This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

Responding to volatile criticisms frequently leveled at Leo Strauss and those he influenced, the prominent contributors to this volume demonstrate the profound influence that Strauss and his students have exerted on American liberal democracy and contemporary political thought. By stressing the enduring vitality of classic books and by articulating the theoretical and practical flaws of relativism and historicism, the contributors argue that Strauss and the Straussians have identified fundamental crises of modernity and liberal democracy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Liberalism, Art, and FundingDale Francis MurrayLiberalism, Art, and FundingSince Ronald Dworkin published A Matter of Principle, a host of critics have attempted to systematically dismantle his arguments advocating state support for the arts that appear in a chapter entitled, "Can a Liberal State Support Art?"1 The combined critical force of Noël Carroll, Samuel Black, and most recently, Harry Brighouse, has dislodged the main supports of Dworkin's position on (...) this subject.2 However, while I am skeptical that the arguments of liberals who endorse state support for the arts can be fully resurrected, I reckon that a few remarks can be presented to try to deflect at least a fraction of the contentions cast on Dworkin's argument by the critics listed above. In order to refine our understanding of precisely why state support for cultural expression should or should not be permitted, it is imperative that some sort of response to the critics of state support for the arts is offered.In this essay, I focus primarily on Brighouse's objections that Dworkin's arguments supporting arts funding fail primarily because they are not sensitive enough to the ways in which such support violates two demands of justice in a liberal state — state neutrality and publicity. I examine these two objections since they seem to be the most interesting, compelling, and damaging to Dworkin's case if substantiated. If Brighouse is correct, these violations act as heavy bulwarks against state support for arts funding, especially since public distrust of the state's intent (and the state's perceived advocacy of notions of the good with which the public disagrees) is high. I will employ Brighouse's neutrality of intent constraint, because it best represents the alleged specific violations of state neutrality that may undermine Dworkin's case. Additionally, neutrality of intent is the most plausible form of neutrality for advocates of public arts funding to build a case for in the space of a short essay.I also wish to make a distinction, which for the most part, is ignored by Dworkin's critics — that there is a degree to which moral value and aesthetic value are different and that this effects a possible alternative reading of the term "ways of life" as most liberals understand it. As a final note of preface, I will assume that the background conditions of income and wealth are just.3 This proviso will become important when we examine the role of the market in funding arts projects in lieu of the government. Now let us reiterate the two requirements of any just liberal state that are at issue when considering the legitimacy of state support for the arts. [End Page 116]Brighouse sets the pair of constraints on any just liberal state (neutrality and publicity) as the centerpieces of his essay. Neutrality of intent, that he appeals to more specifically, can be understood to mean, as Brighouse himself explains, "[T]hat while it is unobjectionable that state actions will have differential effects on conceptions of the good, the government should not intend to favor some conceptions over others" (NPS, 38, emphasis mine). The publicity constraint can be characterized by saying that in any just, liberal regime, justice must not only be done, but it must also be seen as being done. While this serves as the motto of the publicity constraint, it is significant to acknowledge that it stipulates that the real reasons for governmental action must be comprehensible to, and available for inspection by, reasonable citizens. In addition, it must be readily apparent to citizens that the demands of justice are being met. I will return to this constraint on the state later in this essay.Neutrality is of chief interest, since recent liberal political philosophers have emphasized the primacy of the right over the good (RLD, 245). Presumably, individuals, via their rational autonomy, shall define the good for themselves beyond the dictates of government. Our morality is our own personal affair, just so long as we remain within the confines of the harm principle and do not violate the equal liberty of others.On the surface, it is not apparent that state funding for the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Liberalism, Art, and FundingDale Francis MurrayLiberalism, Art, and FundingSince Ronald Dworkin published A Matter of Principle, a host of critics have attempted to systematically dismantle his arguments advocating state support for the arts that appear in a chapter entitled, "Can a Liberal State Support Art?"1 The combined critical force of Noël Carroll, Samuel Black, and most recently, Harry Brighouse, has dislodged the main supports of Dworkin's position on (...) this subject.2 However, while I am skeptical that the arguments of liberals who endorse state support for the arts can be fully resurrected, I reckon that a few remarks can be presented to try to deflect at least a fraction of the contentions cast on Dworkin's argument by the critics listed above. In order to refine our understanding of precisely why state support for cultural expression should or should not be permitted, it is imperative that some sort of response to the critics of state support for the arts is offered.In this essay, I focus primarily on Brighouse's objections that Dworkin's arguments supporting arts funding fail primarily because they are not sensitive enough to the ways in which such support violates two demands of justice in a liberal state — state neutrality and publicity. I examine these two objections since they seem to be the most interesting, compelling, and damaging to Dworkin's case if substantiated. If Brighouse is correct, these violations act as heavy bulwarks against state support for arts funding, especially since public distrust of the state's intent (and the state's perceived advocacy of notions of the good with which the public disagrees) is high. I will employ Brighouse's neutrality of intent constraint, because it best represents the alleged specific violations of state neutrality that may undermine Dworkin's case. Additionally, neutrality of intent is the most plausible form of neutrality for advocates of public arts funding to build a case for in the space of a short essay.I also wish to make a distinction, which for the most part, is ignored by Dworkin's critics — that there is a degree to which moral value and aesthetic value are different and that this effects a possible alternative reading of the term "ways of life" as most liberals understand it. As a final note of preface, I will assume that the background conditions of income and wealth are just.3 This proviso will become important when we examine the role of the market in funding arts projects in lieu of the government. Now let us reiterate the two requirements of any just liberal state that are at issue when considering the legitimacy of state support for the arts. [End Page 116]Brighouse sets the pair of constraints on any just liberal state (neutrality and publicity) as the centerpieces of his essay. Neutrality of intent, that he appeals to more specifically, can be understood to mean, as Brighouse himself explains, "[T]hat while it is unobjectionable that state actions will have differential effects on conceptions of the good, the government should not intend to favor some conceptions over others" (NPS, 38, emphasis mine). The publicity constraint can be characterized by saying that in any just, liberal regime, justice must not only be done, but it must also be seen as being done. While this serves as the motto of the publicity constraint, it is significant to acknowledge that it stipulates that the real reasons for governmental action must be comprehensible to, and available for inspection by, reasonable citizens. In addition, it must be readily apparent to citizens that the demands of justice are being met. I will return to this constraint on the state later in this essay.Neutrality is of chief interest, since recent liberal political philosophers have emphasized the primacy of the right over the good (RLD, 245). Presumably, individuals, via their rational autonomy, shall define the good for themselves beyond the dictates of government. Our morality is our own personal affair, just so long as we remain within the confines of the harm principle and do not violate the equal liberty of others.On the surface, it is not apparent that state funding for the... (shrink)

The essays in this volume blend historical and philosophical reflection with concern for contemporary political problems. They show that the causes and motivations of civil religion are a permanent fixture of the human condition, though some of its manifestations and proximate causes have shifted in an age of multiculturalism, religious toleration, and secularization.

Ira Brevis furor, said the Latins: anger is a brief bout of madness. There is a long tradition that views all emotions as threats to rationality. The crime passionnel belongs to that tradition: in law it is a kind of “brief-insanity defence.” We still say that “passion blinds us;” and in common parlance to be philosophical about life's trials is to be decently unemotional about them. Indeed many philosophers have espoused this view, demanding that Reason conquer Passion. Others — from (...) Hume to the Emotivists — have appeared to reverse this hierarchy.” But those philosophers who refuse to join in the general denigration of emotion as irrational usually share the presupposition that the role of rationality is limited to the calculation of means. In so far as emotions are concerned with the determination of ends, they remain, on this view, beyond the pale of rationality. Modern decision theorists have worked out schemes to assess the rationality of desires, as well as actions, against the background of beliefs and other desires.1 But these schemes leave no room at all for emotions, except, by implication, as disrupters of the rational process. (shrink)

To make abstractions hold good in actuality means to destroy actuality.

We show in ZFC that if there is no proper class inner model with a Woodin cardinal, then there is an absolutely definablecore modelthat is close toVin various ways.

In this paper, we sketch the development of two important themes of modern set theory, both of which can be regarded as growing out of work of Kurt Gödel. We begin with a review of some basic concepts and conventions of set theory.§0. The ordinal numbers were Georg Cantor's deepest contribution to mathematics. After the natural numbers 0, 1, …, n, … comes the first infinite ordinal number ω, followed by ω + 1, ω + 2, …, ω + ω, (...) … and so forth. ω is the first limit ordinal as it is neither 0 nor a successor ordinal. We follow the von Neumann convention, according to which each ordinal number α is identified with the set {ν ∣ ν α} of its predecessors. The ∈ relation on ordinals thus coincides with <. We have 0 = ∅ and α + 1 = α ∪ {α}. According to the usual set-theoretic conventions, ω is identified with the first infinite cardinal ℵ0, similarly for the first uncountable ordinal number ω1 and the first uncountable cardinal number ℵ1, etc. We thus arrive at the following picture:The von Neumann hierarchy divides the class V of all sets into a hierarchy of sets Vα indexed by the ordinal numbers. The recursive definition reads: ;Vλ = ∪v<λVv for limit ordinals λ. We can represent this hierarchy by the following picture. (shrink)

Hart's "Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" is where we find perhaps the first clear pronouncement of defeasibility and the technical introduction of the term. The paper has been criticised, disavowed, and never quite fully redeemed. Its lurid history is now being used as an excuse for dismissing the importance of defeasibility.

This paper critically evaluates the celebrated paper of Hanks and McDermott on temporal projection, non-monotonic reasoning, and the frame problem. First I argue against their intuitions, and a fortiori, against their proposed solution. Next, I suggest how the solution they desire could be obtained, were they willing to represent the problem a bit differently.

Résumé L’une des théories les plus répandues concernant le rapport de l’art à l’éthique s’appelle parfois la Vicarious Experience Theory. Cette approche basée sur la notion d’une expérience par procuration va toutefois avoir du mal à expliquer la valeur (morale ou autre) de tout art « abstrait », non figuratif et/ou non narratif. Il faudrait alors démontrer que l’art (abstrait ou pas) provoque également une expérience directe – et non pas uniquement une expérience par procuration – et que cette expérience (...) directe est toujours déjà « métaéthique ». Cet effet méta-éthique serait inscrit au sein d’une définition (pragmatiste, pluraliste et institutionnelle) de l’art dans son ensemble, alors que la théorie de l’expérience par procuration s’appliquerait uniquement à quelques arts. Je compte défendre cette thèse par un examen des écrits et des pratiques d’Olafur Eliasson. (shrink)

Le concept d’authenticité sert de base à la valorisation de la thématique de « l’identité » qui domine aujourd’hui. Anish Kapoor présente toutes les garanties de cette « hybridité » actuellement très à la mode. Toutefois, il résiste explicitement à toute tentative de « mise en boîte » qui le cantonnerait à l’expression d’une quelconque « indianité ». Kapoor est connu pour l’aspect sensoriel et aléatoire de son travail. Shooting into the Corner est un excellent exemple d’une œuvre qui évacue (...) l’identification culturelle ; elle trouble par ailleurs les catégories goodmaniennes habituelles d’autographique et d’allographique. Son slogan – « Je n’ai rien à dire » – semble confirmer ce rejet de l’authenticité. Je compte démontrer que même l’aléatoire et l’auto-engendré sont reliés au critère d’authenticité, si cette notion repose sur l’intentionnalité et « l’intensionnalité » de l’œuvre d’art. Redéfini ainsi, le concept d’authenticité deviendrait une « règle constitutive » de notre institution. (shrink)

Employee relations ethics, or the lack thereof, is a problem and an issue in both private and public organizations. This article is a case study in military ERE. A retired career Naval officer, I discuss problems of downsizing and retrenchment from a "military" perspective in terms of what I refer to as a "broken covenant.".

In a market place crowded with practical rhetoric books what educational value could a challenging work such as Kenneth Burke’s A Rhetoric of Motives possibly have? Burke knows but doesn’t use the terminology of the classical art and rather than analysing the persuasive rhetoric of well-known speeches to equip us with strategies, he weaves his way around literary texts, teasing out meanings that their authors something intended, sometimes did not. Yet, despite such difficulties, A Rhetoric of Motives is a practical (...) rhetoric book. It is just that its process of explication teaches us to think well. This essay tries to explain Burke’s rethinking of the purpose and contents of a traditional teaching tool—the rhetorical handbook—and defends the value of literary-rhetorical reading that aims to ‘equip’ citizens to think openly. (shrink)

This essay notes a resurgence of interest in rhetorical studies on the appeal of form, grounded in the work of rhetorical theorist Kenneth Burke. The essay argues that form is not only a way to structure discourses, it is a way to structure experience. Form is foundational in creating perceptions and thus experiences. Form is also highly rhetorical, in that how we structure our world carries social and ideological implications. The essay thus argues that an understanding of form as foundational (...) and rhetorical should be central to the educational curriculum. This way of understanding form is then a way of making rhetoric central to education in ways surpassing even the efforts of the ancient Greeks and Romans. A rhetorically centered curriculum based on teaching students how to understand form in their lives is empowering and liberating for students at the same time that it instills in them a strong awareness of ethics. (shrink)

This essay takes a rhetorical pragmatist perspective on current questions concerning educational goals and pedagogical practices. It begins by considering some challenges to rhetorical approaches to education, placing those challenges in the theoretical context of their posing. The essay then describes one current rhetorical approach—based on Kenneth Burke’s dramatism and logology—and uses it to understand and redescribe another rhetorical approach—Jesuit teaching of eloquentia perfecta. Proceeding in this way, the essay presents both a general theoretical framework for discussing educational aims and (...) a specific practical example of how such aims might be achieved. (shrink)

Disturbed by these acrimonious arguments, the authors - former colleagues and university-press board members - embarked on an ambitious project to reexamine a number of major literary and philosophical works dealing with the liberal arts and education. With their discussions ranging from Plato to Rousseau, from Cicero to Vico, from Erasmus to Matthew Arnold, Sousa and Weinsheimer offer not a history of education philosophy but an examination of the present.

The essential nature of legislative power is to make the laws; that of executive power is to execute those law. The difference between the two is both substantial and significant; it is the difference between the rule of arbitrary power and the rule of law. This paper will seek to trace the genesis of an independent judicial power, in both theory and practice, through an examination of sections of The Constitutions of Clarendon, The Assize of Clarendon, Hobbes’ Leviathan, Locke’s Second (...) Treatise, Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws, as well as The Federalist Papers. Moreover, it will seek to establish its executive nature and to explain why it is so often (at least presently) misunderstood to be akin to the legislative power. (shrink)

An extremely important Jewish writer and thinker of the first century AD, Philo of Alexandria exercised through his ideas and language a lasting influence on the development and growth of Christianity in the New Testament period and later. This book provides an introduction to the major themes and ideas in the religious and philosophical thinking of Philo and outlines the importance of his thought by means of introductory treatments and sections of freshly translated text and commentary. Dr Williamson illustrates in (...) his work the place and significance of Philo within Judaism and as part of the background to Christianity, and so provides a valuable resource for scholars and students in this area of study. (shrink)

Biological type specimens are a particular kind of voucher specimen stored in natural history collections. Their special status and practical use are discussed in relation to the description and naming of taxonomic zoological diversity. Our current system, known as Linnaean nomenclature, is governed by the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature. The name of a species is fixed by its name-bearing type specimen, linking the scientific name of a species to the type specimen first designated for that species. The name-bearing type (...) specimen is not necessarily a typical example of the species, while establishment of the boundaries of a species requires empirical taxonomic studies. The International Code of Zoological Nomenclature allows for the naming of new species in the absence of preserved specimens. However, photos and DNA sequences should not function as primary type material, while new species should not be described and named without deposition of at least one type specimen in a collection. Philosophically, species are individuals, spatiotemporally restricted entities. Therefore, Linnaean species names are proper names, which do not define the taxon but serve as a label, providing an ostensive definition of a species. Paratypes have no name-bearing function but, nevertheless, are highly valued specimens in natural history collections. Paratypes should be restricted to those specimens originating from the same sample as the holotype. Diagnosis of a species taxon involves establishment of a connection between a Linnaean name and determination of the boundaries of the species. A first step in this process is the choice of an appropriate species concept. It is not the examination of holotypes and paratypes that necessarily provides the best estimate of the taxonomic boundaries of a species, but this is facilitated by a set of voucher specimens known as the hypodigm. Dissatisfaction with the present nomenclatural code led some researchers to propose emendations. Other taxonomists suggested abandoning Linnaean nomenclature and proposed the alternative PhyloCode, albeit that it relegates the naming of species taxa to the traditional nomenclatural codes. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:François H. Lapointe PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY ThL· survey is limited to articles written in English that have appeared in journals published between 1 January 1974 and 31 December 1976. Abbott, Don. "Marxist Influences on the Rhetorical Theory of Kenneth Burke." Philosophy and Rhetoric 7 (1974): 217-33. Abel, Lionel. "Jacques Derrida: His 'Difference' With Metaphysics." Salmagundi no. 25 (1974): 3-21. Adamowski, T. H. "Character and Consciousness: D. (...) H. Lawrence, Wilhelm Reich, and Jean-Paul Sartre." University of Toronto Quarterly 43 (1974): 31 1-34. Adams, D. J. "Style and Social Ideas in Jacques le fataliste." Studies in Voltaire & the Eighteenth Century 124 (1974): 231-48. Adams, Hazard. "Contemporary Ideas of Literature: Terrible Beauty or Rough Beast?" Contemporary Literature 17 (1976): 349-77. Adorno, Theodor W. "Lyric Poetry and Society." Telos no. 20 (1974): 56-71. Ages, Arnold. "Bonald and the Jews." Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa 44 (1974): 32-43. Allen, Diogenes. "The Experience of Existence: Jean-Paul Sartre and Iris Murdoch." International Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1974): 181-87. Allen, Marcus. "Character Development in the Oreste of Voltaire and Les Mouches of Jean-Paul Sartre." CLA Journal 18 (1974): 1-21. Alter, Jean. "A (Terrorist) System of the Novel." Diacritics 6 (1976): 10-15. Altieri, Charles. "Wittgenstein on Consciousness and Language: A Challenge to Derridean Literary Theory." MLN 91 (1976): 1397-1423. Altieri,Charles. "Wordsworth's 'Preface' as Literary Theory." Criticism 18 (1976): 122-146. [On Wordworth and Wittgenstein.] Ames, Van Meter. "Art for Art's Sake Again?" Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1975): 303-307. Appleman, Philip. "The Dread Factor: Eliot, Tennyson, and the Shaping of Science." Columbia Forum, N. S. 3 (1974): 32-38. Armstrong, Paul B. " E. M. Forster's Howard's End: The Existential Crisis of the Liberal Imagination." Mosaic 8 (1974): 183-99. Arnold, A. James. "La Condition humaine as Nietzschean Tragedy." Mélanges Malraux Miscellany 6 (1974): 15-24. 366 François H. Lapointe367 Aronson, Ronald. "L'Idiot de la famille: The Ultimate Sartre?" Telos no. 20 (1974): 90-107. Arthos, John. "Du Bartas, Petrarch and the Poetry of Deism." Rice University Studies 60 (1974): 1-17. Artz, Johannes. "Newman as Philosopher." International Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1976): 263-88. Ausmus, Harry J. "Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Language." The Midwest Quarterly 18 (1977): 169-86. Ayala, Francisco. "Ortega y Gasset, Literary Critic." Critical Inquiry 1 (1974): 395-414. Bakalar, H. Nicholas. "The Cartesian Legacy to the Eighteenth-century Grammarians." MLN 91 (1976): 698-721. Barnes, Hazel. "Apotheosis and Deification in Plato, Nietzsche and Huxley." Philosophy and Literature 1 (1976): 3-24. Baron, Dennis E. "Role Structure and the Language of Literature." Journal of Literary Semantics 4 (1975): 43-52. Barooskian, Vahan D. "The Aesthetics of the Russian Revolutionary Theatre 1917-1921." British Journal of Aesthetics 15 (1975): 99-117. Bart, B. F. "Hypercreativity in Stendhal and Balzac." Nineteenth Century French Studies 3 (1974-75): 18-39. Barthes, Roland. "An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative." New Literary History 6 (1975): 237-72. Bashford, Bruce. "The Rhetorical Method in Literary Criticism." Philosophy and Rhetoric 9 (1976): 133-46. Bass, Alan. "Time and the Witch: Femininity, Metapsychology and the Temporality of the Unconscious." MLN 91 (1976): 871-912. Bassett, Sharon. "Towards a Critique of Romanticism: Wordsworth, Pater and the 'Anima Mundi'." Criticism 17 (1975): 262-75. Batchelor, R. "Literature, Society and the Concept of Revolt." European Studies Review 5 (1975): 395-427. Battin, M. Pabst. "Aristotle's Definition of Tragedy in the Poetics, Part 1." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33 (1974): 155-70, and Part II in Ibid. 33 (1975): 293-302. Bauer, George. "Sartre and the 'Sugars' of History." L'Esprit Créateur 15 (1975): 377-86. Baumgarten, Murray. "The Historical Novel: Some Postulates." Clio 4 (1975): 173-82. Beauchamp, Gorman. "Gulliver's Return to the Cave: Plato's Republic and Book IV of Gulliver's Travels." The Michigan Academician 7 (1974): 201-10. Bennett, Jonathan. "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn." Philosophy 48 (1974): 123-34. Benzon, William. "Cognitive Networks and Literary Semantics." MLN 91 (1976): 952-82. Bergonzi, Bernard. "A Grid of Codes: Views of Structuralism." Encounter 45 (1975): 52-58. Berry, Wanda Warren. "The... (shrink)