Nancy Leys Stepan’s historical analysis of the analogical reasoning used in nineteenth century research on human variation highlights an interesting feature of scientific discourse: metaphors imported from larger society can negatively impact scientific practice. In this paper, I consider the roles of analogical reasoning in scientific practice and demonstrate how it can mislead the scientists relying on it. One way, the problem of ingrained analogy, results when the correspondences of a metaphor become entrenched in the minds of scientists. Previous solutions, (...) offered by Turbayne (1971) and Recker (2004, 2010), lack the resources to address the problem. Thus, I propose introducing novel critique from relevant outsiders as a method to mitigate the power of scientific metaphors to mislead. (shrink)

WE ARE FACED WITH GROWING POWERS OF MANIPULATION OF OUR HUMAN GENETIC MAKEUP. WHILE NOT DENYING THAT THESE POWERS CAN BE USED FOR GREAT GOOD, IT BEHOOVES US TO THINK NOW OF POSSIBLE UPPER LIMITS TO THE CHANGE THAT WE MIGHT WANT TO EFFECT. I ARGUE THAT THOUGHTS OF CHANGING THE HUMAN SPECIES INTO A RACE OF SUPERMEN AND SUPERWOMEN ARE BASED ON WEAK PREMISES. GENETIC FINE-TUNING MAY INDEED BE IN ORDER; WHOLESALE GENETIC CHANGE IS NOT.

Reason has regularly been portrayed and understood in terms of images and metaphors that involve the exclusion or denigration of some element-body, passion, nature, instinct-that is cast as "feminine." Drawing upon philosophical insight into metaphor, I examine the impact of this gendering of reason. I argue that our conceptions of mind, reason, unreason, female, and male have been distorted. The politics of "rational" discourse has been set up in ways that still subtly but powerfully inhibit the voice and agency of (...) women. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, theoretical discussions about metaphors have appeared with increasing frequency in the literature and, during the last fifteen years or so, such discussions have become more and more common in the methodology of economics. But what exactly is a metaphor? According to a tradition which dates back to Aristotle, a metaphor is the attribution to one object, A, of the name of another object, B, while this name or these qualities do not properly or normally belong (...) to A. Thus, a metaphor is present when a term used to describe A is a term which is already commonly used to name B. Defined in such a way, one must admit that metaphors are frequently found in economics as well as in other sciences. Let us consider, for example, a term like ‘elasticity’ which is extensively used by economists. According to the ordinary dictionary definition, this word designates a property of bodies by which they recover their initial form after having been submitted to a pressure; in a less technical sense, it refers to the flexibility of some bodies or to their responsiveness to pressures. (shrink)

Metaphors are expressions in artificial, contrived, alien languages, and we understand metaphors by constructing translation schemes linking our natural, literal languages to these theoretically contrived metaphorical languages. The relation between a literal natural language and a metaphorical contrived language is like the relationship between a natively known language and a system of subsequently acquired languages etymologically emerging from that basic natural language. This model for understanding metaphorically contrived language is kin to the familiar model explaining how speakers of a language (...) such as Latin may come to decipher a language like Spanish through projecting to Spanish what they know of Latin without the aid of a translation manual. A metaphor is, thus, seen as a sentence in a nonnatural language, itself derived from and at least partially translatable with the natural, literal language of the metaphor's author or audience. (shrink)

The language used to talk about computers is uniquely colorful and sometimes extraordinarily difficult. This paper examines ‘computer discourse’ and points out its highly metaphorical nature. While the use of metaphor is unavoidable, it often leads, especially in informal settings, to the mannered use of words we call jargon. Metaphor becomes jargon when it is used too literally in a self-conscious manner. Experts often use their metaphors as though they were literally true. Technical details fall away and the metaphor is (...) taken for the reality it represents. The less expert sometimes mimic the language they hear, in a self-conscious manner, without truly understanding it. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a formal theory of metaphors called Constrained Semantic Transference [CST]. We start from the assumptions that metaphors are characterized by the description of one domain, called the target domain, in terms of another domain, called the source domain; and that a metaphor works by transferring a set of structural relationships from the source domain to the target domain coherently.Starting from these assumptions, we formally define the concept of T-MAPs which are partial coherent mappings from the (...) source domain to the target domain. We also define two operators, called Augmentation and Positing Structure that extend a given T-MAP by adding new structure to the target domain. (shrink)

In this paper we start from the assumption that in a metaphor, or an analogy, some terms belonging to one domain (source domain) are used to refer to objects other than their conventional referents belonging to a possibly different domain (target domain). We describe a formalism, which is based on the First Order Predicate Calculus, for representing the knowledge structure associated with a domain and then develop a theory of Constrained Semantic Transference [CST] which allows the terms and the structural (...) relationships of the source domain to be transferred coherently across to the target domain. We show how metaphors and analogies can be characterized in CST in such a way that many of their cognitive properties con be explained.We then propose a theory of Approximate Semantic Transference [AST] which is a computational version of CST and is derived from it by replacing the coherency requirement with approximate coherency. We show how AST can be used as a basis for designing models of cognitive processes involved in comprehending metaphors and analogies. (shrink)

According to Kepler and Descartes, the geometry of the triangle formed by the two eyes when focused on a single point affords perception of the distance to that point. Kepler characterized the processes involved as associative learning. Descartes described the processes as a “ natural geometry.” Many interpreters have Descartes holding that perceivers calculate the distance to the focal point using angle-side-angle, calculations that are reduced to unnoticed mental habits in adult vision. This article offers a purely psychophysiological interpretation of (...) Descartes’s natural geometry. In his account of perceived limb position from the Treatise on Man, he envisioned a central brain state that controls ocular convergence and thereby co-varies with the distance from observer to object. A psychophysiological law relates the visual perception of distance to this brain state. Descartes also invokes more traditional theories of distance and size perception based on unnoticed judgments, yielding a hybrid account. (shrink)

Lev Vygotsky's research presented individual men tal processes as being determined by one's historically developed activity, both on a physical level (through labor) and on a mental level (through the use of psychological tools). In this study, the author reviews the translated research of Vygotsky and compares his use of the term psychological tools with research in the areas of metaphors and semiotics. Could these semiotic psychological tools be included in media sound bites and computer software to facilitate and enhance (...) learning? Because the author's research interests are in the area of instructional technology, the intention is to explore psychological theories, such as those of Vygotsky, to see how instructional technologists might use these theories. The ideal would be to incorporate theories into their design and create innovative technology programs that affect learning positively both in the United States and in other countries and cultures. (shrink)

Malone Dies marks the point where Samuel Beckett foremost turns to “metaphysical destruction” of “untrue self,” and Derrida’s critique of the notion of “self-presence” of the subject. In this article, I examine Beckett’s literary absurdities to his readers’ concerns of “abuse” through them. For this investigation Malone Dies posits a stream of conflicting “linguistic nihilism” to the concerns of deconstructing “untrue self,” arguably, which will reflect how abuse of Beckettian readers is stimulated. In this context, abuse is specific forms of (...) emotional tensions aroused by the readers encounter with the Beckettian intersubjectivity. In particular, the existential model of abuse will be analysed as a part of beyond “self-deconstruction” autonomy. (shrink)