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A Real Contrast

Analysis 47 (4):207 - 208 (1987)

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  1. Contrastivism and non‐contrastivism in scientific explanation.Yafeng Shan - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (8):e12613.
    The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanations have to be contrastive in nature (contrastivism). However, others argue that no scientific explanation is genuinely contrastive (non-contrastivism). In addition, a compatibilist view has been recently devloped. It is argued that the debate between contrastivism and non-contrastivism is merely a linguistic dispute rather than a genuine disagreement on the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are both contrastive and non-contrastive in some sense (compatibilism). This paper examines the (...)
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  • In memoriam: Peter Lipton.Tim Lewens - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (2):133-139.
  • Quantum java: The upwards percolation of quantum indeterminacy.Bruce Glymour, Marcelo Sabatés & Andrew Wayne - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (3):271 - 283.
  • Self-forming actions, contrastive explanations, and the structure of the will.Neil Campbell - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1225-1240.
    Robert Kane’s libertarian theory is often attacked on the grounds that undetermined self-forming actions are not amenable to contrastive explanation. I propose that we should understand contrastive explanations in terms of an appeal to structuring causes. Doing so reveals that Kane’s claim that there can be no contrastive explanation for self-forming actions is not an unwanted implication of his appeal to indeterminism, but is actually an implication of the fact that the agent’s will is not yet appropriately structured. I then (...)
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  • Why P rather than q? The curiosities of fact and foil.Eric Barnes - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (1):35 - 53.
    In this paper I develop a theory of contrastive why questions that establishes under what conditions it is sensible to ask "why p rather than q?". p and q must be outcomes of a single type of causal process.
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  • Inference to the loveliest explanation.Eric Barnes - 1995 - Synthese 103 (2):251 - 277.