This book addresses fundamental questions about marriage in moral and political philosophy. It examines promise, commitment, care, and contract to argue that marriage is not morally transformative. It argues that marriage discriminates against other forms of caring relationships and that, legally, restrictions on entry should be minimized.

ABSTRACT This paper explores the background to Mill’s feminist thought by relating his Subjection of Women to his early piece ‘On Marriage’ and three contemporary essays that were written among the radical Unitarian community of South Place Chapel by Harriet Taylor Mill, William Bridges Adams, and William Johnson Fox. It seeks to demonstrate that Mill’s Subjection of Women still has close ties with the earlier feminist thought of the South Place Chapel circle. Specifically, it will show that key arguments (...) like the characterisation of marriage as slavery, the pernicious moral effects of gendered education, and the social benefits of women’s liberation feature in the early essays by Mill himself, Harriet Taylor Mill, William Bridges Adams, and William Johnson Fox as well as in Mill’s Subjection. (shrink)

This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist nor (...) virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage as an example. (shrink)

SummaryPedigree structures of 161 uncle/niece-aunt/nephew and 4420 first cousin consanguineous marriages registered during the 19th and 20th centuries in two large and very different Spanish regions have been analysed and their genetic consequences evaluated. The frequencies of the different pedigree subtypes within each degree of relationship were quite similar in both populations despite significant heterogeneity in inbreeding patterns. The mean X-linked inbreeding coefficient for each type of cousin mating was calculated and compared to that expected for autosomal genes. The effect (...) of genealogical structure on theFx/Fradio was compared to different cultural populations worldwide. Preferentiality and avoidance of close consanguinity along with specific types of pedigrees are discussed on the basis of premarital migration and sociocultural rules still deeply rooted in certain human groups. By admitting that the observedFxcoefficient is usually higher thanFin most human populations some remarks have been made in terms of population genetic risk. (shrink)

This is a review of Elizabeth Brake's book Minimizing Marriage: Marriage, Morality, and the Law (Oxford University Press, 2012).

_Marriage and Morals_ is a compelling cross-cultural examination of individual, familial and societal attitudes towards sex and marriage. By exploring the codes by which we live our sexual lives and conventional morality, Russell daringly sets out a new morality, shaped and influenced by dramatic changes in society such as the emancipation of women and the wide-spread use of contraceptives. From the origin of marriage to the influence of religion, Russell explores the changing role of marriage and codes (...) of sexual ethics. The influence of this great work has turned it into a worthy classic. (shrink)

_Marriage and Morals_ is a compelling cross-cultural examination of individual, familial and societal attitudes towards sex and marriage. By exploring the codes by which we live our sexual lives and conventional morality, Russell daringly sets out a new morality, shaped and influenced by dramatic changes in society such as the emancipation of women and the wide-spread use of contraceptives. From the origin of marriage to the influence of religion, Russell explores the changing role of marriage and codes (...) of sexual ethics. The influence of this great work has turned it into a worthy classic. (shrink)

First published in 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Ryan, Tom Perhaps the most neuralgic issue shaping the Catholic Church's relationship to wider contemporary society is abortion. In Australia, the Church's efforts to counter abortion's increasing incidence and after-effects are evident in Bishops' statements, websites such as Walking with Love, and, from lay-inspired movements such as the Rachel's' Vineyard Retreat. Further, research is bringing a greater appreciation of the trauma and long-term effects of the abortion experience. Given that, it is reasonable to assume its influence, in some instances, on (...) marital consent. Investigating this question, then, is a timely exercise. At the same time, it can provide an insight into a ministry that is somewhat specialised, and, of its nature, sensitive and confidential, namely, the marriage annulment process. Finally, from within that context, it raises adjacent questions relating to Moral Theology. (shrink)

Comments for a paper by Elizabeth Brake (University of Calgary) called "Marriage and Morals," presented at the Summer Workshop on Feminist Philosophy at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, BC, Canada June 17-18, 2005.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd Reviews 181 MARRIAGE AND MORALSy REVISITED Philip Ebersole Greater Rochester Russell Set Rochester, ny 14607, usa [email protected] Timothy J. Madigan Philosophy / St. John Fisher College Rochester, ny 14618, usa [email protected] Katie Roiphe. Uncommon Arrangements: Seven Portraits of Married Life in London Literary Circles, 1910–1939. New York: The Dial Press, 2007. Pp. 343. isbn 978-0-385-33937-7 (...) (hb). us$26; cdn$34. There is a spectre haunting Katie Roiphe’s exploration of Edwardian/Georgian marriage in literary London circles: the spectre of Bertrand Russell, most especially the author of Marriage and Moralsz (1929), a work written in the middle of the period she examines. While Russell makes a few guest appearances in April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE2902\russell 29,2 050 red.wpd 182 Reviews the text, and while he knew almost everyone in the book (sometimes biblically), it is surprising that Roiphe does not take the opportunity to connect the rather disparate couples she discusses with Russell’s contemporary exploration of the meaning of marriage in the post-Victorian era. She focuses on couples living together from directly before the First World War to directly before the Second World War, a period of tremendous change and radical social movements: Modernism, Socialism, Freudianism,and, perhaps most important to the overall structure of the book, SuTragism/Feminism. One of the most telling aspects of Uncommon Arrangements is the focus on somez—zfor the timesz—zuncommonly liberated women. Katie Roiphe is a journalist and an instructor at New York University who has written extensively about modern marriage. Her Uncommon Arrangements tells the story of seven married couples in early twentieth-century England, all of whom tried to live outside the framework of conventional society. They revolted against Victorian values and sought to establish relations between men and women on an equal basis. Most of these couples travelled in the same circles as Russell, and were subject to the same intellectual inXuences. In Marriage and Moralsz—zwritten, ironically, during the time of the slow and painful dissolution of his own second marriagez—zRussell attempted to advocate a rational code of sexual ethics. He believed in openness and honesty about sex and denied that marital Wdelity was the be-all and end-all of morality. The true basis of morality, he said, was respect for the rights and feelings of your partner. Marriage and Morals was far ahead of its time in arguing that so-called “open marriages” (as well as couples living together without going through a marriage ceremony)were perfectly moral, so longas both partners accepted the conditions and did not engage in any deceptive acts. The couples discussed in Uncommon Arrangementsz—zwhile all were involved in relationships that could charitably be called “open”z—zdid not necessarily adhere to Russell’s “no deception” rule. Still, they provide interesting test cases for the idea that you can create a lasting marriage based on your own feelings and ideas without regard for convention. Interestingly, Roiphe does not deal with some likely suspects from this time period: the Lawrences, Woolfs, Eliots, and Bertrand and Dora Russell. In the Wrst chapter, Roiphe deals with the “modus vivendiy” between Wells and his second wife, Jane. Wells rebelled against his convention by Wrst of all divorcing his Wrst wife, Isabel, in 1895, and marrying his cousin Mary Catherine shortly thereafter. As a sign of his domineering personality, he renamed her “Jane”. Wells refused to accept limits on his sexual ambitions. As he put it once, “Except insofar as aTection put barriers around me, I have done what I pleased so that every bit of sexual impulse in me has expressed itselfz” (p. 36). In 1901, Jane gave birth to their son George Philip Wells. It was a troubled birth, and H.yG. ran oT. Instead of becoming angry, Jane understood and promised not to make too many demands on him. Thus their modus vivendiy. H.yG. April 3, 2010 (11:17 am) C:\Users... (shrink)

This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of “moral marriage” based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong‐headed. (...) The paper further argues that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. Finally, the paper argues that this friendship model of marriage does not obscure the important ways in which marriages and friendships differ. (shrink)

This chapter expresses that radical feminist perspectives on marriage and motherhood are in danger of being lost in the quest for equal rights. For more than a decade, feminist philosophers and lesbian/gay activists have been optimistic about the potentialities of legal marriage and legitimated motherhood. Feminist philosophers are taking as valuable theoretical paradigms for ethics many kinds of caring relationships that have been salient in women's lives. "Family" is itself a family resemblance concept. Apart from the institution of (...) marriage and historical ideals of the family, it is uncertain what characteristics mother‐child relationships would have, for many alternatives are possible. Historically, motherhood has been a core element of patriarchy. Moral philosophy might also be transformed by greater attention to the fact that adult experience and its potentialities are significantly conditioned by the childhoods of adults and of those children's relationships to adults. (shrink)

This book defends the conjugal view of marriage. Patrick Lee and Robert P. George argue that marriage is a distinctive type of community: the union of a man and a woman who have committed to sharing their lives on every level of their beings (bodily, emotionally, and spiritually) in the kind of union that would be fulfilled by conceiving and rearing children together. The comprehensive nature of this union, and its intrinsic orientation to procreation as its natural fulfillment, (...) distinguishes marriage from other types of community and provides the basis for the norms of marital exclusivity and permanence. Lee and George detail how the basic moral norms regarding sexual acts follow from the ethical requirement to respect the good of marriage and explain how the law should treat marriage, given its conjugal nature, examining both the same-sex-marriage issue and civil divorce. (shrink)

Kant has famously argued that monogamous marriage is the only relationship where sexual use can take place "without degrading humanity and breaking the moral laws." Kantian marriage, however, has been the target of fierce criticisms by contemporary things: it has been regarded as flawed and paradoncal, as being deeply at odds with feminism, and, at best, as plainly uninteresting. In this paper, I argue that Kantian marriage can indeed survive these criticisms. Finally, the paper advances the discussion (...) beyond marriage. Drawing on Kant 's conception of friendship, I suggest that he might have overlooked the possibility of sex being morally permissible in yet another context. (shrink)

Incompatability in marriage.- The spirital attitude towards old age.- Woman's spiritual influence in marriage.- The revolt against conventional morality.- The ethical attitude towards enemies.- The strain between the older generation and the younger.- The ethical attitude towards the departed.

Marriage practices, the dynamics of interpersonal relationships and the politics of sexuality are relatively under-researched themes in the study of Bengali communism. Historical scholarship on the revolutionary politics of the extreme left Naxalbari andolan of the late 1960s–1970s, the object of this piece of study, is no exception. The article engages with women and men's narratives on the practice of ‘revolutionary’ marriage in the movement through the prism of contemporary popular memory studies and narrative analysis. Drawing on field (...) interviews with middle-class male and female activists, the article draws attention to the contestatory nature of marriage in the collective memory of the movement. Narrative contestations over marriage in the Naxalite movement underscore, I argue, a tension between a utopian ideal of transgressive interpersonal relations and dominant middle-class codes of sexual morality. At the same time, individual attempts to ‘compose’ (in storytelling) socially recognizable and acceptable subject positions are grounded upon the silencing and abjection of more risky memories. Given the discrepancies and contradictions within the narrative repertoire from which individuals construct their identities, these ‘marriage stories’ are a tremendous resource for investigating the politics of love, sexuality and subject-formation in middle-class Bengali society. (shrink)

Suggests that contemporary marriage is at the heart of a serious cultural paradox that renders it strongly valued, but rather brittle. Scientific and therapeutic approaches to this dilemma have had limited success in resolving this problem because professionals have accepted and promoted the popular aspiration of personal fulfillment through marriage, which may have engendered the fragility of marriage. The author provides a brief hermeneutic account designed to make the incoherence of contemporary marriage more intelligible, and to (...) clarify the moral dimension of psychology. Marital research illustrates how a hermeneutic perspective can guide a specific research domain in becoming more responsive to the essential social and ethical concerns that animate it. Suggestions for how researchers can explore why marriage is so central to modern life are offered. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In the 1706 third edition of her Reflections upon Marriage, Mary Astell alludes to John Locke’s definition of slavery in her descriptions of marriage. She describes the state of married women as being ‘subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man’ (Locke, Two Treatises, II.22). Recent scholars maintain that Astell does not seriously regard marriage as a form of slavery in the Lockean sense. In this paper, I defend the contrary position: I argue that (...) Astell does seriously regard marriage as a form of slavery for women and that she condemns this state of affairs as morally wrong. I also show that, far from criticizing Locke, Astell draws on key passages in his Thoughts concerning Education to urge that women be educated to retain their liberty. (shrink)

In _The Marriage of Aesthetics and Ethics_, fifteen authors reflect on the nature of friendship and love and on the complex relation between art and morality.

The Bachelor's Argument against marriage, as I described it in this journal,1 says that marriage involves taking an imprudent risk of finding oneself committed to a relationship with someone one does not love. The evidence indicates that many people who marry eventually find themselves without the feelings for the other person which made a marital relationship seem worthwhile in the first place; and were that to happen to us, it would seem highly undesirable nonetheless to be locked into (...) a relationship with our spouse as a result of the commitment we made when we married. I went on to argue that several obvious responses to this argument fail. In particular, if we enter into marriage without genuinely intending to keep our promise of maintaining a relationship with our spouse, we will be making an insincere promise. Alternatively, if our promise is sincere, but the morality of promise-keeping is such that when our feelings for the other person fade away the moral force of our commitment is canceled, then the commitment itself seems otiose. However, I did not consider all of the possible responses to the argument, and Iddo Landau has recently made an interesting suggestion about how to interpret the marriage commitment in a way that does not render it immoral or pointless.2 His proposal is that what we are committing ourselves to when we marry is ‘to invest work in performing certain acts that are likely to sustain the. (shrink)

Published in 1936, the author predicts that marriage will eventually die out in western civilization. Includes the meaning and origin of marriage, matrimonial unhappiness, sexual maladjustment, adultery, jealousy, concubinage, free love, monogamy, polygamy, divorce, morality and more.

Most moral theories share certain features in common with other theories. They consist of a set of propositions that are universal, general, and hence impartial. The propositions that constitute a typical moral theory are (1) universal, in that they apply to all subjects designated as within their scope. They are (2) general, in that they include no proper names or definite descriptions. They are therefore (3) impartial, in that they accord no special privilege to any particular agent's situation which cannot (...) be justified under (2) and (3). These three features do not distinguish moral theories from other theories, nor indeed from most general categorical propositions we assert. Yet, in recent years, these features of moral theories have been the target of a certain concerted and sustained criticism, namely, that to be committed to such a moral theory, or to aspire to act in accordance with its requirements, results in what has come to be known as moral alienation. Moral alienation, according to this criticism, consists in (i) viewing one's ground projects from an impersonal, "moral point of view" engendered by one's acceptance of the theory; (ii) being prepared to sacrifice these projects to the requirements of moral principle; and (iii) making such a sacrifice specifically and self-consciously in order to conform to these requirements. Moral alienation is said to manifest itself in one (or both) of two ways, depending on the nature of the project thus susceptible to sacrifice. One may be alienated from oneself, if the project consists of tastes, convictions, or aspirations that are centrally definitive of one's self. In this case one's commitment to the project can be at best conditional on its congruence with one's moral theory. It is claimed that this must make for a rather tepid and unenthusiastic commitment indeed. Alternatively, one may be alienated from others, if the project is an interpersonal relationship such as a friendship, marriage, or collegial relationship. In this case one's responses to the other are motivated by one's awareness of what one's moral theory requires. It is claimed that this obstructs a genuine and unmediated emotional response to the other as such. My aim here will be to argue that this very compelling criticism - call it the moral-alienation criticism - is nevertheless misdirected. The real culprit is not any particular moral theory, but rather a certain familiar personality type that may or may not adopt it. (shrink)

One current line of argument against the legalization of same-sex marriage, advocated primarily by the New Natural Lawyers, is that marriage is a pre-political institution that has, as an essential element, a bodily union requirement. They argue that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union in their sexual activities and thus cannot meet the structural requirements of marriage. Accordingly, they argue that the same-sex marriage debate must be framed as a debate about what marriage is, and (...) not, as it was in the anti-miscegenation precedents, about who can get married. I argue that their position, which promulgates a set of pernicious stereotypes about same-sex couples, is, first of all, internally inconsistent. According to their own metaphysical principles about bodily union, they provide no rational basis for the claim that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union and thus that same-sex couples cannot be married. Second, I argue for a deflationary account of the significance of bodily union. While same-sex couples, like heterosexual couples, can realize bodily union, this sort of union has no moral significance and thus cannot be the factor that distinguishes marriages from other sorts of relationships. Finally, I suggest that they have no basis for their claims about the inferiority of same-sex relationships. (shrink)

“I am only what I make myself to be”, Fichte tells us. In this paper, I outline Fichte’s views on sex, marriage and gender, with two aims. Firstly, to elucidate an aspect of his moral theory which has received little attention, and secondly to argue that Fichte’s distinctive stance on selfhood, freedom, and normativity lead to a revisionary account of gender expression and identity, where people can freely carve out their own identity, irrespective of “nature”. In this paper, I (...) therefore outline Fichte’s own views, highlighting what I see as a tension in the texts between essentialism and antiessentialism about gender, before reconstructing a neo-Fichtean view which foregrounds the anti-essentialist aspect. (shrink)

Some argue that same-sex marriage is not an equal rights issue because, where same-sex marriage is illegal, heterosexuals and homosexuals have the exact same right to marry—i.e., the right to marry one adult of the opposite sex. I dispute this argument by pointing out that while societies that prohibit same-sex marriage equally permit individual heterosexuals and homosexuals to marry one adult of the opposite sex, same-sex couples in such societies are denied an important right that opposite-sex couples (...) enjoy—i.e., the right to marry. I argue that the right to marry is fundamentally, not an individual right, but a couple’s collective right, analogous to assembly rights. (shrink)

All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead (...) to fundamental issues about the nature of morality, language, metaphysics, justification, and knowledge. They also have tremendous practical importance in handling controversial moral questions in health care ethics, politics, law, and education. Sinnott-Armstrong here provides an extensive overview of these difficult subjects, looking at a wide variety of questions, including: Are any moral beliefs true? Are any justified? What is justified belief? The second half of the book explores various moral theories that have grappled with these issues, such as naturalism, normativism, intuitionism, and coherentism, all of which are attempts to answer moral skepticism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that all these approaches fail to rule out moral nihilism--the view that nothing is really morally wrong or right, bad or good. Then he develops his own novel theory,--"moderate Pyrrhonian moral skepticism"--which concludes that some moral beliefs can be justified out of a modest contrast class but no moral beliefs can be justified out of an extreme contrast class. While explaining this original position and criticizing alternatives, Sinnott-Armstrong provides a wide-ranging survey of the epistemology of moral beliefs. (shrink)

This paper examines three arguments that claim marriage, as a political institution, is incompatible with political liberalism. These arguments are drawn from Elizabeth Brake 1 and Clare Chambers. 2 My purpose here is to determine which, if any, of the arguments show marriage to be incompatible with political liberalism. The “Neutrality Argument” claims that the political institution of marriage violates the political liberal principle of neutrality. I claim that no such violation occurs. The “Unjustified Discrimination Argument” alleges (...) that marriage involves the state in unjustified discrimination. I suggest there are grounds for the differential treatment identified. The “Public Reason Argument” argues that marriage, as it is currently structured, violates the political liberal principle of public reason. I claim that its current structure can be justified by appeal to public reasons. I therefore conclude that none of these arguments successfully demonstrate that marriage is incompatible with political liberalism. (shrink)

This anthology contextualizes key feminist texts and ideas by linking them with the transformation of public opinion brought about by the late Victorian debate on marriage, motherhood and women's right to an independent life. Included are Mona Caird's controversial The Morality of Marriage ; debates between feminists, traditionalists and anti-feminists on marriage, divorce and the New Woman, and selected reading from New Woman fiction, both feminist and anti-feminist, which reproduces the media debate on morality in literature.

Owing most probably to Western-style modernization, marriage is increasingly understood to be a business strictly for married couples. However, I argue that this is an error, as many inexperienced couples are left to their own devices, and thereby often fail to utilize marriage to acquire the social competencies that are crucial to wider social responsibilities, including political leadership. The modern atomic conception of marriage is influenced by the Kantinspired Western conception of moral autonomy. Nevertheless, I reject this (...) conception as excessively absolutist, and argue that moral autonomy can be tempered by lack of experience, human desire and circumstantial pressures in life. Many African societies view marriage as a union of societies rather than that of individuals, and I argue that the moral support offered by the extended family and the community at large is ultimately geared to inculcate in the spouses inter-personal and social skills of restraint, prudence, tolerance, constructive criticism and other virtues desperately needed to execute societal responsibilities. (shrink)