This paper provides a Genzten style formulation of the game logic framework GLm (0 m ), and proves the cut-elimination theorem for GLm. As its application, we prove the term existence theorem for GL used in Part I.

This paper provides a logic framework for investigations of game theoretical problems. We adopt an infinitary extension of classical predicate logic as the base logic of the framework. The reason for an infinitary extension is to express the common knowledge concept explicitly. Depending upon the choice of axioms on the knowledge operators, there is a hierarchy of logics. The limit case is an infinitary predicate extension of modal propositional logic KD4, and is of special interest in applications. In Part I, (...) we develop the basic framework, and show some applications: an epistemic axiomatization of Nash equilibrium and formal undecidability on the playability of a game. To show the formal undecidability, we use a term existence theorem, which will be proved in Part II. (shrink)

Kaneko-Suzuki developed epistemic logics of shallow depths with multiple players for investigations of game theoretical problems. By shallow depth, we mean that nested occurrences of belief operators of players in formulae are restricted, typically to be of finite depths, by a given epistemic structure. In this paper, we develop various methods of surgical operations (cut and paste) of epistemic world models. An example is a bouquet-making, i.e., tying several models into a bouquet. Another example is to engraft a model to (...) some branches of another model. By these methods, we obtain various meta-theorems on semantics and syntax on epistemic logics. To illustrate possible uses of our meta-theorems, we present one game theoretical theorem, which is also a meta-theorem in the sense of logic. (shrink)

We show the faithful embedding of common knowledge logic CKL into game logic GL, that is, CKL is embedded into GL and GL is a conservative extension of the fragment obtained by this embedding. Then many results in GL are available in CKL, and vice versa. For example, an epistemic consideration of Nash equilibrium for a game with pure strategies in GL is carried over to CKL. Another important application is to obtain a Gentzen-style sequent calculus formulation of CKL and (...) its cut-elimination. The faithful embedding theorem is proved for the KD4-type propositional CKL and GL, but it holds for some variants of them. (shrink)

In order to capture the concept of common knowledge, various extensions of multi-modal epistemic logics, such as fixed-point ones and infinitary ones, have been proposed. Although we have now a good list of such proposed extensions, the relationships among them are still unclear. The purpose of this paper is to draw a map showing the relationships among them. In the propositional case, these extensions turn out to be all Kripke complete and can be comparable in a meaningful manner. F. Wolter (...) showed that the predicate extension of the Halpern-Moses fixed-point type common knowledge logic is Kripke incomplete. However, if we go further to an infinitary extension, Kripke completeness would be recovered. Thus there is some gap in the predicate case. In drawing the map, we focus on what is happening around the gap in the predicate case. The map enables us to better understand the common knowledge logics as a whole. (shrink)

We develop a series of small infinitary epistemic logics to study deductive inference involving intra-/interpersonal beliefs/knowledge such as common knowledge, common beliefs, and infinite regress of beliefs. Specifically, propositional epistemic logics GL are presented for ordinal α up to a given αo so that GL is finitary KDn with n agents and GL allows conjunctions of certain countably infinite formulae. GL is small in that the language is countable and can be constructive. The set of formulae Lα is increasing up (...) to α = ω but stops at ω We present Kripke-completeness for GL for each α ≤ ω, which is proved using the Rasiowa–Sikorski lemma and Tanaka–Ono lemma. GL has a sufficient expressive power to discuss intra-/interpersonal beliefs with infinite lengths. As applications, we discuss the explicit definability of Axioms T, 4, 5, and of common knowledge in GL Also, we discuss the rationalizability concept in game theory in our framework. We evaluate where these discussions are done in the series GL, α ≤ ω. (shrink)

This study adopted an empirical method to investigate lay people’s attitudes toward the bioethical issues of human-animal chimeric brains. The results of online surveys showed that (1) people did not entirely reject chimeric brain research, but showed slightly more negative responses than ordinary animal testing; and that (2) their ethical concerns arose in connection with the perception that chimerism in the brain would humanize the animal. This means that people’s psychology was consistent with the ethical argument that crossing the human-animal (...) boundary would bring moral confusion to our society. Meanwhile, it was not in line with another argument that moral status depended on having high capacities, and that chimerism would cause a problem if it enhanced animals’ capacities. Furthermore, this study analyzed additional psychological factors related to people’s moral judgment and the relationship among those factors. Several psychological factors, such as the perception that chimeric brain research is unnatural, were identified as mediating the relationship between perception of animal humanization and ethical concerns about creating and using chimeric brains. Introducing an empirical approach to the ethics of human-animal chimeric brains brought two findings: (1) this study informed us of socially shared intuition regarding this novel technology; and (2) it unveiled the psychological processes behind people’s ethical concerns in more detail than they spontaneously mentioned. These findings will help to build normative arguments and future policies that are understandable and acceptable to society. (shrink)