This paper emphasizes the crucial role of variation, at several different levels, for a detailed historical understanding of the development of the biomedical sciences. Going beyond valuable recent studies that focus on model organisms, experimental systems and instruments, we argue that all of these categories can be accommodated within our approach, which pays special attention to organismal and cultural variation. Our empirical examples are drawn in particular from recent historical studies of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century genetics and physiology. Based on (...) the quasi-paradoxical conclusion that biological and cultural variation both constrains and enables innovation in the biomedical sciences, we argue that more attention should be paid to variation as an analytical category in the historiography of the life sciences. (shrink)

By this book, Burrell wants to correct the reading of the most familiar of Aquinas’s texts, particularly those concerning God, esse, and actus. His corrective depends on the assertion that Aquinas has and uses a "philosophical grammar." Examples of devices from this grammar are the distinctions between concrete and abstract terms, between existential and predicative uses of "to be," and between the thing signified and the mode of its signification. With these and other "maneuvers," Aquinas is able to fulfill the (...) "theological task he sets himself: to elucidate the parameters of responsible discourse about God". It is only by insisting that the texts in the prima pars of the Summa, Qq. 3-11, are not a doctrine of God that we may be faithful to Aquinas’s apophatic injunction: we can know of God only what he is not. What the Scholastics wanted to make into a tractatus de Deo is in fact only "a series of restrictions on what we might appropriately say". (shrink)

Préalables S’il nous paraît important de poursuivre la discussion, appelée de nos vœux, avec les tenants de l’herméneutique « matérielle » / « numérique » (Mayaffre 2006), cette « réplique » (cf. Jullien 2007) aux commentaires que Damon Mayaffre (désormais DM) a pris le temps de nous adresser sera brève, l’ouvrage collectif Corpus numérique, langues et sens. Enjeux épistémologiques et politiques (Debono [dir.], 2014) proposant d’assez larges développements quant aux termes de ce débat. Dans...

Moreau sketches here with enthusiasm the large features of Aquinas’s epistemology. He is not, as he makes clear, a Thomist either by training or by avowal. The book is not, then, a specialist’s monograph or dogmatic treatise. It is Moreau’s attempt to hear what Aquinas will say to the great questions. The attempt is largely successful in attending to Aquinas’s remarks, though it does not catch their ambiguities.

In his struggle to vindicate the religious enterprise from the charge that it is unfalsifiable and meaningless, McKinnon reduces both science and religion to distorted caricatures, ignores the centrality of the problems of evil, anguish, absurdity, and the egocentric predicament for religion, and asserts that religion and science are fundamentally one and the same. He builds his thesis on a distinction between "assertional," "self-instructional," and "ontological-linguistic" intentionality of utterances. By equivocating about whether these usages are logically independent, McKinnon holds that, (...) as "self-instructional," utterances are outside the positivist's arena. He presses the noteworthy point--that utterances sometimes are intended to report an existential stance--in such a way as to divert attention from the vast differences between religious and scientific methods and subject matter. Not content with leaving religious utterances restricted to mere reporting, McKinnon builds a case for bypassing positivistic attack under the other two usages by trading on a supposed incommensurability between particulars and universals. E.g., he holds that "God is love" must be indeterminate and unfalsifiable since both nouns are universals and since God is incomprehensible. And so it goes, a battle between straw men on a shifting field of honor for a prize of dubious worth. Notwithstanding, this is a thought provoking treatment of a difficult topic.--M. D. P. (shrink)

The core of Lescoe’s new book is a critical edition of the first treatise of book 4 from Ulrich of Strasbourg’s Summa de bono. After Aquinas, Ulrich is Albert the Great’s best known disciple; he was certainly the more faithful. Ulrich’s Summa is, indeed, an enormous treatise built along Albertinian lines, mirroring in its eclecticism and its extent the range of Albert’s own concerns. "It is very apparent," Lescoe writes, "... that Ulrich depended on his master for much of his (...) doctrinal and even literal inspiration. His merit lies not so much in his originality of thought as in the work of synthesis and organization". Perhaps partly because of this, and given the ascendancy of Thomism among the Dominicans from an early date, the Summa de bono lies mostly unedited. A critical edition of book 1 was published in 1930 by Daguillon and a few other sections have been transcribed in unpublished dissertations and theses. But even with Lescoe’s present contribution, three-quarters of the Summa remains untranscribed and almost ninety-five percent of the work remains unprinted. (shrink)