Studies demonstrating the benefits of ethical behavior at an individual level are scarce. The business ethics literature centers its analysis on unethical behaviors and their consequences, rather than ethical behaviors and their benefits. There is now considerable debate on the role of auditors in society and the function of accounting firms in the free market capitalist system. Specifically, the eminently ethical nature of the auditor’s work has been highlighted. Therefore, the aim of our paper is to show the impact of (...) auditors’ sustained ethical behavior: the trust it generates. This trust results in considerable benefits for the firm due to a reduction in the costs of the partner’s supervision of the auditor. The methodology chosen to validate these claims is a survey of partner of the audit firm in auditing companies. The results of this research confirm the hypotheses raised in the theoretical model. (shrink)

Uno de los temas más debatidos en el período inmediatamente posterior a la muerte de Tomás de Aquino fue cómo interpretar fielmente de acuerdo a sus textos el concepto de esse, dada la cualidad metafísica particular que éste adquiría en esta nueva ontología. Teniendo en cuenta que durante la escolástica los pensadores trataban de servirse de la filosofía como instrumento para explicar la fe, la comprensión del esse como distinto realmente de la esencia, fue el centro del debate por ser (...) la base del principal argumento para mostrar la diferencia ontológica entre Dios y las criaturas. (shrink)

Manuel Alejandro Serra Pérez L’expression « virtus essendi » utilisée par Thomas d’Aquin dans certains passages de ses oeuvres a été un des sujets abordés dans le thomisme contemporain chez les plus importants commentateurs d’Aquin. Étienne Gilson fut le premier des commentateurs qui écrivit des notes explicatives sur son sens, montrant que ce pouvoir dont l’expression parle fait référence à la source d’où provient toute perfection et actualité, l’esse ut actus essendi. De son côté, le dominicain canadien Lawrence (...) Dewan, particulièrement intéressé à montrer que cette « virtus » est partagée par les deux co-principes de l’étant, à savoir, la forme et l’être, considère au contraire que la doctrine thomiste de la « virtus essendi » développe plutôt le thème que la forme est le principe de l’être (principium essendi). Face à ces deux lectures contraires, dans cet article nous proposons d’en faire une analyse systématique et de proposer une possible piste d’investigation qui éclaire le sens de ce que Thomas d’Aquin comprend par l’expression « virtus essendi ». (shrink)

Resumen: El pasado siglo XX ha sido testigo de un renovado interés por los planteamientos de la filosofía aristotélica, en especial de la mano del filósofo alemán Martin Heidegger. Pues bien, junto con esta vuelta al estudio de la filosofía peripatética, ha surgido como en paralelo un nuevo interés por la filosofía del ser de Tomás de Aquino, en particular por su noción de esse ut actus essendi. Esto ha desembocado en diversas líneas de investigación, a veces confrontadas, que han (...) versado sobre todo en la cuestión de la recepción tomasiana de la noción de ente y los aspectos en ella implicados. En este trabajo se procurará dar a conocer algunos aspectos importantes de esta recepción, así como de esas distintas líneas de interpretación confrontadas. Abstract: The past 20th century has witnessed a renewed interest in the approaches of Aristotelian philosophy, especially from the hand of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Well, along with this return to the study of peripatetic philosophy, a new interest in the philosophy of being of Thomas Aquinas has emerged as a parallel, particularly in his notion of esse ut actus essendi. This has led to various lines of research, sometimes confronted, which have dealt mainly with the question of the Tomasian reception of the notion of being and the aspects involved in it. In this work we will try to make known some important aspects of this reception, as well as of those different lines of interpretation confronted. (shrink)

For one of the current scholars of Thomism, Serge T. Bonino, research on Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy of being has polarized into two tendencies, the axis of which is the Dominican Thomistic school. One of them is represented by the harsh criticisms that the French medievalist Étienne Gilson made of the positions of this school. The second, on the other hand, is characterized by a staunch defense of the theses of the main commentators of this school. During the 20th century, one (...) of Gilson’s students, the Canadian Lawrence Dewan, openly opposed Gilsonian Thomism on the basis of the traditional interpretation. Today, some of his students consider this Dewanian proposal as a “nouvelle métaphysique thomiste,” assuming that it is a movement that brings a genuine renewal. In this article we will show that this movement, although it claims to be a novelty, is nothing more than the revitalization of the formalist theses of the Dominican school, and therefore cannot be considered a valid interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

La filosofía del ser de Tomás de Aquino es en parte deudora de la ontología aristotélica. Étienne Gilson, reconocido por sus estudios sobre el esse tomasiano, habla de un nivel de la substancia en el Aquinate. Sin embargo, su original concepción del esse como acto del ente, llevó al medievalista francés a poner de relieve la doble composición que integra el ente bajo la primacía del esse. Lawrence Dewan, desde un tomismo más aristotélico, criticó a Gilson por concebir la esencia (...) como algo negativo. En nuestra investigación discutiremos sobre esta disputa con el fin de esclarecer cuál de los dos autores se acerca más a la enseñanza tomista. (shrink)

Necessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunction of first-order contingentism and higher-order necessitism; a combination that would bring about additional drawbacks. I work out a defence of the hybrid combination, including some replies to Williamson’s additional objections. Considerations of ontological parsimony and pre-theoretical intuitions favour the hybrid view over necessitism at all (...) orders. (shrink)

I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to our inferential rationality (to use his term). According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. (...) In that sense, insofar as Boghossian’s scenario is relevant to the debate externalism/internalism, it can be seen (against Boghossian’s original intention) as providing additional evidence for content externalism. (shrink)

The relationship between ethics and performance has previously been addressed in the literature, although there are still some gaps, for example, the relationship of ethical ideologies to student performance. This work aims to contribute to the literature with a statistical evaluation using partial least squares path modelling (PLS-PM) regarding whether university students’ ethical ideologies and moral meaningfulness influence their level of student performance and academic achievement. Results indicate that the ideologies of justice and deontology increase moral meaningfulness, moral meaningfulness in (...) turn increase student’s citizenship behaviours and student’s in-role performance, and finally, student’s in-role performance positively influences academic achievement. This research provides resources applicable to the fields of pedagogy and ethics to encourage performance during the study and highlight the value of the ideologies of justice and deontology. (shrink)

This article examines the role of social media and journalistic media in presidential electoral processes. A systematic review of scientific articles published from 2012 to 2022 was conducted. The results indicate that the media has a significant influence on public perception and the political agenda during election campaigns. Furthermore, the importance of evaluating political leaders in the voters' decision-making process is emphasized. In summary, the article provides valuable insights into how the media can shape the narrative and public opinion during (...) presidential elections. (shrink)

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have (...) reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)

A common view about Moore’s Proof of an External World is that the argument fails because anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the argument to rationally overcome those doubts. I agree that Moore’s Proof is—in that sense—dialectically ineffective at convincing an opponent or a doubter, but I defend that the argument (even when individuated taking into consideration the purpose of Moore’s arguing and, consequently, the preferred addressee of the Proof) does not fail. The key to my (...) defence is to conceive the Proof as addressed to subjects with a different epistemic condition. To sustain this view I formulate some hypothesis about the common general purpose of arguing and I defend that it can be fulfilled even when the addressee of an argument is not someone who disbelieves or doubts its conclusion. (shrink)

Según Williamson, saber y creer son estados mentales, pero creer algo verdadero y creer justificadamente algo verdadero no lo son. Ese tratamiento discriminatorio es relevante para la epistemología de Williamson. Su principal tesis epistemológica negativa y su principal tesis epistemológica positiva están en peligro si su teoría metafísica sobre lo mental es incorrecta. Presento aquí un problema para dicha teoría: impone limitaciones implausibles a los posibles usos de conceptos y expresiones lingüísticas. Describiré algunas opciones que tendría Williamson para evitar el (...) problema; pero sostendré que acarrean cierta dosis de arbitrariedad. (shrink)

I present an epistemological puzzle about perceptual knowledge and its relation to the evaluation of probabilities. It involves cases, concerning a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context, where apparently: S has perceptual knowledge of P; the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. If those two theses were true, the following very plausible epistemological principle would fail: If S knows P, then the epistemic justification S (...) has for believing Not-P is not greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. I offer a solution to the puzzle, which is compatible with basic intuitions and theses of orthodox Bayesianism. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that any philosophically satisfying conception of modality that encompasses possible worlds semantics (PWS) commits us to the Barcan Formula. His argument depends on the assumption that the domain of what there is (the domain of the actual world) has to be identified with the domain D(@), where @ is the index or possible world that in PWS represents , or stands for , the actual world. I work out an interpretation of the relation between (...) PWS and possible worlds terminology that makes it plausible to reject that assumption. (shrink)

E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that–according to them–reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses. Furthermore, their vignettes are inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depends on an unjustified assumption: there is not (...) expertise regarding intuitions. (shrink)

Tanto la Fórmula Barcan como la postulación de possibilia contradicen los juicios intuitivos preteóricos de la mayoría de los sujetos, favorables al actualismo sobre la naturaleza de los mundos posibles. En este artículo discuto y rechazo dos argumentos que pretenderían contrarrestar tales juicios, y que conciben erróneamente la relación entre la semántica de mundos posibles y nuestros lenguajes naturales modales. El argumento más importante asume que el dominio de todas las entidades es idéntico al dominio de @. Desarrollo una interpretación (...) de la SMP conforme a la cual esa tesis no está suficientemente justificada. /// Barcan Formula and the postulation of possibilia contradict the pretheoretical intuitive judgments of most people, which favour actualism about possible worlds. In this paper I discuss and reject two arguments against such judgments, both of which conceive wrongly the relation between possible worlds semantics and modal natural languages. The more important argument assumes that the domain of the actual world is identical to the domain of @. I develop an interpretation of PWS which elucidates why that thesis is unwarranted. (shrink)

Kripke formula cuatro objeciones en contra de una solución disposicionalista simple al enigma wittgensteiniano sobre seguir una regla. En este trabajo presento dos propuestas parcialmente disposicionalistas diferentes a la teoría disposicionalista simple que Kripke discute y defiendo que aquellas cuatro objeciones no les afectan. Una de esas dos propuestas puede atribuirse, con cierta precaución, al propio Wittgenstein. La otra, que me parece preferible, invoca una noción teleológica de disposición. Ambas propuestas apelan al concepto de simplicidad, o —alternativamente— al concepto de (...) similitud natural. Rechazo también ciertas críticas que Kripke hace del uso de tales conceptos para solucionar el enigma sobre seguir una regla. (shrink)

En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese punto explorando (...) una analogía entre la lógica modal y la logica clásica de primer orden. Con ello se pretende proporcionar una visión clarificadora sobre el estatus de la lógica modal y su relación con la lógica en general.In this paper I discuss the alleged commitment of quantified modal logic to philosophical essentialism. Besides some other more or less related arguments against quantified modal logic, Quine (its more prominent critic) objects to it by claiming its commitment to a philosophical doctrine usually regarded as suspicious, essentialism: the view that some of the attributes of a thing are essential to it, and others are accidental. I study to what extent Quine can be right about this specific issue. I defend some of his views by exploring an analogy between modal logic and standard first order logic. That serves to get a better understanding of the status of modal logic and its relation with logic in general. (shrink)

On solipsism and the transmission of memories in the experience of history Resumen: Este artículo está dedicado a la problemática de la experiencia histórica y a varias de sus ramificaciones. De especial interés resulta aquí la cuestión de la preeminencia del testigo respecto a otras instancias en la construcción del relato. Una cuestión que está, sin duda, estrechamente vinculada a las diferentes concepciones del tiempo histórico y de su experiencia. A este respecto, merece especial atención la figura del historiador alemán (...) Reinhart Koselleck por el destacado papel que jugó en los debates en torno a los monumentos erigidos en conmemoración a las víctimas del Holocausto, pero también por las deficiencias teóricas de la historia conceptual koselleckiana a la hora de abordar el papel de las emociones que emanan de la experiencia histórica.: This article is about the problematic of historical experience and several of its ramifications. Of special interest here is the question of the pre-eminence of the witness in relation to other instances in the construction of the story. This question is undoubtedly closely linked to the different conceptions of historical time and its experiences. In this respect, the figure of the German historian Reinhart Koselleck deserves special attention for the prominent role he played in the debates concerning the memorials built in commemoration of the victims of the Holocaust, but also for the theoretical weaknesses of Koselleckian conceptual history in dealing with the role of emotions emanating from historical experience. Palabras clave: memoria, historia, experiencias primarias, testigo, víctima, espacio público. Keywords: memory, history, primary experiences, witness, victim, public sphere. (shrink)

Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and offered different accounts of why certain necessary truths seem to be contingent. One of these accounts was used by Kripke in an argument against the psychophysical identity thesis. I defend the claim that the explanatory force of Kripke's standard account of the appearance of contingency relies on the explanatory force of one of the more general accounts he also offers. But the more general account cannot be used to undermine (...) the psychophysical identity thesis. Specifically, a crucial feature in Kripke's standard account, which is needed to argue for dualism, is explanatorily superfluous. Alternative accounts that are similar to Kripke's original one but lack that trait would also explain the phenomenon. Consequently, the Kripkean dualist argument is blocked. /// Kripke ha argumentado que existen verdades necesarias a posteriori, y ha ofrecido diferentes explicaciones de por qué ciertas verdades necesarias parecen contingentes. Una de esas explicaciones se usaba en un argumento con el que Kripke criticaba la tesis de la identidad psicofísica. En este trabajo sostengo que la fuerza explicativa de la explicacion kripkeana estándar de la apariencia de contingencia depende de la fuerza explicativa de una de las otras explicaciones que Kripke también propone. Pero esa otra explicación, más general, no sirve para rechazar la identidad psicofísica. Con-cretamente, un rasgo crucial de la explicación kripkeana estandar resulta explicativamente superfluo. Explicaciones alternativas, similares a la de Kripke pero que carezcan de ese rasgo, explicarían también el fenómeno. Como consecuencia, el argumento dualista kripkeano queda bloqueado. (shrink)

I present some puzzling cases regarding knowledge and its relation to rational credence. They seem to entail a failure of an apparently correct principle: if S knows P, then the epistemic justi...

Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths, and tried to explain why some of them seem to be contingent. His main explanation motivated two philosophical proposals: the attempt - linked to some interpretations of two-dimensionalism - to analyse the epistemic concept of a priori truth using metaphysical modal concepts; the argument for psychophysical dualism worked out by Kripke relying on his explanation of the appearances of contingency. I point out several difficulties for , and argue that can (...) oe blocked because of the existence of alternative accounts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

EI debate entre la concepción descriptivista de los nombres propios y la teoría de la referencia directa concierne -principalmente- a esta cuestión: (es la función referencial de los nombres propios reduciblemediante la función descriptiva y las funciones logicas? Una tesis distintiva central de Kripke es 10 que denominamos particularismo semántico modal: la función referencial es irredueible, incluso cuando los nombre propios aparecen en enunciados modales. Se presenta aquí una exégesis de las críticas de Kripke contra cierta interpretacion metafóriea de los (...) mundos posibles (que los considera como Iugares lejanos observados con telescopios) interpretándolas como elementos cruciales en su defensa del particularismo semántieo modal.Tbe debate between the description theory of proper names and direct reference is -mainly- a debale on whether or not the referential function of proper names is reducible in term of descriptive and logical functions. A central distinctive thesis in Kripke’s work is what I call modal semantic particularism: the referential function is irreducible even when proper names appear in modal contexts. I present all exegesis of Kripke’s comments against a certain metaphorical understanding of possible worlds (as distant countries discovered through teleseopes) according to which these comments are crucial claims in hisdefense of modal semantic particularism. (shrink)

En el contexto de este artículo denominaremos mentalismo a la conjunción de dos tesis diferentes: (i) para que las expresiones lingüísticas tengan significado es necesario que haya entidades de carácter mental; (ii) tales entidades mentales son suficientes para fijar el significado de las expresiones correspondientes (es decir, lo determinan). Es característico deI segundo Wittgenstein el rechazo a ambas tesis. Pero son sus argumentos contra (ii), especialmente a partir de las consideraciones sobre seguir una regla, los que han concentrado casi toda (...) la atención. En este trabajo presento el argumento principal de Wittgentein contra (i), diferenciándolo de sus objeciones a (ii).In this article mentalism will be used to denominate the conjunction of two thesis: (i) it is a necessary condition for linguistic expressions having meaning the existence of mental entities; (ii) these mental entities are sufficient to fix the meaning of the corresponding expressions (they determine it). The two thesis are rejected by the later Wittgenstein. Most of the attention, though, has been paid to his arguments against (ii), especially based on discussions of rule-following. In this paper I work out Wittgenstein’s main argument against (i), and I distinguish it from his objections to (ii). (shrink)

En este artículo presento, clarifico y exploro algunas virtudes potenciales de una determinada teoría —de carácter intencionalista— sobre lo cómico. Su tesis mínima principal establece una condición necesaria para la comicidad: quien evalúaaprecia una situación como humorística/cómica reconoce un perjuicio o daño ocasionado a ciertos sujetos intencionales. Una versión más fuerte establece que la comicidad deriva de dicho perjuicio. El perjuicio es aquello que, cuando se combina con otros factores, encontramos humorístico/cómico. Clarificar la teoría conlleva una tarea de comparación con (...) otras concepciones del humor, en particular, con la teoría de la incongruencia. (shrink)

This work addresses the objections to analyticity and meaning atribution to single sentences included in Quines Two Dogmas of Empiricism. First, an interpretation of Two Dogmas is provided which implies that the strongest argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on epistemic holism. Then, two possible rejoinders to Quine are presented. They rely on the following thesis: (i) semantic holism that follows from the conjunction of Quines epistemic holism and verificationism is compatible with assignation of meaning to single sentences, which (...) in turn paves the way for a characterization of analyticity; (ii) epistemic holism and the related thesis that every true sentence is empirically revisable are objectionable if we accept criteria of individuation for truth bearers different from those assumed by Quine. (shrink)

Presento y defiendo dos reinterpretaciones de la prueba ideada por Putnam para demostrar que no somos cerebros en una cubeta. Ambas resaltan explícitamente el papel desempeñado por el autoconocimiento de nuestros propios pensamientos y por el externismo sobre el contenido. La primera asume que el externismo implica que un cerebro en una cubeta no puede pensar el contenido proposicional relevante (constituido por conceptos acerca de cerebros y cubetas). La otra versión invoca una tesis externista más débil, conforme a la cual (...) un sujeto corpóreo y un cerebro en una cubeta no pueden compartir el contenido proposicional relevante. (shrink)

Williamson defiende la regla del conocimiento, RK, sobre las aseveraciones: debemos aseverar que p sólo si sabemos que p. En este trabajo exploro algunas consecuencias interesantes de RK: (a) en ocasiones, al hacer una aseveración correcta transmitimos (como implicatura) un significado no literal verdadero, que \sin embargo\ no podría ser correctamente aseverado; (b) ese tipo de implicatura se da, entre otros casos, en una cierta subclase de las implicaturas: las implicaturas argumentativas; (c) RK y la noción de implicatura argumentativa permiten (...) explicar la tendencia a tratar de forma equivalente diferentes tipos de argumentos antiescépticos inspirados en Moore.Williamson defends the knowledge rule, KR, about assertions: one must: assert p only if one knows p. In this work I explore some interesting consequences of KR: (a) sometimes, when making a correct assertion we transmit (as an implicature) a true non-literal meaning which \nevertheless\ could not be rightly asserted; (b) this kind of implicatures are present, for instance, in a certain subclass of implicatures: argumentative implicatures; (c) KR and the notion of argumentative implicature allow for an explanation of the tendency to treat different kinds of Moore-like antiskeptical arguments as if they were equivalent. (shrink)

Igor Douven has offered an original reconstruction and defence of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. Douven's construal has notable exegetical virtues, since it makes sense of some assumptions in Putnam's argument which his opponents have considered question-begging or puzzling. In this article I provide an indirect defence of metaphysical realism, by showing why this new version of the anti-realist argument should also be rejected. The main problems in the Douven-Putnam argument come from ascribing to the realist a distorted view (...) of correspondence truth. The view entails that when no feature selects just one of all the possible interpretations of language the existence of an interpretation suffices to make true a theory. The sensible realist is not committed to this extreme conception of correspondence truth. /// Igor Douven ha presentado y defendido una reconstructión del argumento teórico-modelista de Putnam contra el realismo metafísico. Esta versión tiene ciertas virtudes exegéticas, pues hace inteligible algunos presu- puestos putnamianos que sus críticos han considerado injustificados o sorprendentes. En este artículo proporciono una defensa indirecta del realismo metafisico, mostrando por qué debe también rechazarse el argumento antirrealista bajo esta nueva forma. Los problemas principales del argumento Douven-Putnam proceden de atribuir al realista una concepción distorsionada de la idea de verdad como correspondencia. Conforme a esa concepción, la ausencia de factores que seleccionen una única interpretación del lenguaje de entre las muchas posibles conlleva que la existencia de alguna interpretación ya es suficiente para hacer verdadera a una teoría que sea consistente. El realista sensato no está obligado a aceptar esa tesis. (shrink)

Review of: José Ferreirós. 2016. Mathematical knowledge and the interplay of practices. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

ABSTRACTWe discuss the thesis of universality of geometric notions and offer critical reflections on the concept of “natural geometry” employed by Spelke and others. Promoting interdisciplinary wor...

The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such. The phenomenon we focus on to claim that (...) belief attributions are non-factual is that of normative doxastic disagreement. We show through several examples that this kind of disagreement is analogous to that of the epistemic kind. The result will be a doxastic expressivism. Finally, we answer some objections that our doxastic expressivism could seem to face. (shrink)

El presente artículo busca proponer un acercamiento a la influencia del pensamiento de Thomas Hobbes y su obra en el pensamiento económico. En especial en las escuelas marxista, neoclásica y keynesiana. El influjo de su pensamiento puede evidenciarse en el abordaje metodológico, antropológico e institucional. Se ofrece una Mirada sobre la sociedad civil (comercial), el Mercado y el Estado al mismo tiempo. Hobbes ha sido la inspiración de un concepto de Estado monolítico en lo político, en este sentido, la mirada (...) de la economía bajo el concepto de un gran planificador centralizado, tiene importantes antecedentes en este autor. El ejercicio del control social del individuo como propuesta institucional, en varias escuelas de la economía comparten con Hobbes, varios antecedentes que merecen ser analizados. (shrink)

Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian conventionalism”, conventionalismC and cognates for (...) short. This conventionalistC explication of the a priori has been the target of sound criticisms. Arguments like Quine’s in “Truth by Convention” are in our view decisive: the truth of conventionalismC requires that the class of logical truths and logical validities be reductively accounted for as conventionally established; however, no such reduction is forthcoming, because logic is needed to generate the entire class from any given set of conventions properly so-called. Granted that conventionalismC is untenable, we want to take issue with a different, usually made criticism. Although the argument uncovers some difficulties for the way conventionalist claims are defended by some of its advocates, we will try to show that it fails. The criticism thus stands in the way of a proper appreciation of why the Carnapian account of the a priori is not correct. We will try to illustrate this by showing that the criticism we will dispute would dispose of conventionalist claims not only regarding philosophically problematic cases – logical and mathematical truths –, but also regarding cases for which they have some prima facie plausibility. One such case is that of truths that follow from mere abbreviations, “nominal” definitions; ‘someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried adult male’ can serve at this point for illustration. We will try to articulate a clear sense in which the contents of assertion such as this can be truths by convention. We do not need to prove that a conventionalist claim is true in those cases; it is enough for us to show that it is intelligible, for the arguments we will confront question even this. (shrink)

Existe evidencia de que el ajuste transcultural influye en el desempeño académico en población migrante. A partir de un análisis categorial del discurso, este trabajo evidencia experiencias de ajuste transcultural en cinco migrantes retornados de nivel de licenciatura que emigraron a EE.UU. Los resultados ofrecen guías para diseñar intervenciones psicoeducativas en inclusión social para esta población en contextos universitarios.

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume's argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll's Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I (...) defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke's theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)