Subjective preferences, rationality, and justice

Erkenntnis 11 (1):97-111 (1977)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Three main types of subjectivist ethics are distinguished and specified by the use of elementary game-theoretical notions. It will be argued that all these theories run into difficulties that cannot be overcome within the self-imposed limits of subjectivism.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/bf00169846

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,590

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Subjective Preferences, Rationality, and Justice.Franz Von Kutschera - 1977 - Erkenntnis 11 (1):97 - 111.
Franz Brentano's Epistemology for Ethics.Lawrence J. M. Wilt - 1980 - Dissertation, Indiana University
Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):767-788.
An argument against ethical subjectivism.Mark M. H. Tan - 2015 - Think 14 (41):69-72.
Meta-ethics and the mortality: Mortality salience leads people to adopt a less subjectivist morality.Onurcan Yilmaz & Hasan G. Bahçekapili - 2018 - Cognition 179 (C):171-177.
Historical Types of Scientific Rationality.Vyacheslav S. Stepin - 2015 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 53 (2):168-180.
Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.
Where do the limits of experience lie? Abandoning the dualism of objectivity and subjectivity.Christian Greiffenhagen & Wes Sharrock - 2008 - History of the Human Sciences 21 (3):70-93.
Love is not enough: Other-regarding preferences cannot explain payoff dominance in game theory.Andrew M. Colman - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):22-23.
Sufficiency and Sustainability: Conceptual Analysis and Ethical Considerations for Sustainable Organisation.Tommi Lehtonen & Pasi Heikkurinen - 2022 - Environmental Values 31 (5):599-618.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
19 (#190,912)

6 months
19 (#786,843)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references