)

This article examines the ethics of ambiguity formulated by existentialist authors in the 1940s, linking it to turn-of-the-century debates on ethics between philosophy and the social sciences. The underlying thesis is that, rather than representing a radical conceptual novelty, the ethical thought of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, strained between freedom and situation, constitutes a revisiting and updating of philosophical positions from the landscape of the Third Republic. To demonstrate this, the thought of Frédéric Rauh is examined. Indeed, anticipating (...) what de Beauvoir would later call “ambiguity”, Rauh sought to develop an ethics of action that would constitute a third way between sociological objectivism and the empty abstractions of idealism and rationalism. By reconstructing the transitions from one generation and historical context to the next, the article shows how, and through which mediators, the existentialists were well aware of this debate and, in their own way, developed a philosophy of action, of ethical experience, similar to Rauh’s. (shrink)

Al lettore che nella produzione speculativa di Anselmo si sofferma in modo particolare su De veritate, De libertate arbitrii, De casu diaboli e De concordia, la volontà si manifesta come un indiscutibile centro di interesse della riflessione anselmiana, tesa a determinare teoreticamente il valore e l'efficacia della iustitia, intesa come rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata, in ambito etico ed ontologico. La voluntas si presenta così quale protagonista del rapporto tra Dio e creatura, tra natura, storia ed eternità, perché è proprio (...) mediante gli atti volontari che la creatura può inserirsi od opporsi attivamente al rectus ordo della creazione, che a sua volta costituisce come una forma di libera oggettivazione del farsi altro da sé, rimanendo se stessa, della summa rectitudo. Attraverso questo movimento la rectitudo e la recta voluntas divina si pongono e si mostrano come l'essenza della realtà. Rivelando voluntas e rectitudo una valenza ad un tempo etica e metafisica, si potenzia il significato della volontà come responsabilità e come agente intrinsecamente libero che Anselmo le attribuisce. La voluntas, che vuole perché vuole, si sottrae al regno della necessità e si impone, in quanto artefice di libertà, come la protagonista aporetica della relazione tra la stabilità dell'ordine della realtà e la novità della storia, inchiodando Anselmo, amante della necessità razionale, alla celebrazione di una forza decisiva e ultimativa, che sembra sfuggire al pieno controllo della ratio. (shrink)

Microalgae in the wild often form consortia with other species promoting their own health and resource foraging opportunities. The recent application of microalgae cultivation and deployment in commercial photobioreactors (PBR) so far has focussed on single species of algae, resulting in multi-species consortia being largely unexplored. Reviewing the current status of PBR ecological habitat, this article argues in favor of further investigation into algal communication with conspecifics and interspecifics, including other strains of microalgae and bacteria. These mutualistic species form the (...) ‘phycosphere’: the micro-environment surrounding microalgal cells, potentiating the production of certain metabolites through biochemical interaction with cohabitating microorganisms. A better understanding of the phycosphere could lead to novel PBR configurations, capable of incorporating algal-microbial consortia, potentially proving more effective than single-species algal systems. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty’s relationship with his Sorbonne professor Léon Brunschvicg is usually disregarded or mentioned by scholars as a mere anecdote. Moreover, the rare discussions of the latter’s “critical idealism” usually take at face value Merleau-Ponty’s partial and biased account. In contrast, this paper argues that in order to understand the genesis of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, it is necessary to reassess Brunschvicg’s idealism and his views on the relationship between perception and scientific knowledge. Particular attention is drawn to a specific chapter of Brunschvicg’s (...) masterwork L’Expérience humaine et la causalité physique, entitled “Théorie intellectualiste de la perception”. Therein is articulated the theory of perception that Merleau-Ponty never ceased to contest, and of which his entire oeuvre constitutes a reversal. However, far from highlighting only the elements of opposition, the author also points out the thematic continuity that survives the generational gap between the two authors. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth of the Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient to ground and justify perceptual knowledge. Sellars showed that in order to accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources and capacities, such as those involved in using concepts, are needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs to the space of reasons and not to an independent realm of experience. Dan Hutto and Eric Myin have recently presented the Hard Problem of Content as an (...) ensemble of reasons against naturalistic accounts of content. In a nutshell, it states that covariance relations—even though they are naturalistically acceptable explanatory resources—do not constitute content. The authors exploit this move in order to promote their preferred radical enactivist and anti-representationalist option, according to which, basic minds—the lower stratum of cognition—do not involve content. Although it is controversial to argue that the Hard Problem of Content effectively dismisses naturalistic theories of representation, a central aspect of it—the idea that information as covariance does not suffice to explain content—finds support among the defenders of classical cognitive representationalism, such as Marcin Miłkowski. This support—together with the acknowledgment this remark about covariance is a point already made by Sellars in his criticism of the Myth of the Given—has a number of interesting implications. Not only is it of interest for the debates about representationalism in cognitive science, where it can be understood as an anticipatory move, but it also offers some clues and insights for reconsidering some issues along Sellarsian lines—a conflation between two concepts of representation that is often assumed in cognitive science, a distinction between two types of relevant normativities, and a reconsideration of the naturalism involved in such explanations. (shrink)