‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī’s _Book on the Science of Metaphysics_ is an important work that contains the influence of both Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius in the interpretation of Aristotle. Only chapters 13-16 belong to the Lambda. The limitation results first of all from the main purpose of the work, namely to present a new witness for the reception of Arabic metaphysics. As can be seen from the introduction of the work, the work is conceived as a unified whole and (...) may be meant as a kind of summa of metaphysics, a synopsis of four writings that hold high rank among medieval metaphysical works - especially since 'Abd al-Latif apparently regarded not only the Metaphysics but also his other sources as originating from Aristotle, the First Teacher. This translation includes only the eighth chapter of the Book Lamda. (shrink)

Very few researchers have reported on procedures of recruiting, obtaining informed consent, and compensating participants in health research in the Arabian Gulf Region. Empirical research can inform the debate about whether to adjust these procedures for culturally diverse settings. Our objective was to delineate procedures related to recruiting, obtaining informed consent, and compensating health research participants in the extremely high-density multicultural setting of Qatar.

Islāmic aesthetic is an outcome of Islāmic civilisation based on Islāmic metaphysics and theology and emphasizes that God is the origin or source of all art and thought, including various art forms. Thus, the essences or forms of all things have their reality in the Divine Wisdom or Intellect (Al-‘Aql-i-Awwal). Islāmic conception of art and beauty has its origin in Islāmic Weltanschauung, so, each object of beauty in nature reflects the Creative and Aesthetic aspect of Jamīl Allāh with His Jamāl. (...) Generally, in Muslim world, art and beauty are almost neglected ones, so, they are not given significant and sufficient importance because of some unauthentic and false notions and consequently, we have almost lost this pristine Islāmic heritage and now we must revisit it and realise its vital function and role in our socio-political and ethico-spiritual life. Islāmic aesthetics has a significant role in the cultural tradition of Islāmic Ummah, so it must be revitalised for a peaceful life’s onward caravan. In the present paper, an effort has been made to discuss the etymological meaning of ‘aesthetics’ in general and the main features of Islāmic conception of aesthetics, including art and beauty, in particular, along with various Islāmic art-forms. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#69-70; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2021 P 119-144. (shrink)

One of the important aspects of the classical kalām is that the philosophical topics related to physics and cosmology, namely daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām, have an important place in it. The reason for the involvement of the kalām scholars (mutakallimūn) in these kinds of issues is commonly regarded as an effort to defend Islamic beliefs against other religions and thought systems. However, when their studies are examined closely, the complexity of their concepts and theories, as well (...) as the fact that they discussed these matters not only with opposing groups but also among themselves, show that kalām had a much deeper and integrated relationship with science and philosophy in the classical period. Their engagement with philosophical and scientific matters, such body (jism), substance/atom (jawhar), accident (ʿaraḍ), motion, space, time, and causality dates back to the mid-8th century and displays great diversity. Although the mutakallimūn probably were the first ones to deal with physics-related issues in Islamic thought, it cannot be said that they are given the importance they deserve in modern studies pertaining to the history of science and philosophy in Islamic thought. The fact that, in kalām works, physics-related questions were generally discussed along with theological matters has caused the scholarship of mutakallimūn to be regarded as an adjunct of apologetic discipline and has thereby led to a limited description of kalām’s relationship with science and philosophy in the classical period. This set of circumstances hinders a proper understanding of how science and philosophy emerged and evolved in Islamic thought. In the present article, I will attempt to present the place and role of physical topics, namely daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām, in classical kalām, between the 9th and 11th centuries. Firstly, I will show how the classical mutakallimūn divided kalām into two parts, namely ‘major’ (jalīl) matters, which are based on revelation, and ‘subtle’ (daqīq) or ‘obscure’ (laṭīf) matters, which mainly depend on reason. Matters surrounding jalīl al-kalām indicate the theological problems on which the mutakallimūn had a general agreement, such as God’s oneness, revelation, prophethood, and eschatology. Questions discussed under the category of daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām mostly correspond to philosophical and scientific issues concerning epistemology, physics, and cosmology. Secondly, I will examine to what extent the mutakallimūn dealt with physical sciences and what kind of topics were primarily discussed in the field of daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām. The upshot of this will be that the claim that the mutakallimūn were interested in physics and cosmology merely for apologetic purposes is unsound; rather, in the 9th and 10th centuries, many Muslim theologians also concerned themselves with issues such as motion, void, body, and causality as truth seekers. That being the case, the mutakallimūn should be taken into consideration in studies related to the emergence and rise of science and philosophy in Islamic thought. (shrink)

İnsanın hal ve hareketleri onun nasıl bir karaktere sahip olduğunu dışa yansıtmaktadır. Bu yüzden hal ve hareketler kişiyi tanımamızda yardımcı olur. Yüce Allah, Kurʹân-ı Kerim’de ashâbü’l-yemîn ve ashâbü’l-meymene gibi ifadeler kullanmış ve bu ifadelerle bir takım insanları kast etmiştir. Kastedilen iyi insanların vasıfları bu ifadelerden hemen sonra zikredilmiştir. Bu da Allah’ın sağ tarafa önem atfettiğinin göstergelerindendir. Hal ve hareketleri bakımından sevilen Hz. Peygamber, Müslümanlar için örnek kabul edilmiş ve onun emir ve tavsiyeleri harfiyen uygulanmaya hassasiyet gösterilmiştir. O, sağ taraf ile (...) faziletli ve hayırlı işleri, sol taraf ile de nahoş olan fiilleri yapmış ve bunu teşvik etmiştir. Sahâbe de bunu hem uygulamış hem de sonraki nesillere aktarmaya azami gayret göstermiştir. Daha sonra onun bu yöndeki tavsiye ve uygulamaları fıkıh âlimleri arasında kural haline gelmiştir. Hz. Peygamber’in sağ tarafla ilgili sözleri, uygulamaları ve tavsiyeleri hadisler vasıtasıyla bize aktarılmıştır. Böylece günlük hayatta başta olmak üzere ibadetlerde sağ tarafa ehemmiyet göstermiştir. Bu çalışmada Hz. Peygamber’in sağ tarafı önemsemesinin ve sağ tarafa öncelik vermesinin, beşerî ya da nebevî olup olmaması tartışmasına değinilecektir. Daha sonra Arapça iki kavram olan yemîn ve yesâr kavramlarının tarifi ele alınacak, abdest alırken sağ el ve ayakların önce yıkanmasının, tek kişinin imamın hangi tarafında durmasının ve teşehütte otururken sağ el ve sağ ayağın konumunun hükmü gibi konuların hükmüne işaret edilecektir. (shrink)

The present work provides a detailed account of the available data on ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Baġdādī’s biography, an outline of his philosophical thought, and a detailed analysis of his reworking of pre-Avicennian Greek and Arabic metaphysics.

Many assumptions believe that classical Islamic theology is no longer relevant in the contemporary era, either because its discussion tends to be theocentric and far from the progress of humanism or because it is considered no longer relevant to answer contemporary issues such as secularism, pluralism, globalization, or neo-atheism. Departing from these problems, efforts have emerged for new readings of classical theology by paying more attention to the context and needs of the times. Among these efforts is the renewal of (...) theology by highlighting its methodological aspects, as was done by a contemporary Moroccan theologian and philosopher, Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This study attempts to describe and analyze the style of renewal of theology from the perspective of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This research is a character study using qualitative methods, in which the existing data is analyzed critically. This article shows that Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s style of renewal of ‘ilm al-kalām focuses on efforts to reform the methodology of classical kalam by reforming the method of dialogue science (munaẓarah) through contemporary linguistic and logical tools, rearranging analogy patterns (qiyas), and building a logic of kalam based on the principle’s logic and morality as well as the amalgamation of theoretical aspect and practical aspect. The significance of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s renewal in contemporary Islamic theology lies in the theorizing of concepts in classical theology with a contemporary approach as well as the construction of the methodology of contemporary Islamic theology to answer ever-evolving theological issues. (shrink)

Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār is one of the important representatives of the Kalām thought of the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī School. He was born in A.H. 450/ C.E. 1058 in Bukhara that is one of the city of Transoxiana/Mawara al-nahr where Maturidi School has emerged around this socio-cultural environment. He completed his education and served as a leader (rais/ ṣadr) of the Hanafite scholars there until he was exiled to the city of Marv. Upon his return from exile, he passed away (...) in Bukhara in A.H. 534/ C.E. 1139. The present study aims to determine his method in Kalām. The introduction outlines the subject, significance, purpose, method, and sources of the research. In this study, it was employed a method that focuses on a person in which he/she is examined with his/her views and thoughts by taking into account his/her socio-cultural factors. By doing this, the first chapter of this study deals with the political, socio-economic, and scientific situation in Transoxiana, and the activities of diverse religions, sects, and philosophical schools in this region in A.H. V-VI/C.E. XI-XII. In the second chapter, it studies al-Ṣaffār’s life, scientific personality, works as well as the sources that he made references to in his works in detail. In the third chapter, the kalām method of al-Ṣaffār has been tried to be determined. For this purpose, it analyzes his extant works, Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risālah fī al-kalām and elaborates first on his defense of the Kalām that gives great importance to reason (ʿaql) and to intellectual debates, if necessary, in theological issues. Then it explores his theory of knowledge with his ideas on the definition, possibility, sources, and types of knowledge, and the epistemological understandings he defensed or criticised. Furthermore, to determine his Kalām method, it evaluates his approach towards the value of ‘aql and naql (Qurʾān-Ḥadīth) as sources of knowledge. Since this issue is a distinctive tool for unveiling the kalām methods of different mutakallims and Muslim sects. Finally, it finds out the types of istidlāl, meaning inference of one thing from the other that he used when he argues and defends his views, and illustrates with examples. (shrink)

Abu Ishaq al-Saffar was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhanids' period who followed the Kalam thought of al-Maturidi (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhis al-adilla and Risala fi al-kalam, his method in kalam, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Saffar is a respected and authorative Maturidi theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalam. By adding a long introduction to Talkhis about the naming, importance, and religious legitimacy of the science (...) of kalam, Saffar asserted that the kalam should be learned. When systematically vindication of the science of kalam is examined, it is understood that al-Saffar is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defending the kalam among Hanafi-Maturidis. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalam in al-Saffar divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Saffar's defending the science of kalam shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalam in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Ashab al-Hadith and Ikhwan al-Safa were the opposite fronts of kalam. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Hanafi jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. (shrink)

This article is about the place of kalām (theology) within the general structure of al-Fārābī's metaphysics. In this framework, the article consists of two parts. The first part examines the position of metaphysics within the framework of al-Fārābī's idea of perfection. In the second part, a close reading of al-Fārābī's al-Ibāna ʿan ġarażi Arisṭuṭālīs fī kitābi mā baʿda al-ṭabīʿa is made and al-Fārābī's approach to the theoretical aspect of theology within the theory of milla is analyzed. Since al-Fārābī's theories (...) of perfection and meaning are the theories that affect a major part of his philosophy, the article shows the effects of these two theories on al-Fārābī's analysis of metaphysics without examining their general position in al-Fārābī's philosophy. In this framework, the article examines the idea that al-Fārābī's metaphysics should be evaluated in view of the background of his theories of perfection and meaning, based on the secondary literature on the subject. As evidence for this claim, al-Fārābī's description of the philosophical sciences as the steps of intellectual perfection is shown in the article. The article emphasizes that al-Fārābī's evaluations of the relationship between kalām and metaphysics are based on the theory of perfection. A close reading of the relevant passages in Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda, Treatise on Intellect (Risāla fi-l ‘aql), and Kitāb al-Ḥurūf shows how al-Fārābī's theories of perfection and meaning form the background of his analysis of metaphysics through the philosopher's arguments. On the other hand, the article shows how al-Ibāna might be understood within al-Fārābī's metaphysical construct by showing the extensions of the theories of perfection and meaning in this work. For al-Fārābī, metaphysics, which constitutes the last step of intellectual perfection, is also the highest science. This process is indicated by the concept “al-naẓar al-ilāhī” (divine thinking/thought). In this framework, kalām cannot gain the title of metaphysics because it is a science that does not emerge in the course of intellectual perfection. In this article, this approach is justified by considering the relevant passages in al-Ibāna. Al-Fārābī's distinction between the science of divine oneness (tawḥīd) and metaphysics in this work has been a subject of debate among scholars. Regarding what al-Fārābī meant by the definition of universal knowledge, the article emphasizes that the relationship of metaphysics with the theories of perfection and meaning influenced al-Fārābī's approach to universal knowledge. In the last part of the article, al-Fārābī’s theory of milla is considered in the context of the theory of meaning. For this aim, the article suggests that al-Fārābī’s idea of milla as a copy or similitude of philosophy makes the science of kalām an intermediate science that acts between the verbal and the philosophical areas of meaning. (shrink)

Ijmā is ranked as the third shariah evidence after the Qur’ān and Sunnah in the science of Uṣūl. Shafi was the first one who made Uṣūl which had been known and used by the Islamic scholars, into a written document and who ascertained that Ijmā was the third of the shariah evidences. Kalām is one of the sciences in which Ijmā evidence is used. The scholars of Kalām used this evidence as far as the science of Uṣūl made (...) it possible. They always used it without changing any basics of religious beliefs and acceptances. That the aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been supported with Ijmā which is regarded as one of naqly evidences, played an important role in eliminating suspicions which were tried to be aroused in momins’ mind. In this article, the function and importance of Ijmā evidence, which is one of the primary sources of the science of Uṣūl, in the science of Kalām and Aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been studied.SummaryWhat the Qur’ān demands from us is to emphasize the spirit of unity among ummah and to keep out the factors that could trigger separation and division. Indeed, Allah emphasizes in the following verses in the Qur’ān on the protection of the unitary structure of the ummah: “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided” (Āl a-Imrān 3/103) and “And do not be like the ones who became divided and differed after the clear proofs had come to them” (Āl al-Imrān 3/105). Allah has commanded the Ulul ‘Azm Prophets to hold the religion upright and to avoid division. (al-Shūrā 42/13). The command of holding the religion upright and not to be divided in this religion means to certify what needs to be confirmed in the religion of Allah and to obey those that must be obeyed. This is also the proclamation of the principle of religion that all the prophets have consensus over.Ahl al-Sunnah understanding of Islam is identical to the understanding of the Prophet and his companions. For this reason, Ahl al-Sunna is the school that represents the main backbone of Islam. In Ahl al-Sunna, in many subjects, be it usūlî / primary or furū’ī / secondary, there has been ijmā. These ijmās are Sahaba ijmās and deductive ijmās that come from mutakallimūn (theologians) ijtihāds. Therefore, ijmā and ijtihād are closely connected to each other. Ijmā is supported by ijtihād and ijtihād is also the source of ijmā. Thus, the issue is no longer just a pure ijtihād; it turns out to be a degree that gives a solid knowledge after it has risen to some degree just after the nass/texts.Ahl al- Sunnah theologians are talking about two kinds of ijmā. The first is “ijmā taṣdīqī” (approval consensus) which is the consensus based on Sahaba İjmā. These are the ijmās that occur on the principles called ḍaruratal-diniyya (necessities of the religion), and accepted as solid proofs in religion. Issues such as the principles of faith, obligation of prayer and the fasting are the subjects that are determined by the solid/definite ijmā. Such ijmās are valid approvals on existing provisions. These ijmās based on solid nass (verses and hadiths). Such ijmās do not give any new information. The existing information is strengthened by the alliance of Muslims. In these areas, ijtihād cannot be done and Muslims do not need ijtihād on these issues. There is an consensus of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars about the unfaithfulness of the one who denies one or more of the principles which are accepted as the main obligatory principles in Islam. The other is the “deductive ijmā which the ijtihāds have roles over. This kind of ijmās, are formed as a result of mujtahids’ consensus over the same opinion on the issue of theological secondary issues. The issues related to the secondary theological issues which were open to the ijtihāds and the different results obtained on matters are not accepted as the cause of takfīr. However, depending on the subject he/she can be a sinner. Istidlālī/deductive ijmās are not considered as an independent proofs in ‘Ilm al-Kalām, rather a supportive ones and are considered as textual evidences.Since, texts that are accepted as sources give supposed information. In this regard, the Ahl al-Sunnah scholars accepted other members of the sect who have in secondary theological issues opposed the ijmā of the salaf / predecessor as Ahl al-Qibla, but named them as Ahl al-Bid’a (innovator in religion) because of their opposition to Salaf’s İjmās. Moreover, the scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah did not see them appropriate to participate in the Ijmās, which could occur between the generations that come after Sahābas/companions.Not all disputes have been criticized in Islam. It is a blessing for the ummah to claim different opinions on the issues subject to ijtihād. Since the ummah, in this way, will bring new solutions to emerging issues and as a result, Islam will have a mechanism to produce a dynamic solution. This can only be possible through ijtihād. Dispute is to propose different views on a subject. If this view is not in the actual matters that could harm the unity of the Ummah, rather in the case of ijtihādi issues, this conflict could turn to be mercy.The reason why the methodists evaluate the ijmā within the scope of the authorized evidence is that because they think it is essential that the ijmā be based on a proof. From this point of view, the alliances that occurred in mental matters were not considered as ijmā. The theologians always tried to support their claims with nass/textual proofs. When the ijmā is realized, whether known or not, they have stated that there is certainly a religious proof behind it. Because, the provisions that were reached through ijmā, cannot be against the provisions of the Prophet.Many issues in Islamic Belief and Kalām works are supported by the mental and textual evidences as well as by deductive ijmā. However, many of the claims of Ijmās in these works reflect the inter-sect ijmās of the Ahl al-Sunnah. The sects outside the Ahl al-Sunnah were excluded. This attitude is, above all, the aim of ensuring the integrity within the sect, and trying to protect the Ahl al-Sunnah belief. Since the ijmā evidence has a function that prevents all kinds of arbitrary and divisive thoughts and turns the supposed knowledge into the qat’ī/certain one, it raises the provision to the next level just after the nass, rather than merely being a ijtihādi provision. In the case of the forerunner of the Ahl al-Sunnah, the Māturīdes and Ash‘arites have not differed in in understanding of ijmā in terms of methodology.Although they have different views on the definition and content of the ijmā, they have a common understanding of alliances of Mujtahids on the same view. The mutakallims (theologians) of Māturīdī and Ash’arī schools have used the proof of ijmā as supportive evidence in the cases related to Kalām. al-Ash’arī not only adopted the proof of ijmā but also used it in practice in. He did not make any distinction in proof of ijmā as practical, theological, methodological or sub-divisional; he used it freely in every field. Māturīdī and Ash’arī scholars decided that the ijmā could occur in religious matters and that there would be evidence when it was formed; In the case of mental issues, they have required the knowledge to be based on solid information. In the case of ijmā in purely mental issues, they have disputed over the issue. While some Ahl al-Sunnah scholars stated that since purely mental matters were certain knowledge and therefore don’t need ijmā, they also ruled that because the mujtahids could get this knowledge from religious texts, therefore ijmā could occur in mental matters as well. (shrink)

The volume contains editions of the extant parts of two hitherto unknown theological works by the _Būyid_ vizier al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād. The manuscripts on which the edition is based come from Cairo Geniza store rooms.

In the present paper it is shown that al-Ämidî has tried to integrate somehow pilosophy into theology in way that reveals closer to al-Ghazâlî's than to F.D. al-Râzî's way of combining both currents of thought. Based on an analysis of several ideas taken from different works it is shown that al-Ämidî not only accepts the logic of the philosophers, but also their views that may be considered as scientifically established beyond any reasonable doubt.

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious (...) legitimacy of the science of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

Criticism of Qur'an hermeneutics method by Averroës, an Islamic philosopher.

Recientemente se ha encontrado una copia de la obra al-garib al-muntaqà min kalm ahl al-tuqà, hasta ahora desaparecida. En el manuscrito la autoría del Muntaqà se atribuye a Ibn Masarra. En este artículo se muestra que su más probable autor, según indican las fuentes, es Ibn Jamis al-Yaburi, importante eslabón en la historia del sufismo andalusí. Se analizan además la estructura y el contenido de esta obra ascético-mística que Ibn Jamis transmitió al cadí �Iya? de Ceuta.

In this study, some postscripts (Ḥashiyah) written on Sharḥ al-Aqâid in the Ottoman Empire were examined and their sectarian identities were tried to be determined in the context of the Takwīn. Our aim is to determine the correctness of the opinion that the Ottoman Empire adopted the Ash’arism based on the reading of Ash’arian kalâm books in the Ottoman madrasahs. The book of al-Taftâzânî named Sharḥ al-Aqâid is an important kalâm book that was read together with its postscripts in the (...) time of the Ottoman Empire. This book, in which the views of Omar al-Nasafī in his book named Aqâid is evaluated from the perspective of Ash’ari, is one of the important examples of the commentary and postscript period. In this book, al-Taftâzânî explained both the views of al-Nasafī, who adopted the school of Mâturidism, and his own evaluations together. This structure of the book led to the writing of postscripts and to discuss the views of the two theological schools of Ahl al-Sunnah through this book. In this study, the postscripts written by the Ottoman period famous kalâm scholars such as Ahmad b. Mûsâ al-Khayâlî (875/1470), Muṣliḥ al-dîn Moṣtafâ al-Kastalî (901/1496) and Ramaḍân b. Moḥammad (1017/1608) on the views of al-Taftâzânî were examined. In order to understand the views of al-Khayâlî, the postscripts of Ḳûl (or Ḳavl) Aḥmad b. Ḫıżır al-Kâzarûnî (950/1543) and Abd al-Ḥakîm al-Siyâlkûtî (1067/1657) are also included. (shrink)

This article examines the development and critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. There are two basic positions on analogical arguments: one holds that if analogical arguments yield certainty, then they are analyzable as deductive inferences, rendering the analogy itself redundant. Proponents of this view thus hold that if the analogy is useful at all, it will never yield the certainty demanded in the rational sciences; another holds that the analogy remains useful even when the argument is deductively (...) sound, either because the universal premise is epistemically dependent on the source case, or, because the source case is useful in dialectical contexts. The exploration of these themes will center around Juwaynī’s formalization and subsequent critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. (shrink)

Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī al-Maḥbūbī (d. 747/1346) was the last major Māturīdī theologian of Transoxania. As he left no work of rational theology (kalām) proper, one of the chief sources of his theological thought is his book on legal theory, al-Tawḍīḥ fī ḥall ghawāmiḍ al-Tanqīḥ. Because the work served as a prominent reference for both legal theory and rational theol­ogy, an extensive commentary tradition on it emerged as it was transmitted from Transoxania to South Asia, Anatolia, and the Arab world. (...) A distinctive subfield of this commentary tradition consisted of glosses devoted exclusively to one specific section of al-Tawḍīḥ. Revolving around the nature of good and evil, and intimately linked to the question of human free will, this part of Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa’s text came to be treated as a separate work, commonly referred to as al-Muqaddimāt al-arbaʿ (“The four pro­legomena”). Due to its role as a highly sophisticated refutation of late Ashʿarī doctrine on human volition, al-Muqaddimāt al-arbaʿ eventually developed into a prime source for later Māturīdī scholars in their discussion of human volition and related topics. (shrink)

This book offers a discussion of the kalām cosmological argument, and presents a defence of a version of that argument after critically evaluating three of the most important versions of the argument. It argues that, since the versions of the kalām cosmological argument defended by Philoponus (c. 490–c. 570), al-Ghazālī (1058– 1111), and the contemporary philosopher, William Lane Craig, all deny the possibility of the existence of an actual infinite, these arguments are incompatible with Platonism and the view (...) that God foreknows an endless future. This conclusion, however, is not a problem for the proponents of the kalām cosmological argument, for the book shows how the argument can be defended without denying the possibility of the actual infinite. -/- In order to offer a comprehensive analysis of Philoponus and al-Ghazālī’s cosmological arguments, the book draws on recent English translations of some of their works. Next, the book advances a detailed argument against the popular argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite. Finally, the book offers a unique defence of the kalām cosmological argument by defending philosophical arguments for a beginning of time that do not deny the actual infinite, evaluating which hypothesis best explains the discoveries of modern cosmology, and offering an argument in support of the premise that, if the universe came into existence, then God brought it into existence. (shrink)

Light is a discursive tool that Sufis have drawn upon over the centuries in order to elucidate systems of thought and practice. In medieval Islamic thought, light was closely associated with the soul as well as conceptions of sight and the eye. It also occupied an important place in cosmology. By the twelfth- and thirteenth-centuries, Sufis began to consider notions of light more systematically, creating close correspondences between vision, cosmology, and anthropology within Sufi thought. This coincided with the increased production (...) of complex diagrams in Sufi texts. This article shows that these developments were interrelated. By analyzing Shams al-Dīn al-Daylamī’s diagrams alongside his theories of light with respect to the nature of the soul and body, it demonstrates that the theory of the soul as light played an important part in shaping Sufi thought, practice, and visual culture. (shrink)

In some works of Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), there is a discourse related to the claim that textual evidence produces uncertainty. This claim was put forward as a theory based on approximately eleven premises although this number varies in some of his works. According to this theory, textual evidences are not convenient for drawing definite conclusions about the meanings indicated by these evidences due to the situations which is caused by (ⅰ) the language itself and (ⅱ) the use of (...) the speaker of the language and (ⅲ) understanding of listener respectively. There is an additional phrase “This claim is not valid absolutely” in some of the works that mention this theory. Even though that is the case, this addition is not enough -at first glance- to solve the problem. If the problem of the uncertanity of textual evidence, which was put forward systematically for the first time by Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī as far as is known, is accepted in the borad sense it might cause some critical problems concerning the science of Kalām. The most important one among these problems can be presented in this way: In the science of Kalām, it is claimed that the certain (yakīnī) propositios and certain evidences are used in the issues that Kalām deals with and substantiates. On the other hand, the true narrative (al-khabar al-sādiq) is counted as one of the sources of knowledge in this science. The true narrative has subsections in the form of narratives transmitted from so many groups of people that are almost impossible to agree on a lie. Because all of these have reached us by way of words and narration, the issue of the uncertanity of textual evidence renders these subsections problematic. Consequently, one of the sources of knowledge in the science of Kalām happens to lose its reliability. In the present work, the following problem is analyzed: The problem of the uncertanity of textual evidence in that it causes one fundamental source of knowledge to be eliminated in the science of Kalām. [In the present paper] Two solutions will be offered to solve the problem: (a) Questioning how the issue was discussed after Rāzī and how Rāzī was understood, then showing which understanding is in accordance with Rāzī's statements. For, in order to reach the most accurate conclusion about a problem, how the issue is understood and explained in the historical process has a very important position. To solve a problem regarding a scholar like Rāzī, who left many works that must be examined from a holistic point of view, it is extremely important to consider first-hand his students, close followers and critics. (b) Showing the field and issues in which the textual evidence can be used epistemologically" through "the tripartite division of the issues whose knowledge is sought to be attained, as known only by reason, known only by transplantation, and known by both" in Kalām. Because the division of the issues according to the ways and sources of knowledge will reveal which information sources can be used in what kind of issues and where they will pose a problem when used. Accordingly, the power or consistency of an information source should be examined through issues that are not objectionable in their epistemological use. The aim of this study is to solve the problem in two ways to have been mentioned. (shrink)

Though, the tradition of Muslim religious-scientific work in the Indian Subcontinent can be traced back to 12th century, especially Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, Shaykh Abd al-Haqq Muhaddith Dihlawī, Shaykh Abdur Rahim and Shah Waliullah are the most important figures of 18th century and later. Examined carefully the works on aqaid and ‘ilm al-kalām written by these scholars of Sunni tradition, in the light of the method adopted by them, it is seen that they are either regarded as traditionalist, modernist or (...) rationalist. Meanwhile, Shiism, which was already present in the Subcontinent since the rise of the Safavid Dynasty with scholars from Ithnā ‘Ashariyah (Twelver Shiites) and Ismā‘ilīyah, is also influential in the region with their thoughts and works. Similarly, considering the works of later Shiite scholars, it can be said that some are considered to have a traditionalist perspective while others to have modernist. Apart from all these, Qādiyānīs, except Lahor branch, took also place in the history of Indian Subcontinent thought as a heretic formation within the Islamic tradition. The aim of this study which was prepared via the data obtained by the support of Erciyes University Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit under grant number 8217 is to present a bibliographical survey of the works on aqâid and ‘ilm al-kalām focusing on the development of Islamic thought in the Indian Subcontinent, especially after Shah Waliullah. (shrink)

The Ismāilī/Bātinī movement was criticized by early Ahl al-Sunnah kalam schools on different matters, one of which is the angel belief that is also related to other principles of faith. However, the issue of angels was not a direct subject of criticism; instead, it was mostly discussed in connection with related matters such as prophethood and the afterlife. On that note, the Ismāilī/Bātinī teaching, due to their views on prophethood and the afterlife, was accused of denying angels by some Ash‘arī (...) mutakallims. While Hanafī-Māturīdī kalam scholars found faults with the same points, they did not make such an accusation. Moreover, pointing out as the source of the opinions above to philosophers increased the merit of these criticisms. In the present study, after alluding to the claims and the accusations of the parties concerned, the matter of angels will be discussed in relation to prophethood and the afterlife from the viewpoint of the Ismāilī/Bātinī teaching. While doing so, their own works will be consulted. Subsequently, the criticisms of Ahl al-Sunnah will be compared with the views of the Ismāilī/Bātinī doctrine concerning the issue of angels. Also, the significance and value of different viewpoints put forward by the related schools of thought will be presented in terms of the consequences of those views. (shrink)

This article examines the development and critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. There are two basic positions on analogical arguments: (i) one holds that if analogical arguments yield certainty, then they are analyzable as deductive inferences, rendering the analogy itself redundant. Proponents of this view thus hold that if the analogy is useful at all, it will never yield the certainty demanded in the rational sciences; (ii) another holds that the analogy remains useful even when the argument (...) is deductively sound, either because the universal premise is epistemically dependent on the source case, or, because the source case is useful in dialectical contexts. The exploration of these themes will center around Juwaynī’s formalization and subsequent critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. (shrink)

The first part of this article presents al-Mustamlī al-Buḫārī and his work, a voluminous commentary on al-Kalābāḏī’s compendium of Sufi doctrines, al-Ta‘rruf limaḏhab al-taṣawwuf. Both al-Kalābāḏī and al-Mustamlī had strong tendencies to the discussions of kalām, and of the two al-Mustamlī wrote extensively on theological issues in his commentary, Šarḥ al-Ta‘arruf. In light of the presence of topics of kalām in al-Mustamlī’s book, this article will demonstrate that despite his geographical proximity to Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī’s theological school, al-Mustamlī (...) was probably a follower of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Aš‘arī. The second part of the article concerns al-Mustamlī’s discussion of the nature of spirit. It will be argued that in dealing with the nature of the spirit, al-Mustamlī goes beyond the physicalist anthropology of the kalām and presents an argument for the existence of the spirit that has some affinities with Avicenna's proof of the existence of human rational soul, as it appears in the context of his famous thought experiment, the “flying man”. In both parts, the main claim of this article is that al-Mustamlī’s book is a valuable source for understanding the intellectual history of Transoxiana, and the intricate interactions of different disciplines, kalām, falsafa, taṣawwuf with each other. (shrink)

One of the issues covered by Muʿtazila’s idea of justice is the subject of the imposition of moral obligation (taklīf). The concept of the obligation (taklīf), which expresses that God imposes some difficult acts on His servants and asks them to fulfill them, is important because it explains God’s justice for His servants and His wisdom in creating them. For this reason, the main emphasis in the matter of imposition has been on the veneration of the servants and rendering benefits (...) to them in return for imposition. As a matter of fact, God offers His servants such a reward that it is not possible to achieve with anything other than obligation. This article presents examples of hypothetical obligations emphasizing the same issue. Al-taklīf al-zāid is an additional imposition period meaning that God does not end the life that he determines for the morally obliged (mukallaf), but prolongs the life of the servant in such a way that changes the result of his imposition. In Muʿtazilite thought, the issue of the additional imposition basically takes place in the form of two separate discussions about unbeliever and believer. While the additional imposition of the unbeliever deals with the situation of the unbeliever who is known to believe when his imposition (or life) is prolonged; the additional imposition of believer deals with the situation of the believer who is known to disbelieve when his imposition (or life) is prolonged. Abū ʿAli thinks that it is obligatory (wajib) for God to keep this unbeliever alive when it is known that he would come to believe if He did not kill him and his imposition had been prolonged. His argument in this regard is his thought that the additional imposition is a favour (lutf) for the unbeliever to believe. Abū Hāshim, on the other hand, says that it is not obligatory for God to prolong the imposition of unbeliever in such a situation, and that it would be good (hasan) to kill the unbeliever, even though it is known that he would have believed if his imposition had been prolonged. Because, according to Abū Hāshim, God already gave the unbeliever the opportunity to attain rewards in his first imposition. The unbeliever reached this end because he made a wrong choice in his imposition and it cannot be obligatory for God to re-present the circumstances that will change this outcome. According to him, the additional imposition of an unbeliever is not a favour (lutf), but it is like the enabling to act (tamkīn) and is not obligatory. As for the additional imposition of a believer, Abū ʿAli, Abū Hāshim and the Bahshamites agree that it is good to prolong the imposition of the believer who is known to be an unbeliever if his imposition was prolonged. The reason for their view is that God has endowed the servant with a reward, which would otherwise be unattainable, in return for the prolonged imposition. However, the Husaynites believe that prolonging the imposition of believer in this situation would not be good. Because the believer deserves a reward for his first imposition and in this case, his additional imposition will be a corruption (mafsada) for him. As a result of these different views, when we look generally, it is seen that the main concern in Muʿtazilite thought is to make the most appropriate decision for the benefit of the servant in all the impositions that God has imposed and is likely to impose. The Bahshamites have always prioritized offering more rewards to the servant. However, Abū ʿAli regarding the additional imposition of the unbeliever, and the Husaynites regarding the additional imposition of believer, prioritized the imposition’s resulting in belief, and they thought that it was more suitable for the benefit of the servant. Since the purpose of the imposition in Muʿtazilite thought is to provide the opportunity to attain the degrees that it could never been reached in any other way, regardless of the outcome, it should be said that the views of the Bahshamites on both additional obligations are more consistent within the general system of Muʿtazila. (shrink)

One of the fundamental debates that theologians have held to discuss the possibility of and to facilitate understanding of the bodily resurrection is iʿādat al-maʿdūm; that is, the restoration of the non-existent. Despite some differences in their perspectives, theologians, including the Muʿtazilites, have considered iʿādat al-maʿdūm possible. Avicenna, who opposed the classical views of theologians by rejecting iʿādat al-maʿdūm, provoked a new discussion and fuelled controversy about this issue. Later Islamic philosophers and theologians who were influenced by him took his (...) path and reformulated his arguments about the impossibility of iʿādat al-maʿdūm. Likewise, the theologians of the mutaʾakhkhirūn period, who defended the possibility of iʿādat al-maʿdūm, in support of the classical view, voiced new criticisms against these recontructed arguments. Thus, the debate turned into a highly controversial issue between Islamic philosophers and theologians. In fact, unlike the theologians who included the issue of iʿādat al-maʿdūm in the subsections of the samʿiyyāt chapters as an extension of the resurrection debates, Islamic philosophers did not consider it possible and preferred to address it under the subheadings of the umūr al-āmma chapters on existence and non-existence, in which metaphysical issues were discussed. This is because Avicenna considered iʿādat al-maʿdūm a metaphysical issue related to non-existence. On the one hand, some philosophers, who considered iʿādat al-maʿdūm impossible, deployed the new argument that things that existed and then disappeared could not be recreated in the same way. On the other hand, others expressed their criticisms against these arguments in the disputatious style (jadali) and tried to defend the restoration of the non-existent in the same way. Therefore, the theologians who addressed these issues in their works helped answer the question of whether it is possible to recreate the non-existent. This is because the texts provided detailed and important information about the course of the debate, such as who rejects and accepts iʿādat al-maʿdūm, the background and context of the debate between philosophers and theologians, the proofs put forward for the rejection of recreation, the criticisms in response to these proofs, and the evidence put forward for recreation. Therefore, the present study aims to discuss the arguments for iʿādat al-maʿdūm; that is, whether maʿdūm can be recreated in the same way, and the criticisms against these arguments, which have become a subject of debate between theologians and philosophers. Avicenna’s ideas are also highlighted in the study as he is the source of the arguments for the impossibility of iʿādat al-maʿdūm. In terms of its scope, the present study is based on the major works of the prominent theologians of the mutaʾakhkhirūn period and the main commentaries written on these works. (shrink)

Scholars of kalām have divided the knowledge into two as qadīm (eternal) and hādith (temporal) and correlated "al-‘ilm al-hādith" with humanbeings. They never regarded eternal and temporal knowledge as two distinct types of knowledge, rather they established the framework that eternal knowledge encompasses temporal knowledge. According to this definition, all the knowledge voluntarily emanate from humans are parts of "al-‘ilm al-hādith". Fundamental disciplines have emerged by addressing the same subject-matter from different perspectives and by using different methods. However, as (...) the knowledge these disciplines has accumulated, they became autonomous forgetting the epistemological axis to which they belonged and their interdisciplinary paradigm-based divergence has deepened gradually, resulting an epistemological disruption. Every discipline by starting a process of forming their own "reality", this divergence between the disciplines have deepened paving the way for the stage of "differentiation". This negative network of interrrelational structure between the disciplines has also affected the human interactions causing an institutionalisation in that regard. Throughout history, kalām has always sought to ensure an integration between different disciplines; therefore, it is obliged to put forth the disadvantages that were formed or will be formed by epistemological disruptions using its normative language. Thus, this work deals theoretically with the possibility of kalām being an epistemological axis for this regard. (shrink)

The present article discusses the Department of Kalam, its foundation, academic structuring, philosophy, and contribution to religious thought at the national and international level since the establishment of Ankara University Faculty of Divinity. The process regarding the field of Kalam since the establishment of Ankara University Faculty of Divinity in 1949 has been studied over two historical periods. The first is the period from its being taught as a course under the Chair of the History of Islam and Sects during (...) the establishment of the Faculty of Divinity to 1974 when it turned into an independent chair, and the second is the process from 1974 to the present. Higher religious education was continued in the Faculty of Theology, established under the Istanbul Dārulfunūn, which was constructed in the western style instead of the madrasahs that were closed in accordance with the Law of Unification of Education (Tawhid Tadrisāt) adopted on March 3, 1924.The faculty in question was closed in 1933 due to the shortage of students. Until Ankara University Faculty of Theology, which started its teaching activities in November 1949, was opened, there was no higher religious education for 16 years in Turkey. During this time, the need for experts trained in the field of religion emerged. In order to meet this need, Ankara University Faculty of Theology was opened. In the newly opened faculty, it is aimed to train theologians with versatile knowledge and perspective by teaching philosophy, psychology, sociology, foreign languages, as well as teaching disciplines related to the field of theology. One of the chairs in the faculty’s academic structure opened for this purpose was the chair of History of Islam and Sects. In Ankara University Faculty of Theology, where the academic structuring was organized according to the chair system, the science of Kalam was taught as a course within the Chair of the History of Islam and Sects until 1974. Within this chair, the teachings of Principles of Islam, the history of Islamic sects, and Kalam lessons were carried out. The first instructor of the chair was Prof. Yusuf ZiyaYörükân. Although there were changes in the academic staff during the process, one of the important names that contributed to the field of kalam until 1974 was Muhammad Tavît al-Tanji. These scholars not only made significant contributions to the field of Kalam in terms of method and content with their own studies but also taught scholars to work in this field after them.The doctoral advisor of HüseyinAtay, who is the founder of the Kalam Chair/Department, is M. Tavît al-Tancî. In 1974, when HüseyinAtay became a professor, the Kalam course was separated from the Chair of Islam and Sects and gained the status of an independent chair. HüseyinAtay is the architect of the transformation of Kalam from a lecture to a chair.As a result of Atay’s efforts, being a theologian in Turkey has turned into an identity rather than being a member of an academic discipline. In the studies carried out by Yörükân, Tancî, Atay and the academicians taught by them in Ankara University Faculty of Theology Department of Kalam, the emphasis on the Quran and reason, the importance of critical thinking in the field of theology, the human-centered theological thought, the effort to find solutions to current problems, the researches on Mu‘tazila and Maturidism, the study and translation activities that are carried out to bring the classical theology to the present day come to the fore. In the essence of academic studies conducted within this framework, the importance of correctly determining the distinction between the divine and human in the analysis of religious thought is emphasized. In addition, it is aimed to give a perspective on the meaning and value of human life. In the Department of Kalam, where the human-centered understanding of kalam is systematically dealt with on the basis of individual, responsibility, and morality, the science of kalam is structured not only as a system of thought consisting of abstract fictions but a discipline that has the function of developing and gaining a perspective on what is happening around us and in the World. (shrink)

The concept of tawd (unity of God) is a central issue in Kalm model of discussion and the structure of John Damascene's (d. 750) De Fide Orthodoxa. Pines suggested that it may indicate the profound impact of Christian theology on Mum. Ulrich Rudolph adds two important pieces of evidence to the discussion: He analyzes Abtur al-Samarqandb al-Tawd and the Jacobite Moses bar-Kepha's (d. 903) introduction to his Hexaemeron, and argues that the structural and conceptual affinity between them actually indicates an (...) opposite direction of influence than the one suggested by Pines. According to Rudolph, the similarity of the two treatises shows they were written as an imitation of an older Mub al-Tawd, and second by suggesting an alternative assumption, which will strengthen Pines's theory regarding the development of the Kaltur and bar-Kepha, together with some fragments of earlier Jewish and Christian commentaries on Genesis, will rise the possibility that this model of discussion existed first in the Christian exegetical treatises assigned to Genesis and had already developed before it appeared in the Kalām works. (shrink)

In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali raised objections against the doctrine of the ‘philosophers’ on 20 specific points. In the first, and longest discussion, he examines and rebuts four of their proofs of the pre-eternity of the world—that is, that the universe as a whole had no beginning but extends perpetually into the past. Al-Ghazali rejects that doctrine. But his own position on the issue does not become clear until he discusses the philosophers’ ‘second proof.’ In this (...) paper, I will examine the relevant text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, in order to clarify the nature of Al-Ghazali’s position in relation to the second proof. I will explain why Al-Ghazali cannot adopt what I refer to as the ‘naïve’ theological position, according to which God temporally preceded the world. Instead, Al-Ghazali concurs with the philosophers that time is the measure of motion, but he asserts that time was created with the world, both having a beginning before which there was no time. God, on the other hand, is not temporally prior to the world, but neither is he simultaneous, as the second proof supposes. As timelessly eternal, God bears no temporal relation to the world at all. In conclusion, I describe what I refer to as a naïve philosophical position, which is entailed by the second proof, but distinct from both Al-Ghazali’s position and that adopted by Ibn Rushd in his critique of Al-Ghazali in the Incoherence of the Incoherence. I argue that this naïve philosophical position is incoherent. (shrink)

The common periodisation in Ash‘ari kalām is Ibn Khaldun's distinction between the early and late periods over al-Ghazālī. Although some consider this as an artificial and unrealistic periodisation, we do not think so. For, it is not possible to understand and make sense of the logic and necessity of periodisation without knowing what exactly distinguishes these periods from each other and what kind of great differences and changes occurred in the latter period. The most important factor that distinguishes the (...) theological activities of the two periods is undoubtedly the Peripatetic philosophy that left its mark on the second period. The direct relationship established by the Ash‘ari theologians of the late period with philosophy has been the source of many changes in theology. These changes have manifested themselves in many areas from the understanding of method in theology to the theory of definition, from the use of evidence to the theories of nature, intellect and soul, most importantly from the notion of the Omnipotent God (al-Fā‘il al-Mukhtār) to the metaphysics of possibility-necessity, and from the cosmology of substance-accident to al-umūr al-‘āmma as the main subject-matter of metaphysics. Finally, the changes in the process that started with al-Ghazālī and evolved with Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī brought theology to the brink of philosophization, and at the end of the process, theology turned into a universal (metaphysical) discipline. This situation naturally led to a convergence between the metaphysical thought and theological thought. It is one thing to say that theology is the most honourable and supreme science, and it is another to reveal that it is universal. In this context, al-Ghazālī declared and substituted the Islamic theology as a religious universal discipline for the first time. Actually, this substitution has a hidden philosophical/metaphysical meaning and message. Al-Ghazālī 's characterisation of theology as a universal science can also be interpreted as a challenge to both the sciences of the field it belongs to and the sciences outside itself, with its disciplinary encompassing and priority for theology. It should not be forgotten that theology, while confronting and coming to terms with philosophy and metaphysics, integrating with the subjects it has taken into the field of study, on the other hand, it has to maintain and protect the religious character it belongs to and represents. (shrink)

A commentary on al-Yazdī's gloss on al-Taftāzānī's Tahdhīb al-manṭiq wa-al-kalām; logic, Arabic logic; early works to 1800.

This study contains a critical edition of Ibn al-Jawzī’s Kitāb Akhbār as-Sifāt along with an annotated translation and introduction. KAS is primarily a critique of anthropomorphic conceptions of God, directed against fellow Hanbalis and traditionalists generally. It sheds important new light on the intellectual fault-lines within medieval Hanbalism, and reveals the extent to which kalām had penetrated the school by the 12th century.

This article tries to show that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, one of Ash‘arī theologians of the contracting period, showed a Mu‘tazila tendency regarding the ontic value of divine attributes and his successors followed him in this regard. The problem of divine attributes, a heated discussion area of theology, has been interpreted differently by the theological sects over centuries. Mu‘tazila scholars before Abu Hāshim al-Jubbāī regarded those attributes as nominally attributed to God. For the first time, with Abu Hāshim, this relation was (...) approached with a realistic attitude: Although divine attributes are not accepted as particular realities, they are viewed as states/ahwāl, the universal model of kalam atomism. The pre-Gazzālī Ash‘arī theologians, on the other hand, ascribed real existence to divine attributes as particular properties, whether they adopted this universal model or not. According to Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, the founder of Ashʿarism, which does not include the universal category in any way, the attributes carried by God’s essence consist of particular qualities. al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, who, like Abu Hāshim, made room for universals under the name of states, accepted particular qualities that led to universal attributes in a system compatible with Ashʿarism. Muta’akhkhirūn Ash‘arī theologians, building their thought system within the framework of the particular-universal dichotomy, felt the need to apply the theories of universals and predication to overcome the paradox caused by the famous motto “Attributes are neither Him nor other than Him”. On the basis of universal properties that have a lower degree of existence compared to particular properties, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s theory of particular attributes is intended to be associated with Abu Hāshim’s theory of universal (state). In this context, the value of divine attributes discussed on the ontic ground by the mutaqaddimūn theologians was drawn to the epistemic ground in the muta’akhkhirūn period. From the first kalām works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to the last kalām works, he was distant from the ontic value of divine attributes. The statement that the derived word “knower”, which is appropriate for being a predicate in the propositional structure, and the infinitive “knowledge”, which is not appropriate for being a predicate, meet the same purpose, and that divine attributes are considered divine essence are the most important indications of this distance. Reviewing the works of prominent theologians, scholars of the time such as Fakhr al- Dīn al-Rāzī, Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, Sa‘d al-dīn al-Taftāzānī, al-Jurjānī, and al-Dawānī, this article aims to demonstrate that Abu Hāshim’s view of the divine attributes in the ontic context was welcomed and that the evaluation of divine attributes shifted from particular realities to universal ones in the ontic context. The meaning of “God is knower” proposition according to the pre-Mu‘tazila in the ontic context will be analyzed. Then, its meaning according to Ash‘arite theologians from their framework of universals, will be investigated. (shrink)

The matter of the soul has been one of the most important and central matters in the history of Islamic science and thought. For the soul constitutes one of the two elements that make up the human being, and the issue of the human being has undoubtedly been one of the most prominent matters in Islamic civilization and has been a major preoccupation for Islamic intellectuals. In this context, the Islamic basin of knowledge and thought has constructed two main definitions (...) of the soul, one based on the Qur’anic teachings and the other inspired by Ancient Greek philosophy. Theologians conceived of the soul as a “subtle body”. Philosophers, on the other hand, conceived it as an “abstract substance”. This dispute between kalām and philosophy over the soul has not only been confined to the physical realm, but has also extended to the eschatological dimension, leading to a polemic that has lasted for centuries. As with many issues in post-classical Islamic thought, the influence of philosophy on this issue has been seen to be greater than that of other traditions. In fact, in the aforementioned period and later on, works on the soul from a theological perspective could not bypass the philosophical perspective. Within this framework, the theological perspective criticized the philosophers because they disagreed with it and especially because one end of the issue extended to the eschatological axis, and found it important to refute their conceptions in this regard. One of the most prominent figures of the aforementioned period, i.e., post-classical Islamic science and thought, was Abū Muhammad Rukn al-Dīn Ubaydallāh b. Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Samarqandī (d. 701/1301), a member of the Māturīdī and Hanafī sects. Samarqandī wrote many works and treatises on kalām, Qur’anic sciences, tafsīr, fiqh, hadīth, and mysticism. Among the author’s works/risālas/treaties that have reached the present day, there is a work titled “Risālat al-rūḥ” on the humanitarian-nātik (speaking) rational human soul (al-rūh al-nātiq al-insānī). Comprising an introduction and ten chapters, al-Samarqandī used a theological and mystical style, drawing on the teachings of the Qur’ān on the one hand, and partly on rational arguments on the other. The work includes the subject of the soul and the essence of the human being in this context, the definition and essence of the soul, the comparison between the views of the Ahl al-Sunnah and the philosophers in this regard, and the criticisms against the philosophers, the issue of ma‘ād (the end) in eschatology, the thoughts of the Sufis on the soul, the perception of Allah through the saying “Whoever knows himself, knows his Lord”, which the author considered as a hadith, and similar issues. As a mutakallim and following the line of Ahl al-Sunnah, the main problem of al-Samarqandī’s treatise revolves around what should be understood when it comes to “human being”, the nature of the soul, the manner in which ma‘ād will be realized, and his criticisms of philosophers over these issues. Based on our research and studies, it has been observed that the aforementioned treatise has not yet been analyzed and published. Furthermore, two manuscript copies of the treatise in question were found as a result of our investigations. This study covers the critical edition and review of al-Samarqandī’s Risālat al-rūḥ. (shrink)

Few passages in Arabic philosophy have attracted as much attention as al-Ghazâlî's discussion of causality in the seventeenth discussion of Tahâfut al-Falsafa, along with the response of Ibn Rushd in his Tahâfut al-Tahâfut. A question often asked is to what extent al-Ghazâlî can be called an occasionalist; that is, whether he follows other Kalâm thinkers in restricting causal agency to God alone. What has not been thoroughly addressed in previous studies is a question which al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd both see (...) as decisive in the seventeenth discussion: what theory of causality is sufficient to explain human knowledge? In this paper I show that al-Ghazâlî's and Ibn Rushd's theories of causality are closely related to their epistemologies. The difference between the two thinkers can be briefly summerized as follows. For Ibn Rushd, the paradigm of human knowledge is demonstrative science; for al-Ghazâlî, in contrast, the paradigm of human knowledge is revelation. Yet both remain committed to the possibility of Aristotelian science and its underlying principles. Thus, I suggest that al-Ghazâlî's stance in the seventeenth discussion sheds light on his critique of philosophy in the Tahâfut: namely, philosophy is not inherently incoherent, but simply limited in scope. I also briefly compare this position to that of Thomas Aquinas, in order to place the view in a more familiar context. (shrink)

This article examines the role of scepticism in the Islamic philosophical tradition. It begins with a treatment of the origins and purpose of these discussions in classical kalām (c. 800–1100 CE). Then it moves on to the more mature discussions treating five forms of scepticism in the post‐classical period (c.1200–1800 CE), with the aim of demonstrating how they construed scepticism, the arguments for and against it, and what purposes scepticism played in their system. Three of these types of scepticism (...) are unrestricted, meaning that their denial of knowledge is universal. The other two types are restricted to a denial of inferential knowledge, either entirely, or in certain subjects such as metaphysics and natural philosophy. The discussion will focus on two of the most widely studied works of kalām: Saʿd al‐Din al‐Taftāzānī's Sharḥ al‐ʿAqāʾid al‐Nasafiyya and Jalāl al‐Dīn al‐Dawānī's Sharḥ al‐ʿAqāʾid al‐ʿAḍudiyya, including some of their super‐commentaries. (shrink)