This is the first volume of a two-volume project whose aim is to publish all the known Middle English manuscript translations of the French Somme le mi, a thirteenth-century manual of religious instruction offering teaching on the Decalogue, the seven deadly sins and their remedies, compiled by the Dominican friar Laurent of Orleans. The project extends and deepens our knowledge of the influence of this popular French text, known today only from the versions entitled The Ayen bite of Inwit (...) and The Book of Vices and Virtues, published in 1866 and 1942, respectively. This volume presents the versions extant in BL MSS Royal 18. A. x and Add. 37677; the second will cover the versions in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 494, Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Ashmole 1286, and Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS e Musaeo 23. The texts of both volumes have been prepared with the help of the recently-published edition of the French text, a circumstance from which the earlier English editions were unable to benefit. It is likely that the versions edited here for the first time will make a considerable contribution to our understanding of the processes of textual transmission and to that of translation itself in English literary circles of the fifteenth century. (shrink)

A vital and underappreciated dimension of social interaction is the way individuals justify their actions to others, instinctively drawing on their experience to appeal to principles they hope will command respect. Individuals, however, often misread situations, and many disagreements can be explained by people appealing, knowingly and unknowingly, to different principles. On Justification is the first English translation of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot's ambitious theoretical examination of these phenomena, a book that has already had a huge impact on (...) French sociology and is likely to have a similar influence in the English-speaking world. In this foundational work of post-Bourdieu sociology, the authors examine a wide range of situations where people justify their actions. The authors argue that justifications fall into six main logics exemplified by six authors: civic (Rousseau), market (Adam Smith), industrial (Saint-Simon), domestic (Bossuet), inspiration (Augustine), and fame (Hobbes). The authors show how these justifications conflict, as people compete to legitimize their views of a situation. On Justification is likely to spark important debates across the social sciences. (shrink)

On s'est dès lors efforcé de contextualiser cette thèse et d'en préciser le sens, aboutissant à un double résultat : premièrement, les signifiés propositionnels ne sont ni des entités abstraites (platoniciennes), ni des complexes ...

In Sociology of Culture and of Cultural Practices, Laurent Fleury presents a synthesis of research and debate from France and the United States. He traces the development of the sociology of culture from its origins and examines the major trends that have emerged in this branch of sociology. Fleury also raises issues of cultural hierarchy, distinction, and legitimate culture and mass culture and focuses on new areas of research, including the role of institutions, the reception of works of art, (...) aesthetic experience, and emancipation through art. (shrink)

This article argues that many situations in social life can be analyzed by their requirement for the justification of action. It is in particular in situations of dispute that a need arises to explicate the grounds on which responsibility for errors is distributed and on which new agreement can be reached. Since a plurality of mutually incompatible modes of justification exists, disputes can be understood as disagreements either about whether the accepted rule of justification has not been violated or about (...) which mode of justification to apply at all. The article develops a grammar of such modes of justification, called orders of worth, and argues that the human capacity for criticism becomes visible in the daily occurrence of disputes over criteria for justification. At the same time, it is underlined that not all social situations can be interpreted with the help of such a sense of justice, which resides on a notion of equivalence. Regimes of love, of violence or of familiarity are systematically distinct from regimes of justification. (shrink)

Since the 1990s, the terms “Lamarckism” and “Lamarckian” have seen a significant resurgence in biological publications. The discovery of new molecular mechanisms have been interpreted as evidence supporting the reality and efficiency of the inheritance of acquired characters, and thus the revival of Lamarckism. The present paper aims at giving a critical evaluation of such interpretations. I argue that two types of arguments allow to draw a clear distinction between the genuine Lamarckian concept of inheritance of acquired characters and transgenerational (...) epigenetic inheritance. The first concerns the explanandum of the processes under consideration: molecular mechanisms of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance are understood as evolved products of natural selection. This means that the kind of inheritance of acquired characters they might be responsible for is an obligatory emergent feature of evolution, whereas traditional Lamarckisms conceived the inheritance of acquired characters as a property inherent in living matter itself. The second argument concerns the explanans of the inheritance of acquired characters: in light of current knowledge, epigenetic mechanisms are not able to drive adaptive evolution by themselves. Emergent Lamarckian phenomena would be possible if and only if individual epigenetic variation allowed the inheritance of acquired characters to be a factor of unlimited change. This implies specific requirements for epigenetic variation, which I explicitly define and expand upon. I then show that given current knowledge, these requirements are not empirically grounded. (shrink)

Le manuscrit dont nous donnons une première édition française fut rédigé en décembre 1862 et représente la première ébauche des trois premières sections du livre III du Capital. De fait, Marx l’a intitulé « Chapitre 3. Capital et Profit », en référence au plan rédigé un mois plus tard, dans lequel ce chapitre devient la « troisième section » du Capital, soit le futur Livre III lui-même. -/- Marx y traite en effet de la transformation de la plus-value en profit (...) et du taux de plus-value en taux de profit, de la transformation du profit en profit moyen et de la loi de la baisse tendancielle du taux de profit. Ce chapitre est accompagné de quelques pages intitulées Miscellanea, notes complémentaires aux développements du texte principal. À en juger par le sous-titre que Marx a donné au texte, Heft Ultimum (cahier ultimum), on peut penser qu'il en était suffisamment satisfait pour qu'il serve de matériau principal à la rédaction définitive. Néanmoins, bien que le texte présente une unité et une cohérence théoriques, il faut noter que le temps a marqué le manuscrit de son empreinte, certaines pages nous étant parvenues à l'état de fragment. -/- Concernant la transformation des valeurs en prix de production, le texte prend à revers l’histoire du long et fastidieux commentaire sur le problème du calcul de la transformation, en insistant sur l’oubli de l’origine de la plus-value provoqué par la forme profit et achevé dans le taux général de profit qui s’établit par la concurrence des capitaux. D’une manière générale, Marx manifeste en permanence dans ce texte son souci de bien distinguer l’essence des phénomènes économiques de leur mode d’apparition dans la réalité immédiate. C’est pour lui la seule tâche justifiant le caractère scientifique de l’économie politique. Les lois abstraites de la plus-value, en effet, ne peuvent être démontrées directement à partir du profit empirique – c’est ainsi que Marx qualifie le taux général de profit – dans la mesure où celui-ci rend invisibles les lois fondamentales de la production capitaliste. -/- . (shrink)

Comment savons-nous distinguer le bien du mal, reconnaître que telle action est bonne ou telle règle injuste ? Comme l'écrit Adam Smith, « selon certains, le principe de l'approbation est fondé sur un sentiment d'une nature originale, sur une faculté de perception particulière que l'esprit exerce au spectacle de certaines actions ou dispositions... lls lui donnent un nom particulier et l'appellent sens moral ». L'histoire moderne du sens moral, anglaise et surtout écossaise, commence par un dilemme. L'obligation suppose une règle (...) extérieure à la conscience qui est obligée. Comment juger, si nous ne disposons pas d'une règle de justice ? Mais les partisans du sens moral objectent : comment reconnaître et nous assurer que cette règle est bien juste, si nous n'avons pas d'abord la capacité de discerner ce qui est juste, indépendamment de l'obéissance à cette règle ? De deux choses l'une : soit nous sommes d'emblée et comme naturellement sensibles aux qualité morales, soit la moralité se réduit à la conformité à un univers de conventions. Cette notion est-elle autre chose qu'une chimère de moralistes ? Son étude permet de reconstituer une histoire de la philosophie morale et des polémiques qui l'animent au XVIIIe siècle - depuis Cudworth et Locke, en passant par Shaftesbury, Bayle, Hutcheson, Hume et Smith, jusqu'à Kant et Bentham. Textes de Jean-Pierre Cléro, Michèle Cohen-Halimi, Laurent Jaffro, Alain Petit, Jean-Michel Vienne. (shrink)

In the first part of this contribution, we review the development of the theory of scale relativity and its geometric framework constructed in terms of a fractal and nondifferentiable continuous space-time. This theory leads (i) to a generalization of possible physically relevant fractal laws, written as partial differential equation acting in the space of scales, and (ii) to a new geometric foundation of quantum mechanics and gauge field theories and their possible generalisations. In the second part, we discuss some examples (...) of application of the theory to various sciences, in particular in cases when the theoretical predictions have been validated by new or updated observational and experimental data. This includes predictions in physics and cosmology (value of the QCD coupling and of the cosmological constant), to astrophysics and gravitational structure formation (distances of extrasolar planets to their stars, of Kuiper belt objects, value of solar and solar-like star cycles), to sciences of life (log-periodic law for species punctuated evolution, human development and society evolution), to Earth sciences (log-periodic deceleration of the rate of California earthquakes and of Sichuan earthquake replicas, critical law for the arctic sea ice extent) and tentative applications to systems biology. (shrink)

Cognitive forms vary considerably as a human being detaches herself from what is closest and most personal and moves to communicate — in the broad sense of taking part in a common matter — across increasing relational distances. The article proposes to deal with the variety of cognitive formats which cannot `commonize' cognition to an equal degree, relating them to a set of regimes of engagement with the world that are identified in terms of the dependency between the human agent (...) and her environment. The good that engagement aims to guarantee orients how reality is grasped and specifies the format of what constitutes relevant information. This analysis offers new insight into the composition of communities as well as persons who have to cope with the plurality of cognitive formats and engagements from the very familiar to the most public. (shrink)

La Règle d'or Tout ce que vous voulez que les hommes fassent pour vous, faites-le vous-mêmes pour eux : voilà la Loi et les Prophètes. Jésus. " La vie éthique ou morale est une exigence d'humanité. Elle naît du désir des personnes de donner sens à leurs actes et d'agir en vue du bien. Composée de règles d'action, de normes, de valeurs, de vertus, de représentations du bien ou de ce qui est sensé, elle vise à rendre la vie plus (...) humaine, et met en oeuvre la liberté des personnes dans leur relation avec les autres, avec elles-mêmes, avec la nature et avec Dieu. On appelle généralement "éthique" la science des comportements moraux humains ". Avec quelque 200 articles rédigés par plus de 100 spécialistes venus de divers horizons, ce Dictionnaire encyclopédique d'éthique chrétienne embrasse l'ensemble des différentes notions liées à l'éthique et à la réflexion morale chrétienne. Par son approche historique, interdisciplinaire et oecuménique, il offre une meilleure compréhension des débats sociétaux actuels. Sont aussi traitées des notions fondamentales du christianisme comme la grâce, la joie, l'amour, l'espérance, la foi... Tout lecteur, initié ou non, tirera profit de la consultation de cet ouvrage d'une ampleur sans précédent. (shrink)

Laurent Stern here provides a concise account of the difficulties that arise within the interpretive process and in the context of interpretive conflict. Speakers and agents are expected by others to be occasionally insincere. Attempting to be tolerant of alternative interpretations, and dealing with the insincerity of others, often motivates interpreters themselves to become insincere. Accordingly, moral issues emerge for both speakers and interpreters. Interpretive Reasoning discusses such issues in the literature on interpretation. Stern offers a carefully argued account (...) of the very idea of interpretation. What are the constraints on interpretations? What are our grounds for demanding that others agree with our interpretations? How do we support our interpretations? What are the types of interpretations we encounter? How are problems of first-person authority and self-knowledge connected with interpreting? While the author argues for interpretations supported by principles rather than by the consensus of interpreters, he also shows that even well-supported interpretations may be mistaken, and that some interpretive conflicts are interminable. Although this is a book in philosophy, scholars and students in the humanities, the social sciences, and disciplines concerned with interpretive reasoning can read it profitably. (shrink)

La philosophie de Plotin se situe à la croisée de deux métaphysiques. La première culmine avec l’affirmation de l’identité entre l’être et la pensée : en introduisant les Formes intelligibles dans l’Intellect divin, elle conjugue platonisme et aristotélisme. La seconde inaugure un courant qui marquera durablement l’histoire de la philosophie occidentale, à travers notamment la tradition de la théologie négative. L’ontologie grecque est ainsi menée à son achèvement en même temps qu’elle est débordée par la position d’un au-delà de l’être, (...) l’Un, et ébranlée par l’impensable extinction de l’être que représente la matière. La pensée se trouve aux prises avec deux figures du non-être, qu’il s’agisse de ce non-être par défaut qu’est la matière, ou du non-être par suréminence propre au premier Principe.Ce livre a donc pour objet de montrer qu’il ne s’agit chez Plotin ni d’une forme supérieure d’onto-théologie, ni de la sortie de la métaphysique à laquelle aspire tout un courant de la réflexion contemporaine, mais bien d’une nouvelle et autre métaphysique, qui réussit à entrelacer infini et totalité. C’est ce nœud et cette tension entre deux métaphysiques, dont chacune engage une figure différente de l’altérité, que font apparaître des analyses patientes et éclairantes des textes des Ennéades.Cet ouvrage présente donc à la fois une réinterprétation de l’œuvre de Plotin et une réflexion profonde sur des problèmes qui, de Hegel à Heidegger et de Schelling à Lévinas et Derrida, continuent encore et toujours à inquiéter la pensée. (shrink)

We present here a modal version of the structure seeking dialogues that were introduced in [Rahman & Keiff 2004]. For this purpose, we use a semantics that corresponds to the semantics of non normal modal systems.RésuméNous présentons ici une version modale des dialogues de recherche de conditions que nous avons introduits dans [Rahman & Keiff 2004]. La sémantique utilisée correspond à celle des systèmes modaux non normaux.

While modern theories of emotion emphasize the role of higher-order cognitive processes such as semantics in human emotion, much research into emotional learning has ignored the potential contribut...

This article explores the category of biopolitics through the use Roberto Esposito and Giorgio Agamben make of two Greek words, bios and ōē. In particular, I argue that the separation of bios and ōē as introduced in Homo Sacer has no "natural" nor "lingual" relevance. The exposition of such a fabulous antinomy simply ruins the historical matter of Agamben's discourse on biopolitics. Here, Esposito's research could be read as an attempt to found the category of biopolitics anew without repeating the (...) fiction of a bifurcation between ōē and bios. However, Esposito, in his own celebration of biopower, undermines the very power of language and, thus, ignores the variation of the invariant that is history. Esposito's and Agamben's difficulties lead us back to the possible ambition of all politics to absorb all life, as it was already expressed by Aristotle. In this sense, "modern biopolitics" becomes a case study for the totalitarian temptation of political order. (shrink)

This article introduces a framework which aims at capturing the complexity of economic organizations. The analysis of most legitimate conventions of coordination results in a new approach to the firm as a compromising device between several modes of coordination which engage different repertoires of evaluation. This contribution to the Économie des conventions offers an analytical tool to operate comparative research on firms, intermediate regulatory committees or public policies.

The contrast, often painted in simplistic colours, between Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X as civil rights campaigners bolsters an erroneous reading of the freedom struggle of African-Americans, leaving the impression that the resort to violence and self-defence propounded by Malcolm X was a purely circumstantial departure from the general strategy of the civil rights movement. In fact, both of them reflected long on the capacity of violence and a contrario of non-violence to bring about political and social transformation (...) in the context of the extreme brutality and oppression being suffered by African-Americans. Their dilemma stemmed from an old intellectual tradition of the America of the slave period. Well before the ideas of Gandhi won over the African-American elite, and even before Henry David Thoreau laid the theoretical basis for civil disobedience, African slaves gave thought to the legitimacy and effectiveness of violence to amend their situation. The importance of the non-violent movement in the United States and the historical significance of Martin Luther King cannot be understood unless a true measure is taken of the anti-slavery struggle. While within the religious domain, the Black Church played a major role in dissuading violence, secular thought in favour of legitimate forceful rebellion also found itself confronted by a counter-argument which advanced the power of social change and resistance to injustice that non-violence could effect. This article particularly addresses the challenges to their consciences that confronted the militants of non-violence in their campaign for the abolition of slavery and notably those facing the central figure of that struggle, the former slave become the apostle of liberation, Frederick Douglass. (shrink)

La vision comme modèle du vrai et du beau est l'objet de ce livre d'histoire des idées.

On interprète assez souvent le succès actuel des médecines parallèles comme une réaction à une double insatisfaction que la médecine scientifique laisse au patient dans nos sociétés occidentales. D'une part, la difficulté d'être entendu comme sujet dans sa maladie, comme une personne globale affectée dans la totalité de son être, dans le sens qu'elle donne à sa vie, à ses relations, etc. Et d'autre part, la difficulté d'être appréhendé d'une manière unitaire par le médecin, corps et esprit réunis. Les différents (...) auteurs de cet ouvrage, qu'ils soient théologiens, philosophes, médecins ou historiens de la médecine, ont tous pris au sérieux ces appels à dépasser ce que l'on peut appeler les impasses de la biomédecine en proposant, selon différentes inspirations, une anthropologie renouvelée du corps humain. En particulier, s'il s'agit de faire droit aux convictions du patient et du professionnel de santé, à quelles conditions - épistémologiques mais aussi politiques - un dialogue entre l'Eglise et la science peut-il s'avérer légitime et fécond? Que peuvent nous apprendre les écrits hippocratiques et les textes bibliques pour construire une autre représentation du corps humain et de la maladie? Le modèle des soins palliatifs ne pourrait-il pas fournir à la biomédecine un nouveau paradigme de prise en charge du patient où celui-ci reste un sujet, capable de relation, une personne jusqu'au bout? (shrink)

Laurent Le Bon, directeur du Centre Pompidou-Metz, dévoile au cours d’un entretien avec Roland Huesca l’histoire, les atours et les enjeux de l’écriture de plusieurs catalogues d’expositions : à l’affiche Dada, Chefs-d’œuvre ?..

This essay attempts to describe the neo-Lamarckian atmosphere that was dominant in French biology for more than a century. Firstly, we demonstrate that there were not one but at least two French neo-Lamarckian traditions. This implies, therefore, that it is possible to propose a clear definition of a (neo) Lamarckian conception, and by using it, to distinguish these two traditions. We will see that these two conceptions were not dominant at the same time. The first French neo-Lamarckism (1879-1931) was structured (...) by a very mechanic view of natural processes. The main representatives of this first period were scientists such as Alfred Giard (1846-1908), Gaston Bonnier (1853-1922) and Félix Le Dantec (1869-1917). The second Lamarckism - much more vitalist in its inspiration - started to develop under the supervision of people such as Albert Vandel (1894-1980) and Pierre-Paul Grassé (1895-1985). Secondly, this essay suggests that the philosophical inclinations of these neo-Lamarckisms reactivated a very ancient and strong dichotomy of French thought. One part of this dichotomy is a material, physicalist tradition, which started with René Descartes but developed extensively during the 18th and 19th centuries. The other is a spiritual and vitalist reaction to the first one, which also had a very long history, though it is most closely associated with the work of Henri Bergson. Through Claude Bernard, the first neo-Lamarckians tried to construct a mechanical and determinist form of evolutionary theory which was, in effect, a Cartesian theory. The second wave of neo-Lamarckians wanted to reconsider the autonomy and reactivity of life forms, in contrast to purely physical systems. (shrink)

Retrace l'histoire du néant en Occident en étudiant ses étapes décisives et ses principales désignations.

Laurent Henninger intervenant sur les « révolutions militaires » (notion située au carrefour du débat historique lancé dans les années 1980 par Geoffrey Parker – en polémique avec Jeremy Black – et du débat stratégique américain dans les années 1990) souligne que les avancées dans l’art de la guerre ont été depuis cinq siècles une des composantes majeures de la barbarisation et du totalitarisme. La notion de « révolution militaire » est aujourd’hui contestée par ceux qui y voient un (...) outil interprétatif de trop longue durée et lui préfèrent l’idée de « mutations militaires » (selon laquelle l’accumulation de changements millimétriques sur la longue durée débouche sur des ruptures). Après avoir passé en revue la première révolution militaire – XVe-XVIIe siècles – fondée sur la mise à distance de la cavalerie grâce à l’infanterie nouvelle, à l’artillerie du champ de bataille, Henninger s’interroge sur le critère discriminant pour qualifier les nouvelles guerres de la Renaissance (l’hyperviolence n’en est pas un à ses yeux) et voit dans les armes à feu la vraie rupture car elles influent de façon radicale sur la peur et le courage des combattants et sont source d’une véritable « inhumanité » dans la mesure où leur feu est « imparable ». Il insiste sur l’émergence d’un nouveau type de courage guerrier non archaïque et plus « stoïcien » marqué par l’acceptation de la mort. Dans cette perspective, l’« inhumanisation » technique porterait en elle la possibilité de la barbarisation. L. Henninger développe ensuite cette thèse à partir de l’examen des guerres mécanisées de la période 1860-1950 en s’attardant sur la guerre de Sécession puis sur la Grande Guerre. Il relie aussi la question du totalitarisme à la réflexion sur les « bombardements stratégiques massifs » et les débuts de la dissuasion nucléaire (terme qui ne s’impose que vers 1960). Il conclut en insistant sur le fait que, selon lui, la brutalisation des conflits naît toujours d’un retard de la pensée de la guerre et sur le paradoxe d’une culture occidentale qui produit en même temps barbarie de la guerre et codes qui tentent de l’enrayer. (shrink)

Nous comparons les notions d’usage et de signification chez Ludwig Wittgenstein et Martin Heidegger. Contrairement à Jocelyn Benoist, nous pensons que l’analogie entre Wittgenstein et Heidegger n’est pas superficielle. La métaphysique de Heidegger explicite certaines présuppositions implicites de la seconde philosophie de Wittgenstein. Le pragmatisme naturaliste de Wittgenstein peut être théorisé. Notamment la notion wittgensteinienne d’usage, ou de jeu de langage, peut être comprise comme une pratique à la fois naturelle et normative régie par des règles. -/- Wittgenstein’s notions of (...) use and meaning are compared with the corresponding Heidegger’s ones. Unlike Jocelyn Benoist, we suggest that the analogy between Wittgenstein and Heidegger is not superficial. Heidegger’s metaphysics makes explicit some of the implicit presuppositions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s naturalistic pragmatism can be theorized. In particular, Wittgenstein’s notion of use, or language game, can be understood as both natural and normative rule- governing practice. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to present several immediate consequences of the introduction of a new constant called Lambda in order to represent the object ``nothing" or ``void" into a standard set theory. The use of Lambda will appear natural thanks to its role of condition of possibility of sets. On a conceptual level, the use of Lambda leads to a legitimation of the empty set and to a redefinition of the notion of set. It lets also clearly appear (...) the distinction between the empty set, the nothing and the ur-elements. On a technical level, we introduce the notion of pre-element and we suggest a formal definition of the nothing distinct of that of the null-class. Among other results, we get a relative resolution of the anomaly of the intersection of a family free of sets and the possibility of building the empty set from ``nothing". The theory is presented with equi-consistency results . On both conceptual and technical levels, the introduction of Lambda leads to a resolution of the Russell's puzzle of the null-class. (shrink)

The Swiss philosopher Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847 - Prague, 1914) belongs, with Carl Stumpf, to the first circle of Brentano’s pupils. Within Brentano’s school (and, to some extent, in the secondary literature), Marty has often been considered (in particular by Meinong) a kind of would-be epigone of his master (Fisette & Fréchette 2007: 61-2). There is no doubt that Brentano’s doctrine often provides Marty with his philosophical starting points. But Marty often arrives at original conclusions which are diametrically opposed to (...) Brentano’s views. This is true of his views about space and time and about judgment, emotions and intentionality. In the latter case, for example, Marty develops Brentano’s view and its implications in great detail (Mulligan 1989; Rollinger 2004), but uses them to formulate a very unBrentanian account of intentionality as a relation of ideal assimilation (Chrudzimski 1999; Cesalli & Taieb 2013). Marty’s philosophy of language, on the other hand, is one of the first philosophies worthy of the name. In what follows, we contrast briefly their accounts of (i) judgment and states of affairs and of (ii) emotings and value (two topics of foremost significance, for Brentano and Marty’s theoretical and practical philosophies respectively) (§1), and their philosophies of language (§2). Brentano’s view of language is based on his philosophy of mind. Marty takes over the latter and turns a couple of claims by Brentano about language into a sophisticated philosophy of language of a kind made familiar much later by Grice. Marty’s philosophy of states of affairs and value and of the mind’s relations to these also takes off from views sketched by the early Brentano, views forcefully rejected by the later Brentano. (shrink)

In the context of change to the “new modernity” described in Beck’s work, companies develop management modes and methods that focus more and more on individuals. Constitutive of the individualization process, human resources practices have become ambivalent as the process itself. This contribution examines how a managerial and organizational innovation as telework contributes to the process of individualization, and the paradoxes it addresses to management. At the interface of the social and the technical, teleworking appears as a flexible arrangement, meeting (...) employees’ and employer’s demands – which is a characteristic of the process of individualization – by simultaneously fragmenting collectivity, exposing individuals to social risk, and producing exclusion. The authors focus on two consecutive paradoxes of such individualized managerial practices: the individual–collective dilemma and the autonomy–control paradox. Finally, the paper reveals HRM as a new institution of individualization in a world where regulation functions are more and more transferred to individuals themselves. (shrink)

Vauvenargues is one of those authors we think we know without having read. Sidelined among the minor moralists, the texts he published are rarely considered rigorous and powerful. Hence we are endebted to Laurent Bove for having taken this thought seriously, and for having systematically brought into relief its most striking intellectual aspects. Vauvenargues himself asked his readers to “read slowly” (“lire doucement”)—a reading ethic that has finally been followed to the letter. Pascal also sought the right rhythm of (...) reading, but not without a certain anxiety over an exaggerated slowness: “when one reads too fast or too slowly, one understands nothing.” In a brief and dense work, Bjornstad Hall finds a rhythm in .. (shrink)

Anton Marty (1847-1914) is known to be the most faithful pupil of Franz Brentano. As a matter of fact, most of his philosophical ideas find their source in the works of his master. Yet, the faithfulness of Marty is not constant. As the rich correspondence between the two thinkers shows, Marty elaborates an original theory of intentionality from ca. 1904 onward. This theory is based on the idea that intentionality is a process of mental assimilation (ideelle Verähnlichung), a process at (...) the core of which lies a sui generis relation of “ideal similitude” holding between a thinking subject and its object. This study spells out the Martyian notion of mental assimilation and traces back Marty’s evolution from his earlier position (prominently described in the recently published Deskriptive Psychologie of 1893-1894) to his final view as it is found in the Untersuchungen of 1908. It turns out that besides Brentano, Husserl is a key figure in that evolution. Such a “genetic”elucidation of Marty’s last theory is required in order to reach the main goal of this paper, namely: the clarification of Marty’s degree of dependence upon Brentano with respect to the theory of intentionality. That being said, we do not merely intend to compare the mature Marty with Brentano: our “genetic” considerations will also allow us to describe the interaction between the two thinkers before 1904. Accordingly, we begin by presenting Brentano’s own position on intentionality in discussing its two currently competing readings, namely the “discontinuist” and the “continuist” one. Against a recent interpretation, we argue that Marty’s endorsement of a “discontinuist” reading is not based on a misunderstanding of Brentano’s position. (shrink)

This book presents a state-of-the-art multidisciplinary perspective on psychological, physiological and computational approaches to understanding the ...