In this paper I argue that composition as identity entails unrestricted composition. I also briefly consider a new take on the special composition question.

In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.

Rights dominate most modern understandings of what actions are proper and which institutions are just. Rights structure the forms of our governments, the contents of our laws, and the shape of morality as we perceive it. To accept a set of rights is to approve a distribution of freedom and authority, and so to endorse a certain view of what may, must, and must not be done.

Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that, for people in politics, 'egoism rules' on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on ...

Recent research suggests that many microfinance institutions increasingly focus on financial performance at the expense of the social component of their dual objectives. Existing studies typically assume that capital providers and managers mainly drive this so-called mission drift. In this study, we investigate whether ‘personal mission drift’ at the credit officer level can further explain the reduced emphasis on poorer clients among microfinance institutions. We present both qualitative and quantitative evidence that more experienced credit officers tend to serve fewer vulnerable (...) clients. Specifically, we show that all else being equal, credit officer experience is negatively correlated with the provision of small loans, loans to young clients, and loans to clients with disabilities. Our qualitative analysis suggests that perceived client risk and preferences for increased time efficiency mainly drive more experienced credit officers’ relative neglect of more vulnerable clients. This drift appears to be reinforced by the industry’s incentive schemes. Therefore, credit officer incentives and training should be designed to prevent this mission drift, which is observed at the microfinance institution level but is actually initiated at the credit officer level. (shrink)

Entrepreneurial agency—the individual power to change environments—is central to entrepreneurship research. Yet, from a social inequality perspective, beliefs in an entrepreneurial agency might differ based on the social class environments individuals are born into. Drawing on social cognitive theories, our findings across three data sets among students from Germany and entrepreneurs from the United States indicate that social class origins are associated with entrepreneurial self-efficacy (ESE) beliefs in adulthood. Exploring the underlying mechanisms, we find that students’ early entrepreneurial experiences in (...) education and practice are indicative of reproducing the class gap in ESE. When individuals collect mastery experiences such as social mobility or entrepreneurial success, their lower social class origins turn out to be associated with enhanced entrepreneurial agency beliefs. We discuss the implications for further research on social class, inequality, and entrepreneurship. (shrink)

Social enterprises in the microfinance industry need to adhere to both financial and social demands. Critics argue that there is a mission drift away from the social mission, and this has motivated the introduction of social rating agencies to strengthen the business ethics of microfinance institutions. Using a global dataset of 204 socially rated MFIs from 58 countries, we assess the factors that drive the social performance ratings of MFIs. Overall our results show that social ratings of MFIs are significantly (...) related to financial performance, greater outreach especially in rural areas, well-defined social objectives, staff commitment, service quality and an enhanced customer service. We observe that various rating agencies attach different importance to each of the social indicators. The public policy implication is that social rating agencies need to become more transparent, to reduce the information asymmetries between heterogenous socially motivated investors and the focal MFI. (shrink)

I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.

Digitalization is often associated with optimistic grand narratives about a future society in academic discourse. While the word is frequently linked with hopes and expectations of societal rebirth and beneficial changes for societies and organizations, there has been little attention given to systematically investigating the risks associated with digitalization. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between digitalization and risk, thereby characterizing “the digital risk society.” By conducting a narrative summary and thematic analysis of 34 academic papers three aggregated themes (...) were outlined: First, in the digital risk society, intangible technologies serve as solutions while simultaneously introducing new risks. Second, as an increasing number of tasks are delegated to machines with opaque inner functions, society is suffering from dehumanization. Third, scholars are calling for new approaches to govern these technologies, spurred by concerns over their potentially harmful use. (shrink)

Much fuss has been made of the “spatial turn” in recent years, across a range of disciplines. It is hard to know if the attention has been warranted. A confusion of terms has been used—such as space, place, spatiality, location—and each has signified a cluster of often contradictory and confusing meanings. This phenomenon is common to a range of disciplines in the humanities. This means, first, that it is not always easy to recognize what is being discussed under the rubric (...) of space, and second, that over-extended uses of the cultural turn have stymied meaningful engagement with materiality in discussions of space. This article shows how materiality has been marginalized both by a casual vocabulary and a vigorous a priori epistemological holism on the part of scholars, and how the spatial turn has been too closely linked to the cultural turn to allow it to develop its fullest explanatory potential. It demonstrates how historians might profitably theorize the significance of place and space in their work , and sets out some challenges for using space more effectively in explanatory systems. Inspired by environmental history, sociology, and science and technology studies, I propose a way of establishing space as different from conventional historical handling of materiality, and end by identifying some methodological problems that need to be solved if we are to proceed on a surer footing. (shrink)

Many metaphysicians accept the view that, necessarily, any collection of things composes some further thing. Necessarily, my arms, legs, head, and torso compose my body; necessarily, my arms, my heart, and the table compose something y; necessarily, my heart and the sun compose something z; and so on. 1 Though there have been a few recent attempts to argue against the necessity of this principle of unrestricted composition the consensus is that if it is true, it is necessarily true. 2In (...) what follows I will join the few dissenters and argue that this principle of unrestricted composition is not necessarily true. If I am right, it follows that either some principle of restricted composition is necessarily true or the existence of composite objects is a contingent matter. I will end by indicating why the latter option seems the most plausible. 3I proceed by reductio. Assume the following: Unrestricted composition is necessarily true.That is, assume that necessarily, any collection of things composes something. Then, necessarily, the collection of everything composes something. That is, necessarily, there exists a universal object U having all things as parts, not itself being a proper part of anything. Hence, by our assumption, we get: There must be a universal object U.It is important to note that this is so whether the world is finite or infinite. Holding that in worlds of finite cardinality there is a universal object U while in worlds of infinite cardinality there is no universal object U amounts to accepting a restricted form of composition. 4Now consider the following scenario. Everything in this world is spatially extended and just one half of something else that is also spatially extended. That is, for any thing in this world, there is something else of which …. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that we need to take irreducibly plural logic more seriously in metaphysical debates due to the fact that the verdict of many metaphysical debates hangs on it. I give two examples. The main example I focus on is the debate recently revived by Jonathan Schaffer over the fundamental cardinality of the world. I show how the three main arguments provided by Schaffer are unsound in virtue of an employment of plural logic. The second example I (...) give is a more general issue about the possibility of emergent properties of mereological wholes. Employing plural logic there is a new way to understand such cases. The upshot is that plural logic greatly matters to metaphysics and hence can no longer be ignored the way it has in this area. (shrink)

I develop and defend a version of panpsychism that avoids the combination problem by appealing to plural collective properties.

Social interaction and the constitution of mediated and nested space in the court of appeal -- Conclusion -- Concluding remarks: On becoming juridical -- Ways of spacing law and politics -- Becoming juridical -- Towards hybrid juridical spaces -- References -- Index.

The purpose of this cross-sectional study was to examine whether psychosocial working conditions may be a mediator between indoor physical working conditions and the type of vague general health symptoms included in the diagnosis of sick building syndrome (SBS). The study was based on survey data from 1505 British white-collar workers from 20 different organizations. A path analysis revealed that there was a significant direct relation between physical working conditions and vague symptoms and also psychosocial job strain (Effort-Reward Imbalance ratio), (...) which in turn also strongly related to the vague symptoms. The findings thus suggested a mediating role between physical working conditions and symptoms for psychosocial job strain. Due to the cross-sectional study design no conclusions on causality can be drawn. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the thesis of Composition as Identity as I think it should be understood, and reply to some objections to it. My aim is not to argue that CAI is true, but to show how CAI can be true, and push the debate forward in the direction I think it must and should go in light of some new objections.

Divine Foundationalism is the thesis that God is the source of all things (apart from God hirself). I clarify and defend the thesis, before I consider the main arguments for and against it.

Evolutionary psychology and intelligent‐design theory both need to be able to account for the empirical world, or the world as it is. This essay is an attempt to clarify the challenges these theories need to meet, if the relevant empirical findings are replicable. There is evidence of change in the biological world and of modularity of mind, and there is a growing body of work that finds evolutionary theory a convincing and fruitful account of the “design” of the mind. Three (...) major empirical findings within evolutionary psychology are presented and discussed. The author claims that Cartesian dualism, as it is usually meant within psychology—a split between body and mind—is false, but that Descartes' original division between body and soul has not been challenged and is not challenged by the evidence that the mind is also a biological entity. The article concludes that the convergence of theology and science is to be found in the onus to discover the truth about the world as it really is, and this calls for an ability on both parts to account for the empirical world. (shrink)

BackgroundThe aim of the study was to explore symptoms of anxiety and depression, insomnia, and quality of life in a Norwegian community sample of older adults.MethodsA representative sample was drawn from home-dwelling people of 60 years and above, living in a large municipality in Norway.ResultsBased on established cut-off scores, 83.7% of the participants showed no symptoms of anxiety/depression, 12% had mild symptoms, 2.7% moderate symptoms, 1.5% showed severe symptoms of anxiety/depression. A total of 18.4% reported insomnia symptoms. Regarding health-related quality (...) of life, few participants reported problems with self-care, but pain and discomfort were common. Depression/anxiety, insomnia, and health-related quality of life showed moderate to strong associations.DiscussionThe results suggest a close interplay between anxiety/depression, insomnia, and health-related quality of life in older adults. (shrink)

I show that a particular version of Hume's Dictum together with the falsity of Composition as Identity entails an incoherency, so either that version of Hume's Dictum is false or Composition as Identity is true. I conditionally defend the particular version of Hume's Dictum in play, and hence conditionally conclude that Composition as Identity is true. I end by suggesting an alternative way out for a persistent foe of Composition as Identity, namely mereological nihilism.

Roughly, the problem of the Trinity is the problem of how God can be one and yet be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which are three, not one. That one thing is identical with three distinct things seems to violate traditional laws of identity. I propose a solution to this problem according to which it is just an ordinary claim of one-many identity. For example, one pair of shoes is identical with two shoes; and my one body (...) is identical with its six limbs of arms, legs, head, and torso. The pair of shoes is not identical with each one of the two shoes, nor is my body identical with each one of its six limbs, but rather identical with all of them taken together, or collectively. I argue that the problem of the Trinity should be understood accordingly: God is identical with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit collectively, but not with each one of them distributively. According to the way I develop this proposal, no traditional laws of identity are violated, but merely generalized in an intuitive way. I argue that this is compatible with Christian Orthodoxy as given by the Athanasian Creed. I end by responding to some anticipated objections. (shrink)

Recent publications debate the value of inconsistency arguments. Here, I argue that 'Cause of Death Arguments' - inconsistency arguments that claim miscarriage causes death far more often than induced abortion - are unsound or invalid. 'Miscarriage' ambiguously refers both to intrauterine death, an outcome that does not itself cause death, and preterm delivery, which only sometimes causes death. The referential ambiguity also obscures actions people do take to prevent 'miscarriage.' When using the most plausible versions of each premise, these arguments (...) equivocate. Thus, they cannot prove anything. However, missing the equivocation also causes those responding to Cause of Death Arguments to make unconvincing arguments; they inadvertently make or grant false claims themselves. To avoid such mistakes and expose the merely rhetorical power of Cause of Death Arguments, philosophers should replace 'miscarriage' with disambiguated terms. Doing so should lead people across the abortion debate to finally abandon the Cause of Death Argument. (shrink)

Paul Horwich has formulated a paradox which he believes to be even more virulent than the related Hempel paradox. I show that Horwich's paradox, as orginally formulated, has a purely logical solution, hence that it has no bearing on the theory of confirmation. On the other hand, it illuminates some undesirable traits of classical predicate logic. A revised formulation of the paradox is then dealt with in a way that implies a modest revision of Nicod's criterion.

Recent advances have highlighted the outstanding role of the innate immune system for instructing adaptive immunity. Translating this knowledge into successful immunotherapies like vaccines, however, has proven to be a difficult task. This essay is based on the hypothesis that immune responses are tightly scaled to the infectious threat posed by a given microbial stimulus. A meticulous immunological risk‐assessment process is therefore instrumental for eliciting well‐balanced responses and maintaining immune homeostasis. The immune system makes fine distinctions, for example, between live (...) and dead bacteria, or pathogenic and non‐pathogenic microorganisms. Here, I discuss recent evidence for some of the mechanisms underlying these distinctions and speculate on strategies for therapeutically targeting the immunological risk‐assessment machinery. (shrink)

Despite significant efforts to support those bereaved by intrauterine death, they remain susceptible to avoidable psychological harm such as disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and emotional shock. This is in part because the words available to describe intrauterine death—“miscarriage,” “spontaneous abortion,” and “pregnancy loss”—are referentially ambiguous. Despite appearing to refer to one event, they can refer to two distinct events: the baby’s death and his preterm delivery. Disenfranchised grief increases when people understand “miscarriage” as the physical process of preterm delivery alone, (...) for this obscures the baby’s death and excludes non-gestational parents, such as the father. Additionally, focusing on the delivery reinforces the mistaken idea that a gestational mother bears responsibility for her baby’s death, increasing misplaced guilt. When these terms instead shift the focus to the baby’s intrauterine death rather than the preterm delivery, they can obscure the physically difficult and often traumatic experience women have when they deliver their dead children, leaving women shocked by preterm delivery’s physical reality. Given their outsized role in framing the bereaved’s experiences, and their duty to avoid harming their patients, healthcare practitioners in particular should take special care to discuss intrauterine death and preterm delivery appropriately with patients and their families. Changing language to describe intrauterine death and preterm delivery clearly and precisely helps mitigate disenfranchised grief, misplaced guilt, and shock, while also helping to reframe the social response to intrauterine death, making it more obvious why certain steps, such as allowing bereavement leave following an intrauterine death, promote healing. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

ABSTRACT The “symmetry assumption” in public-choice theory—the idea that people act just as selfishly in the political sphere as they do in the economic sphere—is a good theory that runs afoul of much of the evidence. The public-choice theorists in this symposium, Munger and Mueller, have thus retreated from claiming that public choice explains most political behavior, with Munger positing it as an ideal type that, in principle, might explain no behavior at all. For example, Berman suggests that even politicians (...) who say and do “anything” to be elected or re-elected may well do so in order to acquire the power they think they need if they are to enact policies that will serve the public good. The normative project of “constitutional political economy” into which the original, empirical version of public choice seems to have evolved may or may not tell us how to structure institutions to prevent greedy actors from using politics as a means to their personal aggrandizement. But that project cannot, even hypothetically, produce the public-choice “findings” of widespread self-interestedness in politics that my book found were nonexistent. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The “symmetry assumption” in public-choice theory—the idea that people act just as selfishly in the political sphere as they do in the economic sphere—is a good theory that runs afoul of much of the evidence. The public-choice theorists in this symposium, Munger and Mueller, have thus retreated from claiming that public choice explains most political behavior, with Munger positing it as an ideal type that, in principle, might explain no behavior at all. For example, Berman suggests that even politicians (...) who say and do “anything” to be elected or re-elected may well do so in order to acquire the power they think they need if they are to enact policies that will serve the public good. The normative project of “constitutional political economy” into which the original, empirical version of public choice seems to have evolved may or may not tell us how to structure institutions to prevent greedy actors from using politics as a means to their personal aggrandizement. But that project cannot, even hypothetically, produce the public-choice “findings” of widespread self-interestedness in politics that my book found were nonexistent. (shrink)

The twentieth century saw a vigorous debate over the nature of rights. Will theorists argued that the function of rights is to allocate domains of freedom. Interest theorists portrayed rights as defenders of well-being. Each side declared its conceptual analysis to be closer to an ordinary understanding of what rights there are, and to an ordinary understand- ing of what rights do for rightholders. Neither side could win a decisive victory, and the debate ended in a standoff.

In this paper I argue against grounding being necessarily well-founded, and provide some reasons to think it's actually not well-founded.

forthcoming in Philosophy & Public Affairs [2008].

The Anselmian Thesis is the thesis that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought. In this paper, I argue that such a notion of God is incoherent due to greatness being indefinitely extensible: roughly, for any great being that can be, there is another one that is greater, so there cannot be a being than which nothing greater can be. Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, because there is no perfect creature, and (...) that it is always possible to produce one which would be more perfect.’ G.W. Leibniz. Theodicy. Edited by A. Farrer (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1985. Pp. 249.). (shrink)