This book has arisen out of lectures I gave in recent years at the Uni versities of Munich and Regensburg, and it is intended to serve as a textbook for courses in the Philosophy of Language. In my lectures I was able to presuppose that the students had taken an introductory course in logic. Some knowledge of logic will also be helpful in studying this book - as it is almost everywhere else in philosophy -, especially in Section 3. 2, (...) but it is no prerequisite. I would like to give my sincere thanks to Prof. Terrell for his excellent translation of the book, which is based on the second, revised and en larged German edition. Regensburg, May 1975 FRANZ VON KUTSCHERA INTRODUCTION Language has become one of philosophy's most important and pressing themes during this century. This preoccupation with language has its ori gins in the most diverse areas of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

As cause we often specify an event the occurrence of which first guaranteed that of the effect. This notion is explicated in a framework of branching worlds in Sections I to V. VI and VII point out its close relations to the concept of an agent's bringing about an event. The topic of the last two sections is the distinction between causes and necessary circumstances. For this purpose conditionals are used, interpreted with respect to branching worlds without a similarity relation (...) between them. (shrink)

Theorizing about something we tend to conceive of it as objective and admitting, in principle, of a clear-cut distinction between what it is in its own right and what we believe about it. Obviously this tendency gets us into trouble if we theorize about the mental, and it is the tenet of this paper that the temptation to objectify the mental is the main source of our notorious difficulties with it. Evidence is presented from a variety of fields, from set (...) theory, semantics and epistemology to doxastic logic. (shrink)

As cause we often specify an event the occurrence of which first guaranteed that of the effect. This notion is explicated in a framework of branching worlds in Sections I to V. VI and VII point out its close relations to the concept of an agent's bringing about an event. The topic of the last two sections is the distinction between causes and necessary circumstances. For this purpose conditionals are used, interpreted with respect to branching worlds without a similarity relation (...) between them. (shrink)

T × W logic is a combination of tense and modal logic for worlds or histories with the same time order. It is the basis for logics of causation, agency and conditionals, and therefore an important tool for philosophical logic. Semantically it has been defined, among others, by R. H. Thomason. Using an operator expressing truth in all worlds, first discussed by C. M. Di Maio and A. Zanardo, an axiomatization is given and its completeness proved via D. Gabbay’s irreflexivity (...) lemma. Given this lemma the proof is more or less straight forward. At the end an alternative axiomatization is sketched in which Di Maio’s and Zanardo’s operator is replaced by a version of “actually”. (shrink)

In der Diskussion metaethischer Fragen spielt das Humesche Gesetz eine wichtige Rolle, nach dem normative Aussagen, d.h. Aussagen über Gebote oder Werte, sich nicht aus deskriptiven Aussagen ableiten lassen. In dieser Arbeit wird das Gesetz präzise formuliert und bewiesen, und es wird seine Relevanz für eine Kritik naturalistischer ethischer Theorien erörtert.

Dieses Buch ist aus diesen Vorlesungen entstanden und wendet sichprimär an Studenten. Sein Ziel ist es, ihnen das Werk Freges zu erschließen und sie zum Studium der Originaltexte anzuregen.

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In der Diskussion metaethischer Fragen spielt das Humesche Gesetz eine wichtige Rolle, nach dem normative Aussagen, d.h. Aussagen über Gebote oder Werte, sich nicht aus deskriptiven Aussagen ableiten lassen. In dieser Arbeit wird das Gesetz präzise formuliert und bewiesen, und es wird seine Relevanz für eine Kritik naturalistischer ethischer Theorien erörtert.

The aim of the paper is to show that claims of supervenience of the mental upon the physical do not define substantial forms of materialism. While weak supervenience holds trivially, even strong supervenience does not justify a claim of identity, dependence or determination; it is only a relation between classifications of persons by psychological and physical properties.

To celebrate the 270th anniversary of the De Gruyter publishing house, the company is providing permanent open access to 270 selected treasures from the De Gruyter Book Archive. Titles will be made available to anyone, anywhere at any time that might be interested. The DGBA project seeks to digitize the entire backlist of titles published since 1749 to ensure that future generations have digital access to the high-quality primary sources that De Gruyter has published over the centuries.

Global supervenience of beliefs about physical states of affairs on such states has strongly counter-intuitive consequences about what beliefs we can nomologically hold. This is an argument against a global supervenience of all mental properties on physical ones, and, since that is implied by strong supervenience, also against that as the preferred materialist thesis.

Three main types of subjectivist ethics are distinguished and specified by the use of elementary game-theoretical notions. It will be argued that all these theories run into difficulties that cannot be overcome within the self-imposed limits of subjectivism.

T × W logic is a combination of tense and modal logic for worlds or histories with the same time order. It is the basis for logics of causation, agency and conditionals, and therefore an important tool for philosophical logic. Semantically it has been defined, among others, by R. H. Thomason. Using an operator expressing truth in all worlds, first discussed by C. M. Di Maio and A. Zanardo, an axiomatization is given and its completeness proved via D. Gabbay’s irreflexivity (...) lemma. Given this lemma the proof is more or less straight forward. At the end an alternative axiomatization is sketched in which Di Maio’s and Zanardo’s operator is replaced by a version of “actually”. (shrink)

Two criteria, one for distributive and one for commutative justice are formulated, the latter applying to cases of free cooperation. Both criteria follow Aristotle's idea of proportional equality which in the first case is equality in the fulfillment of legitimate claims, in the second case equality of the gains derived from cooperation. The theory of social welfare functions is employed in the definition of the two criteria, but such functions are applied only to morally or legally justified interests. A theory (...) of justice only has to say how to satisfy conflicting legitimate claims, it is argued, but not what interests are justified in some given context. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is an analysis of events in the framework of intensional logic. Events are constmed as special propositions, generalizing the ideas of Montague and D. Lewis, or equivalently as sets of world segments in which they occur. The main problem of such a propositional analysis is to account for coarse grained events as referred to by nominalizations like „the murder of Caesar". The idea is: This event is the set of all those world segments in which (...) Caesar is murdered in the same way and under the same circumstances as in the real world. Sameness has to be restricted to a set of prcperties if occurences of this event in other worlds are to be possible. Since in natural language the reference of event nominalizations depends on the context, the proposal is to relativize coarse grained events on sets of contextually relevant properties. (shrink)