A partir da noção de individuação ético política o texto explora a coextensividade entre o indivíduo emdevir, os processos de sua individuação e o do campo problemático implicado.

resumo: O texto visa valorizar aspectos promissores do encontro filosófico entre Gilles Deleuze e Gilbert Simondon em torno da recriação do problema da individuação e da ênfase na problemática das disparações intensivas. abstract: The text aims to enrich promising aspects of the philosophical encounter between Gilles Deleuze and Gilbert Simondon around the recreation of the individuation problem and the emphasis in the intensive disparitions problematic.

Dias de Nietzsche em Turim de Bressane / Dias / Miguel Angel de Barrenechea -- A atopia potente de Antonio das Mortes: pensamento original e perspectiva histórica / Rodrigo Guéron -- Dioniso é Brasileiro? / Selda Engelman -- Theatrum Mundi: Filosofia e canção / Olgária Chaim Matos -- Uma filosofia do amor em Cartola / Rosa Dias -- Música e diferença: uma crítica à escuta "desinteressada" do cotidiano / Samuel Araújo -- As estruturas dualísticas dos cantos ritualísticos dos Índios Karajá: (...) um reflexão sob a ótica filosófica de fundamentação nietzchiana / Suely Brígido -- Choque de intensidade na ética / Luiz B.L. Orlandi -- Por um filosofia artístico-rizomática da leitura / Daniel Lins -- Nietzsche, a negatividade e a antropofagia: do Cordeiro e da Ave da Rapina ao Jabuti / Maria Cristina Franco Ferraz -- Entre o teatro e a loucura: uma experiência de "esquizocenia" / Peter Pál Pelbart --. (shrink)

There is a certain excitement in vision science concerning the idea of applying the tools of bayesian decision theory to explain our perceptual capacities. Bayesian models are thought to be needed to explain how the inverse problem of perception is solved, and to rescue a certain constructivist and Kantian way of understanding the perceptual process. Anticlimactically, I argue both that bayesian outlooks do not constitute good solutions to the inverse problem, and that they are not constructivist in nature. In explaining (...) how visual systems derive a single percept from underdetermined stimulation, orthodox versions of bayesian accounts encounter a problem. The problem shows that such accounts need to be grounded in Natural Scene Statistics (NSS), an approach that takes seriously the Gibsonian insight that studying perception involves studying the statistical regularities of the environment in which we are situated. Additionally, I argue that bayesian frameworks postulate structures that hardly rescue a constructivist way of understanding perception. Except for percepts, the posits of bayesian theory are not representational in nature. bayesian perceptual inferences are not genuine inferences. They are biased processes that operate over nonrepresentational states. (shrink)

This article attempts to clarify the commitments of a predictive coding approach to perception. After summarizing predictive coding theory, the article addresses two questions. Is a predictive coding perceptual system also a Bayesian system? Is it a Kantian system? The article shows that the answer to these questions is negative.

Philosophers of perception widely agree that sensory properties, like color, are represented in perceptual experience. Arguments are usually needed to establish that something other than sensory properties, for example three-dimensional objects or kind properties, are part of perceptual content. Call the idea that sensory properties are represented in perceptual experience the Sensation View (SV). Given its widespread acceptance, we may expect to find strong reasons for holding SV. In this paper, I argue that we lack such reasons: SV is largely (...) unjustified. We have surprisingly poor justification for thinking that sensory properties are represented in perception. By focusing on the case of vision, I show that an embedded understanding of visual perception, and empirical evidence in cognitive psychology, indicate that SV is far from warranted. (shrink)

Standard models of visual perception hold that vision is an inferential or interpretative process. Such models are said to be superior to competing, non-inferential views in explanatory power. In particular, they are said to be capable of explaining a number of otherwise mysterious, visual phenomena such as multi-stable perception. Multi-stable perception paradigmatically occurs in the presence of ambiguous figures, single images that can give rise to two or more distinct percepts. Different interpretations are said to produce the different percepts. In (...) this paper, I argue that a non-inferential account of visual perception is just as capable of explaining multi-stable perception. I propose an embedded understanding of vision, and show how the embedded account can, after properly qualifying them, use the explanatory resources of the inferential view to explain just what such a view explains. (shrink)

Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous (...) figures often causes a change in phenomenal properties, this change is accompanied by a change in non-conceptual content. I illustrate the case by considering specific examples. (shrink)

Why does the world look to us as it does? As Nico Orlandi argues, it is simply because of how the world is. This answer emerges from understanding vision as situated in a structured environment, and it contrasts with the view that visual perception involves an inference.

Can one see one thing as another without possessing a concept of it? The answer to this question is intuitively negative. This is because seeing x as F is usually taken to consist in the application of the concept F to x . Seeing the duck-rabbit figure as a duck figure, for instance, involves applying the concept DUCK to the figure; thus, one cannot see the figure as the figure of a duck unless one has the concept of a duck (...) and is able to deploy it when looking at the figure. Nearly by definition, then, one cannot see x as F without possessing a concept of F. Contrary to this line of reasoning, this article treats the question of whether we can see x as F without possessing a concept of F as an open and partially empirical question. Seeing x as F involves seeing x in a certain way, namely as F, and whether concepts are required in order to see something in a certain way is an open question. Accordingly, what follows offers a proposal for an alternative way of understanding seeing–as that does not appeal to concept application. (shrink)

Individuals deceive themselves about a wide variety of subjects. In fortunate circumstances, where those who manage to leave self-deception embrace reality, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the formerly self-deceived often confess to having ‘known [the truth] all along’. These post-self-deception judgments are not conceptually innocuous; if genuine, they call into question the core feature of prominent theories of self-deception, namely that self-deceived individuals do not believe the unwelcome truth. In this paper I argue that post-self-deception judgments do not track a belief, (...) but rather a suspicion of the unwelcome truth. I do this by showing that post-self-deception judgments are themselves instances of self-deception where the individual is self-deceived that they believed the unwelcome truth. I then suggest that the motivational cause of the self-deceit is hindsight bias, specifically the kind known as foreseeability, and that as a result, post-self-deception judgments are not reliable because they do not accurately track previous self-deceptive experiences. (shrink)

This paper questions two prima facie plausible claims concerning switching in the presence of ambiguous figures. The first is the claim that reversing is an instantaneous process. The second is the claim that the ability to reverse demonstrates the interpretive, inferential and constructive nature of visual processing. Empirical studies show that optical and cerebral events related to switching protract in time in a way that clashes with its perceived instantaneity. The studies further suggest an alternative theory of reversing: according to (...) such alternative, seeing the same thing in multiple ways is a matter of uncovering what is already present to the senses through visual search. (shrink)

It is increasingly common in cognitive science and philosophy of perception to regard perceptual processing as a probabilistic engine, taking into account uncertainty in computing representations of the distal environment. Models of this kind often postulate probabilistic representations, or what we will call probabilistic states,. These are states that in some sense mark or represent information about the probabilities of distal conditions. It has also been argued that perceptual experience itself in some sense represents uncertainty (Morrison _Analytic Philosophy_ 57 (1): (...) 15 48, 2016 ). In this article, we will first consider three models of sensory activity from perceptual neuroscience, namely signal detection theory (SDT), probabilistic population codes (PPC), and sampling. We will then reflect on the sense in which the probabilistic states introduced in these models are probabilistic representations. To sharpen this discussion, we will compare and contrast these probabilistic states to credences as they are understood in epistemology. We will suggest that probabilistic representation, in an appropriately robust sense, can be understood as a form of analog representation. In the last part of the paper, we apply this to the issue of whether conscious experience represents uncertainty—we will interpret this as the claim that there are phenomenal features of experience that serve as analog probabilistic representations. (shrink)

This volume deals with collocations from a lexicographic perspective by addressing, in detail, the boundaries between collocations and other word combinations, the possibility of adapting the definition of collocation to the objectives of specific dictionaries, and approaches towards collocation extraction for lexicographic purposes.

In visual science the term filling-inis used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This target article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Examples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are examined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to theoretical issues about neuralignoring an absencejumping to a conclusionanalytic isomorphismCartesian materialism, a particular (...) neural stage that forms the immediate substrate of perceptual experience enactiveanimatesubpersonal” considerations about internal processing, but rather by considerations about the task of vision at the level of the animal or person interacting with the world. (shrink)

Susanna Schellenberg's book is an ambitious project, providing a view of perception that makes sense of its content, its phenomenology, and its epistemic role. In these comments, I focus on her capacitist view and raise questions concerning this view's ability to offer an adequate account of the content and phenomenology of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences.

Dans le présent article, il s’agit de reconsidérer le rapport entre pyrrhonisme et scepticisme académicien dans Les Essais de Montaigne, en posant l’hypothèse que le philosophe aurait, dès le début de sa réflexion, perçu ces deux tendances sceptiques comme des philosophies très proches, voire compatibles, malgré leurs divergences importantes. Son intérêt croissant pour les Academica de Cicéron, dans les versions postérieures des Essais, le conduirait donc non seulement à transformer son propre scepticisme (qu’il découvre de plus en plus proche de (...) celui de Cicéron), mais aussi à affiner son jugement sur les rapports entre les deux philosophies. En conclusion, l’article évoque brièvement ce qu’apportent ces éléments dans la perspective d’une nouvelle vision des relations entre Montaigne et Cicéron. (shrink)

Cet article aborde l’écriture à partir de la configuration actuelle de l’espace urbain, avec ses ensembles résidentiels sécurisés qui redistribuent et donnent sens à l’espace des villes, en provoquant une raréfaction des pratiques de sociabilité. Partant du principe qu’il est impossible de penser le fonctionnement du langage en le séparant de ses conditions matérielles et de la conjoncture dans laquelle celles-ci surgissent, il analyse le lien entre l’écriture urbaine et la façon dont cet espace de signification s’organise matériellement. L’analyse se (...) fonde sur la pratique des tags à Campinas, au Brésil. L’article aborde également le rapport de la population à l’école en tant que lieu d’institutionnalisation de l’écriture. (shrink)

Resumo: O texto que tecemos e aqui apresentamos constitui, em síntese, uma resposta à provocante pergunta de Platão o que é cuidar de si? As respostas que oferecemos consistem em traços da nossa proposta de compreensão de filosofia que se efetiva enquanto um exercício espiritual, que, por sua vez, sustenta a hipótese do filosofar enquanto um modo de viver. Para tanto, da filosofia grega, explicitaremos o exercício do cultivo de si corporificado em Sócrates e, por parte da filosofia oriental, analisaremos (...) o personagem Musashi. Ambos personificam a opção por um estilo de vida filosófica e modo de ser - o primeiro, pelas veredas do diálogo, o segundo, pela vivência - e assinalam a necessidade da evolução espiritual da alma, mediante vida contemplativa. Consequentemente, além de explorar a enorme proximidade entre uma linha filosófica grega e a tradição oriental, fundamentaremos o solo comum do pensamento enquanto exercício ético.: The text we present here is an answer to Plato's provoking question "What is it to care for oneself?" The answers we provide are aspects of our proposal for understanding philosophy as something that is realized as a spiritual exercise; this understanding, for its part, supports the hypothesis of philosophy as a way of life. Starting with Greek philosophy we will make explicit the exercise of the cultivation of the self embodied in Socrates; then, turning to Eastern philosophy, we shall examine the character of Musashi. Both personify the option for a style of philosophical life and way of being - the first through paths of dialogue, the second through experience - and highlight the necessity of the spiritual evolution of the soul by means of a contemplative life. Consequently, in addition to exploring the great proximity between the Greek and the Eastern philosophical traditions, we will find common ground between them in thought as ethical exercise. (shrink)

My main objective is to clarify the platonic perspective about the narratives which present a allegorical character. The question arises from the fact that the philosopher systematically avoids using the terms????????? and???????????, usually translated as narrative and narrate, to designate the allegories in his works. His refusal is odd, because his use of the terms covers a heterogeneous group of narratives and apparently there is no reason that prevents them from designating the allegorical passages. My proposal for a solution is (...) develop a analysis of the occurrences of????????? and??????????? in corpus platonicum, which aims to promote a more detailed characterization of the meaning of the terms. To understand one of the aspects found in this survey, the concept of testimony, I follow the interpretation of Luc Brisson in his work Platon les mots et les mythes. Finally, based on Brisson's thesis, I try to explain why the philosopher avoids the terms????????? and??????????? to refer to the allegorical narratives. (shrink)

In 2015 Dag Prawitz proposed an Ecumenical system where classical and intuitionistic logic could coexist in peace. The classical logician and the intuitionistic logician would share the universal quantifier, conjunction, negation and the constant for the absurd, but they would each have their own existential quantifier, disjunction and implication, with different meanings. Prawitz’ main idea is that these different meanings are given by a semantical framework that can be accepted by both parties. The aim of the present paper is [1] (...) to prove the normalization theorem for the propositional fragment NEp of Prawitz’ ecumenical system, and [2] to show that NEp is sound and complete with respect to a Kripke-style semantics for the language of NEp. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 No seminário de 1959-60, o psicanalista Jacques Lacan anuncia sua decisáo de abordar ali o tema da ética da psicanálise. Para uma clara compreensáo da contribuiçáo freudiana, ele resgata, como contraponto, a referência aristotélica da Ethica Nicomachea . Nessa obra, Aristóteles está em busca de um bem mais excelente, e este corresponde à felicidade. Ele pode ser alcançado pelo uso da atividade racional aliado à prática da virtude. Se, para Lacan, a investigaçáo aristotélica (...) comporta certa idealidade, o registro psicanalítico funda-se a partir da realidade. Para isso, ele retoma a noçáo freudiana de das Ding . Como objeto da primeira experiência de satisfaçáo, das Ding fundará todo o encaminhamento do sujeito. Na estrutura neurótica, entretanto, o reencontro com das Ding é excessivo; o sujeito náo o pode suportar. É por trás dessa realidade sem predicaçáo que é das Ding que Lacan encontrará a realidade que ordena, a saber, a lei da interdiçáo do incesto. É nessa dimensáo que o sujeito, em análise, é convocado a advir. O presente estudo, portanto, tem como objetivo realizar esse percurso – do bem supremo aristotélico à ética do desejo –, apontando as contribuições da psicanálise à discussáo ética. (shrink)

Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the...

RESUMO Hans-Georg Gadamer retomou e elevou a atividade hermenêutica ao status de filosofia. Uma das suas idiossincrasias consiste em entrelaçar, no seu discurso, experiências de ordem ética, política, metafísica e estética. A hermenêutica filosófica pauta-se pela prática do diálogo sobre questões relativas ao pensar e à conduta humana. O presente artigo tem por meta realizar um exercício dialógico entre o projeto filosófico de Gadamer e o pensamento oriental - mais especificamente, o budismo zen da tradição da escola de Kyoto, representada (...) pelo pensamento de Nishida Kitarō. Nossa reflexão será articulada sobre quatro momentos distintos, mas que devem ser tomados dialeticamente: inicialmente, apresentaremos um quadro geral, indicando o estado da questão da hermenêutica gadameriana relativo ao pensamento oriental; a seguir, sustentaremos as semelhanças sobre o modo de proceder de ambas, sua metodologia dialética; posteriormente, aprofundaremos a noção fundamental de experiência e as proximidades que permeiam as perspectivas de ambas as tradições; enfim, como implicação das reflexões precedentes, sustentaremos a hipótese de um saber intuitivo enquanto experiência e ação intuitivas. Ao final, apontaremos algumas conclusões instauradas a partir desse exercício dialógico para a prática filosófica. ABSTRACT Hans-Georg Gadamer has taken over and raised hermeneutic activity to philosophy status. One of his idiosyncrasies is weaving, in his speech, ethical, political metaphysical and aesthetic experiences. Philosophical hermeneutics is guided by the practice of the dialogue on issues related to thinking and human behavior. This paper aims to perform a dialogic exercise between Gadamer's philosophical project and the Eastern thought-more specifically, the Zen Buddhism of Kyoto school tradition, represented by Nishida Kitarō's thought. Our reflection will be divided into four distinct moments that should be taken dialectally: first, we will present a general framework mentioning the status quaestionis of Gadamer's hermeneutics concerning Eastern thought; then, we will maintain the similarities on how the way to proceed in both, its dialectical methodology; subsequently, we will go deeper into the fundamental notion of experience and the proximities that permeate the perspective of both traditions; finally, as implication of foregoing reflections, we will maintain the hypothesis of an intuitive knowledge as intuitive experience and action. In order to conclude, we will consider some conclusions instituted from that dialogical exercise towards philosophical practice. (shrink)

Peter Abelard was one of the most influential writers and thinkers of the twelfth century, famed for his skill in logic as well as his romance with Heloise. His Collationes - or Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher, and a Jew - is remarkable for the boldness of its conception and thought.

This paper seeks to analyze the construction of ethics in sexuality research in which qualitative methods are employed in the field of social sciences. Analyses are based on a bibliographic review of current discussions on research methods of queer theory and on the authors' own experiences of past research on sexuality. The article offers a theoretical perspective on the ways ethnography and in‐depth interviews become methods that can rely on a consensual method and create a politics of intimacy between the (...) researchers and research participants. The politics of intimacy may contribute to the production of a politically engaged knowledge while escaping from the moral matrix that usually governs the relationship between researchers and research participants. It is argued here that the researcher's sexed and gendered body matters for fieldwork; that the consensual method among participants may be employed in sexuality research as a fruitful tool; and that the relationships created among researchers and participants can pose a challenge to predetermined ethical guidelines in research. As a result, discussions problematize the existence of a politics of intimacy in sexuality research that is characterized by ethical relations among research participants. (shrink)

Este não é um livro sobre marketing. É um livro sobre a existência, avisa o filósofo Luiz Felipe Pondé, logo na abertura de Marketing existencial. Seu objetivo não é indicar caminhos para o mercado, nem auxiliar os leitores a serem consumidores mais felizes. É analisar por que a produção de bens em nossa época foi, pouco a pouco, se confundindo com os anseios existenciais dos indivíduos e deixou de atender à mera satisfação de necessidades básicas. Neste século XXI, a (...) difusão de bens de signifi cado passa à vanguarda do mercado, conduzido por um marketing existencial que busca vender produtos não apenas materiais, mas, sobretudo, os imateriais, na forma de bálsamos para as angústias mais profundas das pessoas. Em sua provocante reflexão, o autor recorre à filosofia da existência – de Kierkegaard a Sartre, de Unamuno a Camus – para examinar como as questões essenciais dos seres humanos permanecem vivas e sem resposta, mesmo na sociedade do cartão de crédito. O AUTOR Luiz Felipe Pondé é filósofo, professor da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP) e da Fundação Armando Álvares Penteado (FAAP). É autor de, entre outros, Os Dez Mandamentos (+ um) e coautor de Por que virei à direita (ambos pela Três Estrelas). É colunista da Folha de S.Paulo. (shrink)

This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...) bearer, i.e. something capable of being true, for instance, propositions, sentences or statements. According to the analysis here proposed, none of these truth bearers can be defined without reference to the others. The pragmatic, alternative view here presented, in its turn, is unaffected by this kind of conceptual difficulty. According to this view, one must focus on the use of truth terms – such as ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘correct’, ‘appropriate’, etc. – and the methodological role such terms play in the investigative practices and research programs to be found both in the sciences and in other, everyday investigative activities, such as forensic and journalistic investigations. (shrink)

The relation between ex falso and disjunctive syllogism, or even the justification of ex falso based on disjunctive syllogism, is an old topic in the history of logic. This old topic reappears in contemporary logic since the introduction of minimal logic by Johansson. The disjunctive syllogism seems to be part of our general non-problematic inferential practices and superficially it does not seem to be related to or to depend on our acceptance of the frequently disputable ex falso rule. We know (...) that the acceptance of the ex falso is a sufficient condition for the acceptance of the disjunctive syllogism, but the interesting question is: is the ex falso a necessary condition for the acceptance of the disjunctive syllogism? The aim of the present paper is to discuss some possible ways to define systems that combines the preservation of the disjunctive syllogism with the rejection of the ex falso. (shrink)

In the context of my project to justify the ethical dimension of Hermeneutics, in this article I will propose answers to the central question around which Plato’s Filebo dialogue is articulated, namely, “what is the state and disposition of the soul (hexis kai diathesis)? that can grant men a happy life? Is it for knowledge, or for pleasure?” From the clues proposed in the dialogue, I will develop the notion of a good and happy life as a process and result (...) of the correct mixture between knowledge and pleasure. Under the aegis of Gadamerian hermeneutics, taken as an ethical praxis, the objective is to substantiate the thesis that happiness is the result of the virtuous circularity between knowledge and pleasure as opposed to the vicious circularity that implements unhappiness, establishes a slave life that implies the personal, social and environmental destruction. I will do this by explaining, initially, the type of ontology and the rationality proper to dealing with the good and happy life combined with pleasure; this will make it possible to indicate clues of the appropriate alchemy - through dialogical-phronetic investigation - between knowledge and pleasure to establish a good and happy life. Finally, the original contribution of this reflection lies in proposing criteria to assess whether the mixture was well done by presenting the implications of the vicious circularity and corollaries of the virtuous circularity between knowledge and pleasure. I will show that vicious circularity fosters unhappiness, while virtuous circularity enables the creation of a good and happy life in individual and social terms, in addition to establishing a harmonious relationship and integration with the environment. (shrink)