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The Innocent Eye: Why Vision is Not a Cognitive Process
Oxford: Oup Usa (2014)
Abstract
Why does the world look to us as it does? As Nico Orlandi argues, it is simply because of how the world is. This answer emerges from understanding vision as situated in a structured environment, and it contrasts with the view that visual perception involves an inference.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Content and misrepresentation in hierarchical generative models.Alex Kiefer & Jakob Hohwy - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2387-2415.
Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases.Michael Milona & Hichem Naar - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3071-3096.
Representation and mental representation.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225.
Enactivism and predictive processing: A non-representational view.Michael David Kirchhoff & Ian Robertson - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):264-281.
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