Numerous studies have linked the consumption of violent audiovisual content to the increase of aggressive cognitions and behaviors. This research aims to clarify whether the possible harmful consequences of violent videogames might vary depending on an individual variable such as trait aggressiveness. A correlational study was carried out among 6,130 teenagers from two European countries, in which it became evident, by means of multiple regression analyses, that there was a positive correlation between the use of violent videogames and aggressive behavioral (...) intentions. More relevantly, these correlations were greater amongst those subjects with higher scores on the Aggression Scale. Finally, when analyzing the subjective experiences of users of violent videogames, the more aggressive individuals manifested a greater desire to imitate the characters of the interactive content, admitting that they ended up more agitated even when their initial objective was to relieve tension or relax. Practical and theoretical implications of those results are discussed. (shrink)

For a standard Finsler F on a manifold M, the domain is the whole tangent bundle T M and the fundamental tensor g is positive-definite. However, in many cases, these two conditions hold in a relaxed form only, namely one has either a psuedo-Finsler metric or a conic Finsler metric. Our aim is twofold. First, we want to give an account of quite a few subtleties that appear under such generalizations, say, for conic pseudo-finsler metrics. Second, we aim to provide (...) some criteria that determine when a pseudo-Finsler metric F obtained as a general homogeneous combination of Finsler metrics and one-forms is again a Finsler-metric -- or, more precisely, that the conic domain on which g remains positive-definite. Such a combination generalizes the known -metrics in different directions. Remarkably, classical examples of Finsler metrics are reobtained and extended, with explicit computations of their fundamental tensors. (shrink)

Un a d e la s proclama s má s escuchada s e n la s concentracione s de l 15- M e s qu e los ca r go s político s n o no s r ep r esentan . P ar a v eri f ca r s i es e reproch e est á justi f icado , e n este estudi o analizamo s primer o qu é deb e se r l a representació n (...) polític a e n u n Estad o democrático ; a continuación , y par a sabe r s i lo s representante s “no s representan” , no s f ijamos e n l a fo r m a e n qu e ha n sid o el e gidos , e n e l mod o e n e l qu e ejerce n s u funció n y e n las pre r r o gat iv a s que , e n teoría , garantiza n e l ejercici o d e es a función. (shrink)

Departing from the results achieved by Luis M. Girón-Negrón in his book on Alfonso de la Torre’s Visión Deleytable, we aim to enlarge and complete the presence of Maimonides’ Guide in the work of Alfonso de la Torre through the consideration of a series of central motives in the Visión. These motives, as indicated by the key words, show the converse substrate of the work as well as the intellectual affinity with the intellectualist tradition present in the 16th and 17th (...) centuries in such philosophers as Pomponazzi, Bruno and Spinoza. (shrink)

BackgroundMonitoring recovery–stress balance in sport is becoming more relevant to prevent training maladaptation and reach the optimal performance for each athlete. The use of questionnaires that identify the athlete’s recovery–stress state have much acceptance in sports due to reliability and useful, furthermore for its low cost. Identifying possible differences between sport modalities and sex is important to determine specific needs and possible intervention ways to keep a recovery–stress balance. The aim was to analyze the differences in the recovery–stress state and (...) mood states by sex and sport type during the competitive phase in young Mexican athletes. As a secondary objective, the psychometric properties of the Mexican version of the Recovery–Stress Questionnaire for Athletes were analyzed.MethodsA cross-sectional study was carried on with 461 athletes, 17.95 years old, from six sports disciplines. The RESTQ-Sport and Profile of Mood States were applied in a single moment. Differences by sex and sports modality were analyzed. RESTQ-Sport’s confirmatory factor analysis was performed after the stress and recovery theoretical structure of two stress and two recovery dimensions, and last, the concurrent validation with the POMS was carried on.ResultsSignificant differences by sex were found in the General Recovery and Sport Stress dimensions of the RESTQ-Sport as well as Vigor factor of the POMS, being higher for men; furthermore, both the Sport Recovery dimension of RESTQ-Sport and Cholera and the Fatigue and Depression factors from POMS also had differences by sport type, showing a less recovery and high stress for individual sport athletes. Goodness-of-fit indexes of the model for the RESTQ-Sport were acceptable. Pearson’s correlation between questionnaires was moderate.ConclusionThe recovery–stress state shows differences in the function of sex and sport modality. More special attention is suggested for women and individual sport athletes. The higher punctuation for men compared with women in sport stress dimension did not negatively affect the recovery–stress balance for male athletes. Finally, the Mexican context adaptation of the RESTQ-Sport provides a psychometric instrument suitable to assess the recovery–stress balance in Mexican athletes. (shrink)

Abordamos en este trabajo la imagen de Dios que nos revela el cántico evangélico del Magnificat (Lucas 1, 46-55) y la imagen de María que en él aparece. Partiendo de su contexto en la obra de Lucas y de un breve análisis exegético del cántico, los autores profundizan en sus claves teológicas en relación con dos núcleos: la imagen de Dios y la figura de María introducida por el evangelista. El trabajo concluye con una propuesta de relectura del Magnficat acorde (...) con nuestro tiempo, centrada en su dimensión profética y liberadora. (shrink)

La conocida obra Muʿǧam al-buldān (Diccionario de los países), terminada por el geógrafo y erudito Yāqūt al-Rūmī al-Ḥamawī (m. 626/1229) un año antes de su muerte, ofrece una valiosa información sobre los múltiples topónimos recogidos por este autor. Dicha información no se limita solo a los aspectos geográficos, sino también a los literarios y biográficos, y ha sido abordada en trabajos relacionados con al-Andalus. Mi propósito en el presente artículo es realizar una primera aproximación a la imagen que Yāqūt proyecta (...) del Mágreb a través de algunos ejemplos concretos, realizando un breve recorrido de las fuentes que empleó, entre las cuales destacó especialmente el geógrafo andalusí Abū ʿUbayd al-Bakrī (m. 487/1094), muy citado en toda la obra. (shrink)

En 1968 Raquel Carson comenzaba una revolución en el pensamiento, quizá una de las de mayor peso en la actualidad. En su libro "La primavera silenciosa" acusaba del deterioro ambiental al poder ilimitado del ser humano. La creencia surgida en la modernidad de que todo lo que el hombre decidía era en sí mismo lo mejor por haber sido fruto de una voluntad libérrima, daba primacía y legitimidad absoluta a su acción sobre la naturaleza. Surgieron con gran fuerza numerosos grupos (...) ecologistas que adoptaron un pensamiento que responde al nombre de "ecología profunda" o "Deep Ecology" descrito por primera vez por Arme Naess en un artículo publicado por la revista Inquiry y titulado "The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement". Los principios que proponía este movimiento (Naess 1984) pueden ser resumidos en ocho grandes puntos: 1) la vida de los seres no humanos es un valor en sí: 2) la riqueza y la diversidad de estas formas de vida son también valores en sí; 3) los seres humanos no pueden intervenir de manera destructiva en la vida; 4) a este respecto, la intervención humana actual es eminentemente excesiva; 5) por consiguiente, las reglas de juego deben ser radicalmente modificadas; 6) esta modificación radical debe hacerse tanto a nivel de las estructuras económicas como de las estructuras ideológicas y culturales; 7) a nivel ideológico, el cambio principal consiste en apreciar más la calidad de la vida que el goce de los bienes materiales; 8) las personas que acepten estos principios tienen la obligación de contribuir, directa o indirectamente a la realización de los cambios fundamentales que aquellos implican. (shrink)

Estamos siendo testigos de grandes avances tecnológicos y, a la vez, de grandes desastres naturales y sociales que nos impulsan a plantearnos cuáles son las causas últimas de la degradación natural ecológica. El abuso en el uso de los recursos tal vez pueda tener relación con el abuso en el uso de la tecnología; incluso ser causa de la gran desigualdad social en el acceso a bienes necesarios para llevar una vida digna, raíz de muchos conflictos sociales. La ecología es (...) una disciplina científica, pero cada vez es más habitual ampararse en este término para lanzar opiniones o generar un debate de ideologías de índole catastrofista que no hacen más que generar malestar social sin visos de solución práctica. Las reflexiones sobre la ecología nos parece que deben plantearse de una forma interdisciplinar, pero no de cualquier manera, sino respetando el estatuto epistemológico de cada área del saber. Cuidar el método científico, en el ámbito científico; el filosófico, en el suyo propio; e incluso el teológico. El tema de nuestra relación con la naturaleza nos afecta tan íntimamente que casi todas las áreas del conocimiento pueden decir algo al respecto. En el presente trabajo comenzamos ese diálogo y presentamos las ideas básicas desde las que se podría plantear un modo de actuar humano respetuoso para con los demás hombres y los demás seres de la naturaleza, que mejore nuestro modo de vivir y evite más daños y perjuicios. A esto nos referimos cuando hablamos de “ética ambiental”. La ecología nos toca de cerca porque tiene que ver con el modo de habitar nuestro mundo y las relaciones que tenemos con los demás seres vivos y no vivos. A fin de poder delinear las líneas principales de una ética orientada al medioambiente es preciso, en primer lugar, conocer los datos científicos sobre el tema; en segundo lugar, analizar los problemas graves que se están detectando y comprender que muchas de sus causas todavía son desconocidas y precisan de un estudio más detenido; finalmente, es conveniente revisar las alternativas de solución que nos orienten a llevar una vida mejor, donde se sugieran modos de obrar que no nos cierren el camino hacia ese destino común que tenemos como seres humanos, y que integre al resto de criaturas porque no somos los únicos seres vivientes del planeta. La propuesta de una “ética ambiental” apunta a considerar un verdadero “ecologismo solidario”. (shrink)

Cybersecurity aggregates are numerical data obtained by aggregation on features along a database of cybersecurity reports. These aggregates are obtained by integration of time-stamped tables using some recent results of non-standard calculus. Time-series of aggregates are shown to contain relevant information about the concrete system dealt with. Trend time series is also forecasted using known data-driven methods. Although absolute forecasting of trend time series is not obtained, a directional forecasting of trend time series is achieved thence validated by means of (...) a rolling cross validation scheme on a public database of Scareware reports. (shrink)

A partir de una encuesta por correo electrónico a estudiantes de Ingeniería en el SAI de la UAMA en un contexto de enseñanza remota forzado por la pandemia, se caracteriza la gestión de la docencia, desde la visión de los estudiantes, se realiza un diagnóstico de los aspectos relacionados. Es un estudio transversal con un análisis cualitativo y descriptivo de las respuestas. La gestión docente se ve afectada por factores inherentes al proceso, así como también por factores externos. Los resultados (...) obtenidos muestran que fue impactada fuertemente al realizarse el proceso totalmente vía remota especialmente, la comunicación e interacción alumno-profesor. (shrink)

After compulsory secondary education; many teenagers face the process of choosing a university degree. This process involves uncertainties referred to their personal abilities, interests, social expectations and professional future. The present work is aimed at determining whether the reasons behind the selection of a particular university degree differ depending on the chosen degree. Another objective is determining whether these reasons differ significantly according to gender. The sample comprises 983 students belonging to the area of social and legal sciences at the (...) University of Seville. The obtained results reveal the existence of four main reasons behind the selection of university degrees for which significant gender-related differences were observed: easy degree, job opportunities, high wages and provision of social services. Besides, these seven reasons are observed to differ widely in six of the considered degrees. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...) theories in the first section. Section 2 offers empirical evidence to the effect that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC is the neural correlate of HOTs. Section 3 shows the evidence we have of the deactivation of this brain area during dreams and, in section 4, I present my argument. Finally, I consider and rejoin two possible replies that my opponent can offer: the possibility of an alternative neural correlate of HOTs during dreams and the denial that we have phenomenally conscious experiences during sleep. (shrink)

This book brings together previously unpublished work which looks at issues concerning the foundations and applications of a prominent branch of virtue epistemology: “performance-based epistemology”. The chapters in Part I examine some foundational issues in the conceptual framework of PBE: the relations between apt success and luck; the connection between aptness and a safety condition for knowledge; the fallibility of competences; the kind of reliability needed for knowledge and justification; the nature of epistemic agency; and some ways of enriching the (...) basic conceptual framework of PBE. The chapters in Part II discuss the application of PBE to outstanding problems in contemporary epistemology, such as the nature of a priori intuition; internalist objections to epistemic externalism; the roles that epistemic agency is meant to play in the acquisition of knowledge; the value of second-order reflection; the nature of some epistemic incompetences; and the problem of epistemic circularity. (shrink)

Este trabajo examina parte del pensamiento de Kant de cara a precisar en qué sentido puede pensarse la universalidad como una exigencia para la filosofía moral y cómo las investigaciones de ese autor pueden contribuir a esclarecer esta cuestión. El análisis de los argumentos muestra algunas inconsistencias lógicas en el desarrollo del problema de la universalización moral que los especialistas han tratado de explicar, a partir de las cuales sugerimos que una alternativa de análisis gramatical al estilo de Wittgenstein puede (...) ayudar a clarificar. El trabajo es, pues, crítico y pro positivo y conlleva una interpretación programática de tesis kantianas. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)

There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish phenomenological and metaphysical disputes. Regarding the former, the contenders disagree on whether pre-reflective self-awareness (...) concerns the subject of experience or the experience itself. I first argue that such an awareness has to be indexical—de se or de mentis respectively—, and then show that de se awareness can straightforwardly address classical objec­tions against egological views, whereas de mentis awareness fails to support epistemological arguments in favor of non-egological ones. The metaphysical commitments of a phenomenologically egological view depend on what the corresponding de se awareness demands from reality. I consider two alternatives, the structural and the representational approach and offer some consid­erations in favor of the later and its prima facie neutrality with regard to the metaphysical dispute. (shrink)

Most people think indexical thought has special content (_de se_ content). However, it has been acknowledged that classical examples, such as those offered by Perry and Lewis, are insufficient to establish this conclusion. Ongoing discussions typically focus on first-person beliefs and their relationship to the explanation of successful behavior and linguistic practices. Instead, I want to direct attention to the phenomenal content of our conscious experiences and the largely neglected contribution that its comprehension can make to the way in which (...) first-person representation is understood. This paper offers a novel argument for both the existence and a specific interpretation of the essential indexicality thesis based on widely accepted assumptions regarding the relation between phenomenology and representation. Specifically, I will argue that if (i) two different individuals can have token experiences with the same phenomenology and ii) two token experiences of ordinary subjects with the same phenomenology have the same phenomenal content, then phenomenal content is_ de se _content of a particular kind: _perspectival de se_ content. (shrink)

This article interprets the accounts and testimonies of native Chilean Pentecostalism, from a philosophical approach. In these accounts Pentecostal dilemmas are expressed and that oppressed beings prove by the economical and social conditions that the Chilean society lived in the 20th century. These dilemmas manifest anguish produced by absurd, emptiness and loneliness; that rise due to illness, alcoholism and poverty, which leads the individual to critical situations that push him to choose being Pentecostal, stigmatized beings and socially excluded, or to (...) suffer and death. Once they have chosen being Pentecostal the symbolic exodus starts, interpreting the past, the society and individuality in a tragic way. (shrink)

Resumen: El Preámbulo del Código francés de 1804 anuncia un nuevo orden basado en la recta razón y en los valores político-jurídicos de la Revolución francesa, en un intento de sustituir el papel tradicional que las iglesias habían jugado en la moralidad de la sociedad. Es más, la nueva ley civil se presenta como un sustituto de la ley moral y de la religión con intención de ocupar su lugar en la nueva sociedad que alumbra. Aparece la norma unidimensional con (...) pretensión de regular todos los ámbitos de la vida y que, en de nitiva, acabará con la dicotomía pecado/delito Palabras clave: Derecho, religión, pecado, delito. (shrink)

El Preámbulo del Código francés de 1804 anuncia un nuevo orden basado en la recta razón y en los valores político-jurídicos de la Revolución francesa, en un intento de sustituir el papel tradicional que las iglesias habían jugado en la moralidad de la sociedad. Es más, la nueva ley civil se presenta como un sustituto de la ley moral y de la religión con intención de ocupar su lugar en la nueva sociedad que alumbra. Aparece la norma unidimensional con pretensión (...) de regular todos los ámbitos de la vida y que, en definitiva, acabará con la dicotomía pecado/delito. (shrink)

Resumen: El Preámbulo del Código francés de 1804 anuncia un nuevo orden basado en la recta razón y en los valores político-jurídicos de la Revolución francesa, en un intento de sustituir el papel tradicional que las iglesias habían jugado en la moralidad de la sociedad. Es más, la nueva ley civil se presenta como un sustituto de la ley moral y de la religión con intención de ocupar su lugar en la nueva sociedad que alumbra. Aparece la norma unidimensional con (...) pretensión de regular todos los ámbitos de la vida y que, en definitiva, acabará con la dicotomía pecado/delito Palabras clave: Derecho, religión, pecado, delito. (shrink)

El cuño técnico de la cultura actual ha desordenado el marco tradicional en el cual la imagen podía persistir. El ojo ordenador y la representación contemplativa tradicional fracasan ante la velocidad vertiginosa con que nos inundan hoy las imágenes: el ojo ya no ve, sólo vibra. El autor propone una Estética del vértigo, cuyo propósito es volver a lograr un encuentro entre la concepción tradicional de las imágenes, lo cual significa hoy una defensa de la pintura, y la presencia evanescente (...) propia del vértigo técnico de las imágenes actuales. Esa Estética del vértigo aboga de nuevo por una facultad de juzgar rejlexionante, capaz de afrontar la finitud con sobriedad y pragmatismo. (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is (...) misguided—at least on the reading that the conceivability arguments require—and hence that the arguments are unsupported. This, in turn, alleviates the Hard Problem but leaves us with what I think is a not easy problem. (shrink)